



The officer further stated her LAC is in the process of obtaining Small and Medium size ADA vests, to be issued by Supervisors at the beginning of shifts to officers requiring smaller sizes, to alleviate the difficulties the current issue size creates for her and officers of similar stature.

## **RECOGNISED STANDARDS**

Shields and the Argus Helmets were the subject of an evaluation between all Australasian Law Enforcement Agencies in 2002. An evaluation by the Australian Centre for Policing Research (ACPR) of the equipment used by NSW Police revealed its quality and type equalled that utilised by all other states in Australia and that of the New Zealand Police. No States surpassed NSW in regard to the results of the evaluation undertaken.

Inquiries by Strike Force Coburn failed to locate any published standards relating to riot shields other than 'drafts' developed by the British Standards Institution (BSI). All Australasian agencies are reported to have adopted these BSI standards.

The results of the ACPR studies, and the compliance of NSW Police in terms of the equipment used and its maintenance was as follows:

- ACPR identified procedures to be adopted for the storage and upkeep of riot equipment. NSW Police standard operating procedures comply with the ACPR recommendations.
- The condition of some items of equipment at Redfern has revealed that storage of some equipment does not comply with the ACPR recommendations, specifically the keeping of shields in their protective bags, and storing helmets where they cannot fall to the ground causing scratching to the visor or damaging the protective strength of the helmet.
- ACPR indicated no single shape or design of shield is necessarily perfect for every situation. The NSW Police OSG units utilise the current shields due to their compatibility with present tactical capabilities.
- The ACPR test shields based upon Impact resistance, Transparency, Inert Coatings and Secondary Operations during manufacture. NSW Police shields comply in all these areas.
- NSW Police shields also comply in terms of protection afforded and Portability.
- The helmets currently utilised by NSW Police are the most commonly used style worldwide, and were chosen after consideration was given to British standards. Those standards are reviewed every 5 years, and include protocols for storage, however the condition of the equipment is only as good as the level of compliance with those protocols.



## **EQUIPMENT DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED ON THE GROUND**

Equipment designed for use with other OSG equipment in the form of earpieces and mouthpieces were not included in the equipment that arrived from the [REDACTED] [REDACTED]<sup>(i)</sup>. This led to complaints relating to the lack of communication between the Police front line and other personnel. This lack of communication was exacerbated by the decision of the OSG Team Leader at Redfern to relieve the front line personnel of their portable radios. All Region OSG need to adopt a process to ensure all its relevant equipment is provided when it is requested.

When OSG are deployed in a defensive line, one hand is occupied holding a shield, the other linking officers together in either a loop or double loop formation, making it impossible to utilize a portable radio when in the police line. Include the noise levels of public order incidents, the extended handpiece to portable radios are also ineffective in such situations.

Once the OSG equipment had been transported to Redfern in its trailer, it was reported that for a time access could not be gained to the trailer to issue the equipment. There was no process for management of any vehicle keys at the scene and the officer with the keys to the trailer became involved in other duties after his arrival. The officer had to be located to obtain the keys before the equipment was distributed.

The absence of a Command Post management process at the scene created a number of problems including delays in accessing the riot equipment once it had been transported to the scene. Once the appropriate officer was contacted, the equipment was obtained.

Strike Force Coburn reviewed a number of submissions, reports and open source documents dealing with other forms of equipment available to law enforcement agencies in relation to public order incidents. This process has identified several options included in the recommendations of this report to improve the type of equipment available to police responding to violent unplanned riots.

## **OPTIONS TO IMPROVE EQUIPMENT IN THE FUTURE**

As the riot at Redfern deteriorated, the LAC Commander had limited options for countering escalating crowd violence, and decided that the use of water hoses was the best available option to defend police positions in the situation at that time.

Current training levels for General Duties Police in the use of equipment for riot control is either non-existent or minimal. Various sources have provided suggestions relating to the use of long shields<sup>2</sup> by General Duties Police to combat these situations. Many of the injuries sustained during the riot were to the knees and lower legs of officers, highlighting the benefits that long shields could have provided. In addition to affording greater protection, the shields would allow for a wider range of tactical options to be adopted. These options could include General Duties Police being able to form a defensible barrier pending the arrival of OSG and other specialist units.

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2 Refer Operational Safety & Tactics, Public Order Training Centre, London. – Report on activities by Chief Inspector LUPTON. *September 1998*



The protective equipment on issue to Redfern is the same as that utilised by the OSG. OSG personnel are trained to resolve incidents such as Redfern, forming into arrest teams to take action against offenders, and the equipment used is designed with those tactics in mind.

General Duties officers are generally not trained in such tactics, and subsequently have the need for different protective equipment, rather than a "One size fits all" approach. Consideration must be given to obtaining general duties specific protective equipment. A quantity of long shields and sets of fire retardant overalls available for use by non OSG personnel would afford greater protection and potentially reduce injuries. Education Services have also suggested consideration of obtaining a quantity of smaller round style shields, for use by Mounted Police, Commanders and Team Leaders.

## **LESS THAN LETHAL FORCE - EQUIPMENT**


In obtaining legal advice regarding possible options for utilisation of equipment which was less protective in it's nature, the phrase 'Less than Lethal Equipment' has been used to describe equipment which by it's nature, is a use of force at a level less than lethal force. Given that it remains the duty of NSW Police to keep the peace, regardless the level of violence utilised in breaching that peace, it has been suggested to give consideration to the use of offensive as well as defensive equipment.


The use of this type of equipment will allow Police to break up groups of offenders into smaller congregations, hampering the development of group dynamics, usurping leaders within the groups, and facilitating arrest tactics. At the same time officer safety is improved since it allows for Commanders to increase the distance between offenders and Police, reducing the chance of injury from objects thrown at officers while demonstrating to observers such as the general community, and offenders, a clear use of force to regain control of the situation.

Its use when necessary also clearly demonstrates the intent of Police to control the situation and intolerance of unlawful behaviour while reducing the resolve of the less committed and deterring uninvolved bystanders from joining in.

Tactical options can be developed in relation to any equipment to provide processes through which it could be deployed when circumstances warrant. A variety of "Less than Lethal" or offensive equipment exists.

This category of equipment includes:





(i)


The use of Impact projectiles for example as researched by Strike Force Coburn can provide alternative tactical options, although filling a void in the NSW Police use of force options, it does so in an extremely dramatic and violent use of force:

*It (use of impact projectiles) provides the capability to overcome an offender's resistance from a safe distance through the use of only impact energy. This extended range engagement reduces the potential for death or serious injury to officers and suspects alike when compared to more confrontational tactics.*

*Currently officers have few options that effectively bridge the gap between verbal challenges and physical intervention including deadly force. Closing the distance between suspects and officers to enable the use of batons or OC Spray in some circumstances is not an option as such action brings the officer within the range of the offenders weapon/s.*

Advice has been sought from Legal Services' Operational Legal Advice Unit regarding the use / proposed use of such devices as a tactic in circumstances such as the Redfern incident.

