



APPROPRIATENESS OF 1ST RESPONSE AGREEMENT AT REDFERN

The 'current' (as at 16/02/04) Redfern First Response Policing Agreement (FRPA) was endorsed on 11 January 2000 by the then Redfern LAC Commander and relevant Police Association Representative. It outlines:

- 4 mobile units (officers) Sunday – Wednesday 24hrs per day
- 4 mobile units (officers) Thursday – Saturday AM shift
- 6 mobile units (officers) Thursday – Saturday PM shift.


Redfern 45 is a stationary unit located at Redfern Railway Station, and is not included as a mobile unit.

Information provided by Superintendent Smith is that Redfern LAC is traditionally rostered per intelligence with Sunday nights usually quiet, as it is all over the Sydney CBD.

INTELLIGENCE BASED 1ST RESPONSE AGREEMENT VS TRADITIONAL MODEL

All LAC 1st response agreements are based upon total calls for service quantified by timeframes to identify when the demand for Policing services are most necessary. Agreements are the subject of regular review by Local Area Commanders and Region Commanders. The Redfern LAC agreement is illustrated below.

Redfern LAC - Average Number of Calls for Service and
First Response Police Unit Comparison - Q 3 2003





The level of staffing at The Redfern LAC on the evening of 15 February 2004 was consistent with the demands for service upon the Command. A review of the 1st Response Agreement should be conducted by the Redfern Local Area Command.

The use of intelligence information is relative to the strategic planning and risk identification by Commands in developing a preparedness to adequately provide a policing response to the major issues specific to that LACs environment.

TURNOVER OF PERSONNEL THROUGH REDFERN LOCAL AREA COMMAND

Inquiries conducted include examination of the turnover of personnel through the Redfern LAC since 1 April 2003. Those inquiries reveal the following staff movements.

<u>Transfers IN</u>	Inspector	3
	Sergeant	6
	Constable	6
	Mounted Unit	5
<u>Transfers OUT</u>	Inspector	Nil
	Sergeant	3
	Constable	21
	Mounted Unit	1

With the addition of Probationary Constables during that period the Command currently has 28 personnel in over strength positions.

(Source : Inner Metropolitan Region Human Resources Manager)


DELAY IN ADDITIONAL POLICE RESOURCES BEING CALLED AND ARRIVING AT THE SCENE

Strike Force Coburn found delays in calling additional Police resources occurred on 15 – 16 February 2004. The nature and cause of the delays by way of summary include:

- Delays in the arrival of additional OSG personnel following an alleged misunderstanding by Inspector Snell and Inspector Emery regarding requested equipment and personnel.
- Delays in the call out of POLAIR following discussion between the scene and VKG at 10:15pm. During that call discussion between Inspector Chambers and Detective Inspector Bennett related to the Air Wing was being on duty, call out was neither requested or offered. Inspector Chambers only advised that POLAIR personnel completed duty at 6.00pm.
- Delays in the arrival of additional OSG police from other LACs across Sydney, after it was realised the 20 OSG officers requested by Inspector Emery at the scene had not been mobilised. (*refer 1st point above*).



POLICE AND EQUIPMENT



ROLE OF OPERATIONS SUPPORT COMMAND AND OTHER SCARE RESOURCES

The roll and call out arrangements for scarce resources after hours are summarised as follows:

SCARCE RESOURCES

Police Media Unit)	Support from these sections is arranged
Video Unit)	through the DOI during an incident upon the
Mounted Unit)	decision being made by the Commander to
Police Air Wing)	utilise them.
Dog Unit)	
Transport section)	
Special Services Group)	
Education Services)	
Police Chaplains & Welfare)	
OIA)	
Police Rescue)	

REGION OFFICE RESOURCES

Operations Manager)	Call outs, Intelligence & Environmental
Region Intelligence Co-Ordinators)	analysis, OSG personnel, equipment and
OSG Co-Ordinator)	training.



LOCAL AREA COMMANDS

Commander)	Preparation & Awareness of the
Crime Manager)	Command to identified risks.
Crime Co-Ordinator)	Strategic planning and tactical
Investigations Manager)	options. Crime Management Unit
Intelligence Analysts & Field Intelligence)	ongoing analysis, monitoring LAC
Education & Development Officer)	risks and environment.

CURRENT STATUS AND CALL OUT PROTOCOLS OF SUPPORT UNITS

A number of support units have roles in policing responses to both planned and unplanned incidents of public order & civil unrest.

MEDIA UNIT

The unit was contacted and a member attended Redfern Police Station at 10.20pm, travelling to the scene in the company of the Local Area Commander.

The Media Unit have a Call Out policy managed through the Duty Operations Inspector and if necessary the manager of the Media Unit. It has been reviewed and is now considered appropriate.

No prior warning was received by the unit from any external media sources - this is not surprising as it would be in the interest of external media organisations for an incident to occur.

VIDEO UNIT

A member of the unit was called out through the DOI around 2.00am - arriving at Redfern at 2.30am.

The video unit have call out protocols to provide 24 hour support. It is managed through the DOI and if necessary in consultation with the Manager of the Video Unit.

The Redfern riot confirmed they do not possess suitable equipment for the service they were required to provide in relation to evidence gathering.

The unit's cameras are designed for recording of Crime Scenes and similar roles and don't effectively capture vision of sufficient quality to be utilised for identification of offenders in crowds. (The Special Services Group have the desired capability.)

From 7.46pm a video camera from Redfern LAC was brought to the scene by Sgt Baxter and used to film the incident, it however experienced power difficulties.



MOUNTED UNIT

Information is that the Unit contacted a supervisor at Redfern Police Station approximately 8.30pm and offered their services to assist in the riot however it was declined. An option of personnel only was also offered to attend and assist as the Unit has the capacity to call out 12 – 18 officers if necessary, however this too was declined.

Discussions with the Commander of the Mounted Unit indicated there were a number of tactical options available to assist the Redfern Commander on this night by the use of horses.

Call out is through the DOI. The Mounted Unit do training incorporating public order and their deployment with OSG.

The unit has been utilised during a number of public order operations. The unit is equipped for incidents similar to the Redfern riot despite not being requested. Superintendent Smith indicated his reluctance to use this unit was due to concerns for potential injuries to intoxicated youth.

The Mounted Unit provided details of a quantity of protective equipment the unit requests in their submission to Strike Force Coburn for use in Public Order incidents. The current protective equipment the unit utilises should be evaluated to ensure it remains appropriate. Possible advantages of round shields and other additional protective equipment should be discussed between the Inner Metropolitan Region Commander and the Commander of the Mounted Unit.

POLICE AIR WING

At 10.15pm the POLAIR was called for by the Duty Officer at Redfern to the DOI who advised POLAIR was not available, having concluded duties at 6.00pm. It was not until 2.05am that the DOI advised Assistant Commissioner Waites that the Air Wing had been contacted and was responding. POLAIR were subsequently above the scene within one hour. The DOI stated he was not requested at that time to call out the Air Wing.

