



NSW Police

Final Report – Part A Analysis – Redfern Local Area Command Civil Unrest 15-16 February 2004

Strike Force Coburn

Coburn Review Team

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Strike Force Membership

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Detective Inspector Frank Gilroy, Stage II
Detective Inspector Luke Freudenstein, Stage II
Intelligence Analyst Aimee Attard, Stage I & II
Senior Constable Scott Richardson, Stage II
Inspector Barry Gallagher, Stage I & Stage II
Senior Sergeant Garry Dunn, Stage II

Key Terminology Used

ACLO – Aboriginal Community Liaison Officer
IESOPS – Incident and Emergency SOPS
LAC – Local Area Command
OSG – Operations Support Group
OSTTU – Operational Safety and Traffic Training Unit
POC - Police Operations Centre

The ‘block’

The area within Redfern Local Area Command bounded by Cleveland, Abercrombie and Vine Streets and includes Eveleigh, Louis and Caroline Streets.



TERMS OF REFERENCE

Strike Force Coburn was initiated as a operational project on 17 February 2004 following direction from the Commissioner of Police to review a range of issues arising from the civil disobedience at Redfern between 15 -16 February 2003 (Project Register No.000068).

Strike Force Coburn was responsible for considering both micro and macro issues dealing with public order management. Terms of Reference were drawn from two source documents:

1) Micro Issues – Commissioner Moroney – Memorandum dated 17 February 2004

In consultation with relevant stakeholders the Project Team were responsible for reviewing the strategic & tactical capability of the NSW Police to respond to civil disobedience at the Redfern Riot (15 –16 February) including:

- Equipment
- Communications
- Awareness & Preparation
- Staffing
- Command & Control
- Standing Capabilities (SPG, OSG, former TRG)

Report A – This report addresses the specific issues raised by the Commissioner.

An interim report titled ‘Preliminary Analysis of the Redfern Civil Disobedience Events: 14 - 16 February 2004’ was submitted to the Commissioner of Police on 27 February 2004. This initial report was based on limited information available to the review team. The report sought to provide an executive overview of the incident on 15-16 February 2004 and the initial police response. Material examined and information considered was limited to data collected over a short time frame focusing on the Redfern incident. The initial report provided Strike Force Coburn insight into existing public order management responses used by the NSW Police and provided a basis for considering broader macro issues.

2) Macro Issues – Deputy Commissioner Madden – Memorandum dated 25 February 2004

This final report incorporates a wider range of information and analysis including submissions from a number stakeholders. The review team has been able to consider broader macro issues affecting public order management by the NSW Police including the larger State-wide capacity to respond to any issues of a similar or greater magnitude. The terms of reference extended to considering the following issues:

- People (OSG personnel, training and ability to respond)
- Equipment (OSG personnel, equipment and availability)
- Leadership (preparedness of Commanders, Duty Officers and OSG Commanders to manage public order events)
- Policy (suitability of the Public Order Policing Policy)

Report B – A separate report addresses the broader macro issues raised by the Deputy Commissioner Operations.



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INCIDENT OVERVIEW: 15 - 16 FEBRUARY 2004

The Environment

"The block" at Redfern suffers from a high level of social disadvantage flowing into a continual rate of high volume criminal activity, particularly in the area of robbery. Reports indicate a high level of drug activity both in distribution and use. A brief overview of crime indicates crime trends are either steady or trending down. There is a high level of Police proactivity and it appears Police strategies are relatively effective.

Initial concern at the continued low level of heroin related arrests or Police interception in the drug trade, has been explained by an adverse court decision on drug house legislation and the awaiting of subsequent legal advice and preparation of appropriate strategies in consultation with the Attorney General.

The Riot

On 15 February at 2100hrs and into the early hours of 16 February 2004, a crowd of up to 150 individuals (fluctuating from 30 to 150) staged an organised street battle with Police outside the Redfern Railway Station. During the 6-hour incident close to 250 Police, Ambulance and Fire Brigade personnel were deployed to the scene. Approximately 40 Police were injured during the incident.