(ii)



(iii)



<sup>(iv)</sup> This is because currently there are no guidelines, instructions, or standard operating procedures in place that NSW Police can rely upon that confirm the safe operation and appropriate deployment of these 'less than lethal' devices.



Any new offensive or defensive equipment will need to be accompanied by the establishment of training and operating regimes. Organisational approval will also be necessary for specific items to be added to the NSW Police available resources, and the development of protocols regarding authority to utilise such tactics.

The introduction of a variety of equipment and tactics involving the use of less than lethal force by appropriate trained personnel would enhance the tactical options available to Police Commanders in dealing with violent public order incidents. Research revealed studies showing inaction by Police on many occasions results in an increase in the momentum of group dynamics and the aggression by groups, inevitably against Police.

Such equipment does not impinge upon the ability to contain an incident, it will however enhance capabilities to more effectively disperse mobs when required, and provide Commanders additional tactical options.

These options include the potential to minimise the duration of incidents, preventing violence from escalating rather than prolonging the potential for Police injuries through a policy of containment being the only option available. Enhanced tactical options can also provide a greater possibility for arrests at the time of the incident rather than retrospective investigation and arrest.

Prior to adoption of any new equipment it will require corporate sign off and protocols to be established relating to training, standard operating procedures and authority to deploy. OSTTU, the Firearms Standing Committee and Legal Services would be the appropriate sections to evaluate and provide advice re the implementation of any new equipment, taking into consideration any impact on external stakeholders.

Given the legal ramifications, individual LACs and/or Regions should not obtain equipment the use of which would be considered the utilisation of 'less than lethal' force without corporate approval of its type, to ensure standardisation of equipment, tactics and authority to deploy.

## **COMMAND EQUIPMENT**

The absence of a purpose built Command Vehicle created difficulties relating to the generation of a log to record details of the incident, Command decisions and intelligence processing. The absence also left a Region Commander, Local Area Commander, and numerous Duty Officers and Team Leaders exposed while attempting to command the operation, making NSW Police appear unprepared, under resourced and unprofessional, not only to external witnesses but to our own personnel.

From the inquiries conducted by Strike Force Coburn, consideration could have been given to an offer made by the Director, Advanced Technology, Special Services Group (SSG) who indicated the SSG response capability includes a vehicle ideally suited as a forward command post. However the vehicle is extremely large and generally best suited for Major Incident responses. Therefore the need for a smaller vehicle still needs to be explored.

A submission by the Inner Metropolitan Region Commander and others identified the need to obtain a purpose designed OSG/Incident Command Post Vehicle to be staffed and maintained by dedicated Region OSG officers who are available under most of the suggested models to respond to a request from Region management.



The primary purpose of this vehicle would be to assist in providing conditions and a resource for better management in terms of resource assembly, deployment, retrieval and stand down, other equipment issues such as dispersal and retrieval, and the planning and communication of command decisions.

## **PRISON VANS & ARREST PROCEDURES**

The Redfern riot highlighted opportunities to improve the arrest procedures at public order events. Evaluation of the current effectiveness of the Public Order Management Policy must include strategies to enhance arrest, charging and custody management procedures for public order incidents, with recognition that there will be significant differences in processes required by Metropolitan Regions compared to rural locations.

Although arrest processes for public order incidents are relatively well known, they are rarely seen to be adopted. Consequently, arrests have now tended to be avoided, or when undertaken without adopting Public Order arrest processes which results in a rapid depletion of available Police personnel from the incident. This has severely diminished the tactical options available to Commanders in the management of planned incidents let alone unplanned ones.

Within Metropolitan Regions adequately staffed prison vans should be available to be deployed to a scene to be managed, and assembled under the direction of a nominated individual (Duty Officer/Team Leader) from the command post. This is in order to provide adequate prisoner security and transportation without reducing the tactical options available to Police in dealing with the incident.

Consideration should also be given to the availability of sufficient custody management facilities at processing locations, and appropriate digital cameras and videos to deal with the possibility of a large number of offenders to be processed, as these issues are regularly not considered when operations are planned.

In rural locations, access to Corrective Services vehicles at short notice or securing charge locations in combination with revised prisoner processing practices could be considered.

Evaluation of the current effectiveness of the Public Order Management Policy must include strategies to enhance arrest, charging and custody management procedures for public order incidents.

## **LOGISTICS PLANNING IN PLACE FOR DISTRIBUTION OF RIOT EQUIPMENT**

Redfern LAC riot equipment is held at both the Redfern Police Station and within Redfern 14 (outside supervisor). Other riot equipment is stored at the [REDACTED]<sup>(i)</sup> in trailers prepared for deployment. In the case of a call out, personnel are directed by the Region OSG Co-ordinator to collect equipment and attend a scene where it is met by OSG personnel deployed to the incident. This is the planned process to be undertaken; and it is what took place at Redfern, except the personnel were not called out due to confusion over the request.

Strike Force Coburn reviewed the response time of OSG equipment to the scene. Whilst some confusion appeared to exist between the scene and the Inner Metropolitan Region Operations Manager the deployment response time for OSG equipment at a region level to the scene was



not considered adequate. That is, 1hr 20 minutes elapsed between the initial request and its arrival at the scene. The key timings on 15 February 2004 were as follows:

**21:29** Equipment requested by Inner Metropolitan A/Region Operations Manager of the OSG Co-ordinator.

**22:50** First OSG equipment trailer arrives at the scene.

**02:30** Second delivery of OSG equipment arrives at the scene.

The current process regarding Inner Metropolitan Region OSG call out, including the deployment of equipment, requires Region Operations Manager to contact the OSG Co-Ordinator, or the officer acting in his position.

This officer then either responds personally or contacts another member of the OSG to attend the [REDACTED] <sup>(i)</sup> access the relevant keys, obtain the equipment and deploy to the required location. There is concern that access to the necessary equipment is dependent upon being able to reach the OSG Co-Ordinator, and the effectiveness of the process.

The first delivery took 1 hour 20 minutes, arriving at 2250hrs, due to the previously discussed access problems requiring officers to force entry to the equipment, followed by a later delivery at 0230hrs. All Regions should evaluate the effectiveness of their current equipment access and call out processes.

## **LEVEL OF EXPERIENCE OF POLICE AT REDFERN RIOT**

The experience levels of Police present on the evening of 15–16 February 2004 is represented in the following table:

Officers	Total deployed at scene
Probationary Constables	57
Constables	101
Senior Constables	48
Sergeants / Team Leaders	18
Duty Officers	14
Superintendents	1
Total	249

## **LEVEL OF TRAINING IN THE USE OF RIOT EQUIPMENT**

Strike Force Coburn believes the level of training in the use of riot equipment by Police deployed at the incident was inadequate. While the number of Redfern LAC staff who have received 1 day introductory riot training is approximately 70 officers of the 152 available. Only 13% (29) of police involved in the riot on 15–16 February 2004 were from that Command. No such training has been provided to surrounding Commands who came to Redfern's assistance. The training level for Redfern and adjoining LACs needs to be 100% as a matter of urgency.



