

**Supplementary
Submission
No 148p**

**INQUIRY INTO INQUIRY INTO MUSEUMS AND
GALLERIES**

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AN INCOHERENT CARGO CULT 'MUSEUM' FOR THOSE WITH AN EDIFICE COMPLEX, DRIVEN BY DEVELOPERS

SUMMARY:

- The five Government reports noted below fail to make a coherent case for a new museum notably if based upon so-called 'bench mark' museums. The reports deliberately avoid comparing the current Powerhouse Museum with the five 'benchmarks' because all are less imposing. The reports are often misleading since they look at museums which today would cost huge amounts of money compared with what has been (misleadingly/low balled) requested by Minister Harwin from the NSW Government/Cabinet [approximately \$725 million].
- There is no coherent 'Vision' statement. The one that has been squeezed out to befuddle Government lacks rationale or any ordered thought. It is fragmentary, sub-optimal and amateur. The 'rationale' also lacks coherence and a rationale
- The inclusion of a Planetarium/ Omnimax, especially such as the Rose Centre in New York which in today's dollars would cost over A. \$540 million, is based on no business plan and no explanation of where the true level of capital and operating funds would be sourced. Parramatta/Sydney do not have philanthropists like Mr and Mrs Rose. All known facilities like this around the world are subsidised loss leaders often quietly failing in competition with modern, readily available technology.
- The entire project is false in saying that 'iconic' new museums benefit local communities when 'Starchitect' designers plonk them down in a city like Bilbao, Spain or Toronto, Canada. This is a form of facile 'cargo cult' thinking by developers, Governments and city boosters who have an 'edifice complex'.
- Hobart's MONA is an unusual exception which proves the rule: it had no Government fiscal support and was devised by a shrewd, inspired arts philanthropist. He made a unique experience within. His creative perspective has filled dramatic subterranean spaces with a remarkable, idiosyncratic program that is constantly changing. He continues to massively subsidise MONA. He has created a fine, below-ground, cultural [i.e. non-iconic] 'race horse'. As currently described the new museum in Parramatta is not even a camel but a stitched together pantomime horse.
- The new museum's drivers appear not to be community centred but primarily development and developer driven; the 'iconic' qualities so-called are really iconic ghost shadows cast by super unit towers in Ultimo and Parramatta.
- This vast morass of papers has been produced to mislead Cabinet/Government into thinking they provide a solid basis for a 'final' funding decision and are now misleading the public, on the basis of quantity i.e.: 'never mind the quality just feel the width.'
- No costing for this enormous, misleading and fatuous parcel of data flab has been given. It needs to be questioned along with the efforts of Mr Craig Limkin, Mr Michael Parry and other Departmental/MAAS senior staff.
- What is THE TOTAL COST OF THE PROJECT NOW WITH ALL HEADINGS [plus consultants and Government staff costs] AND INFLATION included?

1.1 The new 'museum' at Parramatta's Riverbank. Context:

Successful museums only grow from the cultural life and the hearts and minds of the communities they represent. The power to stimulate engagement and sustainability is derived from these forces and from the collections which represent their histories, aspirations and memories. The narratives they tell are woven from such strands. Their stories evolve and grow in response to their host communities as they live and change. The core experiences are not the glossy box within which these experiences are set, but the experiences themselves. What works in one place does not work in another. Parramatta is not Bilbao. Even this city now harbours doubts as to what defines 'success' and whether the art museum there really worked for the majority of Bilbao's people. The growing local consensus is that it has failed this crucial test.

1.2 Eye candy and the cargo cult:

Ministers, planners and city boosters almost always fail to understand such basic realities underpinning cultural, social and economic success which determine museum sustainability. Their facile response to eye candy and superficial notions of what museums mean to their owners- the local citizens- leads them to a puerile pursuit of so-called 'iconic' buildings. They mindlessly manifest a cargo cult complex which sees such 'icons' as being delivered through 'Starchitect' intervention and glossy bits of schmatter stuck in serried ranks ('the ultimate deterrent') or splendid isolation ('it doesn't matter what it means isn't it special/famous/ a celebrity!'). In a weird way it embodies that infamous phrase: 'never mind the quality, just feel the width.'