Given the situation that a Signal One had been called an hour earlier and Police were being injured, the DOI in what appears to be efforts to keep Police responses to the situation as “low key”, only advised that the Air Wing was not on duty. He failed to advise of the protocols for a call-out regardless of being requested to or not. Conversely requests for Polair should have been pressed by Redfern personnel.

The capacity of the Air Wing to provide support is significantly more than tactical advice to Commanders at the scene. When integrated with the capabilities of the Special Services Group this can provide a powerful investigative tool.

The ability of the unit includes the potential to improve the information / intelligence flow into Command Posts with a significantly effective capacity to identify offenders from video footage when deployed in conjunction with the SSG.

In the near future this capacity can be further enhanced as an investigative tool through the ongoing development of the Phototrac project.



DOG SQUAD

Call out of Dog Squad support is managed through the DOI and VKG. Five Dog Squad units responded to the Redfern incident with two of the dogs injured.

Advice from the unit confirmed no known equipment anywhere in the world which would prevent the injuries sustained by the animals deployed at Redfern.

The Dog Squad call out policy has been altered. In the future event of a call out to a situation similar to Redfern, a Dog Squad Liaison Officer of Commissioned Rank will also respond, attending the Command Post. This officer will provide advice relating to the capabilities of this resource.

TRANSPORT SECTION

At 11.20pm an option was discussed relating to the use of prison vans to facilitate arrests. This option was dismissed due to the non-availability of drivers on duty or on call.

Issues in relation to the capabilities of this unit need to be considered in conjunction with recommended policy improvements. They relate to arrest procedures and prisoner security, transport and charging options. (Recommendation)

There will be significant differences in processes necessary to address the needs of Metropolitan Regions compared to rural locations.

Presently within the Metropolitan area on occasions where offenders have been arrested at such incidents, despite field arrest processes being relatively well known, they are rarely adopted. Arrest photographs can now be enhanced and simplified through the use of digital photography.

When a field arrest system is not in place arrests have tended to be avoided, since they result in a rapid depletion of available Police personnel when occupied transporting and charging rather than utilising those arrest procedures. This has severely diminished the tactical options available to Commanders in the management of planned incidents let alone unplanned.

Within Metropolitan Regions adequately staffed Prison Vans should be available to be deployed to a scene of unplanned as well as Planned operations.

They should be managed, and assembled under the direction of a nominated individual (Duty Officer/Team Leader).


When obtained as a support capacity they will provide Prisoner security and transportation without reducing the tactical options available to Commanders in resolving an incident.

Other alternatives as a response capacity for unplanned incidents are necessary for non Metropolitan Regions. Options could include access to Corrective Services vehicles at short notice or securing charge locations in combination with revised prisoner processing practices.



SPECIAL SERVICES GROUP (SSG)

A call out capability exists at present, managed through the DOI and Commander SSG. A maximum response time of 2 hours to any location within the Metropolitan Regions has been indicated.



Primarily there is an awareness shortfall for Commanders regarding the capacities of this unit. Their deployment could significantly improve the evidence gathering capacities of the organisation in relation to incidents similar to the Redfern riot.

POLICE RESCUE SQUAD

At 9.07pm officers from the Rescue Squad were in attendance at the Redfern riot providing support immediately behind the police line, particularly in relation to injured officers.

This unit is available on a 24/7 basis via the DOI and can provide lighting, forms of accommodation and stand down areas for Police.

WELFARE SERVICES

The DOI was not requested to call out any welfare services personnel and consequently none were contacted. There are five full time Chaplains with a network of part time assistants, and three full time psychologists. Call out of these personnel is via the DOI.

NEGOTIATORS UNIT

The unit may have a role in such incidents, with call out being arranged through the DOI, to the Commander Negotiators Unit Det Insp Abel. Contact between Insp Abel and the Commander of an incident allows for evaluation of the situation and if deemed appropriate, call out of a Negotiating team of four officers.

No request was made for negotiators. Some negotiating was undertaken by the Redfern Crime Manager, who by virtue of his rank is no longer accredited as a negotiator, although does have recent experience in the field.



The Redfern incident has highlighted opportunities for the improvement of skills for Supervisors, Duty Officers and Commanders at the scenes of riots, particularly in the areas of Command and Control, and tactics. It is recommended that Education Services consider enhancing the training for the following officers.

Target Audience	Type of training enhancement
Recruit Training	Familiarisation with riot equipment and basic public order management tactics. Scenario based training as part of officer survival training should be considered.
General Duties Training	Familiarisation with riot equipment and basic public order management tactics. Scenario based training as part of officer survival training should be considered (incorporated into DEFTAC training annually). Introductory emergency management concepts. Training to be rolled out to high risk LAC's in priority order.
Local Area Commanders, Duty Officers and Supervisors Training	Additional Command and Control, Command post establishment and civil unrest management.

WELFARE

The Redfern incident identified opportunities to improve the welfare support services provided to injured police following incidents of this nature. Police Chaplains were not contacted despite a call out process being in place.

Protocols exist in relation to high risk or critical incidents, however it is apparent from a Welfare point of view that a timely response from these services was overlooked. Support was eventually forthcoming albeit not timely, and officers had access to and utilised services of the Police Chaplains and Psychologists counselling.

Leading Senior Constable McGowan received a significant head injury during the incident, and was conveyed to hospital. He provided opinion regarding actions taken in relation to his welfare. Inquiries have established that shortly after his arrival at hospital a Duty Officer from Ashfield Local Area Command visited him, as well as a Constable from Ashfield advising him of his wife's impending arrival.

Later during the day while still in hospital, LSC McGowan was also visited by two representatives of the Police Association, a Police Chaplain and two Sergeants from Ashfield LAC. On the officer's release from hospital he was taken home by his wife.

On the day following his release LSC McGowan received phone calls from Deputy Commissioner Madden and the Premier of NSW Mr Carr. His Local Area Commander Superintendent Graham contacted him daily for the remainder of the week in relation to his welfare.



REST & REFRESHMENT OF POLICE

There is a combination of reports indicating both sufficient and insufficient levels of water were provided to Police during the riot. Available bottled water at the SPC was not taken to Redfern with OSG equipment to Redfern, but bottled water was however obtained from a local outlet and provided to Police.

It was reported that when a second line of Police had been formed beyond the range of the offenders' missiles, officers were rotated between that line and the front line, providing them the opportunity to drink and rest before being rotated back into the front line.

Arrangements to supply police in the field with appropriate refreshments from organised suppliers are in place and is managed upon activation of the Police Operations Centre for a planned event utilising resources beyond the local level. If the incident remains at LAC level, the responsibility remains with that Command.

The Redfern incident required a response where meals could have been arranged from the POC if requested. As the POC was not activated for the Redfern incident, that assistance was not sourced, and meals were arranged at a local level.