## **SUPERVISOR AWARENESS OF ASSETS AND THEIR AVAILABILITY / LOCATION**

Strike Force Coburn concluded that Supervisors were aware of the location of riot equipment held by the Redfern LAC and its availability. It was obtained when requested, despite poor systems in place regarding accountability for its condition.

## **SUPERVISOR AWARENESS OF ADDITIONAL RESERVES OF RIOT EQUIPMENT / LOCATION**

The awareness of additional equipment by Supervisors appears to have been limited to the holdings of Redfern LAC. Knowledge of the additional equipment held at the [REDACTED] (i) as well as how to obtain it was not as well known.

The Duty Officers were aware however of whom to contact in order to obtain the additional equipment. It was the Duty Officer's awareness of additional equipment at the [REDACTED] (ii) which resulted in his conversations with the Region Operations Manager in efforts to obtain it and OSG personnel.

## **SUPERVISOR AWARENESS OF AUTHORISATION REQUIREMENTS FOR ACCESS TO RIOT EQUIPMENT**

Redfern LAC Standard Operating Procedures indicate their riot equipment is to be deployed at the discretion of the Supervisor/Duty Officer, and the processes were adhered to by the relevant personnel, and are appropriate.

### **FINDINGS - EQUIPMENT**

1. Access to additional riot equipment from the [REDACTED] (iii) during the Redfern riot was not timely.
2. The Scott Aspen brand helmets on issue to Redfern LAC are operationally inappropriate (suitable only for training).
3. No communication equipment was taken from the [REDACTED] (iv) for use at the Redfern riot.
4. The type of protective equipment available for General Duties personnel during the Redfern riot was inadequate given their training and the equipment's use in a static line.
5. The Redfern incident identified concerns in relation to ill-fitting equipment issued to Local Area Commands, such as bullet resistant vests being all of the one size.
6. Equipment needs to be identifiable to allow for accountability in its issue, its recertification as operationally effective after use in incidents or training, and in relation to evidentiary considerations.



7. NSW Police do not possess 'Less than Lethal Force' equipment as tactical options for Commanders.
8. An adequately equipped vehicle as a mobile command post for use at Redfern would have allowed for better management of necessary command post functions.
9. There was a lack of storage and accountability protocols relating to riot equipment on issue to Redfern LAC, it has been revised and improved since the riot.
10. There is a lack of process to regularly examine the standard of protective riot equipment being used by NSW Police.
11. Prison vans were not utilised during the incident.
12. There are numerous other locations within NSW with holdings of protective riot equipment. It appears these holdings are either unknown by the Region OSG Co-ordinators, or unreported by them to Strike Force Coburn.

### **RECOMMENDATIONS - EQUIPMENT**

1. An urgent review is conducted at all Regions to determine riot equipment availability for deployment to unplanned incidents, as well as its quantity and the quality of equipment held.
2. Redfern LAC's protective riot equipment requires upgrading to Operational quality.
3. OSTTU be tasked to assess equipment currently utilised by the OSG and alternatives held by NSW Police for officers wearing helmets to communicate.
- 3a. Call Out processes of all Regions relating to protective equipment should be reviewed to ensure *ALL* available equipment can be accessed in a timely manner.
4. OSTTU should be tasked to research options re alternative protective equipment suitable for General Duties personnel, such as Long Shields, Fire Retardant overalls, and Riot specific vests.
5. LACs should review equipment on hand re sizing implications for officers attached to the LAC.
6. An assessment is required by OSTTU as to the need for uniquely identifiable reference markings on all equipment.
7. OSTTU should be tasked to research 'Less than Lethal Force' options, including modifications to the SPG's Bearcat armoured rescue vehicle.
8. Options re availability of adequately equipped vehicles for use as forward command posts should be explored by each Region and LAC.
9. All Local Area Commands issued with protective riot equipment should design a system of accountability for the quality, storage and access arrangements. Accountability for this can be managed through Command Management Framework (CMF).



10. OSTTU be tasked with implementing a process to regularly examine the standard of riot equipment being used by NSW Police, giving consideration to the establishment of an Australian Quality Standard.
11. The availability of prison vans should be explored by all Regions for use during public order incidents.
12. Each Region needs to audit ALL its LAC's to identify all equipment held, to account for it and ensure its quality and availability.

## COMMUNICATIONS

The role of communications leading up to and during the Redfern riots played a pivotal role in the unfolding events on the night of 15 February 2004 into the morning of 16 February 2004. The following discussion indicates notification activities during the incident inclusive of the role individuals played in Executive notifications.

### Adequacy of communication protocols for executive notification

On 15–16 February 2004, VKG used the protocols of 'Serious, Unusual or Newsworthy' (S.U.N.) for determining executive notifications for a broad range of significant incidents. When incidents meet this criteria, VKG are expected to contact the 'on call' Executive Staff Officer (Operational Response Unit). The occurrence of a 'notification' relies on the judgement of the Duty Operations Inspector. Incidents of riots or civil unrest were not specifically mentioned in the S.U.N. protocol at the time of the Redfern incident.

The Redfern incident highlighted deficiencies in these S.U.N. notification protocols. Strike Force Coburn concluded that these protocols were broad and lacked specific criteria to determine issues or incidents that should be notified to the executive. These protocols were open to arbitrary interpretation by Duty Operations Inspectors and personnel at VKG.

The Commissioner's Staff Officer, Chief Superintendent Aust, was advised of the riot about 5am on Monday, 16 February 2004. The Commissioner's Chief of Staff has the delegated responsibility to communicate issues of significance to the Commissioner, and the Commissioner's Office. In general, the Commissioner or his Staff Officer advises the Minister's Chief of Staff and the Ministry.

Following the Redfern incident the communication protocols used by VKG have been revised with endorsement by the Commissioner. The communication protocols have been enhanced to include specific examples of significant issues including riotous behaviour and civil unrest. Strike Force Coburn believes these revised protocols will assist in the upward notification of significant events to the executive.

Strike Force Coburn reviewed the timings and extent of executive notifications on 14, 15 and 16 February 2004 to determine the sequence of notifications by key individuals during the incident. An itemised summary of notifications and timings are included below to assist in understanding the role individuals played.


Strike Force Coburn concluded the delay in notification to the executive of the unfolding events is likely to have been a result of an under appreciation of the seriousness of the riot by the Local Area Commander, based on a belief the situation was under control.



