




REDFERN LAC

January 2003 – February 2004




- Redfern LAC is rated 36th in the state with most thefts occurring in the suburbs of Alexandria and Redfern.
- The control chart average of 43 has been constant since April 2003. In November 2003, January 2004 and February 2004, the actual offences were above the control chart average.
- From January 2003 to February 2004, 615 vehicles were stolen from within the Redfern LAC with 38 charges being preferred.
- The legal action rate of 6.20% is down on the target of 10.00%.
- 27 individuals received legal actions between January 2003 and February 2004 of which 17 were ATSI. Juveniles accounted for 10 of the 17.
- 4 individuals received legal actions from September 2003 to February 2004 of which 3 were ATSI. Juveniles accounted for 2 of the 3.



MALICIOUS DAMAGE

REDFERN LAC

January 2003 – February 2004




- Redfern LAC is ranked 52nd in the state for Malicious Damage and the suburb of Redfern experiences most of these incidents.
- 79 incidents per month is the control chart average since September 2002.
- Between January 2003 and February 2004, 1104 incidents of Malicious Damage have occurred with 102 legal actions instituted.
- The legal action rate is 9.20%.
- 90 individuals received legal actions of which 29 were ATSI. Juveniles accounted for 10 of the 29.
- 50 individuals received legal actions from September 2003 to February 2004 of which 16 were ATSI. Juveniles accounted for 8 of the 16.



MOVE ON

REDFERN LAC

January 2003 – February 2004




- Redfern is rated as the 21st LAC in the state for the proactive use of the move along legislation, which occurs mostly in the suburb of Redfern.
- The control chart average of 27 has increased to 34 from November 2003. In the month of December 2003 there were 72 move along directions issued which is a significant increase.
- From July 2003 to February 2004, the Move on legislation was used a total of 364 times with 3 legal actions taken.
- The legal action rate is 0.80%.
- 3 individuals received legal actions between July 2003 and February 2004 of which 1 was ATSI. Nil juveniles.
- 1 individual received legal actions from September 2003 to February 2004. That person was an ATSI. Nil juveniles.



PERSON SEARCH

REDFERN LAC

January 2003 – February 2004



- Redfern LAC was rated 25th in the state for proactive measure of person searches. These searches took place predominantly in the suburb of Redfern on Wednesdays and Thursdays.
- The control chart average of 24 has remained steady since July 2003. In the months of October, November and December 2003, actual person searches were higher than the average.
- From July 2003 to February 2004, there were 245 persons searched and 8 legal actions.
- 8 individuals received legal actions between July 2003, and February 2004. 2 were ATSI. Nil juveniles.
- 5 individuals received legal actions from September 2003 to February 2004. 2 were ATSI. Nil juveniles.




THE INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM AT REDFERN LAC

Redfern LAC implemented SOPS for response to incidents at the 'block' originally dated March 1998, subsequently updated during March 2004. The LAC does not have Risk/Threat Assessment Planning whereby increases in civil disorder and community unrest can be immediately identified.

Superintendent Smith provided information relating to planning and intelligence gathering for the 'block'. He indicated difficulties experienced by the LAC Intelligence Office due to data capture methods in COPS restricting the ease of extraction of specific data for the 'block' area.

The Redfern Intelligence Office produced statistics of 'violence towards police' identified through COPS. During the period 8 October 2002 to 12 February 2004, 43 reported incidents of missiles thrown at police were identified with the majority reported during May 2003. From 15 February 2003 to 15 February 2004, 74 police have been hurt on duty in the Redfern LAC, the great majority of these injuries occurred during arrests and violent disorder incidents. 67 of these police joined the NSW Police after April 1988.

It appears intelligence is acted upon tactically after events have occurred, rather than using analysis of trends and patterns of incidents to pro-actively respond to community behaviour and activities. There is a need for a more strategic approach for intelligence collection at the LAC with the Field Intelligence Officer in the ideal position to do this. A perceived hindrance to this previously occurring may have been identified via information provided by Inspector Hooper of the Crime Management Faculty. Inspector Hooper provided information that Redfern LAC Intelligence Analyst and Field Intelligence Officer are often away from the Command, seconded to other duties.



(i)

During the period 1 January 2000 to 1 January 2004, there were 31 incidents of 'Riot and Affray' within Redfern LAC with most events occurring during May 2003. These incidents range from 'Pub Brawls' to 'Signal One' incidents at the 'block'.

During the period 1 January 2000 to 1 January 2004, there were 6 incidents of Protest/Demonstration/Violent Disorder within Redfern LAC with most events occurring in May 2003.


Operation Concertinas is one local operation targeting juvenile male offenders in the Redfern Railway Station area. The operation focuses on incidents of Robbery, Stealing and Assaults, with results indicating a decline in incidents since December 2002.