The crowd threw rocks, bricks, cement, fireworks and petrol bombs at Police and NSW Fire Brigade personnel. The level of organisation and violence used by the crowd is unprecedented in recent times. The events were fuelled by a perception of Police involvement in the death of a youth the previous day. The hot evening weather and alcohol consumption are also believed to have contributed to the atmosphere on Sunday evening.

First Response

Initially a small number of Police from the Redfern LAC responded to the incident that was believed to have been under control. Confronted by a crowd of up to 70 people throwing bricks police were initially overrun and forced to retreat. Limited riot equipment supplies were distributed amongst Police (between 4 – 8 sets) to deal with the initial threat. Order was initially restored as the crowd move back into Eveleigh Street. With an inability to observe the 'block' area Police believed the situation was under control.

Escalating Violence

Over the next 6 hours crowds of between 30 and 150 people emerged from Eveleigh Street attacking Police. The crowd used the 'block' in Redfern as a staging location throughout the evening. By 2250 hours more riot equipment arrived at the scene where Police were maintaining defensive positions.



On several occasions Police attempted to move the crowd away from the Redfern Railway Station, which had been set alight. These attempts were met with escalating violence and growing crowd numbers. By 0100 hours up to 60 Police had converged on the scene from across the metropolitan area. Police numbers grew to 230 Police by 0300 hours. Up to 32 OSG personnel were deployed by 0200 hours.

Police Response

The Police strategy and tactics was to maintain a defensive (static & advance) line and keep the crowd away from the Redfern CBD area. On several occasions Police successfully moved the crowd away from the railway station in an attempt to deal with a small fire. On each occasion the crowd responded in greater numbers pushing Police back. To avoid escalating crowd violence, Police refrained from making arrests during the incident.

Superintendent Dennis Smith (Redfern LAC) arrived at the scene at 2200 hrs with the first executive notification occurring around 2228 hours via the DOI. The Region Commander arrived on the scene at 0147 hrs.

The use of chemical agents was discounted as an option as Police were not issued with protective masks. The Police Commander used a fire hose at 0215 hrs in an effort to deflect projectiles and move the crowd back from Police positions.

Review of the Policing response

The Redfern incident has highlighted inadequacies in the first response arrangements for unplanned public order incidents. While NSW Police is well placed to respond to isolated and short riots involving large crowds, prolonged and organised riots place demands beyond the capabilities of Local Area Commands. The events of 15–16 February 2004 were compounded by difficulties in establishing the size of the crowd assembling in Eveleigh Street, Redfern.

Equipment & Deployment

The Redfern incident has highlighted procedural issues with deployment, familiarisation and maintenance of riot equipment. While the type, style and quantity of riot protective equipment utilised by the New South Wales Police was eventually adequate under the circumstances, the Redfern incident has presented an opportunity for a reassessment of equipment types and front line tactics for riots. Access to equipment was an issue with difficulties in locating storeroom keys.

This review found the quality of some riot equipment indicates deficiencies in the storage, maintenance and inspection processes being utilised by the Redfern LAC. This resulted in some damaged equipment being used by Police on the ground. It is unlikely that these deficiencies contributed to the number of injuries by police on the front line.

While the style and type of riot protective equipment used by the NSW Police is considered adequate for OSG trained Police, Police on the ground experienced some difficulties with equipment. These difficulties were generally a result of unfamiliarity with the equipment and riot tactics by general duties police. The introduction of training for recruits, Team Leaders, Duty Officers and Local Area Commanders will serve to address many of the difficulties experienced by police on the front line. Further issues such as distinguishing General Duty protective equipment from OSG protective equipment could improve levels of protection.



Command & Control

The review found that an absence of a structured command post management process at the scene is likely to have created delays in accessing of riot equipment once it had been transported to the scene. Its absence also created difficulties in the generation of a log to record details of the incident, command decisions and intelligence received.