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## **NOTIFICATIONS RELEVANT TO THE DEATH OF THOMAS HICKEY**

**Saturday 14 February 2004**



(1)

## **EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS – UNFOLDING RIOT**

**Sunday 15 February 2004**

**17:33** Inspector Emery rings VKG from Redfern Railway Station, attempting to speak to Inspector Chambers (DOI) to provide a Sitrep regarding incidents occurring since the death of Thomas Hickey. Inspector Emery advises Inspector Chambers he has been trying unsuccessfully to call Superintendent Smith. Inspector Emery had been in contact with Superintendent Smith earlier in the day.



- 17:55** Inspector Emery contacts Superintendent Smith and advises him of the Redfern situation.
- 18:00** Superintendent Smith telephones Assistant Commissioner Waites, and advises him of the Redfern situation. Assistant Commissioner Waites was advised by Superintendent Smith that there were problems in Lawson St with Aborigines under the influence of alcohol and 'trying to goad Police'. Superintendent Smith stated it was under control, with no further assistance required, 'just advising' Assistant Commissioner Waites.
- 18:15** Inspector Emery and Redfern Duty Officer - Inspector Garth Smith were gathering personnel together to re-open the railway station after having spoken to Superintendent Smith. At this time, Inspector Emery and Smith confer and discuss tactical options for the civil unrest.
- 18:18** Inspector Emery makes inquiries with Inspector Chambers regarding availability of Vikings or OSG. Inspector Chambers indicates there were none on duty to his knowledge.
- 19:26** Inspector Smith informed Inspector Chambers that Redfern police were briefed and 'will stay away from the block'. Both morning and afternoon shifts were available and they were policing the Redfern area but keeping out of the 'block'. Inspector Emery indicates he has received information that those congregating in the 'block' want confrontation.
- 20:51** Inspector Emery advises Inspector Chambers that Superintendent Smith wants to keep a low-key presence.
- 21:04** A large crowd emerged from Eveleigh Street and charged at police. 'Signal 1 called'. Police tactically withdraw into Redfern Rail Station.
- 21:28** Inspector Emery contacts Inspector Chambers and indicates 'a couple of hundred have just charged', causing police to retreat. Inspector Emery thinks they are gearing up to go again. Insp Emery says he has no emergency or OSG response available. Inspector Chambers provides a phone number for the Region Operations Manager, Inspector Snel.
- 21:30** Inspector Emery rings Inspector Snel for OSG equipment and OSG Staff. The verbal message Inspector Snel recalls was for 20 sets of equipment only. Inspector Snel then contacts Assistant Commissioner Waites and advises him that Inspector Emery was after equipment but not OSG staff. Assistant Commissioner Waites enquires as to whether Superintendent Smith was on the scene and if not, to be asked to consider attending Redfern.
- 21:42** At 9.42pm Inspector Snel calls Inspector Chambers and indicates that Inspector Emery called her for OSG equipment. She asks Inspector Chambers for a Situation Report, which he does, inclusive of the Redfern Rail Station being shut down. Inspector Snel says that Assistant Commissioner Waites was not aware the Railway Station had been closed. Inspector Chambers says the Redfern Rail Station had only just 'then' been completely closed. Inspector Snel asks how many people are at the railway station, Inspector Chambers indicates that he doesn't know, as minimal information is being broadcast over VKG.



- 21:50** About 9.50pm Inspector Snel contacts Superintendent Smith. He is at home but getting ready to go to the site.
- 22:14** Redfern's Crime Manager, Detective Inspector Darren Bennett, who is at the riot scene, calls Inspector Chambers re the situation at the 'block', and inquires about Polair support. Inspector Chambers advises that the helicopter is not available. Inspector Chambers then speaks to Inspector Smith and tells him he has to call Superintendent Adney to update her on the situation regarding the injured police and riot. Inspector Smith says he is just containing it (the riot) now. Inspector Chambers asks how many rioters there are and Inspector Smith says numbers vary.
- 22:19** Inspector Chambers phones Superintendent Adney. Inspector Chambers provides a situation report to Superintendent Adney, indicating 'things flared up thirty to forty five minutes ago, stating police are kitted up and escorting Fire Brigade personnel into the area - but are in no danger'. Superintendent Adney asks for a definition of what "kitted up" means, with Inspector Chambers indicating that he assumes police are using riot gear they've had [at Redfern] for some time. Inspector Chambers indicates that he thinks Redfern Inspectors have contacted Inspector Snel and arranged for OSG. Inspector Chambers tells Superintendent Adney everything is OK at the railway station, with fifty rioters still around causing trouble. Inspector Chambers informs Superintendent Adney that Police Media are at the scene.
- 22:22** Superintendent Smith arrived at Redfern. His intent was containment and negotiation pending further resources arriving.
- 22:30** Superintendent Adney 'Short Message Services' (SMSs) Acting Deputy Commissioner Parsons and Deputy Commissioner Madden apprising them of the situation. It is understood Acting Deputy Commissioner Parsons then conferred with Superintendent Adney at 10.34pm. Acting Deputy Commissioner Parsons then undertook to advise Commissioner Moroney.
- 22:37** Superintendent Adney rings Inspector Chambers. Superintendent Adney says she has called Acting Deputy Commissioner Parsons and he wants to know if Assistant Commissioner Waites and Superintendent Smith have been informed. Superintendent Adney asks if Superintendent Smith is at the scene?
- 22:50** Acting Deputy Commissioner Parsons and Superintendent Adney confer.
- 23:30** Assistant Commissioner Waites receives a phone call from Superintendent Smith who advises him that the people were still 'playing up', but that it is 'in hand'.
- 23:45** Acting Deputy Commissioner Parsons rang Assistant Commissioner Waites inquiring as to the situation. Assistant Commissioner Waites answered the inquiry providing information he had received from Superintendent Smith. Acting Deputy Commissioner Parsons inquired if Assistant Commissioner Waites should go to Redfern. Assistant Commissioner Waites advised that he had considered it, however, Superintendent Smith had been insistent that the situation was under control.
- 23:50** Acting Deputy Commissioner Parsons contacted Commissioner Moroney to advise him of the Redfern situation. The information received by Mr Waites was not of a nature that properly described the gravity of the situation. This was presumably based on a belief that 20 OSG were en route and the situation was under control, so there was no cause for an alarm which would trigger a notification upward to Mr Parsons.