Redfern Local Area Command is currently conducting [REDACTED] (ii) operations specifically relating to drug activity. There are seven other combined operations dealing with robbery and drug activity also being conducted.

During period 1 January 2004 to 15 February 2004 there were 18 reports of malicious damage to Police vehicles by missiles being thrown.



THE INFORMANT NETWORK AT REDFERN LAC



(i)

Information reports submitted by Redfern Police average 237 per month during the period January 2003 to mid February 2004.

SIGNALS OF IMPENDING PROBLEMS

The 'Glock' Incident

On Thursday 12 February 2004, there was an event at the 'block' involving two officers following a wanted person into the area. The two officers were attacked by 12 to 14 persons. During this incident, attempts were made by the POIs to remove both officer's firearms. One of the officers lost possession of his Glock for a short period of time, with the firearm pointed at his stomach prior to it being regained. The POI pointing the firearm at Police was arrested and charged.

It has been suggested this incident was sign of tension building in the 'block' area, but there is no evidence identified linking this incident to the riot.

Some Redfern Police spoken to have reported an attitude amongst police that the violence and abuse directed towards them is a tolerated part of policing in the area. Isolated incidents of rocks being thrown at Police and abuse directed towards officers does not seem to be anything out of the ordinary. It has been perceived that this could alleviate the sense of any warning of an impending riot.


Incidents between 12 and 14 February, 2004.

The only reported incident occurring during the period between the 'Glock' Incident and the impalement of Thomas Hickey is a partial collapse of premises at 78 Eveleigh Street, Redfern on 12 February 2004. Superintendent Smith indicated that the demolition or collapsing of building structures in the 'block' is not uncommon. This incident necessitated the Fire Brigade to knock down a brick wall during the afternoon of 12 February 2004. Redfern's Commander, Crime Manager, Duty Officer, Supervisor and a car crew attended the scene of this incident.

Mr Michael Ramsay, Project Director of Redfern/Waterloo Partnership Project, outlined his knowledge of a large brick wall collapsing in the 'block' on 12 February 2004. Mr Ramsay stated the area was cleaned up by placing the bricks in wheelie bins. Mr. Ramsay was at Redfern during the riot and claimed the bricks used against Police were the bricks placed in the wheelie bins.

Death of Thomas Hickey





Events between 4.00pm to 7.00pm on Sunday 15 February 2004

- 16:30** The Station Master at Redfern Railway Station, Mr Barry Hall, reports youths throwing rocks and bottles at the station and passengers. Mr Hall also reported adults drinking 'long necks' on the corner of Eveleigh Street watching youths throw rocks and bottles at cars and pedestrians in Lawson Street. Mr Hall closes the Lawson Street entrance/exit after being approached by an unknown adult aboriginal male and being told to 'get out of there' as something is going to happen tonight.
- 16:50** Mr Hall reports youths in Eveleigh Street breaking up bricks to make smaller projectiles. Police arrive at the Station a short time later and speaks to the Station Master.
- 17:30** Mr Hall notices a young aboriginal girl placing a poster on a front window of the Station. The poster is headed, 'Wanted Child Murderers' depicting photographs of Senior Police.
- 17:42** Duty Operations Inspector Chambers receives information from the Redfern Duty Officer, Inspector Emery, that although the crowd were intoxicated and well equipped they were not causing trouble at that time.
- 18:00** Mr Hall closes platform 1 as the level of rock throwing had intensified. He also saw a white car being pelted with rocks. When police leave the Railway Station, the incidence of rock throwing increases.
- 18:00** Inspectors Emery and Smith keep the Redfern day shift back.



18:12 Inspector Emery informs Inspector Chambers of information received from a Redfern Aboriginal Community Liaison Officer (ACLO) regarding a 'busload of Aboriginal people coming from Walgett to kill the cop in relation to the death of Thomas Hickey'.

Inspector Emery believes this ACLO is unreliable, however, Inspector Emery asked Inspector Chambers if any police from Operation Vikings or OSG are on duty. Inspector Chambers informs him he does not think so, but there may be some OSG from Redfern LAC working.

18:40 Mr Hall rings Police from Redfern Railway Station requesting police to attend his location as soon as possible as things were escalating.

Events between 19:00 and 21:00 on Sunday 15 February 2004

19:00 A briefing was held at Redfern Police Station for the day and night shifts. The day shift was to be kept back for at least another hour. Inspector Emery also attempts to gain assistance from neighbouring commands.

19:22 Information provided via City Rail informed police the booking office at Redfern Railway Station had been closed as it was being 'pelted with bricks and bottles'.

