Radicalisation and Violent Extremism: Causes and Responses

by Chris Angus

1. Introduction

The radicalisation of Australian citizens, and the decision by a small number to commit acts of extremist violence, has led to considerable community concern in recent years.

In NSW, there was the tragic December 2014 Martin Place Lindt Café siege and the October 2015 murder of a police civilian finance worker outside the NSW Police Force headquarters.2

On a global scale, radicalisation and extremism have led Australians to travel to conflict zones to fight in foreign wars. A recent report in the *Australian Police Journal* estimated that up to 250 Australian jihadists took part in the conflict in Syria in 2014. This number is both numerically and proportionally greater than the number of foreign fighters from other nations, including the United States, the Netherlands and several Scandinavian countries.3

This e-brief does not purport to be a comprehensive account of all the literature in this expanding area of study. Rather, it seeks only to offer an introduction to this complex subject. One focus is on government counter-radicalisation programs and commentaries on these. The e-brief begins by defining radicalisation and violent extremism, which share certain common elements but are also different in important respects.

2. The difference between radicalisation and violent extremism

The Australian Government’s September 2015 *Living Safe Together* awareness kit defines radicalisation as follows:

Radicalisation happens when a person’s thinking and behaviour become significantly different from how most of the members of their society and community view social issues and participate politically. Only small numbers of people radicalise and they can be from a diverse range of ethnic, national, political and religious groups.4
It should be emphasised that becoming radicalised does not automatically mean that a person is engaging, or will engage, in violent or dangerous behaviour. While someone with radical beliefs may seek to substantially transform the nature of society and government, in most instances their behaviour does not pose a danger to the Australian community. In fact, radical viewpoints may even benefit society, as noted by *Living Safe Together*:

Some movements advocate and attempt to implement positive, non-violent attitudes and actions to change politics and society. For example, the suffragettes who struggled to get the right to vote for women in the early twentieth-century can be seen as a radical movement and those involved would have gone through a process of radicalisation to come to these beliefs. Groups that advocate such attitudes often offer a challenge to conventional understanding that can radically transform a country’s social and political landscape.\(^5\)

In contrast, violent extremism occurs when “a person or group decides that fear, terror and violence are justified to achieve ideological, political or social change, and acts accordingly”. Violent extremism is an extension of radicalisation from a relatively benign expression of a viewpoint to the use of violence to achieve a particular goal.\(^6\)

In short, radical individuals may hold hateful or anti-social ideas that many others might find offensive or disturbing. Nevertheless, if their ideas do not extend to using violence or advocating the use of violence, they should not be considered violent extremists.\(^7\)

The *Living Safe Together* program lists three broad categories of violent extremism: ideological, issue-based, and ethno-nationalist/separatist.\(^8\) These are discussed in turn below.

### 2.1 Ideological extremism

Ideological extremism is generally nationalistic/political or religious in nature. With regard to nationalism, *Living Safe Together* notes that there are several extreme nationalist groups in Australia, some of which promote neo-Nazi type beliefs. Examples of religious extremists include certain Islamist groups and Christian fundamentalists, such as Peter James Knight, who murdered one person in an attack on an abortion clinic in 2001.\(^9\)

At an international level, the Southern Poverty Law Centre provides an extensive list of “major terrorist plots and racist rampages” committed by radical right-wing religious or political individuals and groups in the US since 1995.\(^10\)

A 2015 case study by UK counter-extremist think tank Quilliam compared far-right wing extremists with Islamist extremists, and highlighted some distinctions between these two groups:

Far-right individuals or groups tend to aggressively defend national culture and history, even liberty and democracy. They have an authoritative concept of the state, in which the state and the people, all of which are ethnically homogenous, should merge into a single unit.

...
Islamism is a desire to impose any given interpretation of Islam over society and it is viewed by its adherents as a comprehensive ideology. “Its proponents believe that Islam must be placed at the centre of an individual’s identity, as either the overriding or the only source of that identity. The Islamist outlook is one that essentially divides the world into two distinct spheres: ‘Muslims’ and the ‘rest’.”

However, these two groups share a number of key similarities:
- Both groups tend to:
  - justify the use of violence over persuasion;
  - prefer uniformity over diversity;
  - have collective goals over individual freedom; and
  - give orders instead of using dialogue.

Political and religious ideologies are not mutually exclusive, and can intertwine in a radicalised or extremist framework. According to Living Safe Together, religious violence, although justified using interpretations of traditional religious texts and teachings, or guidance from influential people, can nevertheless be politically motivated at its core.

2.2 Issue-based extremism

Issue-based violent extremism is grounded on a specific issue or cause. While issue-based activism may be disruptive, it is generally peaceful and used to draw attention to that issue. However, violence, threatening behaviour and/or criminal damage is sometimes advocated by people who want to take their cause a step further.

Issue-based extremism can include animal liberation, environmental activism or anti-gun control. A 2013 report by the US Congressional Research Service lists several examples of such extremism, including animal rights extremists and eco-terrorist groups that were responsible for at least 25 criminal incidents in the US during the late 1990s and early 2000s, totalling approximately US$48 million in damages.

2.3 Ethno-nationalist or separatist extremism

Ethno-nationalist/separatist extremism involves the actions of groups or individuals involved in violent political or independence struggles based on race, culture or ethnic background. Living Safe Together comments that ethno-nationalist or separatist violent extremist groups have included the Basque separatist group ETA, the former Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, and Australians who travelled to the former Yugoslavia to engage in conflict in the 1990s.