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**Sunday 16 February 2004**

- 01:15** Superintendent Smith rings Assistant Commissioner Waites requesting more Police, though still indicating that he sees no need for Assistant Commissioner Waites to attend the scene. At this point, Assistant Commissioner Waites decides to attend.
- 01:37** Assistant Commissioner Waites rings Insp Chambers and advises he is attending the scene with an expected time of arrival at Redfern in 10 minutes. He requests an 'all channels' call for 30-50 extra Police. Inspector Chambers advises Assistant Commissioner Waites that rioters are coming up behind Police.
- 01:47** Assistant Commissioner Waites arrives at scene and advises Inspector Chambers that molotov cocktails are being thrown and wants a circuit breaker by way of State Protection Group (SPG).
- 01:50** Assistant Commissioner Waites confers with Chief Inspector Jennings of the Tactical Operations Unit (TOU) of the SPG re tactical options. None suitable from SPG. Contact then with Inspector Snel for Inner Metropolitan Region OSG Co-ordinator Senior Sergeant Mark Wade's phone number.
- 02:00** Assistant Commissioner Waites phoned Senior Sergeant Wade for chemical options. No suitable chemically based tactical options were available.
- 02:00** Inspector Chambers, on own initiative, contacts 'on call' air wing officer, on the basis that all Police were in position. Air Wing's first contact with DOI in this event.
- 02:05** Assistant Commissioner Waites contacted by Inspector Chambers and advised that Polair has been called out and did he want Video Unit to attend the riot site? Assistant Commissioner Waites indicates he does want Video Unit called out.
- 02:17** Inspector Chambers calls Superintendent Adney who advises that the matter is still escalating, with Inspector Chambers having called cars from all Metropolitan areas to attend scene. Inspector Chambers further advises that SPG resisting attending as not their job but providing advice. Adney advises that SPG should send negotiators at minimum.
- 02:20** Superintendent Smith takes possession of the fire hoses and turns them on the rioters.
- 02:22** Deputy Commissioner Support Scipione calls Inspector Chambers having been advised by the Commissioner of New South Wales Fire Brigade (NSWFB) re New South Wales Police (NSWP) have taken over their fire hoses as a tactical option. Sitrep by Inspector Chambers re fire at railway station and inquiries by Deputy Commissioner Scipione re numbers of staff, dogs, SPG role, arrests and if Assistant Commissioner Waites is present.
- 02:30** Senior Constable Jeffree of Police Video Unit arrives at riot.
- 02:30** Sergeant O'Riordan arrives with extra riot equipment.
- 02:37** Assistant Commissioner Waites contacts Inspector Chambers who says that plenty of Police on site but not enough protective equipment. Assistant Commissioner Waites tells Inspector Chambers there is an OSG trailer coming from Hornsby and to contact Fairfield Duty Officer for their OSG trailer.



- 02:46** Inspector Chambers calls Superintendent Smith re State Rail inquiry re trains and advises they are 'running'.
- 02:58** Inspector Chambers calls Assistant Commissioner Waites to advise that the Fairfield trailer is on the way and the Polair crew should have contacted someone at the riot site, possibly Superintendent Smith. Assistant Commissioner Waites finds Polair is overhead and calls them down to put their 'night sun' into Eveleigh St. Assistant Commissioner Waites advised re Transport Ministry inquiry and says that the trains will run unless there are bricks thrown at the trains.
- 03:30** Assistant Commissioner Waites memo: 'Rioters start to disperse into the darkness of the 'block'. Police advance and the rioters have completely drifted away'.
- 05:00** Commissioner calls DOI and receives Sitrep of events. Informed status of incident now quiet and Assistant Commissioner Waites present at scene.
- 06:46** Supt Adney calls new DOI Fitzgerald for Sitrep.

The Ministry and the Minister were not informed of the Redfern Riot until the morning of 16<sup>th</sup> February. The notification of the Ministry and the Minister is the responsibility of the Commissioner's Office.

The matter had been described properly enough by Inspector Chambers to Superintendent Adney for her to be concerned enough to contact Acting Deputy Commissioner Parsons. Acting Deputy Commissioner Parsons inquired if Assistant Commissioner Waites was attending. Assistant Commissioner Waites informed Acting Deputy Commissioner Parsons that he had considered attending however Superintendent Smith had been insistent that the matter was under control.

Superintendent Smith's assessment of the scenario that matters were under control were then relayed to Assistant Commissioner Waites. This is likely to have precluded further upward transmission of the information to the Acting Deputy Commissioner Parsons. However, it should be noted that Superintendent Smith believed there were 20 OSG en route to the scene.

The estimation of the event by Inspector Emery in concurrence with Inspector Smith as the event unfolded appears to be a correct assessment.

The Duty Operations Inspector, in general, relies on the relevant Duty Officer to contact the Local Area Commander who would contact the Region Commander on a needs basis.

The inquiry by Detective Inspector Bennett of Inspector Chambers as to the availability of the Polair was properly answered by Mr Chambers that Polair was not available. However there would have been value added by Inspector Chambers advising Inspector Bennett of a 'call out' protocol that existed for Polair. About 2am, Polair was called out by Inspector Chambers. In circumstances where key resources such as Polair are not available the Duty Operations Inspector should offer advice on options to obtain these resources.

Whilst the call out of Polair by Inspector Chambers was a good decision, consultation about the decision with Commanders at the scene may have enabled them to exercise further options.



At 6.40am Sunday 15 February 2004, VKG faxed a Sitrep note relative to the death of Thomas Hickey to Superintendent Adney. The same morning, Superintendent Adney discussed it, amongst other matters, with Acting Deputy Commissioner Parsons. The death of Thomas Hickey as described in the Sitrep did not trigger a need by Acting Deputy Commissioner Parsons to advise Commissioner Moroney.

Strike Force Coburn understands that in any usual circumstance the death of a person in hospital after impalement would not have caused any notification to be sent to the Commissioner via the Deputy Commissioner (Operations).

The Commissioners Office has reviewed and updated the categories in which information is now received. The Commissioner's Staff Officer is now contacted by the Duty Operations Inspector in circumstances of 'Other arrests or incidents that would attract significant media interest...' The death of Thomas Hickey would now be included within this category as are riots and civil unrests.

Following the Redfern incident changes have also been made to the Sitrep protocols including:

- *Sitreps are still the responsibility of the Local Area Command* (normally the Duty Officer). A state-wide memo under the hand of the Commissioner will be distributed in the near future followed by a Police Weekly article relating to Sitreps and notifications. The article will be developed by Inspector O'Reilly of the Operations Response Unit.
- *Reporting through the command structure will be reinforced.* The Duty Operations Inspector will be a 'through' point of information from the field to the Executive. This has no effect on notifications to the Regional Commander from within their own Commands. There are two relevant protocols for notification, these being the Commissioner and the Operational Response Unit protocols. There is a further protocol for the Commissioners Office to contact the Minister.

## **ROLE OF THE DOI, AND ANY SUBSEQUENT BREAKDOWN IN NOTIFICATIONS**

As discussed previously, Strike Force Coburn believes there was a breakdown in the role of the Duty Operations Inspector (VKG) in communication to the executive in the first instance via the On Call Executive Staff Officer, due to the inadequacy of the S.U.N notification protocol.

Subsequent notifications, once the severity of the incident was appreciated, were considered adequate. The delay in the initial notification to Superintendent Adney by the Duty Operations Inspector was a break down in notification protocols of S.U.N procedures. Changes to these protocols following 15- 16 February 2004 will improve the timeliness of future notifications.