If anyone has any doubt about this look at the outcome of the relatively new Liebeskind building at the Royal Ontario Museum doubtfully called 'The Crystal' and the notoriously funny documentary about the then Director and the 'Starchitect' and his wife. This excrescence gained no traction with the hearts and minds of Torontonians for identical reasons as expressed above and is a huge cultural white elephant.

1.3 Consumer and community engagement:

The 'Willingness to pay' analysis reviewed by others elsewhere is so superficial, socially absurd and asinine that this reviewer believes it would be given an 'F' as an undergraduate exercise. Despite its claimed scientific veracity and procedures which are, in fact, pseudo-science when dealing with such cultural complexities as community engagement, propensity to visit and empathic identification with a new museum, this approach fails on those 'scientific'[sic] as well as many other bases. This is not a paint ball arcade, indoor race track or cinema multiplex or combination of all three.

The research duration (July 2017), lack of ethnic and community consultative depth and range, lack of travel/distance factoring and comparative attractions analysis, and naïve assumptions are likely to cause grave financial and fiscal errors presaging disaster after a few months of the opening of the museum.

The lead into a planetarium/Omnimax brand builder shows just how hopeless the report is [see below] as well as its apparent disregard for strongly expressed community preferences in Parramatta and surrounding western localities. It demonstrates a similar naivety as Government's cavalier proposal to demolish the heritage buildings on the Riverbank site (Riverview and St George's Terrace) which was swiftly attacked in a petition with over 12,000 signatures within a few weeks of being launched.

In this domain of museum planning obtaining relevant, bankable guidance on consumer demand (potential visitor proclivity to visit then pay and for what/how much/how long/from where etc.) depends on the comprehensiveness, audience segmentation and techniques of survey; the precise questions and context/ order in which they are asked; the setting and moderation of

survey discussions; and the range of options presented with great caution taken not to 'load' these or lead the subjects to desired conclusions. As one expert once noted: 'tell me the answers you want and I will get the questions and interviewees to deliver them for you'. Further detailed analysis of the 'supporting' [sic] documents will be undertaken. However, one glaring fact is inescapable here: this work was done three years into the so-called Business Case development utilising an already entirely predetermined project location, envelope and potential subject list. For the previous Premier and this Arts Minister to maintain this was the way business case planning should proceed either appears to indicate they are incompetent in this field or that they misled both the Cabinet and the Inquiry or both. This document would not pass muster at the simplest level for a project seeking commercial funding.

Another obvious, self-confessed factor in respect of the 'Consumer Demand' research is that this document notes its research and analysis was undertaken in a singular month, July 2017. It does not demonstrate a really comprehensive approach; nor a sufficiently sophisticated inclusion of communities and potential market segments; a fully appropriate range of options presented (Cumberland Hospital/Female Factory site/Parramatta history and heritage/Aboriginal areas and subjects/human creativity/multicultural engagement/ environmental and natural sciences/decorative and applied arts/multicultural community collections/access to all NSW major collections/outdoor facilities like an auditorium; etc.?); or the breadth and depth of the research or the broader contexts within which the research and analysis were set.

Going on the public 'consultation' evenings in Parramatta and Ultimo the outlined subjects and activities were shoehorned into a narrow range of options, time slots and contextual parameters.

To try to accomplish this work in July 2017 in a population spreading over hundreds of square kilometres; dozens of cultural and community cohorts/demographic groupings; multilingual and multi ethnic sub-groupings; arts and other cultural associations; economic and socially defined groups; and a number of other market segmentations is facile, to put it politely.