It's absence also created a number of other problems, which impacted upon the policing of the incident at Redfern. Early activation of the "POC" may have assisted in site control management.

Use of an adequately equipped vehicle as a mobile command post would allow for establishment of a clearly defined forward command post or command post in the future. It's use at Redfern would have assisted in providing for better management of resources and recording of command decisions.

Training & future preparedness

Three quarters of the officers in attendance at Redfern were higher in rank than Probationary Constable. On this basis the review concluded that the experience of the officers present, in terms of years of service was not a contributing factor to the unfolding events or injuries sustained.

Notwithstanding this, the Redfern incident has highlighted opportunities to improve the level of training for Local Area Commanders, Duty Officers and Supervisors in site control, command post, management and public order management including riotous tactics and crowd behaviour.

Approximately 70 General Duties personnel stationed at Redfern have received some basic familiarisation training in the use of this riot equipment. However, the contingent of personnel from Redfern LAC at the riot only comprised 13% (29) of the total number of Police who attended. Of the total number of police deployed 16% (37) were trained OSG operatives with 15% (7) of the total number of officers injured were OSG operatives.

Familiarisation training in riots and tactics should be introduced into recruit training, Duty Officer and Commander training initiatives. At a minimum, equipment and basic tactics should be included in yearly DEFTAC training for all personnel likely to be called to riot incidents. The introduction of scenario-based training in riots through Learning Technology Systems should be considered for Supervisors, Duty Officers and Commanders with an emphasis on decision-making and leadership.

Enhancing organisational capability

The NSW Police capacity to respond to prolonged violent riots was enhanced, following the dissolution of the TRG in the 1990's, with the introduction of region based OSG contingents. The role of OSG resources in both unplanned and planned public order events continues to be critical. Call out arrangements for OSG support during the Redfern incident were considered adequate given the assessments of the severity of the incident by the Local Area Commander at the scene. Difficulties experienced were a result of confusion between the Duty Officer at the scene and the Inner Metropolitan Region Operations Manager resulting in a considerable delay in OSG attendance.



This review has highlighted opportunities to streamline and strengthen the OSG capability within the NSW Police. The review team is of the firm belief that a centralised training, call out and coordination capacity would enhance operational responses to future riots. Whilst the preferred operating model for an enhanced OSG capability should be the subject of executive consideration, the review team does not support the re-establishment of a TRG style unit.

Any strengthened OSG model should include a balance of regional resourcing and statewide co-ordination underpinned by corporate ownership.

The preferred model should incorporate a centralised training, accreditation, equipment auditing, DEFTAC, policy, operational co-ordination and should be supported by a senior executive corporate spokesperson.

Revisiting the philosophy of containment

It is clear that as the situation at Redfern deteriorated, the LAC Commander was faced with limited options for countering the escalating crowd violence. The tactic of containment was shown to be inadequate for the circumstances and unfolding events.

International experience suggests inaction (containment) by Police on many occasions results in an increase in the momentum of group dynamics and the aggression by groups, inevitably against Police. This was shown to be the case in the Redfern incident.

The introduction of a variety of non-lethal offensive equipment for appropriately trained personnel to deploy (following receipt of a predetermined level of approval) would enhance the tactical options available to Police Commanders in dealing with violent public order incidents. The acquisition of such equipment would provide both options for containment and resolution. Revised tactics and supporting equipment could provide Commanders additional tactical options to effect arrests at the time in appropriate situations. This would potentially minimise the duration of incidents, thus preventing violence from escalating rather than only retrospective investigation and arrest.

A review of the use of chemical agents (eg. OC Spray or other agents capable of being projected over 20 metres from the Police line) and other tactics to break up crowds should be considered an organisational priority. Any such options adopted will require corporate sign off and clear levels of authority for deployment. It is strongly recommended that the debate over resolution options (i.e. arrest or containment) needs to be explored.