However the role and functions of the Duty Operations Inspector are perhaps not fully appreciated in the field and require further marketing. Superintendent Corboy has advised that marketing of the role of the Duty Operations Inspector will be an ongoing activity by V.K.G.




Acting Deputy Commissioner Parsons had to ring Assistant Commissioner Waites on the night of the riot. Deputy Commissioner Parsons advises that this downward inquiry from the Deputy Commissioner to the Regional Commander was a concern that he and Commissioner Moroney had discussed on the night.

Documents submitted to Strike Force Coburn identified the following observations:

- The information given by Inspector Emery to Superintendent Smith and Inspector Chambers was accurate.
- The information passed onto Superintendent Adney by Inspector Chambers was accurate but not initially timely as the call occurred at 10.19pm.
- The information passed by Superintendent Adney to Acting Deputy Commissioner Parsons was accurate but not timely due to the delay in initially getting the notification from Inspector Chambers.
- Contact at 9.40pm between Inspector Snel and Superintendent Smith was timely and Inspector Snel advises in this conversation she indicated to Superintendent Smith that he should contact her if OSG are required.

At 10.15pm Detective Inspector Bennett contacted Inspector Chambers to determine the availability of Polair. Inspector Chambers advised Detective Inspector Bennett that Polair was unavailable. Inspector Chambers did not advise Detective Inspector Bennett of an availability of call out procedures for Polair. The absence of aerial surveillance or lighting seriously inhibited Superintendent Smith's appreciation of the seriousness of the event. It should be noted Police were unaware of the size of the riot crowd and their collection of missiles, which were assembled in Eveleigh Street. Once Polair was activated and arrived overhead, the seriousness of the event was fully appreciated. By this time, however, the riot was in its final stages.

In a report from VKG, it was indicated that the DOI has no role in the line management or decision-making process relating to field operations. The report indicated that VKG goes to great efforts to inform personnel of this fact, so that the DOI does not interfere in operational decision making. However, on this occasion, the decision by Inspector Chambers to call out Polair was appropriate.



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## **ADEQUACY OF POLICE RADIO COMMUNICATIONS AT THE TIME OF THE CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE**

Radio communications on 12 February 2004: The “Glock” Event: involving an allegation of a ‘VKG radio blackspot’ at the ‘block’.

On Thursday 12 February 2004, there was an event at the ‘block’ involving two officers following a wanted person into the area. These two officers did not, as per Redfern SOPS, call VKG prior entering the ‘block’. The two officers were involved in a violent incident with 12 to 14 persons attacking them. During this incident, attempts were made by the offenders to remove both officer’s firearms. One of the officers lost possession of his glock for a short period of time, with the firearm pointed at his stomach by an offender prior to being regained. During this incident one of the Officers indicated he called a ‘signal one’. This message was not picked up by VKG and as result a question of the effectiveness of the coverage of Police radio occurred, with the inference that VKG has a radio ‘blackspot’ in the ‘block’.

The term a radio ‘blackspot’ indicates an area without police radio coverage. This was initially suspected as the cause of this ‘signal one’ not being picked up by VKG. After this issue was raised, a number of electronic tests were conducted by VKG in the following days, with no ‘blackspots’ located within the Redfern area including Eveleigh St. An additional check of all portable radios on hand at Redfern found none that were operationally defective. A review of the voice tape from the 12 February 2004, provided evidence that the Police were under incredible stress at the time of the incident, causing for very poor quality voice transmissions. The ‘signal one’ transmission was not picked up by the VKG Operator. However, a replaying of the tape recording of the transmission confirms the ‘signal one’ transmission is audible.

## **RADIO TRAFFIC VOLUME ISSUES ON THE 15-16 FEBRUARY 2004**

There was a desire by Superintendent Smith to keep the Redfern incident ‘low key’. In order to do this he sought agreement with Inspector Chambers to keep VKG transmissions relative to the Redfern incident to a minimum. The result was a minimum amount of information being conveyed by Police radio deliberately and conversations between Inspector Chambers and senior officers at the scene being conducted by mobile phone. This in turn did not overload VKG to a point of congestion.

## **COMMUNICATIONS ISSUES WITH EQUIPMENT ON THE FRONT LINE DURING RIOT**

Police on the front line experienced difficulties hearing orders due to the helmets issued at the scene. The portable radios issued to the front line police were removed by the OSG Supervisor at the scene. This needs to be subject to assessment by OSTTU as to the appropriateness of this tactic as it caused concern amongst Police losing their communication devices.



Information from Assistant Commissioner Waites was that the sound of the rioters combined with the fire truck pumps running was so loud and intense that he had to tap Superintendent Smith on the shoulder to get his attention and then put his mouth to his ear in order to verbally communicate. This shows the difficulty of oral communications at the scene.

Current options during these type of incidents include megaphones, yelling, written messages or hand signals. Specific hand signals are taught in OSG training, however, not in general duties training.

## **ON SITE RECORDS**

A major factor of any serious or major event is a recording of occurrence times and command decision making for further evidentiary matters or management review purposes. There have been no contemporaneous command logs presented to Strike Force Coburn relative to the riot site. Much of Strike Force Coburn's information has been collated via CIDS, various VKG records, submitted documents and logs developed at a later time. This has caused Strike Force Coburn to occasionally identify time corrections on submissions but that did not affect content.


Strike Force Coburn notes the existence of the Duty Officers Manual. This portfolio holds documents which include various scenarios including 'Public Order'. It as 'Incident Entry / Exit log', a 'Running Sheet / Operation Log', a prompt sheet relating to resource availability and a 'Major Incident / Emergency General Action check sheet'.

It would have been advantageous to Strike Force Coburn had the various operational field record documents located within the Duty Officers Manual been contemporaneously used during the event at the riot site. It would have been a further advantage if these documents were used by support elements to assist in consistency in decision making and recording the same.

## **ROLE & ADEQUACY OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS BRANCH (MEDIA UNIT)**

The Media Unit provides a 24-hour media advisory service to all police, ranging from over-the-phone advice to attending major crime scenes and managing critical issues. Products include Daily Briefings and Media Releases. The role of the Media Unit on 14, 15 and 16 February 2004 is summarised in date order below.