Recently, a number of Australians have travelled to Syria and Northern Iraq to help Kurdish separatists in the conflict against Islamic State (ISIS) and other regional actors. Notably, some of these separatists, although fighting against ISIS, are considered terrorist groups under Australian law. As such, Australians involved with these groups are also breaching domestic law. However, there have been calls for the Australian Government to grant amnesty to Australians fighting with these groups, indicating possible uncertainty over which conflicts may involve extremism and which conflicts do not.
3. Causes of radicalisation and violent extremism

Experts and authorities have identified a diverse range of factors and motivations that can influence a person to become radicalised, and from there possibly commit extremist violence. While the list of possible causes is extensive, several key factors are discussed in this paper, as well as a number of academic models designed to try and map the radicalisation process.

3.1 Radical ideology, limited understanding

*Living Safe Together* contends that the presence of a strict and literal understanding of a given ideological belief is a key factor in a person resorting to violent extremism.\(^{19}\) Quilliam expanded on this, noting that such views can be reinforced and exacerbated through the internet:

> The use of the Internet to consume propagandist content, or disseminate messages indicates that social media sites in particular are often exploited to reaffirm an extremist position discovered offline.\(^{20}\)

Critically though, despite the tendency of radicalised individuals to subscribe to extreme ideologies, several experts note that many of these individuals have limited understanding of their own ideological position.

In Australia, *Living Safe Together* reported that people who radicalise and promote violence often do not have a genuine understanding of the ideology they claim to represent.\(^{21}\) This view was mirrored in the UK House of Commons Home Affairs Committee 2012 inquiry into violent radicalisation, which cited the following evidence:

> Genuine theology also appeared to play a very limited role: Alyas Karmani noted that the Islamic understanding of individuals at risk of radicalisation seen by his organisation, STREET, “equated to a primary school level”.\(^{22}\)

In relation to this issue, a 2013 Victoria University study of 542 respondents from government and Muslim and non-Muslim communities found that many participants were concerned that there was deliberate misleading of religious followers, either through ignorance or lack of education, in order to promote a variety of “political Islam”.\(^{23}\)

Reviewing extremism more broadly, Quilliam commented that this lack of understanding was likely due to “the absence of critical thinking and digital literacy skills”, with participants consuming and regurgitating material without critically engaging with underlying arguments.\(^{24}\)

3.2 Personal relationships and influence

*Living Safe Together* commented that the influence of personal and social relationships is another key factor in driving radicalisation and extremism. These relationships can occur face-to-face, or through other media such as the internet:

> Many people join extremist groups for social reasons. In Australia, people are most vulnerable to involvement in violent extremism through the influence of close personal relationships. This is especially true for young people. … Radicalisation is most often led by personal face-to-face relationships, but there are some examples of people becoming involved in
radical groups through the internet. A person may become part of an online community of people who share their views and radicalise in a virtual environment.25

The UK’s Youth Justice Board conducted a systematic review of religious radicalisation and violent extremism in 2012. It referred to a study that identified possible benefits that a person can gain by being part of a radical group or movement, including:

- gaining rewards from membership of the group/movement (such as status, respect, and authority over other members)
- close social ties, having contact with people experiencing the same set of issues or having some involvement with terrorism through family or other associates.26

### 3.3 Identity and social exclusion

A number of studies have found that personal identity issues and wider problems of marginalisation, racism and social exclusion can act as a catalyst for radicalisation and, potentially, violent extremism. Victoria University’s 2013 study identified a broad range of personal and socio-cultural factors that may act as causes and drivers of radicalisation and extremism, which are reproduced in the following table:

**Table 1: Radicalisation and extremism – personal and socio-cultural factors**

| Personal and individual factors | For a very large number of participants, issues around identity and sense of belonging were seen as important underlying factors in helping drive people toward radicalisation and extremism. These included the implications of lack of belonging; the tensions of multiple cultural allegiances and loyalties; rebellion against family or community norms; the yearning for cultural and religious authenticity; and the need for approval and attention, particularly for those whose fractured self-esteem or sense of self-worth makes them strive to feel like a ‘somebody’ rather than a ‘nobody’. |
| Socio-cultural factors | The dominant perceived driver in this category was the broad domain of marginalisation, racism and social exclusion. This included the rejection or marginalisation of minority groups by mainstream society; the phenomenon of self-exclusion and insularity by minority groups from the mainstream in an effort to preserve a coherent cultural identity; and the corrosive experience of discrimination and racism in the community, particularly for Muslim- and African-background participants. |

Both the Youth Justice Board and Quilliam identified “emotional vulnerability” as a key risk factor that may predispose Muslim involvement in terrorism, including feelings of anger, alienation, disenfranchise, shame, guilt and vulnerability. These emotions may be exacerbated when linked to feelings of being culturally uprooted or displaced and searching for spiritual guidance, and often arise during times of transition where challenges, such as an identity crisis, enhance susceptibility to extremism.28

As an example of how such emotions arise, Quilliam noted that conspiratorial websites and sensationalist reporting by some media organisations inflated the sense of threat Muslims posed to the British
community. This leads to negative community perceptions towards the Muslim “other”, which in turn drives some Muslims deeper into radical ideology.  

However, the 2012 House of Commons Home Affairs Committee inquiry, while acknowledging that a sense of grievance was a clear driver of radicalisation, remained sceptical about the extent to which social exclusion causes violent extremism:

Arguments about social exclusion were not entirely convincing, given that 42% of offences were perpetrated by individuals either in employment or full-time education, and the recent Home Office research finding that individuals tend to have similar socio-economic status to the broader population in which they live.