19:26 Inspector Smith informs Inspector Chambers they will be patrolling Lawson Street and will be staying away from the 'block'. Inspector Smith believed the crowd of youths congregating there were waiting for a confrontation. Inspector Chambers stated he had been watching CCTV for a half an hour and the youths had not moved.

19:42 Whilst travelling in Lawson Street, a Redfern Police Vehicle had a brick thrown at it. Police vehicles from Surry Hills and City Central were requested to leave the area by VKG.

19:45 The windows of the Railway Station were smashed and bricks were landing on the roof. Inspector Emery closes off Lawson Street.

19:47 The Railway Station was closed down to trains stopping or picking up passengers.

20:26 All appeared to be quiet according to Inspector Smith.

20:45 Inspector Smith requests Railway Station Master to close platforms 1 to 7.

20:51 Inspector Emery informs Inspector Chambers of need for replacements of day shift staff. He indicates Superintendent Smith wants police to keep low key. Inspector Emery also states rocks and bricks being thrown, but not landing within 30 feet of police.

20:56 A conversation between Inspector Emery and Inspector Chambers outlines the disorder escalating. Approximately 200 persons have charged at police who had to retreat, and there was no emergency or OSG response available.



Events between 21:00 and 22:15 on Sunday 15 February 2004

- 21:00** Mr Hall reports staff are expressing concern things are getting out of hand at the Railway Station. He advises them to close their work- stations and go home. Four staff leave and two remain.
- 21:02** Redfern 14 requested to attend the location Lawson and Gibbons Streets by Inspector Garth Smith with riot gear.
- 21:04** A 'SIGNAL ONE' was called by Redfern 45 at the intersection of Lawson and Gibbons Street.
- 21:06** Inspector Smith directs all cars to the Command Post at the corner of Gibbons and Lawson Streets.
- 21:15** Mr Hall is informed by the Rail Management Centre to evacuate the railway station.
- 21:28** Petrol bombs being thrown in the direction of police. Bottles and bricks being thrown at police, with attempts to set fire to the railway station. Fire Brigade is summoned. Inspector Emery states they were just charged by 'a couple of hundred' causing police to retreat. Emery reports to Inspector Chambers 'they are gearing up to do it again'. He further states there is no emergency or OSG response. Inspector Chambers looks for the on call officer and OPS Manager phone numbers for Inspector Emery.
- 21:29** Inspector Emery contacts relieving Operations Manager Inspector Snel requesting OSG equipment and personnel. This request is in adherence with the Redfern Standard Operating Procedures for the 'block' dated March 1998. Inspector Snel later reports being asked for equipment only.
- 21:31** Fire at Redfern Railway Station. Inspector Chambers has requested no trains to stop at the Station.
- 21:42** Inspector Snell briefed by Inspector Chambers via phone.
- 21:45** Ambulance requested to treat four or five injured police.
- 22:03** Sergeant James Shearer, OSG, had been contacted by Sergeant Wade – OSG Commander – to arrange for equipment to be taken to Redfern. Cannot contact the LAC Commander of Redfern, but is given the location of the Command Post.
- 22:05** The crowd advanced and Inspector Smith gave permission for the police line to advance. A number of police are hurt and removed.
- 22:15** Redfern Crime Manager, Detective Inspector Darren Bennett, contacts Inspector Chambers and asks if a helicopter is on duty. He is told no.

Commander's Operational Phase

Sunday 15 February 2004



22:20 Superintendent Smith arrives at the Command Post. Superintendent Smith gives the reason for additional resources taking so long to arrive as there was a presumption at 9.00pm equipment and 20 OSG were coming. As the night progressed it was evident there was a need for more police.

22:50 The OSG van arrives with protective equipment, Inspector Chambers contacts Police Media Unit (PMU).

23:09 Superintendent Adney, Deputy Commissioners Office, contacts Inspector Chambers indicating she had just spoken to Superintendent Smith, who wants '20 more staff, anyone'. Inspector Chambers states Eastern Suburbs 10 informed him only 20 OSG were wanted. Superintendent Adney states Smith wants as many police as he can get. Inspector Chambers states everyone available from the 'City' is already there, but he will try and get 20 more personnel for Superintendent Smith.

(At this point there was still no apparent realisation that the 20 OSG requested at 9.30pm had not arrived at Redfern, or have not actually been requested.) During his interview with Assistant Commissioner Laycock on 4 March 2004, Superintendent Smith states, 'Contacted Donna Adney two or three times, requesting help. I felt the gravity of the situation wasn't being understood and I contacted Adney to get more help.'

23:10 Superintendent Smith requests 20 OSG and 20 other police from Inspector Chambers through Superintendent Adney. Inspector Chambers states 'every available police officer in the city is there'.