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## OPERATIONS SUPPORT GROUP CALL OUT

- 21:04** There was a group of rioters exiting from Eveleigh St into Lawson St east over the rail bridge. These rioters were throwing bricks and bottles, causing approximately 10 Police to tactically withdraw into Redfern Railway Station. Police cars parked nearby were damaged and a baton stolen from the interior of an unsecured vehicle. A rioter then set the Redfern Railway Station on fire.
- 21:28** Inspector Emery informs Inspector Chambers that a couple of hundred people have just charged and caused police to retreat and he thinks they are gearing up to go again. Inspector Emery responds by stating there is no emergency or OSG response at Redfern. Inspector Chambers then provides the phone number for Inspector Snel.
- 21:29** Inspector Emery rings Inspector Snel to request 20 Operations Support Group (OSG) personnel and 20 sets of riot equipment for them. Inspector Snel indicates that she was of the understanding she was requested to organise for the delivery of 20 OSG riot outfits from the [REDACTED] <sup>(ii)</sup> to the Redfern site, with no request for personnel.
- 21:45** Inspector Snel called Senior Sergeant Wade, the Inner Metropolitan Region OSG Co-Ordinator who was off duty.
- 21:50** Senior Sergeant Wade then called out two OSG supervisors, who attended the [REDACTED] <sup>(iii)</sup> and after difficulties accessing the equipment resulting in [REDACTED] <sup>(iv)</sup> personnel being sent to the [REDACTED] <sup>(v)</sup> to assist, picked up the OSG truck and conveyed it to Redfern, arriving about 10.50pm.

There was a belief at the scene that OSG had been called out at 9.29pm, the reality was the call out did not commence until almost 4hrs later at 1.15am. Strike Force Coburn understands Police at the scene were expecting 20 OSG personnel and equipment to arrive at the scene. This belief is reinforced by the following:

- 22:15** There was a telephone conversation between Inspector Chambers and Inspector Garth Smith, who says he has OSG on the way.
- 22:20** Superintendent Adney asks Inspector Chambers if Redfern need more OSG, and he says no because Inspector Emery is calling around and so is Inspector Snel.



**23:00** Superintendent Smith calls Inspector Chambers. Superintendent Smith says 'they are gearing up for another strike at us now' and that he was expecting 20 OSG to arrive after being called out.

**01:10** There was a realisation that there was no callout of OSG in progress. That caused further contact to be made with Sergeant Wade by Inspector Garth Smith. Senior Sergeant Wade then rang Inspector Snel for authorisation for call out of 20 OSG. Authorisation was given and 15 OSG staff arrived at the scene within the next 90 minutes.

## **ACTIVATION OF THE POLICE OPERATIONS CENTRE**

The Police Operations Centre (POC) is a facility which operates within the Sydney Police Centre from which an appointed Police Commander commands & co-ordinates the Police response during certain operations.

The POC has a defined 'Level of Activation' with three specific levels of operation:

Monitoring Role (Part Day - 24 hour)  
Fully Operational  
Terrorist incident

The POC is opened at a level 1 to monitor an incident locally or overseas with the ability to proceed to the next level within 30 minutes.

Triggers that are likely to cause the POC to be opened include intelligence or an actual event to suggest that NSW Police may require a significant and co-ordinated response.

Tasks of the Police Operations Centre include:

- The management of operations including maintenance of records
- Development of contingency plans
- Maintain a log of significant events
- Gather, analyse and disseminate intelligence
- Provide Situation reports.

Authority for activation of the POC can come from the following officers:

- Commander, Inner Metropolitan Region
- Deputy Commissioner Operations
- Commissioner.

At 1.15am during the riot, Superintendent Smith and Assistant Commissioner Waites spoke on the phone. During this conversation Superintendent Smith indicated that the option of opening the POC was discussed, but it was decided that it was not required.

If the POC had been activated at Level 1, that is 'monitoring', at an earlier point in time, this may have assisted in better coordinating resources, however, such an activation was not considered until later in the incident, which precluded its effective use.

The P.O.C. has an electronic log which is used by operators within its confines. 'Highly protected' information is not recorded in that log.



In response to incidents outside the Inner Metropolitan Region there are options available to activate and utilise the Police Operations Centre. Region Commanders are able to either deploy their own personnel into the P.O.C. during an incident / operation, or alternatively the trained Inner Metropolitan Region personnel can be utilised, providing all the functions undertaken by the POC in support of the incident / operation on behalf of the other Region.

## **FINDINGS - COMMUNICATIONS**

1. Information supplied to Assistant Commissioner Waites was based on the belief the situation was under control. This assessment did not facilitate the upward movement of the information, causing unsatisfactory timeliness of notifications to the Executive.
2. In relation to the 'Glock incident' on February 12, Strike Force Coburn found that there were no radio 'black spots' in Redfern and the poor transmission related to misunderstanding of the content of the transmission by the VKG Operator.
3. There is a lack of understanding by operational Police of the roles and capabilities of the DOI.
4. The lack of activation of Polair earlier precluded a greatly enhanced NSW Police response to the incident. The decision by Inspector Chambers to call-out the Polair was a correct decision, though consultation with relevant field commanders should have occurred prior to the call-out.
5. The absence of a command post log from the event to refer to has caused Strike Force Coburn to experience difficulties in collecting accurate information relating to the incident and appropriate accountability for the operation. There was a further significant impact on other investigations and enquiries as well the provision of an audit trail for important decisions.
6. There is no operational checklist relevant to riots and other serious incidents developed for Crime Managers or Local Area Commanders. The Duty Officer's Manual allows for statewide standards and consistency in having record of field communications, checklists and prompt for riots and serious incidents.
7. The lack of a dedicated radio channel precluded the 'low key' response desired by Superintendent Smith.
8. There was a failure to satisfactorily escalate information to senior management of the Police Media Unit. There was growing media interest on Sunday the 15 February 2004 and senior media unit officers were not appraised in a timely fashion. This additionally caused for the Police Ministry's media officers to also not be appraised.
9. There was confusion in the conversation that occurred between Inspector Snel and Inspector Emery at 9.30pm. The outcome of this miscommunication was that there was recurrent belief for almost four hours that 20 OSG personnel were being called out. This precluded appropriate OSG response times.
10. There could have been operational advantages if the P.O.C. had been opened during the incident. Strike Force Coburn concluded that the existing activation protocols for the POC are adequate, however, all Commanders need to be aware of the existence and the importance of the P.O.C. and its associated protocols.



## **RECOMMENDATIONS - COMMUNICATIONS**

1. Commander training to include reference to ensuring clarity in communications during management of high-risk operations.
2. Consideration be given to using the 'Glock incident' tape recording by Education Services for training purposes to emphasize the important of clarity of communications under stress. As there are no 'black spots', no further action re that issue.
3. VKG should market the role of Duty Operations Inspector (DOIs) more effectively to Duty Officers and Commanders, to ensure a fuller understanding of the role of the Duty Operations Inspector and the associated responsibilities of the position. Similarly LACs should provide adequate information and training to personnel relating to the operations of DOIs at VKG.
4. Duty Operations Inspectors should be further educated as to their roles by VKG, with encouragement to consult regularly with operational Commanders at scenes of high risk incidents, to co-ordinate available resources.
5. The requirement to use command logs to record times, decisions and resources should be reinforced in future Commander training activities.
6. That the issue of the Duty Officers Manual be revisited for use by all Crime Managers and Commanders, to record, in consistent formats, the key communications and decision making during high-risk incidents such as riots.
7. The availability of additional radio channels should be made aware to Commanders by VKG during high-risk incidents when frequent communication is predicted, or a request for 'low-key' communications is preferred.
8. The Media Unit has improved its protocol for internal notifications re major incidents. No further action required.
9. Education Services to consider training implications relating to communications. On-going assessment and decision making training should be provided by Education Services in commanding civil unrest situations for Commanders, Duty Officers and Supervisors.
10. The availability and benefits of using the POC should be re-enforced to operational Commanders by communication from the Executive.