This view was shared by political scientist Olivier Roy, who has argued that Muslim extremism in Western nations is symptomatic of a “generational nihilistic radicalized youth revolt” rather than issues of racism or social exclusion:

“In France, the second generation (whose parents emigrated from the Maghreb countries like Algeria and Morocco in the 1970s or after) are in revolt against everything their parents represent.

“They reproach them for not hav[ing] passed on ‘good’ Islam, for having become Westernized, for accepting their life as migrants slipping down the social ladder, and for not having revolted. They are living in a myth and are not political militants who want to create a new society.”

If racism and social exclusion were the factors that pushed young people towards violent radicalism, there would be tens of thousands of jihadists instead of the hundreds who have left France for Syria today, Roy says.

3.4 Perceived injustice for a person’s community

One additional driver of radicalisation is perceived frustrations and injustices committed against an individual’s community or group.

In relation to Muslim-background participants, Victoria University reported that the Israel-Palestine conflict and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq emerged as focal points for the capacity of radical and extremist groups to attract and maintain support. The Youth Justice Board made similar findings, commenting that identification with the suffering of Muslim victims globally could predispose a person to Islamic extremism.

Of course, perceptions of injustice are not exclusive to Muslims. The 2012 House of Commons Committee inquiry cited evidence from the UK Government that any radical individual “who distrust[s] Parliament” is at particular risk of engaging in violent extremism, even if this distrust is unfounded:

This appeared to be borne out in our inquiry, both in terms of Islamist and extreme far-right radicalisation. Individuals are frustrated because they feel unable to participate in the political process and feel that mainstream parties do not recognise their concerns. This may not be true and we stress that we are talking about perceptions.
3.5 Models of the radicalisation process

While myriad factors can lead a person to become radicalised or a violent extremist, the relationship between these factors and any given individual is difficult to analyse.

Experts believe that a combination of different factors can converge in a variety of ways to render an individual susceptible to radical ideology. As noted by the European Parliament in a 2014 paper on youth radicalisation, the key to understanding the process of radicalisation is to conduct:

… [an] analysis of the socio-political sequences of action and contexts, of interrelationships between social structures, political contexts and biographical exposure in which violence is embedded.\textsuperscript{35}

In response to this issue, a number of academic models have been developed to try and create a step-by-step outline of the radicalisation process, and possible factors that influence these individuals.\textsuperscript{36} However, these models can differ significantly in the stages involved in radicalisation. To highlight this, several example models are compared in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2: Models of the radicalisation process\textsuperscript{37}</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>The Prevent pyramid</strong></td>
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</table>
| **Sageman’s four-stage process**                             | A four stage model, but unlike the Prevent pyramid its stages or “prongs” are not necessarily sequential. The model’s four prongs are as follows:  
  • A sense of “moral outrage” (e.g. the killings of Muslims in Bosnia and Chechnya);  
  • A specific interpretation of the world (e.g. a “war against Islam”);  
  • Resonance with personal experiences (i.e. linking wider injustices with individual perceptions of everyday life, such as discrimination); and  
  • Mobilisation through networks, amplifying these existing grievances. |
| **“The staircase to terrorism”**                             | A sophisticated “multi-causal approach” to understanding suicide terrorism. The model involves six “floors”, with movement up each floor characterised by a particular psychological process:  
  • Ground floor: Psychological interpretation of material conditions;  
  • First floor: Perceived options to fight unfair treatment;  
  • Second floor: Displacement of aggression;  
  • Third floor: Moral engagement;  
  • Fourth floor: Categorical thinking and the perceived legitimacy of the terrorist organisation;  
  • Fifth floor: The terrorist act and sidestepping inhibitory mechanisms. |
| **McCauley and Moskalenko’s model**                          | This model involves twelve mechanisms of political radicalisation operating across three levels: that of the individual, the group, and the mass level: |
• Individual radicalisation:
  o Personal victimisation;
  o Political grievance;
  o Joining a radical group – the slippery slope;
  o Joining a radical group – group cohesion;
  o Extremity shift in like-minded groups;
• Group radicalisation:
  o Extreme cohesion under isolation and threat;
  o Competition for the same base of support;
  o Competition with state power;
  o Intra-group conflict;
• Mass radicalisation in conflict with an out-group:
  o Out-group threats leading to greater cohesion;
  o Dehumanisation and hate for “enemy”;  
  o Martyrdom;

Although these radicalisation models differ from one another, sometimes significantly, the Youth Justice Board nevertheless noted the following similarities:

Despite the identification of differing stages in the radicalisation process, all studies agree that there is a stage of individual change (for example, increase in religiosity, search for identity) that is enhanced through external aspects (for example, experienced discrimination or racism, or a perceived attack against Muslims such as the wars in Bosnia and Iraq), and a move to violent radicalisation, usually taking place when the individual socialises with like-minded people. These stages are not necessarily sequential, and they can also overlap, meaning that a person may skip a stage in reaching militant action or alternatively may become disillusioned at any given point and abandon the process altogether.38

3.6 The normality of extremist individuals

As shown above, many factors can contribute to radicalisation and violent extremism, and a range of radicalisation models have been created in an attempt to determine what steps individuals tend to take when becoming increasingly radicalised.

However, despite many of these causes and models analysed in significant detail, it remains extremely difficult to determine whether any particular factor acts as the primary influence on a person’s behaviour, let alone what steps are most (or least) likely to result in violent extremism.