Comparative experience of this reviewer in similar multi cultural, multi ethnic cities like Toronto (Canada), Los Angeles and London for example, shows such research and analysis for a cultural project of this scale and complexity (let alone cost) requires months if not years of sensitive, strategic, socio-cultural research.

This cannot be properly undertaken in a month or even six months but requires sustained, strategic research in many dozens of moderated sessions. Such a cavalier acknowledgement of its limitations suggests that this research, like most Commissions of Inquiry, knew the answers before it started.

If you build it and do not engage their hearts and minds they will stay away in droves.

This begins to look almost as if Government not only has imbibed the Kool Aid it has been doling out to the cargo cultists in the Daily Telegraph and Parramatta Council but also that it does not really care about the ultimate result since it probably won't be around when this abortion (hopefully never) opens to the public.

1.4 About this pile of 'Extended Final Business Case' documents- six in all:

Five of the six documents briefly reviewed here, when taken as a whole, would also not pass muster if produced by a bunch of first year undergraduates who proffered them as their 'end-of-year' project. In other circumstances the reviewer would have to give it an 'F' and make them repeat the year. The fact that the Minister, the previous Premier, the present Premier, the Daily Telegraph, the Museum senior staff and MAAS Board have apparently not understood how full of pathos this assemblage of ordure appears- is telling. It does not even have the coherence of a camel. Sadly, it is a poorly stitched pantomime horse agglomerated by amateur macramé artists, all 'happy hands at home'. The only coherent report among the six is that devoted to the 'Super Tower' on the Riverbank site at Parramatta. Mind you with the current collapse of the units

market this exercise in developer gratification may be underpinned by a financial foundation built on submarine river sand.

1.5: Key elements of failure:

The reports reviewed exhibit several key characteristics of failed undergraduate efforts:

- * Assemblage of lists containing dozens of exemplars lumped together to try to show access to more culture than a penicillin factory but lacking any selectivity, logic, philosophy or professional museological understanding of key factors noted above. Laundry lists or bureaucratic cookey cutter quotes do not a successful museum make
- * High school level mistakes of basic fact
- * Egregious plagiarism hiding in plain sight/site without real evaluation of content, meaning and implications; a 'bit of this goes with a bit of that' approach without any true costing [capital or operational] or intellectual coherence.
- * Vast amounts of bureaucratic verbiage; steaming piles of papers; heaps of ugly architectural imagery; wildly incoherent approach to data; inability to realise that 'pile it high' is 'selling it cheap' in a way which embodies that phrase quoted above about 'quality and width'.
 - *Facile, superficial, business-case 'supporting' research such as the so-called 'Willingness to pay' study which would not get past first base with commercial lenders

Sadly these failures have led to the waste of a great opportunity at great expense to the taxpayers of NSW and the citizens of Parramatta and greater western Sydney. There is no need really for the satire about this project of the 'Even Greater Sydney Planning Commission' [ABC Radio]: this pile of papers is self satirising all by itself. No wonder Government did everything it could to avoid releasing this steaming dump.

The following are just a few of the more egregious elements this reviewer has noted. Or has the will or time to describe. Each document is located in the Powerhouse Museum Alliance website- see the list below. This review does not claim to be comprehensive rather it is put forward as symptomatic of the errors, superficiality and misleading statements contained in the five reviewed documents.

2.1 It's size that matters?

This is certainly true when many of the symbolic, core objects in a museum's collections are very large. The 'large objects list' contained in the flaccid 4500 pages dumped by Government indicates that many large objects- such as the Catalina- will go into a 'temporary' store from which they may never emerge.

Comments about this high-risk, expensive waste are included elsewhere in these reviews but it is important to note here that this reveals another example of misleading by the Minister of Cabinet and taxpayers: the magnificent large object collection will mainly not be seen by visitors partly because the new buildings lack the scale and impact of the existing Powerhouse Museum both in cubic volume and in gross footprint (approx. 41,000 M2 vs. 21,000 M2 and hundreds of thousands of M3 variance); because the flood-prone ground floor will have to be up to 17 metres above normal current river levels thereby costing enormous amounts to pile, span and probably cantilever the main display space; and because conserving, dismantling, moving, reconstituting and then displaying these large objects [many now actively steamed] if even possible hugely exceeds Government's puny and deliberately shrunken object logistics costs.