23:25 Inspector Snel rings Superintendent Smith to see if OSG personnel are required, but his mobile is engaged. She speaks to Inspector Emery and states there was no request for OSG personnel.

23:30 Superintendent Smith contacts Assistant Commissioner Waites, stating the situation was under control and there were only 30 people involved in some rowdy behaviour.

This is in conflict with Superintendent Smith's earlier conversation with Superintendent Adney, some 20 minutes earlier. However there were fluctuations in riotous behaviour throughout the night, and this conversation may have occurred during a quiet period.

23:34 Superintendent Smith is informed by Inspector Chambers he can only raise 5 more police and questions whether OSG on the way. Superintendent Smith was not able to confirm this and asked for the assistance of the State Protection Group (SPG).

23:40 Inspector Snel contacts Inspector Chambers requesting prison trucks for Redfern.

Monday 16 February 2004

00:16 City Rail contact VKG to ascertain how long trains will be stopped from going through Redfern.

00:30 Inspector Smith states a large group of persons were gathering at Eveleigh Street and made several advances upon police throwing rocks and bottles.



- 00:57** Inspector Chambers receives information that police were going to advance as the railway was being 'trashed'. Inspector Emery states police are out numbered as there are '150 upon them', and 30 to 40 more Police are required.
- 01:00** Senior Sergeant Wade receives a request from Superintendent Smith by phone for 20 OSG. This request is approved by Inspector Snel.
- 01:15** Superintendent Smith contacted Assistant Commissioner Waites indicating he required further police as there were now 100 extra rioters and police were being attacked with rocks, bricks and bottles. Assistant Commissioner Waites leaves his home address to attend Redfern.
- 01:19** Superintendent Smith contacts Inspector Chambers requesting more police stating there are police who have been on duty for 18 hours, and they'll be lucky to 'hold' Redfern Police Station. DOI states OSG on the way but can't say how many.
- 01:37** Assistant Commissioner Waites calls Inspector Chambers requesting 30 to 50 more police, indicating his E.T.A. to Redfern is approximately 10 to 15 minutes.
- 01:47** Assistant Commissioner Waites informs Inspector Chambers that Molotov cocktails are being thrown and he requires something to deflect them.
- 01:50** Sergeant O'Riordan loads 50 sets of riot equipment at the SPC for transport to Redfern.
- 02:00** Lee Wood at Polair is contacted by Inspector Chambers.
- 02:00** Assistant Commissioner Waites rings Senior Sergeant Wade requesting availability of chemical munitions with a negative result.
- 02:04** A CIDS message outlines the Fire Brigade have withdrawn due to safety issues and have handed equipment over to police. The Fire Brigade indicated they are of the belief there are not enough police on hand.
- 02:05** Inspector Chambers informed Assistant Commissioner Waites that a helicopter had been called out, and did he want the video unit?
- 02:10** Inspector Chambers calls the video unit out.
- 02:14** Superintendent Smith informed Inspector Chambers he was using NSWFB hose to manage rioters.
- 02:30** Sergeant O'Riordan arrives and distributes riot equipment.
- 02:37** Assistant Commissioner Waites informs Inspector Chambers there are sufficient police but insufficient protective equipment and requests more.
- 02:53** Alan (nfi) from Minister of Transport's Office calls Inspector Chambers to confirm if trains are running.
- 02:58** Inspector Chambers contacts Assistant Commissioner Waites and informs him the van with protective equipment will be there in 10 minutes, and that he had not had any contact from Polair.



- 03:00** Sergeant O’Riordan conducts a briefing with OSG team leaders.
- 03:03** Lee Wood for Polair indicated to VKG that Polair was airborne and would be overhead within a few minutes.
- 03:14** Sergeant Dean Smith, Fairfield LAC, contacts Inspector Chambers confirming what type of riot equipment is required, then indicates 10 sets of riot gear and 10 additional vests will be sent to Redfern.
- 03:26** Inspector Smith indicated that all lines advanced.
- 03:30** Sergeant O’Riordan states that a tactical approach was commenced at 3.30am. During the approach and whilst holding the perimeter nil rioters were sighted.
- 03:36** Superintendent Smith requested Polair to light up Eveleigh Street.
- 03:51** Inspector Smith declares ‘Area under Control’.