For example, there is a tendency within the community to explain violent extremism as a symptom of mental health issues or a “terrorist personality”. However, while experts have acknowledged that mental health may play a role in some extremists,39 there is little evidence that these problems are a consistent factor in acts of violent extremism. The European Parliament commented further on this issue:

One pitfall of the conventional wisdom about radicalisation is to explain the process in terms of mental and social fragility, abnormality or irrationality. According to this view, terrorists are considered as lost individuals, cut out from the realities of the world, ruthless and driven by mental disorders. The scale of some very specific events (violent attacks, mass-murders) fuels the belief according to which extraordinary and horrific forms of violence are necessarily perpetrated by monstrous and fanatic individuals. However, the work of Martha Crenshaw (1986, 1992, 2000) and more recently the
research undertaken by Andrew Silke (2001, 2008) significantly challenge this narrow psycho-pathological view of the issue. These studies show that there is no evidence of a ‘terrorist personality’ or of ‘terrorist genetics’.  

Indeed, the European Parliament contended that “one of the common characteristic of terrorists is their normality”, and that “there is no such thing as a single or even prevalent set of motivations, driving radicalisation at the individual level”.  

This view is shared by the Youth Justice Board, which found “that Islamic radicalisation and terrorism emanate from a very heterogeneous population that varies markedly in terms of education, family background, socio-economic status and income”. Ultimately, “recent studies show that the common characteristic among Islamic extremists is just how normal they are.”

The wide range of personalities and factors involved in radicalisation make it challenging to determine: if a particular person is at risk of becoming (or has become) radicalised; the likelihood that they may engage in violent extremism in future; and, most importantly, their capacity to disengage before they commit violence.

4. The Australian response to radicalisation

Responses to radicalisation and violent extremism exist at both the State and Commonwealth levels. While there is a wide range of legislative responses to the threat of violent extremism, this paper focuses on programs that respond to radicalisation or violent extremism through education or community engagement.

Examples of recent policies and announcements in different jurisdictions are provided below, along with criticism of these strategies.

4.1 Commonwealth

Since the mid-2000s the Australian Government has had programs that counter the “use or support of violence to achieve ideological, religious or political goals.” According to the Living Safe Together website, the current Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Strategy supports broader counter-terrorism efforts by addressing factors that make people vulnerable to extremist influences and recruitment by terrorists.

The CVE Strategy has a number of objectives, which it seeks to achieve through the combined efforts of government agencies and community partners:

1. Identify and divert violent extremists and, where possible, support them in disengaging from violent extremism;
2. Identify and support at-risk groups and individuals to resist and reject violent extremist ideologies;
3. Build community cohesion and resilience to violent extremism;
4. Communicate effectively to challenge extremist messages and support alternative narratives; and
5. Communities, both through their own activities and in collaboration with government, play a vital role in achieving these objectives.

In line with these objectives, the Australian Government currently focuses on the following areas of activity:

Table 3: Activities under the Australian Government’s CVE strategy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of work</th>
<th>Activities</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identification and information sharing</td>
<td>Identifying violent extremist ideology at an early stage and sharing information and intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation, recruitment and containment</td>
<td>Understanding the motivations of recruits, methods of recruiters and containing the influence of violent extremist ideology.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Referral and support, diversion and rehabilitation</td>
<td>Establishing appropriate referral mechanisms for services that support individuals to choose non-violent forms of expression and participate in society.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Building community resistance to violent extremism by equipping communities with the skills and resources to understand and address extremism and reduce marginalisation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>Developing key messages that inform and empower communities to challenge extremist ideologies and support the non-violent expression of views. Encouraging the dissemination of counter-narratives, and providing appropriate communication channels for delivering them.</td>
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In terms of recent funding decisions, in August 2014 the Australian Government announced that it would provide $13.4 million in funding towards CVE programs. These programs included the Living Safe Together Grants Programme, which gave grants totalling $1.6 million to 34 community-based organisations to help divert individuals away from extreme ideologies.

However, the status of the Living Safe Together Grants Programme is unclear; the Australian Strategic Policy Institute reported that the Government only allocated funding for 2014-15, with no further funding rounds available in subsequent years.

In 2015 the Australian Government also announced that it would invest $22 million in programs designed to monitor and counter extremist material online. According to a media release from the Attorney-General: The new initiative will establish a social media monitoring and analysis capability to better understand extremist narratives and how they affect Australians. The measures will also help reduce access to extremist material online through the recently launched Report Online Extremism tool and by working with the Australian Communications and Media Authority, private sector and international partners to take down or otherwise address extremist content.

4.2 NSW

On 2 November 2015 Premier Mike Baird announced a $50 million suite of counter violent extremism (CVE) measures. Key measures are outlined in the table below:
Table 4: Countering violent extremism measures in NSW

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goal</th>
<th>Key policies</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support schools</td>
<td>• Provide additional training and support for the expanded school counsellor workforce the Government is providing NSW public schools.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Establish up to five Specialist School Support Teams to be deployed to identified schools and work with them to develop strategies based on their specific needs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Enhance the case management framework for supporting school children at risk of engaging in violent extremism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Build community resilience and cohesion</td>
<td>• Develop a comprehensive package of community cohesion programs as an early and important preventative strategy, including an $8 million fund for future initiatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Establish a Community Cohesion Ambassadors’ Program for community leaders to work with students in schools and the community to provide advice on the risks of violent extremism and the importance of community cohesion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support community</td>
<td>• Establish a support and advice telephone line and online services for community and family members to seek advice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Establish a training program for front-line NSW Government workers and establish broader capacity building programs for community organisations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensure coordination and best practice</td>
<td>• Establish a Premier’s CVE Expert Council of experts to provide advice on NSW approaches, including experts from the private, academic and non-government sectors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Appoint a new Director for CVE Programs in the Department of Premier and Cabinet, who will ensure coherence in implementation of this program of work.</td>
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These measures followed the announcement of a sweeping audit of prayer groups across the State school system in July 2015. The audit is to cover programs of all religions and will seek to gauge the scale of the problem facing the education system.52