As to the main 'atrium' space there is no comparison between that and existing Powerhouse Museum spaces [deliberately]. Comparisons with such spaces around the world (e.g. The British Museum), with which the new submarine museum could not possibly achieve parity given the future footprint, flooding and cost envelope, abound.

The Minister's unsubstantiated claim that the new museum will be as large and as imposing as the Powerhouse Museum would be laughable if it was not so tragically misleading.

2.2: The so-called 'Benchmark' museums: what an irrelevant, uncosted parade

These museums are well known and, in their own right, are not unimpressive. Some of the longer laundry list of museums/ cultural facilities pictured and two of the 'benchmark' museums are about twice the gross footprint of the new 'museum' at Riverbank, Parramatta. Today (e.g. Melbourne and San Francisco) they would cost in the upper \$1.8 billions of Australian dollars, plus if they were designed to accommodate large objects and the range and type of interactives being promised for the new 'museum'. Not one has recently been located next to a climate-change affected river. The stand out is Brisbane, which was recently seriously flood affected.

The overriding problem is that not one of them includes collections which approximate to those in MAAS. Not one has the vast cubic volumes also embodied at Ultimo in the Powerhouse Museum. That is because there really are no comparators in 99.9% of museums in the world to match this grand building scale and collection typology- which is why the old power station buildings were chosen originally: they could not be afforded in scale then, if new build. Far more so today, they cannot be afforded in scale as these reviewed misleading documents demonstrate.

This explains why Chicago's Museum of Science and Industry for example, or the National Air and Space Museum in Washington, or Sacramento's Californian State Railway Museum or York, England's National Railway Museum or the Victoria and Albert Museum are not used as comparators. Even then their main volumes are cramped in comparison with the Powerhouse Museum. This also explains why the present Powerhouse Museum is not referenced as a 'benchmark'. This is transparently dishonest and presumably deliberate.

As is the list of current Powerhouse Museum failings, none of which are irremediable or fatal flaws and all of which either are inaccurate or could be easily remediated at a fraction of the cost of the new submarine museum. If Government challenges these statements let them cost such limitations and their remediation; let them also release the 2014 MAAS Business Case submitted to Treasury.

2.3 'Vision'? What Vision?

Equally misleading by the Minister and the minions and consultants who composed this flab fest of data is the fact that the one large-scale museum outlined in the so-called 'Vision' document is basically a large aircraft hangar in Holland (Dutch National Military Museum). This structure (one of several similar facilities though this is the biggest) is basically a large tin shed with side glazing on a concrete base. Careful measurement of official plans demonstrate that its grade-level main display has a footprint of approximately 24,200 M2 with an internal glaze height of approximately 13 metres (maximum). There is a mezzanine floor with some visitor and display facilities/volumes comprising another 14,200 M2, giving a total rough gross floor area of approximately 38,200 M2. The cubic volume is substantial in places but compromised by the mezzanine. The larger aircraft, such as the DC3, are 'squashed' and do not compare in scale or surrounds to even vaguely approximate to the Boiler Hall in the Powerhouse Museum with the Catalina and so forth. So a tin shed is more impressive than the Powerhouse Museum's enormous original, heritage, brick buildings restored and in fit-for-purpose condition.

Really?

All this example shows is that large sheds with big kit and a bit of sound and light is the new 'most engaging/best practice'. Huh? Who are these amateurs and flim-flam practitioners? What exactly does a 'deep-dive' mean? Was it into a puddle?

2.4 More lies? More greed?

The claims made in the 'Vision' text are a travesty revealing nothing so much as the ignorance of the Minister and his minions:

'[DNMM's]...vast spaces...dynamically display their huge collection [with] sound, projection and lighting [which] bring the objects to life, telling their stories...'