THE ROLE OF SUPPORT UNITS

- The Duty Operations Inspector, Warren Chambers, was asked about resources on a number of occasions. Units such as OSG, Vikings and Polair were not actually requested but Redfern Police did ask if they were available. Inspector Chambers stated they were not available.
- Knowing the problems being experienced by police at the scene of the riot, Inspector Chambers could have taken a more active role in attempting to obtain more resources and Polair. It is believed obtaining additional police to Redfern should have been facilitated by Inspector Chambers, not Inspector Emery.
- Should the inquiry regarding Polair been acted upon earlier by Inspector Chambers, the Police response to this riot would have been more effective. Perhaps Detective Inspector Bennett could have insisted on the attendance of Polair to the DOI.
- Superintendent Smith felt the gravity of the situation was not being understood. However, neither he nor his Duty Officers were aware of the current situation regarding the OSG call-out.
- Inspector Snel was contacted by Duty Officer Emery at 9.29pm. He states he requested OSG personnel and equipment in accordance with Redfern SOPS for the ‘block’. Inspector Snel states only equipment was requested. It was not until 1.00am that Inspector Snel granted approval for OSG personnel.
- The time frame between the first request for OSG personnel by Inspector Emery to Inspector Snel at 9.30pm to the time at which OSG arrived at 1.30am was a significant issue in how police responded to the riot.



ROLE OF ABORIGINAL COMMUNITY LIAISON OFFICERS IN THE LEAD UP TO THE RIOT

Ms Doreen Peters, the NSW ACLO State Coordinator provided the following information –

- ‘The role of the ACLO is 95% operational. It is expected that ACLOs maintain high visibility as the major part of their duty is to consult and liaise with all sections of the Aboriginal community in the community.’
- ‘While performing their duties ACLOs gather information in an informal manner from the Aboriginal Community, such as what is likely to occur in situations such as the death of an Aboriginal person and the following days of the funeral.’
- ‘In the Redfern incident the Redfern ACLOs should have been aware of which community members to approach to assist in any situation which is likely to get out of hand. Even when they do not have a good rapport, they would still know that some uproar is likely to happen. Any information gathered should be passed onto the command with appropriate advice.’
- ‘Following the death of the young person at Redfern ACLOs should have been either recalled to duty and appropriately tasked by the command or alternatively when ACLOs are not rostered when a situation occurs such as the Redfern incident, they should contact the command and provide the best advice on how these situations are best managed.’

PERFORMANCE OF REDFERN ACLOS AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH POLICE

- Very few of the requirements suggested by Ms Peters were performed by the Redfern ACLOs in response to the death of Thomas Hickey.
- A review by Inspector Hooper of the Crime Management Faculty revealed Redfern LAC having three ACLO's. Due to internal personality conflicts one is seconded to Marrickville on a permanent basis.
- The remaining two are rostered on opposite shifts as they have difficulty working together. Information provided indicates that both state they experience difficulties in performing their roles as they are not briefed daily in relation to operational matters. They also stated they have been embarrassed when asked about certain incidents by members of the Aboriginal community and they have no knowledge of these matters.
- Both ACLOs believe they would be more effective in their role if they were given more clear direction as to what is expected of them on an operational and daily basis.
- Inspector Smith stated that after being briefed by Inspector Emery of the days events he believed both ACLOs were unavailable.

– [REDACTED]

(i)



- Superintendent Smith stated an ACLO attended the 'block' on Saturday afternoon 14 February 2004 and reported there was no indication of trouble. The same ACLO came in on Sunday 15 February 2004 at 5.00pm but was intoxicated and sent home by Inspector Emery. The ACLO left about 1 hour later.
- Superintendent Smith indicated that he considered calling the ACLOs out during the riot, but he believed that the community does not think highly of them. Additionally Superintendent Smith indicated Redfern Police officers were sceptical of the ACLOs.

UNDERSTANDING AND APPRECIATION OF IMPENDING VIOLENCE – INITIAL INCIDENT

- [REDACTED] (i)
- Superintendent Smith attended Redfern LAC on Saturday 14 February 2004 and received a full briefing from Inspector Emery. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] (ii) An ACLO attended the 'block' three times during the day by direction of Superintendent Smith and reported nothing unusual.
- [REDACTED] (iii) Superintendent Smith stated that he spoke to Inspector Emery and there was no information indicating impending violence from the 'block. Inspector Emery has been at Redfern LAC for 7 years.
- Mr Michael Ramsay, Project Director of Redfern/Waterloo Partnership Project outlined his knowledge of bricks being stored in bins after a collapse of a brick wall days prior to the riot. Ramsay assisted police communicating with the aboriginal community during the riot, identifying the bins and bricks from the wall collapse were the same being used during the riot.
- Mr. Ramsay stated that during the 12 months since Superintendent Smith has been working at Redfern, there has been a definite improvement in the relationship between the Police and the Redfern Aboriginal Community.
- Ms. Jody Broun, Director General of the New South Wales Department of Aboriginal Affairs informed Assistant Commissioner Laycock on 17 March 2004, [REDACTED] (iv)
- Ms. Broun believes an advisory committee should have been set up for operational issues prior to the riot. She stated government and non-government committees have lost direction and needed to look at premises, railway and environmental issues, with a whole of Government approach needed.
- Mr Sol Bellear, Director of Community Relations, Department of Aboriginal Affairs, whilst not present at the time of the riots received information after the event, which he believed was accurate. He stated there was a large number of Koori visitors to the 'block' just prior to the riot, arriving from Saturday 14 February 2004.