4.3 Other States/Territories

In May 2015, the Victorian Government allocated $25 million over four years to enlist young role models to engage with people at risk of radicalisation, and to fund programs to tackle this issue:

Under the strategy, a taskforce led by Deputy Premier James Merlino will be established with ministers across four key portfolios – education, youth, multicultural affairs and police – along with an advisory group of community representatives. Both will identify and recruit young people who can reach out to disaffected youth, and devise information campaigns, education programs, or peer support that could be funded through the budget package.53

In June that same year, the Victorian Attorney-General announced that the Government was considering giving Victoria police powers to force people identified as potential terrorists into de-radicalisation programs, restrict who they associate with, and ban them from using the internet.54
Turning to Western Australia, it has been reported that the Government is developing an anti-radicalisation plan that will target children as well as adults.55 The WA Police Annual Report provided a brief summary as to how this strategy may be progressed:

[The agency is d]eveloping a local intervention framework with the Department of the Premier and Cabinet for countering violent extremism that will connect to the national intervention model. It is expected a state-based intervention model will be operational in the next financial year for the purposes of detecting and disrupting the radicalisation of people within the community.56

4.4 Criticism of Australian CVE programs

The primary criticism of existing CVE programs, as noted by a range of stakeholders, is that references to “homegrown” terrorism create a false concern that many, if not most, Muslims are likely to commit acts of violent extremism. This is detailed further by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute in its 2015 publication *Gen Y jihadists*:

… concerns have re-emerged with reports of Muslim youth leaving Australia to engage in jihad as foreign fighters. Video footage of some young Muslims fighting on behalf of [ISIS] has emerged—and been continuously discussed in the media—against the background of the government’s legislation and announcements of practical measures to deal with the problem. Research suggests that this has reinforced perceptions in some sections of Australia’s non-Muslim communities that Muslims are the ‘other’—they are perceived as not belonging.57

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute warned that anti-terrorism rhetoric risks convincing elements of the Muslim community that there is a deeply entrenched hostility towards them, while also causing non-Muslims to view the entire Muslim community as unreliable or even non-citizens. Consequently, these beliefs may impact future counter-radicalisation efforts by authorities:

It could be argued that the reactions of the Australian Muslim and non-Muslim communities partly reflect fear and concerns about personal and communal safety. But scepticism, a focus on exploring causes for the tendency among some Muslims to opt for terrorism-related activities, and the heightened media focus on the terrorist threat posed by some Muslim extremists run the risk of sending a message that could be subliminally internalised by some young non-Muslim Australians. This may also be creating disillusionment among some Muslims about being ‘othered’. In the long term, the current focus could emerge as a factor contributing to reduced communal harmony.58

These fears are shared by a number of Muslim community groups and individuals. The Lebanese Muslim Association was critical of the Commonwealth Attorney-General Department’s discourse on the causes of radicalisation, which it argued were outdated and marked by a dismissal of research and recommendations from the Muslim community:

There are many voices in the Muslim community which can articulate the problem and recommend solutions based on these root causes, but they are excluded. Clearly, to involve these voices would only constitute a concession that the government’s strategy has been flawed.
This, and other “consultations” are evidently just box-ticking exercises. Opportunities for these Departments to feel satisfied that they have “consulted” with the Muslim Community, without actually having done anything constructive.59

Other critics, such as the University of Sydney’s South Asia Study Group Coordinator Hussain Nadim, have argued that Muslim community leaders do not have adequate influence over at-risk youth, whether or not they promote government-supported counter-radicalisation strategies:

Not only are the Muslim community leaders no experts on the subject of radicalisation, but they are also distant from the younger generation of Muslims who undergo an identity crisis triggered internally by Australian society (which functions contrary to their beliefs) and externally by sophisticated propaganda which they digest over social media.

Opening up new Islamic institutes and publishing liberal Islamic texts has absolutely no measurable impact on radicalism – thick intellectual texts are not read by majority of the Muslim youth. And there is little evidence that Imams have much to do with growing radicalisation, given that groups like al Qaeda and ISIS tend to bypass structures and hierarchy to reach directly to recruits.60

Separately, Nadim has criticised the NSW Government’s CVE measures as poorly targeted and counterproductive:

"The entire idea and the entire issue of radicalisation, its roots are embedded in this very notion that kids, especially Muslim kids, feel isolated and aren't able to integrate and having these programs run at the school level will not help countering that, it will only allow further isolation and further radicalisation of kids at the high school level."

Mr Nadim says he was surprised to read that only $7 million of the funding will go directly to training school staff in identifying so-called "at risk" students.

"It is almost impossible to identify at-risk students. How is the government or teachers going to identify who is at risk and who is not at risk at the age of 13, 14, 15 and 16? Secondly, these programs have already been tried, tested and disengaged in the other countries like the US. For example, a recent event in the US when a Muslim kid brought a clock to school and it was seen as a bomb, and it had a widespread rejection from the community all over the US, even President (Barack) Obama came out against this idea.61

Similar criticisms have been levelled at the Victorian Government’s proposal to impose curfews and internet bans on at-risk teenagers,62 indicating that a balance between anti-terrorist rhetoric and engagement with at-risk communities may be necessary to maximise the success of CVE programs.