INJURIES

Of the 45 officers and 2 Police Dogs injured, the injuries received were generally either to the head and shoulders or legs and feet. Injuries to legs and feet were recorded at a ratio of 2:1 of all injuries. 80% (40) of Police injuries occurred whilst officers were in the front line, with an unknown number of officers injured whilst attempting to extract already injured officers from this front line. Other officers were injured whilst performing duties as part of arrest teams.

This supports a recommendation for consideration of Long Shields for General Duties officers pending the deployment of OSG officers, since only 7 of the 45 Police injured were OSG personnel.

REGION RESPONSIBILITIES

Regions have been identified as having a significant role not only in the response to public order incidents but also in enhancing the preparedness of Local Area Commands to such incidents, as is the case in relation to Critical Incidents, High Risk incidents or Serious Crime.

REGION OPERATIONS MANAGER

The phone call between Inspector Emery and Inspector Snel at 9.30pm had a significant impact on Police operations relating to the riot. Inspector Snel was relieving in the role of Region Operations Manager and has stated Inspector Emery did not ask for 20 OSG officers, only for equipment. Inspector Emery states he asked for both. There are subsequent references from Command personnel at the scene in conversations demonstrating an expectation by them of the arrival of 20 OSG officers.



The role of the Operations Manager is pivotal in relation to the effectiveness of Call Out procedures, particularly for Region support resources such as OSG. The position should also be responsible for the management and accountability of such resources, their equipment maintenance and storage including models for their deployment.

The Region Operations Manager must be able to respond to a situation by mobilising resources to a pre-arranged degree, advising the Commander at the scene of what support is being deployed.

Region Commanders rely upon the Operations Manager to ensure the existence of a high level of preparedness to deal with incidents which may arise.

Additionally front line Police rely upon this officer's capabilities to effectively act in concert with the DOI as the central co-ordinating officer for deployment of support resources when incidents occur. Communications confusion possibly contributed to the initial OSG staffing deficiencies experienced at Redfern.

It is also incumbent upon this role to keep the Region Commander apprised by having an effective and accurate knowledge of the potential risks facing Commands. This officer must ensure the capacity of a Command to address identified contingencies is adequate, and develop the Region's capabilities to ensure an adequate capacity to provide timely, appropriate support to those Commands.

REGION INTELLIGENCE CO-ORDINATOR

This role should have sufficiently functional intelligence networks to recognise and alert the Region Commander, Region Operations Manager and Local Area Commands of the indicators of the potential for an incident to take place. The role should provide strategic analysis of identified significant risks to individual commands, and issues impacting across Commands and Regions to assist in the preparedness of the organisation to deal with incidents.

The absence of any such intelligence from the Redfern community or the LAC field intelligence, together with a degree of acceptance of brick throwing at Police in that area hampered the effectiveness of predicting the incident.

OSG ADVICE TO LOCAL AREA COMMANDS (OSG COMMISSIONED OFFICER)

During the riot, the only advice available to the Operation Commander in relation to capabilities and tactics of the OSG was from officers of the rank of Senior Constable and Sergeant. These officers were only trained to the level of OSG Team Leader, usually performing duties as either a Weapons Instructor or a General Duties Team Leader. These officers were unable to effectively discuss tactical options at Command Level with the Operation Commander.

During the riot after Superintendent Smith had requested additional Police to be sent to the scene, this was countermanded by Sergeant Shearer from the OSG who stated only OSG trained officers should attend.



The presence of an OSG trained Commissioned Officer, experienced in managing teams of OSG in situations such as that riot would have assisted the officers commanding the operation. Such an experienced adviser at the Command Post could assist through the provision of accurate, and achievable tactical options for command personnel to consider, while commanding the OSG officers as a specialist unit on behalf of the operation commander and in accordance with his directions.

LAC CRIME MANAGEMENT UNITS (CMU)

The CMU includes the Crime Co-Ordinator (manager), the Intelligence Supervisor (monitoring environmental awareness), field intelligence officers and various liaison officers. The Education and Development Officer (EDO) has input in terms of preparedness, skills maintenance and induction of new personnel to the Command.

CMUs are required to undertake an analysis of their environment to identify potential planned and unplanned public order management incidents as part of their risk management function. Such analysis should include evaluation of the LAC's capacity to effectively respond to and investigate these public order type incidents. The outcome of the analysis should enhance the collective awareness and preparedness of the LAC to deal with risks identified.

The below table displays the strategic roles and responsibilities of a CMU:

Planning function	Responsibility
Risk Identification by Commands	CMU.
Intelligence collection and analysis	CMU / Region Intelligence Strategist.
SOPs – development, implementation and communication	Duty Officers, Command Management Teams and Region Operations Manager.
The skills base and career development of Command personnel.	EDOs / Local Area Commander / Region Human Resource Co-ordinator
Staff induction processes ensuring risk and SOP awareness	EDOs
Planning incorporating an Investigation Plan for responses to such events.	Investigations Managers, Crime Managers and CMU.
Resource Management including equipment.	Selected Duty Officers/Crime Manager and the EDO.




EXPERIENCE LEVELS AT REDFERN DURING RIOT

Strike Force Coburn identified approximately 250 Police attended the riot, with a summary of these personnel listed below.

All Personnel Present


- 21% (55) of the total of those officers were Probationary Constables.
- 14% (37) of the total of those officers were OSG trained officers.
- 17% (45) of the total officers present were injured.






REDFERN LAC

- 11% (29) of the total officers in attendance are stationed at Redfern.
- 44% (13) of personnel from Redfern in attendance were Probationary Constables.
- 17% (16) of personnel from Redfern in attendance were injured.



OSG PERSONNEL

- 77% (28) of total OSG personnel present were from Inner Metropolitan Region
- 23% (9) of total OSG personnel present were from Greater Metropolitan Region
- 16% (6) of total OSG personnel present were injured.






POLICE INJURIES

Total Injuries 42 officers

Ranks of Officers Injured:	Supt.	1
	Insp	1
	Sgt	5
	LSC	2
	S/Con	12
	Consts	11
	P/Con	8



FINDINGS - STAFFING:

1. The proportion of Probationary Constables to the total staffing of Redfern Local Area Command is consistent with other Commands in the Region.
2. The level of staffing at The Redfern LAC on the evening of 15 February 2004 was consistent with the demands for service upon the Command.
3. Over three quarters of the officers in attendance at Redfern were higher in rank than Probationary Constable. The officers present in terms of years of service in the NSW Police cannot be considered an issue.
4. Delays in the arrival of additional OSG personnel followed an alleged misunderstanding between the Inner Metropolitan Region Operations Manager and Duty Officer.
5. Despite the lack of timeliness in their mobilisation, sufficient OSG trained personnel were eventually present at Redfern.
- 5a. Other than some personnel from Redfern LAC or other General Duties Police who responded to the Redfern riot have had no public order / riot training.
6. It was necessary to obtain OSG officers from those personnel on duty throughout Sydney when it was established the 20 OSG officers requested by the Duty Officer had not been arranged by the Region Operations Manager.