Well surprise, surprise. In 1988 the same kind of interpretive installation was partly created but could not proceed because of budgetary constraints. Complete to some extent in the early 1990s they worked for a while but were discontinued owing to technical wear and tear. Government cost cutting finished them off.

The platforms required still exist and new technologies including smart phone systems linked to super reality headsets etc. will make further more targeted interpretation of upgraded objects and technically advanced collections remarkably easy in both main Powerhouse Museum halls- at a fraction of the cost to be faced at Parramatta with far smaller spaces and cubic volumes. If many if not most of the large objects are to be moved into storage and if many more large objects are available why not display the latter at the Cumberland Hospital site/Female factory in a new purpose designed building focused on innovation? And upgrade the Ultimo site as well. At a fraction of the cost of the small, flood- threatened Riverbank submarine site?

There is also the matter of the 'Mona Lisa' of engineering, the Boulton and Watt beam engine and the other steam-driven engines installed at great cost in 1988 so that the magic of live steam could animate them as originally intended. Interpreted by engineers who were expert at both telling their stories and in maintenance of a wide range of mechanisms. All this came grinding to a halt with more Government cuts. So much for 'bringing objects to life'...and 'telling stories.' There appears to be no plan to have engines live steamed at Riverbank, Parramatta.

The reason for the Powerhouse Museum's destruction [and Willowbank/St George's Terrace at Parramatta], for large object removal/sequestration from visitors and for selling off the sites is now obvious- development driven greed for access to the Ultimo Powerhouse Museum site and the Parramatta site on the part of elite, rent-seeking developers who seem to easily manipulate this Minister, it may be argued, this Government and the Mayor and some members of Parramatta City Council. So more super towers in both locations are the corrupt order of the day.

“

3.1 Plain wrong, careless, stupid and ignorant:

A small typo on one page or another of a document is explicable and far from being a 'hanging offense'. Repeated twenty times in the Benchmark document it indicates a wanton carelessness with accuracy. When a world famous and inspired piece of museum architecture devoted to science and astronomy is ascribed to a world famous art museum we have entered a world of incompetence and ignorance. When suggested as some kind of 'Benchmark' for the new 'museum' proposed at the submarine river- side site at Parramatta and when this facility alone cost nearly the entire [underestimated/misleading] budget for the whole Parramatta project, one has entered a world beyond satire. Even the ABC TV program 'Utopia' did not quite dare go that far. The fact that apparently no one in the 'Deep Dive' undertaken by the Department of Planning pointed this out speaks volumes [see below- the Rose Centre].

So how much did this pile of drivel ‘Extended Final Business Case’ cost the NSW taxpayer?

3.2 A Rose by any other name:

This example could be extended with many others but the present reviewer believes it should suffice.

The misspelled (or misspelt) word is apparently ‘PROGRAM’ but it appears in a grotesque, repeated misspelling on many, perhaps most visual documentation pages contained in the ‘Benchmarking’ report. Simple proof reading would pick this up. Lack of such basic checking indicates haste and carelessness.

The ROSE Planetarium at the American Museum of Natural History in New York is perhaps the finest and most expensive gem in this field museologists have seen. It is unlikely to be repeated because new and relevant technologies are evolving at an incredible pace. In some ways it is a loss leader and a deep cost, not profit centre. Currently it is often reduced to showing normal Hollywood films to fill the show space. Nonetheless the following early encomium is fully justified:


‘A marvellous celestial playhouse . . . offering visitors a virtual journey through time, space and the mysteries of the cosmos...’ —**New York Times**

The Rose Center for Earth and Space of the American Museum of Natural History the dazzling **\$210-million museum within a museum that opened in New York City in early 2000** has won exuberant praise from critics and the public. Its awe-inspiring form, a huge sphere inside a glass cube, reminds people of how enthralling great architecture can be. And the sophisticated and imaginative exhibits with which it tells the story of the universe have already earned the Rose Center acclaim as the world’s foremost museum of astronomy, astrophysics, and Earth science.