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- Mr. Bellear outlined there are a few activists associated with the 'block', with a Mr Lyle Munro who worked to create bad blood on Sunday 15 February 2004. (Detective Inspector Darren Bennett, Crime Manager of Redfern stated they did not see Mr Munro during the riot, though saw him whilst viewing footage of the riot.)
 - Mr Bellear also received information there was a stockpile of bricks and bottles which was set up prior to Thomas Hickey's impalement. He believed the Molotov cocktails thrown by kids were 'not put together in five minutes and required some planning'.
 - Mr Bellear stated there was nothing the Police would have necessarily seen that would have given them notification of something escalating on the Saturday/Sunday 14/15 February 2004, believing Superintendent Smith was doing a good job.




WARNING SIGNS

- Ms Doreen Peters indicated 'It is common knowledge among Aboriginal communities when a death of an Aboriginal person occurs, it is most likely that some unrest in the community will happen. ACLOs in most commands are well aware when this situation arises.'
- Ms Jody Broun informed Assistant Commissioner Laycock that after a death of an aborigine there is 'Sorry Time', where violence, rioting and unacceptable behaviour does not usually occur.
- Superintendent Smith stated his understanding of behaviour after a death in the Aboriginal Community is one of grieving and 'Sorry Time' which did not usually involve riotous behaviour.
- Inspector Garth Smith believed there was no breakdown in communication, cultural awareness or sensitivity to issues associated with the traditional grieving process.
- Assistant Commissioner West advises the level of observance of traditional grievance varies according to particular segments of Aboriginal Communities.
- Inspector Garth Smith indicated no knowledge of any particular incident leading police to believe tensions were building between the aboriginal community and police, other than the death of Thomas Hickey.



- Inspector Garth Smith stated from his perusal of intelligence holdings and events relating to the young persons death there appeared to be no intelligence to suggest a riot had been planned.

Inspector Emery was one who may have an understanding and had an appreciation of the impending violence. He outlines the following occurrences –





- Later that day Inspector Emery states patrolling police were subject to verbal abuse.
- Inspector Emery heard that the media – Channel 10 - were trying to ‘stir things up at Redfern’.
- In the afternoon stone throwing commenced around the railway station.
- Inspector Emery rang Superintendent Smith to inform him Redfern Railway Station had to be closed.
- Inspector Emery maintained day shift to supplement the night shift.
- Inspector Snel, at 9.29pm, did not request OSG personnel believing Inspector Emery had only asked for equipment.
- Superintendent Smith states after the death of Thomas Hickey he talked to Redfern Police three or four times that day.
- Superintendent Smith stated since May 2003 there were over 40 incidents at the ‘block’ where bottles and bricks had been thrown at police. If police go there for an unplanned arrest ‘they will be surrounded and bricked’.
- (i)

(ii)
- Superintendent Smith has previous experience working with the aboriginal community whilst previously working as Local Area Commander in Griffith.
- Superintendent Smith stated 12 morning shift police were kept back and worked between 6 and 13 hours overtime each.
- The Superintendent stated ‘there was no intelligence from the community, family or ACLOs indicating there was going to be an all out war. He stated Inspector Emery felt the media was door knocking and stirring things up. There were no placards, no banners, nothing!’ *(BETWEEN 5.25 AND 5.30PM THERE WERE WANTED POSTERS DEPICTING SENIOR POLICE BEING PLACED NEAR THE RAILWAY STATION. THIS WAS REPORTED TO POLICE A SHORT TIME LATER)*
- When asked about opening the Police Operations Centre, Superintendent Smith stated after speaking to Assistant Commissioner Waites he wanted him to come on site so they could show seniority to Police on the ground.
- Superintendent Smith had contact from Inspector Emery on Sunday afternoon indicating this was nothing out of the ordinary happening. Police were getting verbally abused which had happened previously on 40 occasions during the last 12 months.



- Superintendent Smith stated he was happy with Intelligence reports for the LAC, which are submitted at a rate of approximately 200 per month. Superintendent Smith indicated ‘if there was something he could have done better - it was awareness’, then asking the rhetorical question, “Should we have picked up on it earlier?”
- Superintendent Smith also stated there needs to be a speedier call out procedure for equipment and staff.
- Assistant Commissioner Waites received five telephone calls between 6.00pm and 1.15am on Sunday 15 February 2004 into Monday 16 February. Assistant Commissioner Waites is provided with information from Superintendent Smith and Inspector Snel and is also contacted by Acting Deputy Commissioner Parsons.
- After the 1.15am telephone call from Superintendent Smith, Assistant Commissioner Waites decides to attend Redfern.