Chapter 6 of this paper discusses a number of alternative approaches to counter-radicalisation strategies, by Australian and overseas experts.
5. Counter-radicalisation approaches in other jurisdictions

This chapter provides a short overview of counter-radicalisation programs in international jurisdictions. While not exhaustive, it presents a snapshot of existing strategies in selected countries, as well as the shortcomings of these programs.

5.1 United Kingdom

The UK Government's Prevent strategy, one of the four elements of the UK's Contest counter terrorism strategy, aims to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. The UK Government website explains Prevent’s goals and operation, which covers all forms of terrorism, including far right extremism and certain aspects of non-violent extremism:

The Prevent strategy:
- responds to the ideological challenge we face from terrorism and aspects of extremism, and the threat we face from those who promote these views
- provides practical help to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure they are given appropriate advice and support
- works with a wide range of sectors (including education, criminal justice, faith, charities, online and health) where there are risks of radicalisation that we need to deal with

Prevent uses a range of measures to challenge extremism, including the following:
- where necessary, we have prevented apologists for terrorism and extremism from travelling to this country
- giving guidance to local authorities and institutions to understand the threat from extremism and the statutory powers available to them to challenge extremist speakers
- funding a specialist police unit which works to remove online content that breaches terrorist legislation
- supporting community based campaigns and activity which can effectively rebut terrorist and extremist propaganda and offer alternative views to our most vulnerable target audiences - in this context we work with a range of civil society organisations
- supporting people who are at risk of being drawn into terrorist activity through the Channel process, which involves several agencies working together to give individuals access to services such as health and education, specialist mentoring and diversionary activities

However, Prevent has received significant criticism from both Government institutions and non-government organisations. The main points of criticism as outlined by the European Parliament are listed below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community partnership and stigmatisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The deployment of Prevent coincided with community spending cuts brought about by the GFC, leaving it one of the only sources of funding for several NGOs. To obtain funding, some NGOs altered regular community projects to match the descriptions of the Prevent funding stream irrespective of the risk the beneficiaries posed in terms of radicalisation. This in turn contributed to a sense of frustration and alienation amongst the Muslim community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The associated Channel mentoring program was also criticised for the perception that young Muslims were being referred to the program for regular activities such as political</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
involvement in peace movements or pious religious practice.

A thin border between partnership and snooping

• Partnerships established between community representatives and local counterterrorist police were used as covert means of gathering intelligence about the structure and relations within the community. Ongoing changes to the program further reinforce the fear of “snooping”, with the focus on institutions such as schools, universities or hospitals, where teachers, professors or doctors were encouraged to report potential “radicals”.

Handpicked “acceptable” community representatives

• Following the election of the Cameron Government in 2010, the Government considered many previous partners of the Prevent programmes, such as the Muslim Council of Britain or the Muslim Association of Britain or the Islamic Society of Britain, as “Islamists” and therefore stopped their involvement in Prevent-related work. This risk ed being counter-productive by (i) portraying the partnership programmes as purely mouthpieces for the government and (ii) shifting the legitimacy towards organisations that opposed the British government on grounds of bias.

5.2 Europe

European nations have a wide variety of counter-radicalisation polices in place to address the risk of violent extremism. In a 2014 paper, the Institute for Strategic Dialogue compared counter-radicalisation approaches in the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark and Germany. Select programs in each nation are detailed in Table 6:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6: Counter-radicalisation strategies in the EU66</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Netherlands</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From 2007-2011 the Dutch Government counter-radicalisation strategy considered radicalisation to be a consequence of societal breakdown, with redress lying in programmes intended to reinforce social cohesion and the successful management of a multicultural environment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Example Programs</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <strong>Personal Intervention Against Young People in Right-Wing Extremist Circles</strong>: A program designed to support those on the fringes of right-wing extremist groups to exit these groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <strong>Nuansa</strong>: A nation-wide initiative comprised of an early-warning and advisory service; a research and information database; and the organisation of meetings, workshops and training sessions for professionals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sweden</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden’s counter extremism plan reflects current understandings of the social factors that can lead to radicalisation, including discrimination, segregation, a lack of community cohesion and feelings of marginalisation or exclusion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Example Programs</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <strong>Tolerance Project</strong>: Provided educational opportunities for young individuals in schools to disconnect them with neo-Nazi groups or extremist behaviour.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <strong>EXIT Fryshuset</strong>: Set up to help individuals leave white supremacism groups, and to support them in establishing new lives with economic and social support structures to make their new lives sustainable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Denmark</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Danish plan identifies radicalisation partially as a symptom of inadequate social integration. Its strategy is therefore divided into...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
preventative activities and targeted interventions.

**Example Programs**
- **‘Back on Track’**: Program aimed at developing and testing mentoring schemes as a tool to support inmates in leaving far-right, far-left or religious extremism behind.
- **‘Deradicalisation - Targeted Interventions’**: Nation-wide program that develops tools that can be adapted to the individual needs of young people seeking to stay out of extremist circles. Involves both mentoring schemes and preventive talks.

**Germany**
Germany does not currently have a specific national action plan for combating extremist radicalisation, with programs falling under the remit of the wider German counter-terrorism strategy.

**Example Programs**
- **Violence Prevention Network**: Project works with individuals in prison convicted of violent crimes linked to far-right extremism or religious radicalisation. It involves a 23 week program in prisons, a year of dedicated support upon release, and ongoing support for an individual's family before and after release.