This official introduction and guide to the Rose Center takes the reader on a tour of its two spectacular main exhibition spaces the Hall of the Universe and the Hall of Planet Earth and explores its architectural and technological wonders. Here is ample evidence of why U.S. News & World Report has proclaimed the Rose Center: ‘spectacular . . . a stunning new destination for star-gazing earthlings’.

THIS FACILITY IS DESCRIBED AS THE ‘PLANETARIUM AT THE MET’ in the Benchmarking document

‘The Met’ is the usual shortened version of the name of: ‘The Metropolitan Museum of Art’ in New York. To ascribe this leading part of the American Museum of Natural History, the science- based educational museum of natural history in that city, to the ‘Met’ is beyond credence. Especially since it is quoted as a key benchmarking exemplar.



3.3 How much would the Rose Centre cost now in Australia (approximately)?

On December 1, 2000 the exchange rate was approximately, \$1 Aussie =US \$.54

So \$200 million US\$ = A \$ 370 million approximately.

In current A \$, after 18 years' inflation, \$370 million in 2000 = \$542 million approx. [BPI probably more]. The total new 'museum' budget submitted to Cabinet was in the region of \$685 million. As the Americans say: go figure.

There is no need to belabour this point. Time and again examples, images and references are inaccurate, cost explosive, unsubstantiated in terms of business case, misleading, simple eye candy or just plain wrong. In this light please see the Minister's comments to the Upper House Inquiry [August 2017] quoted below when he tried to stand-over both Mr Secord and Mr Shoebridge- very much in the same tone as the previous Premier- Mr Baird. This so-called 'Extended Final Business Case', whose title is an oxymoron, is arguably unreliable in the extreme, a travesty of the truth. This reviewer leaves it to the judgement of others as to whether previous Premier and current Minister lied to the Inquiry and to the people of NSW about Government's planning process, its veracity or its reliability. Please see his comments below.

4.1 Ministry for Cultural (Pantomime Horses)... err...Infrastructure... err... Planning?

It is well understood that there is nothing a bureaucrat or a Minister prefers than a vast thicket of planning documents which appear coordinated, integrated and interdigitated with lots of boxes to tick. Unlike brilliant examples of cultural projects such as MONA in Hobart, which are the work product of a singular innovative team under the creative direction of a

passionate expert, the 4,500 pages of these Preliminary, then so-called 'Extended Final Business Case' reports exhibit every telling aspect of 'Utopia' [National Building Authority] and many of 'Yes Minister' [Ministry for Administrative Affairs] coupled with elements from Monty Python [Ministry for Silly Walks]. They are self satirising.



4.2: The Minister on the Business Case at the Inquiry:

One wonders if the reader can spot his economy with the truth after the Minister did all he could to suppress the 'Extended Final Business Case'?

“Mr DAVID SHOEBRIDGE: You have cleared it up. There is no final decision to relocate it; it is subject to the business case.

The Hon. DON HARWIN: Mr Shoebridge, with great respect, this Government has processes as to how it makes major expenditures. The budget process will not allow allocation of the sum of money required to build the museum unless a final business case is completed. Until then it is in principle.

The CHAIR: Minister, will you present that final business case to this inquiry?

The Hon. DON HARWIN: The final business case is a document prepared for the consideration of Cabinet. Cabinet documents remain Cabinet in confidence.

The CHAIR: In other words the answer is no.

The Hon. DON HARWIN: *The Government could not function unless it had business cases to inform its decision-making process.*

The Hon. SHAOQUETT MOSELMANE: It is like the KPMG report for local government; it is a secret.”