7. The insufficient use of the support services listed, such as Welfare, SSG, Mounted Unit, Negotiators and others highlights the need for the capabilities of those units to be marketed to Commanders.
8. No Prison Vans or Transport Unit personnel were available to facilitate transport for multiple arrests.
9. Following discussion between the Crime Manager at the scene and the DOI at VKG at 1015 hours the DOI failed to adequately communicate options available re call-out of POLAIR, equally the request should have been pursued by Insp Bennett.
10. Actions undertaken concerning the welfare of injured personnel could have improved by initiating call outs to Counsellors, Chaplains or both.
11. Crime Management Units need to conduct thorough environmental analysis of their LACs to identify the risks to their Command.
12. Injuries to the legs of officers accounted for the injuries to Police at a ratio of 2:1, highlighting the need to assess the type of protective equipment required by General Duties police such as Long Shields pending deployment of OSG.
13. The current protective equipment on issue to the Mounted Unit requires review, from an OH & S and operational effectiveness perspective, to ensure its adequacy to protect officers and horses and maintain their capacity to respond and assist in incidents such as Redfern.
14. Insufficient training is provided to NSW Police in relation to public order management in relation to unplanned incidents.
15. The attendance of an OSG advisor of Commissioned Officer rank at the riot could have been of assistance to the forward commander.

RECOMMENDATIONS - STAFFING

1. No action is necessary in relation to the staffing levels of Redfern Local Area Command.
2. A review of the 1st Response Agreement should be conducted by the Redfern Local Area Command.
3. No action is necessary in relation to the amount of Probationary Constables that attended the riot
4. A preferred option for OSG structure be implemented to ensure adequate availability of appropriately trained Police to respond to unplanned events.
5. Training is required for all operational personnel in public order management / riot control tactics.



6. Region Operations Managers and DOI's utilise the Duty Officer's Manual checklists to allow them to provide adequate resource management of an incident by evaluating matters in the same terms as officers at the scene.
7. The nature of the roles of support units should be marketed and reinforced to DOI's, LAC Commanders, Duty Officers, and Supervisors.
8. Within Metropolitan regions adequately staffed prison vans must be available to be deployed to the scene of unplanned as well as planned operations, together with related arrest plans. Rural regions need to reassess their needs and develop appropriate arrangements accordingly.
9. As per RECOMMENDATION 7
10. DOI's, Commanders, Duty Officers and Supervisors need to be reminded of the welfare services available for personnel.
11. Crime Management Units of all Commands prepare strategic plans for employment of predetermined tactical options and investigative response plans in the event of identified possible incidents occurring.
12. The type of protective equipment (eg. Long shields) available for use by General Duties police should be reviewed by the OSTTU.
13. Commander of the Mounted Unit review the adequacy of the Unit's protective equipment and the need for additional and possible alternative protective riot equipment.
14. Training to be provided in the following areas:
 - a) In basic public order policing and use of protective equipment commencing at recruit level for all operational personnel, similar to that provided to Redfern officers.
 - b) For DOIs in relation to communication of available options for field commanders.
 - c) For Supervisors, Duty Officers and Commanders in relation to public order management, tactics, leadership, decision making and incident command and control, specifically including unplanned incidents.
15. An experienced OSG trained officer of Commissioned rank should be called out/deployed to assist operation commanders.

COMMAND & CONTROL

The overall strategic and tactical management of police was considered poor throughout the whole evening of the riot. There was a lack of direction for police, particularly those attending the scene from LACs other than Redfern. The co-ordination of specialist units and protective equipment was also inadequate and a cause of the poor Police response.



The Command Post was a police vehicle that was often not manned, and located in an inappropriate position, considering the proximity to the riot scene. Assembly areas were identified and broadcasted, however, there was little direction for the police at these locations.

Outlined below are some of the observations made by police who performed duties at the riot-

"Upon arrival a scene of emergency vehicle chaos greeted us. There were police cars parked backwards, forwards, locked, unlocked and blocking roads. The same applied to fire trucks. There would have been 40 to 50 civilians standing around the emergency vehicles. Were they involved in the riot? Who were they? Where do we go now? What do we do?"

"We parked our caged truck, walked about 40 metres towards a large crowd of over 100 police. They looked like GD's. They were standing willy, nilly in no order just talking amongst themselves. A quick look of the rank indicated most were probationary constables or had one stripe on their shoulder, (our real front line). I then saw 15 to 20 commissioned officers standing about 15 metres away, in a huddle. Most were on mobile phones."

"The only reason we moved into Eveleigh Street was because the offenders went to bed, not any tactical movement or result of any management decision. I know the political implications and criticism that would have been made if we had charged the line and made mass arrests. Sirs 50 police were injured as they were standing in a line being hit by objects. If you didn't want us to move in and adopt a softer approach that's fine, but you should have not left us standing in the line."

"Once at this location we attempted to liaise with the LAC and his four commissioned representatives. During this liaison very little information or direction was given. It was clear to not only the GAIN police, but other police, that there was no command or control being asserted over the situation."

"On several occasions 'rioters' were allowed to walk past police lines and attend local shops. One of these persons seemed to be one of the main agitators. We took the initiative of sealing off the area with crime scene tape."

"Our feelings after the fact are that it was not a great night for the NSW Police Service. We finished the shift with a feeling of disgust and embarrassment."

"What was apparent was the lack of leadership and direction on the ground. There appeared to be lots of Police standing around upon my arrival but very few seemed to know what to do. The apparent Command Post for this incident was clearly identifiable, being a marked police sedan. Yet there were few, if any, Commanders at this location upon my arrival. There was no officer in charge, taking names and directing staff to particular locations relevant to their duty type."

I would have expected to find a Senior Officer wearing a Site Controller tabard, the next most senior wearing a Forward Commander tabard and numerous Inspectors/Duty Officers performing specific tasks as per IESOPS".

The last quote finishes off with IESOPS, that is, Incident and Emergency Standing Operating Procedures. These procedures, completed in 2001, are an updated version of Major Incident/Emergency Standing Operating Procedures. (MIESOPS) compiled in 1996.



IESOPS set out:

- the functions of the various Police Sections/Units and how they can be of assistance;
- information in regard to the availability of resources, not only police resources but also those belonging to other agencies; and
- the emergency management arrangements provided for in the State Emergency and Rescue Management Act, 1989.

Definitions of Command, Control, Command Post, Assembly Areas, amongst others are also outlined, along with checklists and a Guide for Police Commanders at Incidents and Emergencies. From information and submissions received IESOPS were not followed in these areas –

- Command
- Control
- Command Post
- Marshalling area
- Completing of Logs
- Tactics

IESOPS are adequate for emergency management responses, which are usually after the event, however, very little information is available for unplanned civil disorder and responding to confrontation matters. There is no mention of riot, civil disorder or Operation Support Group throughout IESOPS. Crowd control is outlined in these procedures but only relative to sightseers and spectators at planned events.