It is strongly recommended that any change to the police strategy of containment should be reinforced through rewritten corporate guidelines based on solid legal advice. The present philosophy of containment is not entirely consistent with the expectations by the public of an appropriate policing response. As the Redfern incident and other international research suggests, without other tactical options this philosophy of containment can remove control of the incident from Police. Concurrently a review of the Public Order Management Policy should occur to ensure the policy adequately encapsulates violent riots and any changes to the containment philosophy with an emphasis on arrests and legal aggressive tactics as the circumstances would allow.

It is also suggested that greater use of special resources such as mounted police, early activation of Polair and a plan for criminal investigations may have assisted the end result.



The review team gave careful consideration to the decision to use a fire hose on 16 February 2004. The use of this type of equipment during a riot in NSW is believed to have been unprecedented. The LAC Commander made this decision on the basis that police were left with no options to defend the police position. The NSW Fire Brigade supported this option as a strategy to reduce the risk to Police and NSW Fire Brigade personnel on the ground. However, its use in the absence of corporate guidelines may expose NSW to civil and other liability.

Communications and executive notifications

The role of communications leading up to and during the Redfern riot played a pivotal role in the unfolding action on the night of the 15 February 2004 and into the morning of the 16 February 2004. The Redfern incident highlighted deficiencies in these notification protocols. The review concluded that these protocols were broad and lacked specific criteria to determine issues or incidents that should be notified to the executive. These protocols were open to arbitrary interpretation by Duty Operations Inspectors and personnel at VKG. Following the Redfern incident, the communication protocols used by VKG have been revised with proposed endorsement by the Commissioner.

The review concluded the delay in notification to the executive of the unfolding events is likely to have been a result of an under appreciation of the seriousness of the riot by the Local Area Commander. It is acknowledged that the frequent assessments from the scene that the incident was under control were based on limited observations of the size of the crowd assembling in Eveleigh Street. This is likely to have precluded further upward transmission of the unfolding events to the executive. The assistance of POLAIR at the scene earlier would have greatly enhanced the NSW Police response to the incident. This aerial reconnaissance ability and the back to the Police Operations Centre aerial picture capability, would have provided OSG line commanders with confirmation that there were over two hundred people barricaded in Eveleigh St. Police were only able to confirm these number by advancing across the Lawson St rail bridge and being subjected to a barrage of flying bricks.

PART 'B' of this report, as a separate document, centres on a discussion of the current Public Order Management Policy, Strategic issues, the Lupton Report as well as the role of the former TRG. The involvement of the SPG and OSG are also discussed, together with a number of recommendations as to proposed models for consideration by CET.

Appreciation

This review has been conducted in a constructive manner and is grateful for the numerous submissions made from across the NSW Police containing valuable contributions and suggestions. Strike Force Coburn acknowledges the excellent work performed by all Police at the scene and recognises "we were not there" and refrained from judgement calls relying invariably on a clinical assessment of the facts.

The future environment

Numerous submissions have been received proposing many models for a future 24/7 State-wide OSG response. Each of these submissions have been carefully analysed and several selected for consideration by CET. It is hoped the selection and implementation of the most appropriate model will ensure (with other recommendations) in the words of Commissioner Moroney, *"that Redfern will never happen again"*.



SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

After reviewing the events of 15-16 February 2004 and the submissions provided to Strike Force Coburn the following recommendations are made to improve the NSW Police's capacity to respond to and manage unplanned events of this nature.