5. Conclusion:

If Government was sufficiently 'informed' on the basis of this inchoate 4500 pages of tripe to decide to proceed with the three projects 'moving' and trying to replace the Powerhouse Museum then the only conclusion to be drawn is that this Government is incompetent, incapable of analysing basic planning documents and easily misled by a mendacious process. The only possible

reason for suppressing this pile of data flab was to hide its inadequacy from analysis. The true reason for the entire project was as gifts to developers who will look after the politicians who filled the trough for them before they retired

6. Six documents consulted for this analysis:

Taken from Powerhouse Museum Alliance website with its numbering:

5. Vision Statement

[New Western Sydney Museum 5 Vision Statement](#)

(2016/17? (does not include Ultimo), Johnstaff, 'Attachment A' for No 4 above – or 'A' for No 1 above, 11pp.)

6. Project Definition New Western Sydney Museum

[New Western Sydney Museum 6 Project Definition](#)

(undated, Johnstaff, 'Attachment C' for No 1 above, 10pp)

7. Rationale

[New Western Sydney Museum 7 Rationale](#) (14 Feb, 2017; Johnstaff, 'Attachment BB' for No 1 above, 98pp)

10c. Development Options Assessment – Super Towers Options

[New Western Sydney Museum 10c Development Options Assessment – Super Towers Options](#)

(21 July 2017, Fender K)

24. Museum Benchmarking and Precedent Analysis

[New Western Sydney Museum 24 Museum Benchmarking and Precedent Analysis](#)

(undated, 2017? Fender Katsalidis Mirams Architects, for Johnstaff; analysis of 5 other museums, 99 pp.)Katsalidis Mirams Architects, for Johnstaff, 15pp)

22. Willingness to Pay Study

New Western Sydney Museum 22 Willingness to Pay Study

(Sept 2017, CaPPRe Pty Ltd, for Johnstaff, 'Attachment H' to No 1 above, 21pp)

7. Notes on comparative sizes and exhibition cost/operational considerations:

'The combined floor area of PHM at Ultimo is 42,594sqm, as detailed in Steensen Varming for Johnstaff, attachment F, The Ultimo Presence Project, 8 August 2017, p.13

In the approved option 3 design for the New Museum Western Sydney the floor space is 21,200sqm, of which only 11,000sqm is exhibition space, see Final Business case (Supplement) The New Museum in Western Sydney Johnstaff, version 6.0, 24 April 2018, option 3, p. 4.

See also Attachment I, Project Concept Options, The New Museum in Western Sydney, Fender Katsalidis Mirams Architects for Johnstaff, 20 September 2017, option 3 and final page for spaces and sizes.

So the NMWS is half the size of the PHM.

By reliable calculations in option 3, there will be just 10,500sqm is exhibition space, temporary, touring and long term. And only 5,200 are for long term galleries.

This means the NMWS will have 5,300 of temporary and touring space, including a primary touring hall of 1,500sqm. The Wran building temporary exhibition space is 1,800sqm. MAAS has not been able to fill this in recent years.

There is no known object based museum that has more than half its exhibition spaces allocated to temporary and touring exhibitions. People working on the NMWS must have no idea of the time and costs involved in the planning, research, design and construction of museum exhibitions. The staff time and exhibition development costs to service a museum like this will be considerable, and will require more curators, designers, conservators, registrars and fabricators. Let alone educators to engage the students and visitors.

Yet the business case is based on there being no increase to staff number or recurrent funding. It is a fantasy to think that MAAS can possibly support and sustain this level of changing exhibitions + another 4,000sqm in the 'Ultimo Presence', all with no increase to their staffing numbers or recurrent budget.

In recent years they have managed about one small new exhibition per annum. There's also this: Full Business Case, p. 67, Option 3 The large amount of gallery space within the option represents a significant additional recurrent expenditure cost to enable frequent turn-over. If the museum offering is not dynamic and changing there is a risk that visitation levels will not be maintained. Dependent upon the final design outcome, the floor area within the option and building footprint may not enable sufficient space for Government to realise planned development for the site necessary to off-set the capital costs.' JS/KW.