IESOPS need to be urgently reviewed to assist police in the professional response to unplanned civil disorder.

OUTLINE OF ACTIVITIES RELATING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COMMAND POST:

20:51 Inspector Emery informs Inspector Chambers of need for replacements of day shift staff. He indicates Superintendent Smith wants police to keep low key. Inspector Emery also states rocks and bricks being thrown, but not landing within 30 feet of police.

20:56 A conversation between Inspector Emery and Inspector Chambers outlines the disorder escalating. Approximately 200 persons have charged at police who had to retreat, and there was no emergency or OSG response available.

Events between 21:00 and 22:15 on Sunday 15 February 2004.

21:00 Mr Hall reports staff are expressing concern things are getting out of hand at the Railway Station. He advises them to close their work- stations and go home. Four staff leave and two remain.

21:02 Redfern 14 requested to attend the location Lawson and Gibbons Streets by Inspector Garth Smith with riot gear.



- 21:04** A 'SIGNAL ONE' was called by Redfern 45 at the intersection of Lawson and Gibbons Street.
- 21:06** Inspector Smith directs all cars to the Command Post at the corner of Gibbons and Lawson Streets.
- 21:15** Mr Hall is informed by the Rail Management Centre to evacuate the railway station.
- 21:28** Petrol bombs being thrown in the direction of police. Bottles and bricks being thrown at police, with attempts to set fire to the railway station. Fire Brigade is summoned. Inspector Emery states they were just charged by 'a couple of hundred' causing police to retreat. Emery reports to Inspector Chambers 'they are gearing up to do it again'. He further states there is no emergency or OSG response. Inspector Chambers looks for the on call officer and OPS Manager phone numbers for Inspector Emery.
- 21:29** Inspector Emery contacts relieving Operations Manager Inspector Snel requesting OSG equipment and personnel. This request is in adherence with the Redfern Standard Operating Procedures for the 'block' dated March 1998. Inspector Snel later reports being asked for equipment only.
- 21:31** Fire at Redfern Railway Station. Inspector Chambers has requested no trains to stop at the Station.
- 21:42** Inspector Snell briefed by Inspector Chambers via phone.
- 21:45** Ambulance requested to treat four or five injured police.
- 22:03** Sergeant James Shearer, OSG, had been contacted by Sergeant Wade – OSG Commander – to arrange for equipment to be taken to Redfern. Cannot contact the LAC Commander of Redfern, but is given the location of the Command Post.
- 22:05** The crowd advanced and Inspector Smith gave permission for the police line to advance. A number of police are hurt and removed.
- 22:15** Redfern Crime Manager, Detective Inspector Darren Bennett, contacts Inspector Chambers and asks if a helicopter is on duty. He is told no.

COMMANDERS OPERATIONAL PHASE

Sunday 15 February 2004

- 22:20** Superintendent Smith arrives at the Command Post. Superintendent Smith gives the reason for additional resources taking so long to arrive as there was a presumption at 9.00pm equipment and 20 OSG were coming. As the night progressed it was evident there was a need for more police.
- 22:50** The OSG van arrives with protective equipment, Inspector Chambers contacts Police Media Unit (PMU).



23:09 Superintendent Adney, Deputy Commissioners Office, contacts Inspector Chambers indicating she had just spoken to Superintendent Smith, whom wants '20 more staff, anyone'. Inspector Chambers states Eastern Suburbs 10 informed him only 20 OSG were wanted. Superintendent Adney states Smith wants as many police as he can get. Inspector Chambers states everyone available from the 'City' is already there, but he will try and get 20 more personnel for Superintendent Smith.

(At this point there was still no apparent realisation that the 20 OSG requested at 9.30pm had not arrived at Redfern, or have not actually been requested.) During his interview with Assistant Commissioner Laycock on 4 March 2004, Superintendent Smith states, 'Contacted Donna Adney two or three times, requesting help. I felt the gravity of the situation wasn't being understood and I contacted Adney to get more help.'

23:10 Superintendent Smith requests 20 OSG and 20 other police from Inspector Chambers through Superintendent Adney. Inspector Chambers states 'every available police officer in the city is there'.

23:25 Inspector Snel rings Superintendent Smith to see if OSG personnel are required, but his mobile is engaged. She speaks to Inspector Emery and states there was no request for OSG personnel.

23:30 Superintendent Smith contacts Assistant Commissioner Waites, stating the situation was under control and there were only 30 people involved in some rowdy behaviour.

This is in conflict with Superintendent Smith's earlier conversation with Superintendent Adney, some 20 minutes earlier. However there were fluctuations in riotous behaviour throughout the night, and this conversation may have occurred during a quiet period.

23:34 Superintendent Smith is informed by Inspector Chambers he can only raise 5 more police and questions whether OSG on the way. Superintendent Smith was not able to confirm this and asked for the assistance of the State Protection Group (SPG).

23:40 Inspector Snel contacts Inspector Chambers requesting prison trucks for Redfern.

Monday 16 February 2004

00:16 City Rail contact VKG to ascertain how long trains will be stopped from going through Redfern.

00:30 Inspector Smith states a large group of persons were gathering at Eveleigh Street and made several advances upon police throwing rocks and bottles.

00:57 Inspector Chambers receives information that police were going to advance as the railway was being 'trashed'. Inspector Emery states police are out numbered as there are '150 upon them', and 30 to 40 more Police are required.

01:00 Senior Sergeant Wade receives a request from Superintendent Smith by phone for 20 OSG. This request is approved by Inspector Snel.



-
- 01:15** Superintendent Smith contacted Assistant Commissioner Waites indicating he required further police as there were now 100 extra rioters and police were being attacked with rocks, bricks and bottles. Assistant Commissioner Waites leaves his home address to attend Redfern.
- 01:19** Superintendent Smith contacts Inspector Chambers requesting more police stating there are police who have been on duty for 18 hours, and they'll be lucky to 'hold' Redfern Police Station. DOI states OSG on the way but can't say how many.
- 01:37** Sunday 16 February, Assistant Commissioner Waites calls Inspector Chambers requesting 30 to 50 more police, indicating his E.T.A. to Redfern is approximately 10 to 15 minutes.
- 01:47** Assistant Commissioner Waites informs Inspector Chambers that Molotov cocktails are being thrown and he requires something to deflect them.
- 01:50** Sergeant O'Riordan loads 50 sets of riot equipment at the SPC for transport to Redfern.
- 02:00** Lee Wood at Polair is contacted by Inspector Chambers.
- 02:00** Assistant Commissioner Waites rings Senior Sergeant Wade requesting availability of chemical munitions with a negative result.
- 02:04** A CIDS message outlines the Fire Brigade have withdrawn due to safety issues and have handed equipment over to police. The Fire Brigade indicated they are of the belief there are not enough police on hand.
- 02:05** Inspector Chambers informed Assistant Commissioner Waites that a helicopter had been called out, and did he want the video unit?
- 02:10** Inspector Chambers calls the video unit out.
- 02:14** Superintendent Smith informed Inspector Chambers he was using NSWFB hose to manage rioters.
- 02:30** Sergeant O'Riordan arrives and distributes riot equipment.
- 02:37** Assistant Commissioner Waites informs Inspector Chambers there are sufficient police but insufficient protective equipment and requests more.
- 02:53** Alan (nfi) from Minister of Transport's Office calls Inspector Chambers to confirm if trains are running.
- 02:58** Inspector Chambers contacts Assistant Commissioner Waites and informs him the van with protective equipment will be there in 10 minutes, and that he had not had any contact from Polair.
- 03:00** Sergeant O'Riordan conducts a briefing with OSG team leaders.
- 03:03** Lee Wood for Polair indicated to VKG that Polair was airborne and would be overhead within a few minutes.
-