Other observers have been more critical of European counter-radicalisation policies. The European Parliament’s 2014 paper on youth radicalisation noted that a number of policies have been criticised by all sides of the political spectrum, as these initiatives often produced mixed results and raised key questions in terms of fundamental rights, ethnic and racial discrimination and social cohesion.67

Additionally, the European Parliament concluded that existing policies “have in several instances been found to generate a feeling of suspicion that is unhelpful to the relations between the state and Muslim communities across Europe.”68

**5.3 United States**

While the threat of terrorism in the US is not considered to be as great as in Europe, in 2011 the White House released a report supporting local partnerships and community engagement as key components of counter-radicalisation and counter-terrorism efforts.69 The strategy—the Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States (SIP)—consists of three objectives:70

1. Enhancing federal community engagement efforts related to CVE;
2. Developing greater government and law enforcement expertise for preventing violent extremism; and
3. Countering violent extremist propaganda.

A 2014 paper by the Congressional Research Service gave examples of the White House Administration’s CVE activity:
Enhancing federal community engagement efforts related to CVE

Federal agencies are to cooperate with local groups to expand engagement efforts and to foster preventative programming that builds resilience against radicalisation and violent extremism.

The federal government acts as a facilitator, convener, and source of information for this community-based approach.

Developing greater government and law enforcement expertise for preventing violent extremism

The SIP emphasises three key items in this area:

• The US government must improve its understanding of radicalisation via research, analysis, and partnerships;
• Greater sharing of information among state, local, and federal agencies regarding terrorist recruitment and radicalisation is necessary; and
• The federal government has to improve radicalisation-related training offered to federal, state, and local agencies.

Countering violent extremist propaganda

Considered by the SIP to be the most challenging area of work, the White House has, among other things, created an Interagency Working Group to Counter Online Radicalization to Violence that uses existing federal programs to “raise awareness and disseminate tools for staying safe from online violent extremism.”

The Congressional Research Service identified several risks and challenges evident in the SIP’s objectives, which it argued may require Congressional oversight to operate effectively. These are summarised in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 8: Risks and challenges associated with the SIP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Picking Partners and Establishing “Rules of the Road”</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Much of US government’s CVE efforts centre on engagement with Muslim American community groups, which may not be as easy as simply reaching out to local organisations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intervention with At-Risk Individuals</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There appears to be little federally driven guidance to community groups on how to intervene with people vulnerable to radicalisation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Identifying Programs to Assist Grassroots CVE Efforts</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A publicly available, comprehensive list of grant programs that can be harnessed for CVE activities does not exist, making it hard for communities to know what possible resources are available to them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Countering Extremist Ideas: Choosing Good vs. Bad</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The task of countering extremist ideas highlighted in the SIP raises a number of questions, such as how the federal government determines which ideologies are dangerous and which are safe (essentially determining which beliefs are good and which are bad).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Lack of a Lead Agency</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is no single agency managing all of the individual activities and efforts of the plan. Without a lead agency it may be difficult to monitor the levels of federal funding devoted to CVE efforts and how many personnel are devoted to CVE in the federal government.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. Alternative counter-radicalisation responses

A wide range of experts have recommended alternatives or improvements to existing counter-radicalisation strategies, both in Australia and in overseas jurisdictions.

6.1 Australian responses

Australian experts have provided a number of different proposals to improve counter-radicalisation strategies and discourse. In its *Gen Y Jihadists* report, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute provided nine policy recommendations for the Australian Government to adopt in response to Islamic extremism, including:73

- Explain the reasons for Australia’s Middle East deployments more persuasively, including more direct engagement with online critics of Australian policy;
- Improve collaboration with Australian Muslims. In particular, engagement programs need to operate on the basis that there is no single Muslim community in Australia, and recognise the variety of diverse communities based on different cultural and ethnic backgrounds and on different interpretations of Islam;
- Engage schools in a practical discussion about terrorism and counter-radicalisation. For example, using COAG to create a uniform strategy where Australian governments work with communities to identify and manage at-risk individuals;
- Expand existing radicalisation diversion programs by defining how an intervention process might work, where authority to decide to intervene will reside, and how to handle an individual from the point of intervention;
- Rather than continuing government online counter-radicalisation campaigns, combat online propaganda by working with the Muslim community to develop the community’s own alternative online material opposing radicalisation.

Victoria University also reported a range of responses from participants in its 2013 study, aimed at helping prevent or mitigate the threat of radicalisation and violent extremism:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 9: Victoria University counter-radicalisation proposals74</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Counter-narratives</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Making violent extremism less appealing</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The role of police</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The role of government

The main role of government was seen to be preventing or mitigating the threat of violent extremism in terms of empowering, educating and engaging communities. Examples of this included bottom-up grassroots initiatives that empower communities, and prioritising social cohesion as a means of engaging communities.

The role of communities

Communities should focus on normalising cultural difference and community cohesion; encouraging intercultural contact, and reducing community insularity. The Muslim community’s role should involve being more outspoken in countering the religious, cultural and political justifications for violent extremism, and in promoting alternative views to counter the legitimacy of violent extremism.

Notably, a recurring proposal by many stakeholders is the need to effectively engage Australia’s Muslim community when responding to Islamic terrorism. This view was encapsulated in an article in The Australian by Deakin University Professor Shahram Akbarzadeh:

> Whatever strategy is adopted, let’s not forget Muslim community organisations have a big role to play. It may not be clear to some, but Australian Muslims are the first to suffer the consequences of terrorism. The shame of having a member of the faith commit acts of violence in the name of religion, and the subsequent anti-Muslim backlash, affect all Australian Muslims. They have a stake in addressing extremism and need to be acknowledged as partners for an effective counter-terrorism strategy.75

6.2 International responses

As in Australia, most international experts believe that strong counter-messaging is a key means to reduce radicalisation and violent extremism, particularly when performed by ex-extremists with a greater understanding of an ideology’s underpinnings.