The indicators of tension and warning signs for civil disorder were clear and plentiful. Appreciating Superintendent Smith’s comments about 40 incidents of bricking and abuse of police in the past year, these indicators may have seemed to be the norm and somewhat tolerated. Taking into account the social and cultural sensitivity there was a need to balance the operational requirements with the social issues.

Set out in the Constables Education Program, JST 137, Operational Safety and Tactics, are Tension Indicators of Crowds and Mobs. All police should be able to identify signs of unrest, which may lead to civil disorder.

A number of these signs were clearly evident prior to the riot. Research recommended by Education Services provided reference to a simple disorder model set out in the Association of Chief Police Officers on Keeping the Peace.

An appreciation of the various levels of unrest as set out below between 9pm 15 February and 3.30am 16 February may have resulted in an earlier Police response:

Stage	Description or criteria
State of normality	The day-to-day state of order and provision of policing services within a community.
Tension	A level of increased concern or feelings in a community. (Redfern on numerous occasions)
Disorder	This represents the stage at which mood is supplemented by action, whether isolated or sustained. It manifests itself in disruption, damage and violence. (Redfern between 4.00pm and 9.00pm – not identified by many – only really Emery – due to tolerance to such behaviour)
Unrest	Escalation into violent or disruptive behaviour. This stage may be typified by extreme conflict. (Redfern from 9.00pm to 3.30am. If earlier signs were identified and acted upon this stage may not have been reached).
Unrest	This is the period, sometimes prolonged, when the rebuilding of relationships takes place.



Educations Services are considering training and exercises for unplanned civil disorder utilising Minerva and Hydra to facilitate this training. Minerva is an operation simulation system where commanders operate with the command teams and are presented realistic issues as they unfold. Currently a number of high risk incidents and one protest march based in the CBD are used as exercises in Minerva. Hydra is a strategic simulator where commanders work as a syndicate to look at the strategic issues surrounding an incident as it develops. It has a variety of exercises from School based scenarios, high risk incidents, through to full counter terrorist incidents.

A Counter Terrorist Commander's Course is before CET for approval. This course appears to be ideal for Commanders and should include training in unplanned civil disorder. Positions on the course should be offered firstly to those in locations where unrest is likely to occur, e.g. Redfern, Dubbo etc.

CULTURAL AWARENESS

In relation to the breakdown in cultural awareness or sensitivity to issues associated with traditional grievance processes Ms Doreen Peters provided the following information:

- 'New South Wales Police deliver an Aboriginal Cultural Awareness Program on a corporate level through the Police College. In addition, some LACs have established partnerships with local Aboriginal communities to deliver local cultural awareness programs'.
- 'Traditional Grievance – Naming and depicting deceased people. In many Aboriginal communities there is a prohibition on naming of people who are deceased, which may last for months or even years, until all the relevant ceremonies have been concluded.'
- 'Generally, faces of people who have died should not be shown in a way that their communities will view them. Always check with the local community before broadcasting names or images of deceased people and they will inform you of the appropriate practice.'
- 'The immediate family (mother/father) are not normally approached. Rather an extended family member is the person to communicate with appropriate authorities e.g. police, funeral directors, medical staff etc. Also respected Elders are the right people to approach while funeral arrangements are made.'
- 'Equally respectful is contact with family members after the funeral and grievance period, and should be held with extended family members or respected elders.'

Some of these points were not respected by the general media, and it should be noted that it was not the NSW Police who broadcasted the name and photograph of the deceased person throughout the media.

If the ACLO system had been working at Redfern, in the manner set out by Doreen Peters, these traditional processes may have been respected and certainly warning signs of impending civil disorder could have been brought to the attention of police.



Information received from Strike Force Timepiece, reveals 35 persons were arrested in relation to the riot. 19 resided in the area policed by the Redfern Local Area Command. Of those 19 only 2 or 3 actually lived in the 'block'.

FINDINGS - AWARENESS AND PREPARATION

1. Failing in the Redfern Intelligence System to strategically identify cultural, seasonal or environmental issues, which may lead to unrest or civil disorder in the 'block' area.
2. Greater use of the source system to enhance the informant network at the Redfern Local Area Command.
3. Failure of support units to acknowledge the urgency of requests and lack of follow up upon those requests.
4. Communication breakdown in the call out of Operation Support Group.
5. Inability of Aboriginal Community Liaison Officers at Redfern Local Area Command to identify unrest in the 'block'.
6. Breakdown in the relationship between Redfern Police and the Aboriginal Community Liaison Officers.
7. Failure of police to acknowledge the tactical warning signs of unrest leading to civil disorder at Redfern on Sunday, 15 February, 2004 e.g. wanted posters of senior police, continual throwing of rocks and the closing of Redfern Railway Station.
8. Re-enforcement of cultural awareness for Redfern Police and continuation of partnerships with local aboriginal community is essential.