03:14

(i)

03:26 Inspector Smith indicated that all lines advanced.

03:30 Sergeant O'Riordan states that a tactical approach was commenced at 3.30am. During the approach and whilst holding the perimeter nil rioters were sighted.

03:36 Superintendent Smith requested Polair to light up Eveleigh Street.

03:51 Inspector Smith declares 'Area under Control'.



Visiting police also indicated they were not aware who was in Command. No one was wearing vests which indicate roles of police at such events.

SITE CO-ORDINATION

There was no person in charge of the actual Command Post to direct police to a marshalling area (not established), assembly area (not clearly established), stand down area (not established), first aid area (not established) and direction as to what was requested of Ambulance and Fire Brigade personnel.

Police accounts indicate members of the public were allowed to walk past the police line and into the area where the incidents were occurring.

Superintendent Dennis Smith could have considered the Police Operations Centre (POC) earlier in the night. Later he wanted Assistant Commissioner Waites to come on site so they could 'show seniority'. There was no apparent appreciation of the value of the POC, which could have been set up and managed by police trained for this purpose. The POC could have been opened in the absence of Assistant Commissioner Waites attendance, and staffed by Police trained for this purpose.

OPERATIONAL LOGS

Inspector Garth Smith was the only officer identified as having produced a log relating to requests and decisions, albeit these notes were not contemporaneous. Assistant Commissioner Waites reports nominating two Inspectors as staff officers to record decisions, but they absented themselves as the riot abated.

FOLLOW-UP OF REQUESTS

20 OSG personnel were reported to have been requested at 9.30pm and due to a misunderstanding did not arrive until 1.30am, causing detriment in the ability to respond to the disorder. Minimal follow up was undertaken by the Duty Officer, Commander or DOI to confirm expected times of arrival, additionally hindering Police responsiveness to the riot.

Twenty sets of protective equipment arrived at Redfern at 10.49pm, followed by additional equipment transported to the scene at 1.50am. More equipment arrived at 2.30am.

DECISION MAKING

Submissions received by Strike Force Coburn indicated reports of site chaos, lack of co-ordination and limited briefings by the Duty Officers who set up the Command Post.

Whilst an inquiry made about the availability of Polair brought about a negative result, its non availability should not have been so readily accepted. If Polair had illuminated Eveleigh Street earlier Police may have become aware of the number of those rioting and used more options.



It was clear the rioters were intending to cause police harm with the sheer volume of bricks, bottles and Molotov cocktails thrown. Support units, such as the Mounted Police were not used as Superintendent Smith indicated he believed 'intoxicated youths may have been injured'. This led to the questionable tactics of police standing in a line attempting to hold their ground whilst being 'pelted' with missiles.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

At one stage Superintendent Smith was in the front line during the use of the fire hose, any decisions made whilst there were purely tactical and only communicated to a few police nearby. Similarly when Assistant Commissioner Waites took Command he was positioned close to the police line, stating he wanted to support the troops who appeared frightened.

Reports submitted to Strike Force Coburn indicate there was a lack of clear direction communicated from the senior Police throughout the evening in relation to tactics and deployment options of Police. This particularly related to Police from LACs other than Redfern. Assistant Commissioner Waites states the riot was prolonged due to the lack of sound tactical decisions.

WHAT ROLE DID (OR SHOULD) THE OPERATIONS SUPPORT GROUP (OSG) PLAY IN THE EVENTS OF 15-16 FEBRUARY 2004?

OSG ROLE:

The role of the OSG is to provide operational support on a 24 hour basis to LAC/Regions in situations falling within the charter of Operations Support Group. They can be utilised in support of any Policing operation where a highly disciplined response team is required. This includes support activities where specialist protective equipment may be utilised but does not include the resolution of high risk situations, involving armed offenders.

CHARTER OF THE OSG:

The OSG can be utilised to support Commanders in the following situations:

- Events where crowds are anticipated
- Protests and demonstrations
- Searches for improvised explosive devices,
- Searched for evidence, persons and property
- Canvassing
- Emergency incidents
- Security at Correctional/Juvenile Justice institutions
- Policing operations including but not limited to antisocial behaviour, saturation patrols, crime enforcement operations and support to specialist units.
- Safe movement of violent prisoners
- Chemical, Biological and Radiation response.

There is sufficient information in the SPG's 'Role' document and the OSG 'Charter' document to indicate the SPG and OSG have differing functions in Policing. The OSG is Region based with no current statewide centralisation and / or coordination structure.



ACTUAL ROLE OF OSG ON 15–16 FEBRUARY 2004:

Sunday 150204

1812 Inspector Emery contacts Inspector Chambers re the availability of OSG and Vikings resources. Inspector Chambers advised that neither of those groups were operational at that time to his knowledge.

2104 There was a charge by a group of the rioters leading to a tactical withdrawal by Police.

2128 Insp Emery conferred with Inspector Chambers, looking for O.S.G. personnel. Inspector Emery is given the phone number for the Region Operations Manager, Inspector Snel.

2130 Insp Emery rings Insp Snel and asks for 20 OSG riot outfits and 20 OSG personnel.

The message was interpreted by Inspector Snel that there was a requirement for 20 OSG riot outfits. Insp Snel contacted the OSG Coordinator, Sgt Wade, who organised the OSG equipment to be delivered to the riot scene. At that time, Supt Smith and Inspector Emery and Smith believed 20 OSG personnel were being organised to attend via callout.

2200 Sgt Shearer, an OSG Field Supervisor, who, acting as a duty officer at Eastern Suburbs Command, begins involvement while at his station.

2223 An OSG supervisor calls on air for a sitrep and then goes and picks up equipment.

2248 OSG equipment truck and two supervisors call off at the Redfern Command Post at Lawson and Gibbons St.

These OSG supervisors noted that there was a Police line of 14 officers wearing dated riot equipment. The OSG officers immediately went to the rear of the OSG equipment truck, removing 18 shields, a quantity of leggings, 12 ballistic vests and 18 helmets.