EQUIPMENT

FINDINGS	RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Access to additional riot equipment from the [REDACTED] ⁽ⁱ⁾ during the Redfern riot was not timely.	1. An urgent review is conducted at all Regions to determine the adequacy of riot equipment available. Such review to include quality and quantity of assets.
2. The Scott Aspen brand helmets on issue to Redfern LAC are operationally inappropriate (suitable only for training).	2. Redfern LAC's protective riot equipment requires upgrading to Operational quality.
3. No communication equipment was taken from the [REDACTED] ⁽ⁱⁱ⁾ for use at the Redfern riot for the use of OSG.	3. OSTTU to be tasked to assess equipment currently utilised by the OSG and alternatives held by NSW Police for officers wearing helmets to communicate. 3a. Call Out process of all Regions relating to protective equipment should be reviewed to ensure <i>ALL</i> available equipment is accessed in a timely manner
4. Protective equipment available for General Duties personnel during the Redfern riot was inadequate given lack of training and the equipments used in a static line.	4. OSTTU should be tasked to research options re alternative protective equipment suitable for General Duties personnel, such as Long Shields, Fire Retardant overalls, and Riot specific vests.
5. The Redfern incident identified concerns in relation to ill-fitting equipment issued to Local Area Commands, such as bullet resistant vests being all of the one size.	5. LACs should review equipment on hand re sizing implications for officers attached to the LAC.
6. Equipment needs to be identifiable to allow for accountability in it's issue, recertification as operationally effective after use in incidents or training, and evidentiary considerations.	6. An assessment is required by OSTTU as to the need for uniquely identifiable reference markings on all equipment.
7. NSW Police does not possess 'Less than Lethal Force' equipment as tactical options for Commanders.	7. OSTTU should be tasked to research 'Less than Lethal Force' options, including modifications to the SPG's Bearcat armoured rescue vehicle.
8. An adequately equipped vehicle as a mobile command post would allow for better management of necessary command post functions.	8. Options re availability of adequately equipped vehicles for use, as forward command posts should be explored by each Region and LAC.



FINDINGS	RECOMMENDATIONS
9. There were a lack of storage and accountability protocols relating to riot equipment on issue to Redfern LAC. This has been revised and improved since the riot.	9. All Local Area Commands issued with protective riot equipment should design a system of accountability for the quality, storage and access arrangements. Accountability for this can be managed through Command Management Framework (CMF).
10. There is a lack of process to regularly examine the standard and currency of protective riot equipment being used by NSW Police.	10. OSTTU is tasked with implementing a process to regularly examine the standard of riot equipment used by NSW Police, giving consideration to the establishment of an Australian Quality Standard.
11. Prison vans were not be utilised during the incident	11. The availability of prison vans should be explored by all Regions for use during public order incidents.
12. There are numerous other locations within NSW with holdings of protective riot equipment. It appears these holdings are either unknown by the Region OSG Co-ordinators, or unreported by them to Strike Force Coburn.	12. Each Region needs to audit ALL LACs to identify all equipment to account for it and ensure its quality and availability. .

COMMUNICATIONS

FINDINGS	RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Information supplied to Assistant Commissioner Waites was based on the belief the situation was under control. This assessment did not facilitate the upward movement of the information, causing unsatisfactory timeliness of notifications to the Executive.	1. Commander training to include reference to ensuring clarity in communications during management of high-risk operations.
2. In relation to the 'Glock incident' on February 12, Strike Force Coburn found that there were no radio 'black spots' in Redfern and the transmission related to the stress and misunderstanding of the content of the transmission by the VKG Operator.	2. Consideration be given to using the 'Glock incident' tape recording by Education Services for training purposes to emphasizes the importance of clarity of communications under stress. As there are no 'black spots', no further action re that issue.
3. There is a lack of understanding by operational Police of the roles and capabilities of the DOI.	3. VKG should market the role of Duty Operations Inspector (DOIs) more effectively to Duty Officers and Commanders, to ensure a fuller understanding of the role of the Duty Operations Inspector and the associated responsibilities of the position. Similarly LACs should provide adequate information and training to personnel relating to the operations of DOIs at VKG.