## **AWARENESS AND PREPARATION**

The intentions of this section are to provide information relating to the Policing environment within the Redfern LAC prior to 15 February 2004. The section will highlight crime trends and Policing responses across the LAC in an endeavour to identify any obvious signs of civil unrest.



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## INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS AND INFORMANT NETWORK


- Statistics from the Redfern Operations and Crime Review (OCR) dated 25 February 2004, reveal most categories of crime are **steady** remaining near the control chart average and **trending down**. This would indicate the Command's crime reduction strategies are effective.
- Whilst this Command is rated number one in the state for robberies, overall Redfern is rated 27<sup>th</sup> in the combined crime categories of Assault, Break Enter and Steal, Robbery, Stealing and Stolen Vehicle/Vessel.
- Pro-activity, being drug detection, use of move on legislation and the use of person search legislation are relatively high along with the submission of information reports. This pro-activity is not considered to be obtrusive to the community, however, there were 74 reports of police being hurt on duty between 15 February 2003, and 15 February 2004. The majority of these injuries were occasioned during arresting of offenders, domestic violence or civil unrest incidents.
- In January 2004, there were 53 drug detections, which is well above the Control Chart average of 29. The majority of these drug detections were for possession of cannabis, **with seven legal actions for supply heroin, one legal action for use heroin and five for possession of heroin**.
- The 'Drug House' legislation has had minimal use within the Redfern LAC during the last two years. Following adverse court findings based upon legal technicalities involving possession and knowledge.
- In her evidence at the Redfern Parliamentary inquiry on 8 June, 2004, Karen Becker – Director of Drug Health Services, Central City Health Services, Roselle – stated 15 to 30 thousand needles were dispensed from the Redfern Van monthly. Becker agreed, when questioned, that 43 daily users would use 500 to 1,000 needles per day.
- The intelligence systems at Redfern did not activate any warnings that a riot may be imminent on the 15/16 February 2004.
- The informant network at Redfern did not alert Redfern LAC of any pending civil disorder.
- The Aboriginal Community Liaison Officers, one of which was sent to the 'block' three times on Saturday 14 February 2004, did not report any behaviour that may have indicated that a riot was imminent.
- The Redfern Local Area Commander, Superintendent Smith, enjoys the support of Aboriginal Elders and Leaders within Redfern and has been the driving force behind police programs assisting aboriginal children.

## DRUG DETECTION



## REDFERN LAC

January 2003 – February 2004



- Redfern Local Area Command is rated as the 20<sup>th</sup> best LAC in the state for drug detections, with possession of prohibited drug in the top ten charges.
- The control chart average of 29 drug detections per month has been constant for over a year. In January 2004, 53 detections were made, and the LAC reports conducting 6 operations targeting middle level suppliers.
- 394 drug detections were made between January 2003 and February 2004 with 316 legal actions initiated.
- The legal action rate is 80.20%.
- 213 individuals received legal actions of which 47 were Aboriginal/Torres Straight Islanders (ATSI). Juveniles accounted for 9 of the 47.
- Drug arrests appear to be dependant on operations, but are increasing.
- 116 individuals received legal actions from September 2003 to February 2004 of which 25 were ATSI. Juveniles accounted for 3 of the 25.


There has been a gradual increase in needle distribution since early 2003 (Ramsay, Parliamentary inquiry)+

## ROBBERY



## REDFERN LAC

January 2003 – February 2004




- Redfern LAC is rated number 1 in the state for Robbery. The offences are predominantly bag snatches and assault and robberies, which are on the lower scale of robbery offences.
- The control chart average of 44 has been constant since July 2003, with slight rises in actual robbery incidents in November 2003, January 2004 and February 2004.
- From January 2003 to February 2004, 695 incidents of robbery occurred with 63 legal actions preferred.
- The legal action is 9.10% down on the target of 13%.
- 47 persons received legal actions from January 2003 to February 2004 of which 31 were ATSI. Juveniles accounted for 16 of the 31.
- 20 individuals received legal actions from September 2003 to February 2004 of which 12 were ATSI. Juveniles accounted for 5 of the 12.



## ASSAULT REDFERN LAC

January 2003 – February 2004




- Assault at Redfern is rated 42 in the state with common assault prevalent.
- 67 assaults per month is the control chart average since August 2003.
- From 1-2003, to 2-2004, there were 906 incidents of assault, of which 224 were domestic related, with 79 assaults upon police. 200 legal actions were instituted.
- The legal action rate is 22.10% is down on the target of 25.00%.
- 177 individuals received legal actions of which 49 were ATSI. Juveniles accounted for 11 of the 49.
- 83 individuals received legal actions in the lead up months to the riot from September 2003, to February 2004, of which 22 were ATSI. Juveniles accounted for 7 of the 22.



## BREAK & ENTER

### REDFERN LAC

January 2003 – February 2004




- Break and Enter offences at Redfern rated 29<sup>th</sup> in the state and occur mainly in the suburbs of Alexandria and Redfern.
- The control chart average of 118 has been steady since September 2003.
- From 1-2003 to 2-2004 there were 1685 incidents of which 53 legal actions were instituted.
- The legal action rate is 3.10% is down on the target of 10.00%.
- 71 individuals received legal actions of which 26 were ATSI. Juveniles accounted for 13 of the 71.
- 19 individuals received legal actions in the months of September 2003 to February 2004 of which 7 were ATSI. Juveniles accounted for 2 of the 7.
- Since August 2003, the control chart average for Break, Enter and Steal offences are down for the Redfern Local Area Command.

## STEALING



## REDFERN LAC

January 2003 – February 2004



- Redfern LAC is rated 18<sup>th</sup> in the state for stealing. The most common offence is 'steal from motor vehicle/vessel' from the suburb of Redfern.
- The control chart average of 253 was set in September 2003 and prior to that was 353. In the months leading up to the riot, November and December 2003, along with February 2004, actual stealing offences were above the control chart average.
- From January 2003 to February 2004, there were 4092 incidents of stealing within the LAC with 174 legal actions being instituted.
- The legal action rate is 4.30% is down on the target of 7.00%.
- 171 individuals received legal actions between January 2003 and February 2004 of which 49 were ATSI. Juveniles accounted for 11 of the 49.
- 77 individuals received legal actions from September 2003 to February 2004 of which 23 were ATSI. Juveniles accounted for 3 of the 23.

## STOLEN VEHICLE/VESSEL