2300 Supt Smith still believes that 20 OSG are on the way.

2300 A call went out for all OSG present to assemble at the Command Post and they found there were not enough to make up a line and then a call went out for further OSG operatives. The riot equipment was issued to officers present and 6 OSG officers. S/C Crowe conversed with Supt Smith for a short time and then spoke to Sergeant Shearer who had taken the role as OSG field commander. S/C Crowe takes command of the Police line.

2309 There was a general call for more Police, but the OSG field supervisor wanted the additional Police to be OSG only, but Superintendent Smith says, 'Any Police'. There is an observation that the call for which type of 'Police' is a responsibility of Supt Smiths'.

S/C Crowe then organised available Police into 3 arrest teams consisting of 10 Police in each team. Four of the arrest team wore riot equipment to protect other members. He advised the line on tactics to counter actions by the rioters. For the next 30



minutes the line went forward in Lawson St for the purpose of bringing stability to the area and during this time several police were injured.

- 2300 Appeal for more OSG, by 12 midnight there were only 4 additional on duty OSG.
- 2320 There is still a belief by Inspector G. Smith that 20 OSG are being called out.
- 2358 There was a phone call from Flemington DO, Chief Inspector Ashton to Inspector Chambers. Inspector Ashton said he had two OSG available but he was advised that Inner Metropolitan OSG were wanted only.

Monday 160204

- 0100 The realisation that no OSG group had been called out as assumed, which caused phone calls between Inspector Smith, Sgt Wade and Inspector Snel. That occurred and over the next 90 mins 15 OSG arrived at the scene.
- 0117 There was a call from the OSG field supervisor to all cars to ensure those Police attending the riot scene did so in their ballistic vests.
- 0220 Supt Smith deployed a fire hose from the front line at the rioters.
- 0230 OSG Sgt O'Riordan and Stokes arrived with more OSG equipment and the fire hose is deployed. Sgt Shearer hands over the OSG field supervision to Sgt O'Riordan. Sgt Shearer then took up a forward supervisory role immediately behind the front line. There were fresh OSG officers arriving and they were rotated into the line relieving general duty Police. The maximum width of the line was 25 officers, being 23 OSG trained and two Redfern Sergeants. Sgt O'Riordan took over command of the line.
- 0300 Sgt O'Riordan conducted a briefing with 6 OSG trained Sergeants leading to a tactical approach with Polair overhead.
- 0330 The police line went forward and the OSG entered a virtually empty Eveleigh Street as the rioters had dispersed. The area was secured until investigations were completed.

ARREST, CHARGING AND EVIDENCE GATHERING CONSIDERATIONS

Options

Little consideration was evident of preparation for arresting rioters. Video footage shows in the early stages a wedge formed by police with the arrest team at the rear wearing no protective equipment. When missiles were thrown the arrest team had to retreat to safety.

Rioters were allowed far too close to the police line with little fear of being apprehended. This allowed rioters ample time to take full aim at police with bricks and Molotov cocktails.

When the police line retreated after a barrage of missiles were thrown at them, the rioters simply collected their bricks and missiles and used them again. When police moved forward there was no attempt by Police to collect the bricks and missiles that had been thrown at them earlier.



The seriousness of offences being committed during the riot, in particular relating to the throwing of Molotov cocktails, required the availability of investigators for evidence gathering processes. No criminal investigators, with the exception of the Detective Inspector Bennett were on duty at the scene during the riots to gather this evidence.

Five persons were arrested on the morning of the riot, Monday, 16 February, 2004. However, not one was charged with offences connected to the riot that morning.

Serious consideration needs to be given to organising SOPS for arrest and charging in public order incidents with evidentiary identification protocols the major concern. More legally aggressive tactics for arrest should be included in the Public Order Management Policy.

APPROPRIATE ASSESSMENT OF INCIDENT SEVERITY

Redfern SOP's prior to February, 2004:

During March 1998 the Redfern LAC developed and implemented "Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for Eveleigh Street 'block' Area Redfern.". These SOPs were not fully adhered to during the riot, particularly in relation to the attendance of OSG.

The SOPs relate to perceived situations that may arise, categorising them into four levels of severity with predetermined responses for each level. These levels are listed below:

Level One: Pursuit of Offender

--

(1)

Level Two: Officers are unable to withdraw/isolated

--



- Supervisor/DO to attend & decide upon additional resources & their duties LAC to be informed at discretion of DO
- Establish Command Post (Pre determined Locations provided)
- The 'block' intersections (Pre determined Locations provided)
- Use of protective equipment at discretion of Supervisor/DO
- ACLO's to be used at discretion of Supervisor/DO to be called out.
- Controlled withdrawal, when directed by Supervisor/DO
- De-brief & Sitrep.

(i)

Level Three: Major incident in area, riot ect.

--

--



- ACLOs used at discretion of Supervisor/DO - call out after hrs.
- All Police leave controlled area immediately on direction of Supervisor/DO.

(i)

Level Four Search Warrants

--

(ii)

POST RIOT SOPS

In March 2004 these SOP's were enhanced with some minor alterations. Response in relation to *Unplanned arrests* remains the same as Level One. In relation to *Planned operations and Search Warrants*, procedures reflect the Level Four stage, with Redfern command to be notified in advance, and the operation conducted according to Redfern controls.

The SOPs detail predetermined responses to *Throw Missile incidents* which differ slightly dependent upon whether the offender is unknown or identified. The response mirrors the previous Level One response with the inclusion of HVP in response at the discretion of the Supervisor/DO.

In response to a *Major Incident* the new SOPs reflect a Level Three response and have incorporated some instructions to improve Command Post management techniques for marshalling, tasking of Police and maintaining the incident log. The procedure now also details requirements for investigative processes to be undertaken regarding incidents which have occurred in the subject location.

SKILLS OF COMMANDERS

Information obtained in this section relates to historical records maintained by corporate systems relating to attendance at service courses. The information provided cannot obviously extend to information relating to skills of individual officers experiences. Research of current training material inclusive of the Operational Commanders Training Manual, Duty Officers Manual and Sergeants course composition, does not include specific training in control of riotous behaviour.

- Information from the Leadership Development Directorate indicates that participants within their programme are not exposed to riotous behaviour management training.
- Limited numbers of Commanders have been exposed to Counter Terrorism/Politically Motivated Violence training through Task Force Pioneer experiences.
- April 2004 SAP records indicate there were 55 officers at command level who have completed the Senior Emergency Management course. This course does not include components directly relating riotous behaviour management.



- The Emergency Management course is a pre-requisite for all leading Senior Constable positions across NSW Police and is offered to officers from the rank of Constable to Inspector.
- OSG personnel are all trained in dealing with riotous behaviour, with OSG Team Leader training including components relating to command of riotous situations. The majority of personnel in OSG are of 'constable ranks' and are not trained in relation to command of riotous situations.
- Local research indicated that very few Duty Officers and Commanders have training in unplanned civil disorder.