FINDINGS	RECOMMENDATIONS
4. The lack of activation of Polair earlier precluded a greatly enhanced NSW Police response to the incident. The decision by Inspector Chambers to call out POLAIR was a correct decision, though consultation with relevant field commanders could have occurred prior to the callout.	4. Duty Operations Inspectors should be further educated as to their roles by VKG, with encouragement to consult regularly with operational Commanders at scenes of high risk incidents, to co-ordinate available resources.
5. The absence of a command post log from the event to refer to has caused Strike Force Coburn to experience difficulties in collecting accurate information relating to the incident and appropriate accountability for the operation. There was a further significant impact on other investigations and enquiries as well the provision of an audit trail for important decisions.	5. The requirement to use command logs to record times, decisions and resources should be reinforced in future Commander training activities.
6. There is no operational checklist relevant to riots and other serious incidents developed for Crime Managers or Local Area Commanders. The Duty Officer's Manual allows for statewide standards and consistency in having records of field communications, checklists and a prompt for riots and serious incidents.	6. That the issue of the Duty Officer's Manual be revisited for use by all Crime Managers and Commanders to record, in consistent formats, the key communications and decision making during high-risk incidents such as riots.
7. The lack of a dedicated radio channel precluded the 'low key' response desired by Superintendent Smith.	7. The availability of additional radio channels should be made aware to Commanders by VKG during high-risk incidents when frequent communication is predicted, or a request for 'low-key' communications is preferred.
8. There was a failure to satisfactorily escalate information to senior management of the Police Media Unit. There was growing media interest on Sunday the 15 February 2004 and senior media unit officers were not appraised in a timely fashion. This additionally caused for the Police Ministry's media officers to also not be appraised.	8. The Media Unit has improved its protocol for internal notifications re major incidents. No further action required
9. There was confusion in the conversation that occurred between Inspector Snel and Inspector Emery at 9.30pm. The outcome of this miscommunication was that there was recurrent belief for almost four hours that 20 OSG personnel were being called out. This precluded appropriate OSG response times.	9. Education Services to consider training implications relating to communications. On-going assessment and decision making training should be provided by education services in commanding civil unrest situations for Commanders, Duty Officers, Region Staff Officers and Supervisors.
10. There could have been operational advantages if the POC had been opened during the incident. Strike Force Coburn concluded that the existing activation	10. The availability and benefits of using the POC should be re-enforced to operational Commanders by communication from the Executive.



FINDINGS	RECOMMENDATIONS
protocols for the POC are adequate, however, all Commanders need to be aware of the existence and the importance of the POC. and its associated protocols.	

AWARENESS AND PREPARATION

FINDINGS	RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Failing in the Redfern Intelligence System to strategically identify cultural, seasonal or environmental issues, which may lead to unrest or civil disorder in the 'block' area.	1. Implementation of intelligence gathering operations for vulnerable locations within Local Area Commands eg. 'the block' at Redfern. Such operations to proactively collect information of crime, occurrences of unrest, environmental, seasonal and cultural trends for the vulnerable location.
2. Greater use of the source system to enhance the informant network at the Redfern Local Area Command.	2. Redfern Local Area Command to enlist the assistance of Source Management for increasing informant numbers. Assistance should also be sought in the professional management of their informants. (Senior Sergeant Tracey Chapman has facilitated this recommendation)
3. Failure of support units to acknowledge the urgency of requests and lack of follow up upon those requests.	3. Region Commanders and the Commander of Communications design training for support units, e.g. VKG – DOI and Operations Manager to appreciate difficulties experienced by those in the field at an unplanned civil disorder event. DOI and Operations Managers should work from a checklist, similar to that in the Duty Officers manual, providing information of what resources may be needed at the site.
4. Communication breakdown in the call out of Operation Support Group.	4. The Duty Officer's check- list and running sheet matrix, maintained in the Duty Officer's manual, be adopted by the Operations Managers and DOI to record what is requested is received. Regular checks should be made to action any request that may have been forgotten or misunderstood.
5. Inability of Aboriginal Community Liaison Officers at Redfern Local Area Command to identify unrest in the 'block'.	5. The State Co-ordinator for Aboriginal Community Liaison Officers to liaise with the Redfern Local Area Commander to upgrade the performance and direction of Aboriginal Community Liaison Officers.