RECOMMENDATIONS - AWARENESS AND PREPARATION

1. Implementation of intelligence gathering operations for vulnerable locations within Local Area Commands, e.g. the 'block' at Redfern. Such operations to proactively collect information of crime, occurrences of unrest, environmental, seasonal and cultural trends for the vulnerable location.
2. Redfern Local Area Command to enlist the assistance of Source Management for increasing informant numbers. Assistance should also be sought in the professional management of their informants. (Senior Sergeant Tracey Chapman has commenced such assistance)
3. Region Commanders and the Commander of Communications to design training for support units, e.g. VKG – DOI and Operations Managers to appreciate difficulties experienced by those in the field at an unplanned civil disorder when requiring assistance. DOI and Operations Managers should work from a check list, similar to that in the Duty Officers manual, providing information of what resources may be needed at the site.
4. The Duty Officers check-list and running sheet matrix, maintained in the Duty Officers manual, be adopted by the Operations Managers and DOI to record what is requested is received. Regular checks should be made to action any request that may have been forgotten or misunderstood.



5. The State Coordinator for Aboriginal Community Liaison Officers to liaise with the Redfern Local Area Commander to upgrade the performance and direction of Aboriginal Community Liaison Officers.
6. The Redfern Local Area Commander to devise strategies for the most effective use of Aboriginal Community Liaison Officers in forging community links to ensure they complete their duties in compliance with Standard Operating Procedures for Management of Aboriginal Incidents and promote a productive relationship with police.
7. Education Services to design training programs for police, at all ranks, for Unplanned Civil Disorder.
8. Local Cultural Awareness programs, including issues associated with the Traditional Grievance process, to be continued with the assistance of Doreen Peters, State Coordinator for Aboriginal Community Liaison Officers.

STAFFING ISSUES

ADEQUACY OF POLICE ROSTERED FOR DUTY ON EVENING OF 15 FEBRUARY 2004

The Redfern rosters for 14 – 16 February 2004 were used to complete the following table. It should be noted that on 15 February 2004 the day shift were retained on duty to supplement the nightshift.

Table: Resource Availability

Classification	14/02/04	15/02/04	16/02/04
No.	No.	No.	No.
On Roster	153	152	152
On loan	10	10	10
Long Term Sick	4	4	4
Maternity Leave	1	1	1
Sick Leave	0	0	2
Restricted Duties	2	2	2
Courses	1	1	9
Court	0	0	1
Recurrent Leave Day	62	57	54
Rest Day	32	39	9
Annual Leave	2	1	6
Additional Leave	1	2	0
Total NOT Available	115	117	98
Total Available	38	35	54
% Available	33%	30%	55%



The resource capability of Redfern LAC was significantly higher on the Monday (16/02/04) than the Friday (14/02/04) or Saturday (15/02/04).

Table: General Duty Availability

Classification	14/02/04	15/02/04	16/02/04
No.	No.	No.	No.
*GD Total	88	88	88
GD Available	27	28	29
% GD Available	30.7%	31.8%	33.0%

**N.B. includes the LAC, Duty Officers & Crime Manager*

General Duty availability is static across the 3 days at approximately 31%.

Table: General Duty Capability

Classification	14/02/04	15/02/04	16/02/04
No.	No.	No.	No.
Superintendent	0	0	1
Inspectors	2	2	3
Sergeants	3	3	4
S/Const	2	2	4
Const	8	7	9
P/Const	12	14	7
Total	27	28	30
% P/Con	44.4%	50%	23.3%

The percentage of Probationary Constables to total GDs on shift is relatively high particularly on the Saturday (44.4%) and Sunday (50%). NSW Workforce Planning advise that there is no state-wide benchmark in terms of ratio of Probationary Constables to other Police within LACs. The level for the Redfern LAC is not inconsistent with other LACs within the Inner Metropolitan Region.

Table: Criminal Investigation Capability

Classification	14/02/04	15/02/04	16/02/04
No.	No.	No.	No.
CI Total	13	13	13
CI Available	2	3	7
% Available	15.4%	23.1%	53.8%

Table: Response Team Capability

Classification	14/02/04	15/02/04	16/02/04
No.	No.	No.	No.
Response Team Total	21	21	21
Response Team Avail.	8	4	9
% Available	38.1%	19%	42.9%

Six of the Response Team were assigned to Operation "Concertina" at the time of the riot.