TRAINING

Education Services (ES) were consulted in relation to current and future training for NSW Police in relation to unplanned civil disorder incidents, providing three separate submissions to Strike Force Coburn.

The first submission provided information relating to current training materials available for NSW Police.

The second submission canvasses a tiered approach to Public Order Management Training. This approach is in four levels:-

1. Level One – Recruit Level Training.
2. Level Two – Basic Operator, Operations Support Group.
3. Level Three – Forward Command and Control of Public Order Incidents.
4. Level Four – Command and Control of Public Order Incidents.

The third submission outlines proposed training courses by Operational Safety Training and Traffic Unit (OSTTU). These courses are as follows:-

1. Public Order Commanders Course (4 days)
2. Operations Support Group Commanders Course (2 days)
3. Operations Support Group Tactical Advisors Course (5 days)
4. Public Order Advisory Team.
5. Equipment/Training.

Additional research relating to training identified the San Diego Police Department's training course for their personnel in civil disorder. – (Justice Departments civil disorder Initiative Addresses Police Training Gap).

FINDINGS - COMMAND AND CONTROL

1. Inadequate training at Command, Supervisor and Constable level for Unplanned Civic disorder resulted in the following



- The Command Post was inappropriately positioned to be operationally effective.
 - The forward command post was inadequate.
 - Site co-ordination was inadequate and badly positioned.
 - Poor records and very few logs were kept.
 - Tactical and strategic options such as OSG, Mounted Police and Polair were not utilised appropriately.
 - Command and Control focused mainly on the police line where Commanders were situated.
 - Requests and follow up inquiries for Operations Support Group were not actioned in a timely fashion.
2. There was a lack of options for arrest, charging and evidence gathering.
 3. There was a lack of trained investigators deployed to the scene.
 4. IESOPS do not cater for a police response to unplanned civil disorder or public order incidents.

RECOMMENDATIONS - COMMAND AND CONTROL

1. Redfern SOPs to be updated re location of Command Post during the 'block' incidents.

Education Services and OSTTU to consider current and future training requirements for all levels of NSW Police in relation to public order incidents, particularly in relation to command responsibilities, command post management, log keeping and utilisation of specialist units.
2. Public Order Management Policy be reviewed to include arrest and charging tactics.
3. Detectives to be included in the police response to unplanned civil disorder.
4. IESOPS to include information on the police response to unplanned civil disorder and public order incidents.



SUBMISSIONS

POLICE ASSOCIATION CONCERNS

Following the incident the NSW Police Association convened a meeting with Association members attached to the Redfern LAC on 240204. The Association provided a preliminary response to Strike Force Coburn dated 260204 raising three main issues of concern:³

- **Equipment:** Including the adequacy, amount and condition of protective equipment which may have contributed to delaying resolution of the incident and resulting in injuries to police.
- **Training:** Including the number of police who were not trained in riot situations suggesting a higher number of Redfern based police should have been trained in the use of equipment.
- **Adequacy of Police Numbers:** Including the number of OSG qualified who were called to the incident and the apparent need for a full time OSG capacity.

The Association has provided Strike Force Coburn with a range of material that requires further consideration including prior submissions to the Executive for upgrading of OSG capabilities and equipment at the Redfern LAC.

Officer Safety

As outlined in a number of NSW Police Standard Operating Procedures, Police Officer safety is paramount during incidents such as the Redfern Civil Disturbance. Maintained appropriate equipment is one means of reducing the following risks for Police:

- Serious injury or loss of life
- Post Traumatic Stress Disorder
- Minor Injury
- Workplace Stress

Such risks impact upon sick leave, Hurt on Duty claims, Workcover, Workers Compensation, EAPS uptake, as well as the Police Officers wider family.

Command and Control

Concerns have been raised regarding command and control and lack of leadership during the incident.

³ Remfrey, P. 26/2/04. Memorandum to S/F Coburn.












- Supervisor/DO to attend & decide upon additional resources & their duties LAC to be informed at discretion of DO
- Establish Command Post (Pre determined Locations provided)
- The 'block' intersections (Pre determined Locations provided)
- Use of protective equipment at discretion of Supervisor/DO
- ACLO's to be used at discretion of Supervisor/DO to be called out.
- Controlled withdrawal, when directed by Supervisor/DO
- De-brief & Sitrep.

(i)

Level Three: Major incident in area, riot ect.









NSW Police

Final Report – Part B

NSW Police capacity to respond anywhere in NSW to incidents of violent disorder

Strike Force Coburn

Coburn Review Team

Assistant Commissioner John Laycock APM, Dip. Law
Detective Inspector Brenton Lee
Detective Inspector Frank Gilroy
Detective Inspector Luke Freudenstein
Intelligence Analyst Aimee Attard
Senior Constable Scott Richardson
Senior Sergeant Garry Dunn
Inspector Barry Gallagher



LIST OF OMISSIONS

Page 13 (i), (ii): Equipment location.

Page 24 (i), (ii): Name of a suspect who was arrested but not charged.

Page 24 (iii): Name of unassociated member of public.

Page 32 (i): Equipment location.

Page 36 (i), (ii): Equipment location.

Page 37: Police call signs and designated duties.

Page 38 (i), (ii): Equipment location.

Page 39 (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v): Equipment location.

Page 40 (i), (ii), (iii): Equipment location.

Page 42 (i): Equipment location.

Page 43 & 44 (i): Possible 'less than lethal' options being considered by NSW Police.

Page 44 (ii), (iii), (iv): Privileged legal advice.

Page 46 (i): Equipment location.

Page 47 (i): Equipment location.

Page 48 (i), (ii), (iii), (iv): Equipment location.

Page 51 (i): Relevant to Coroner's Inquest (death of TJ Hickey)

Page 57 (i): Operational changes: Polair

Page 59, 60 & 61 (i): Relevant to Coroner's Inquest (death of TJ Hickey)

Page 61 (ii), (iii), (v): Equipment location.

Page 61 (iv): Unit identification.

Page 75 (i): Criminal history.

Page 75 (ii): Information re: Controlled operations.

Page 76 (i): Information re: Informants.

Page 76 & 77 (i): Relevant to Coroner's Inquest (death of TJ Hickey)

Page 83 (i): Sensitive, personal information.

Page 84 (i), (ii), (iii), (iv): Relevant to Coroner's Inquest (death of TJ Hickey)

Page 86 (i), (ii): Relevant to Coroner's Inquest (death of TJ Hickey)

Page 87 (i): Relevant to Coroner's Inquest (death of TJ Hickey)

Page 87 (ii): Criminal history.

Page 99 (i): Operational changes re: Technological support.

Page 120 (i), Page 121 (i), page 123 (i), (ii): Standard Operating Procedures - previously supplied to the Committee.

Page 126 – Page 130: List of confidential submissions.