In relation to Muslim youth in Western nations, US think tank New America discussed a range of counter-radicalisation strategies designed to counteract ISIS propaganda. Examples are summarised below:76

- Enlist defectors from ISIS to tell their stories publicly, creating a powerful counter-narrative from people who have experienced life in ISIS territories;
- Further undercut ISIS propaganda by amplifying alternative voices such as that of the ISIS opposition group Raqqa is Being Slaughtered Silently;
- Strongly emphasise that, while ISIS positions itself as the defender of Muslims, its victims are overwhelmingly fellow Muslims; and
- Provide “off ramps” to young ISIS recruits with no history of violence, so that instead of serving long prison terms for attempting to join a terrorist group they would instead serve long periods of supervised probation.
More generally, Quilliam listed several positive policy measures that it believed could help individuals disengage from extremist groups:

Well-articulated and inspiring counter-messaging, which effectively undermines extremist narratives, can prove powerful when prompting extremists to reflect on their own position. Using image and audio-based material on social media sites is particularly effective when communicating positive messages. Moreover, grassroots initiatives which open up dialogue between experts and society allow people to feel engaged and respected, while also producing valuable insight and rich discussion. Developing personal resilience can enable society to deal with the difficulties and adversaries it encounters, leaving people less susceptible to extremism. Supporting people through times of transition, via outreach programmes in schools, universities and local communities, can contribute towards healthy behaviours and develop more supportive and cohesive communities. Schools and universities can also play a role in developing critical thinking skills through the encouragement of free and independent thinking, which enables students to critically engage with topics. This will encourage students to rationalise their thinking, leaving them less vulnerable to extremism.77

In its critique of European counter-terrorism laws and strategies, the European Parliament gave the following recommendations to more effectively prevent youth radicalisation in the European Union (EU):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 10: European Parliament recommendations to improve youth counter-radicalisation efforts78</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revise the EU’s diagnosis of radicalisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tackle negative consequences of counter-radicalisation policies by restricting their scope</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthen EU expertise in the field of violent extremism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keep in check practices of online surveillance carried out in the name of counter-radicalisation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. Conclusion

Radicalisation and violent extremism will continue to be issues of concern for Australian authorities and the wider community. As shown in this paper, there are considerable challenges in identifying factors that lead individuals down the path of radicalisation. While there are a number of recurring causes of radicalisation and violent extremism, different individuals have different motivations for engaging in such behaviour, making it hard to pinpoint exactly when alarm bells should sound for family, friends or authorities.
There are a wide range of counter-radicalisation strategies at all levels of Australian government, as well as a diverse range of policies at the international level. The effectiveness of these policies is often contested. Nonetheless, across most governments worldwide it is recognised that effective counter-radicalisation programs must be inclusive of local minority communities and their leaders. Top-down policies are unlikely to succeed. Whether these more inclusive, localised strategies will be more effective than existing efforts is yet to be seen.

6 Ibid p 10.
7 Ibid p 7.
8 Ibid p 10-12.
9 Ibid p 11.
10 Southern Poverty Law Centre, *Terror from the right*, 1 November 2015.
11 R Manning, C La Bau, *In and Out of Extremism*: How Quilliam Helped 10 Former Far-Right and Islamists Change, Quilliam, August 2015, pp 16-17.
13 Living Safe Together, note 5, p 11.
14 Ibid p 12.
16 Living Safe Together, note 5, p 12.
20 R Manning, C La Bau, *In and Out of Extremism*: How Quilliam Helped 10 Former Far-Right and Islamists Change, Quilliam, August 2015, p 12.
24 Quilliam, note 20, p 12.
27 Victoria University, note 23, pp 9-10.
28 Youth Justice Board, note 26, pp 32-33; Quilliam, note 20, p 12.
29 Quilliam, note 20, p 12.
30 UK House of Commons, note 22.
31 E Symons, *ISIL is really a revolt by young Muslims against their parents’ generation*, Quartz, 3 December 2015.
32 Victoria University, note 23, pp 9-10.
33 Youth Justice Board, note 26, pp 32-33.
34 UK House of Commons, note 22.
36. The UK Youth Justice Board provides an overview of the most prominent radicalisation models. See Youth Justice Board, note 26, pp 10-21.
37. Ibid.
39. For example, in relation to the Lindt Café attack, see J Kidd, *Sydney siege inquest: Experts divided on whether Lindt Cafe attack was terrorism or result of mental illness*, ABC News, 26 August 2015.
41. Ibid pp 11-12.
42. Youth Justice Board, note 26, p 4, 31.
44. P Jennings (ed), *Gen Y jihadists: Preventing radicalisation in Australia*, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, June 2015, p 47.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
49. Australian Strategic Policy Institute, note 44, pp 47-8.
57. Australian Strategic Policy Institute, note 44, p 48.
58. Ibid p 49.
60. H Nadim, *Muslim radicalisation: Why Australia's strategy is failing, and how to fix it*, The Interpreter, 1 June 2015.
64. Ibid.
71. Ibid pp 4-18.
73. Australian Strategic Policy Institute, note 44, pp 51-6.
74. Victoria University, note 23, pp 14-5.
77 Quilliam, note 20, p 13.

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