FINDINGS	RECOMMENDATIONS
6. Breakdown in the relationship between Redfern Police and the Aboriginal Community Liaison Officer.	6. The Redfern Local Area Commander to devise strategies for the most effective use of Aboriginal Community Liaison Officers in forging community links to ensure they complete their duties in compliance with Standard Operating Procedures for Management of Aboriginal Incidents and promote a productive relationship with police.
7. Failure of police to acknowledge the tactical warning signs of unrest leading to civil disorder at Redfern on Sunday, 15 February 2004 eg. Wanted posters of senior Police, continual throwing of rocks and the closing of Redfern Railway Station.	7. Education Services to design training programs for police, at all ranks, for Unplanned Civil Disorder.
8. Re-enforcement of cultural awareness for Redfern Police and continuation of partnerships with local aboriginal community is essential.	8. Local Cultural Awareness programs, including issues associated with the Traditional Grievance process, to be continued with the assistance of Doreen Peters, State Co-ordinator for Aboriginal Community Liaison Officers.

STAFFING

FINDINGS	RECOMMENDATIONS
1. The proportion of Probationary Constables to the total staffing of Redfern Local Area Command is consistent with other Commands in the Region.	1. No action is necessary in relation to the staffing levels of Redfern Local Area Command.
2. The level of staffing at The Redfern LAC on the evening of 15 February 2004 was consistent with the demands for service upon the Command.	2. A review of the 1 st Response Agreement should be conducted by the Redfern Local Area Command.
3. Over three quarters of the officers in attendance at Redfern were higher in rank than Probationary Constable. The experience of the officers present in terms of years of service in the NSW Police cannot be considered an issue.	3. No action is necessary in relation to the number of Probationary Constables that attended the riot.
4. Delays in the arrival of additional OSG personnel followed an alleged misunderstanding between the Inner Metropolitan Region Operations Manager and a Redfern Duty Officer.	4. A preferred option for OSG structure is implemented to ensure adequate availability of appropriately trained Police.
5. Despite the lack of timeliness in their mobilisation, sufficient OSG trained personnel were eventually present at Redfern.	5. Training is required for all operational personnel in public order management/riot control tactics.



FINDINGS	RECOMMENDATIONS
5a. Other than some personnel from Redfern LAC, other general Duties Police who responded to the Redfern riot have had no public order/riot training.	
6. It was necessary to obtain OSG officers from personnel on duty throughout Sydney that night when it was established the 20 OSG officers requested by the Duty Officer had not been arranged by the Region Operations Manager.	6. Region Operations Managers to utilise the Duty Officer Manual's Checklist, to allow them to provide appropriate resource management of an incident, by evaluating matters in the same terms as officers at the scene.
7. The insufficient use of the support services listed, such as Welfare, SSG, Mounted Unit, Negotiators and others highlights the need for the capabilities of those units to be marketed to Commanders.	7. The nature of the roles of the support units available should be marketed and reinforced to LAC Commander's, Duty Officers and Supervisors.
8. No Prison Vans or Transport Unit personnel were available to facilitate transport for multiple arrests	8. Within Metropolitan Regions adequately staffed prison vans be available to be deployed to a scene of unplanned as well as planned operations. Rural regions need to reassess their needs and develop appropriate arrangements accordingly
9. Following discussion between the Crime Manager at the scene and the DOI at VKG at 1015 hours, the DOI failed to adequately communicate options available re call-out of POLAIR at that time, equally the request could have been pursued by Inspector Bennett.	9. As per 7.
10. Actions undertaken concerning the welfare of injured personnel could improve by initiating call outs to Counsellors, Chaplains or both.	10. DOI's, Commanders, Duty Officers, and Supervisors need to be reminded of the welfare services available for personnel.
11. Crime Management Units need to conduct thorough environmental analysis of their LACs to identify the risks to their Command.	11. Crime Management Units of all Commands prepare strategic plans for employment of predetermined tactical options and investigate response plans in the event of identified possible incidents occurring.
12. Injuries to the legs of officers accounted for the injuries to Police at a ratio of 2:1, highlighting the need to assess the type of protective equipment required by General Duties police such as Long Shields pending deployment of OSG.	12. The type of protective equipment (eg. Long shields) available for use by General Duties police should be reviewed by the OSTTU.



FINDINGS	RECOMMENDATIONS
13. The current protective equipment on issue to the Mounted Unit requires review, from an OH & S and operational effectiveness perspective, to ensure its adequacy to protect officers and horses and maintain their capacity to respond and assist in incidents such as Redfern.	13. Commander of the Mounted Unit review the adequacy of the Unit's protective equipment and the need for additional and possible alternative protective riot equipment.
14. Insufficient training is provided to NSW Police in relation to public order management in relation to unplanned incidents.	14. Training to be provided in the following areas: a) In basic public order policing and use of protective equipment commencing at recruit level for all operational personnel, similar to that provided to Redfern officers. b) For DOIs in relation to communication of available options for field commanders. c) For Supervisors, Duty Officers and Commanders in relation to public order management, tactics and incident command and control
15. The attendance of an OSG advisor of Commissioned Officer rank at the riot could have been of assistance to the forward commander.	15. An experienced OSG trained officer, of Commissioned Officer rank should be called out/deployed to the scene. This officer to provide advice to the Commander regarding OSG capabilities and tactical options.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

FINDINGS	RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Inadequate training at Command, Supervisor and Constable level for Unplanned Civil Disorder resulted in the following – <ul style="list-style-type: none">• The Command Post was inappropriately positioned to be operationally effective.• The forward command post was inadequate.• Site coordination was inadequate and badly positioned.• Poor records and very few logs were kept.• Tactical and strategic options such as OSG, Mounted Police and Polair were not utilised appropriately.• Command and Control focused mainly on the police line where Commanders were situated.	1. Redfern SOPs to be updated re the flexibility of the location of Command Post during the 'block' incidents. 1.a Education Services and OSTTU to consider current and future training requirements for all levels of NSW Police in relation to public order incidents, particularly in relation to command responsibilities, command post management, log keeping and utilisation of specialist units.



FINDINGS	RECOMMENDATIONS
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Requests and follow up inquiries for OSG were not actioned in a timely fashion.	
2. Lack of options for arrest, charging and evidence gathering.	2. The Public Order Policy be reviewed to encourage evidence gathering, arrest and charging tactics.
3. Lack of trained investigators deployed to the scene.	3. Detectives to be included in the police response to unplanned civil disorder.
4. IESOPS do not cater for a police response to unplanned civil disorder or public order incidents.	4. IESOPS to include information for the police response to unplanned civil disorder or public order incidents.

STRATEGIC PLANNING

FINDINGS	RECOMMENDATIONS
1. There is a need for standardised “descriptors” to indicate the level of seriousness to assist requests for resources.	1. Local Area Commands need to develop a specific response matrix, addressing primary risks to that specific Command. Such strategic planning can assist the pre-planning of responses, and the consideration of mobilisation of support units, or requesting authority for specific tactics or equipment sooner as developed for the Rugby World Cup.
2. Use of an execution matrix that defines “triggers” can determine a pre arranged response, such as call out of resources, tactics, or resources to be deployed at that stage, for example a level two or three incident would have assisted. A good example of this is the risk assessment matrix utilised by the Rugby World Cup.	2. Use of the checklist in the Duty Officer’s Manual should be reinforced in managing and responding to an incident to develop uniformity in communication of needs.



IMMEDIATE AVAILABILITY – EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL

FINDINGS	RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Response times for equipment and OSG personnel is dependent upon the system utilised by individual Regions.	1. Regions capacity for expeditious deployment of equipment to an unplanned incident could be enhanced if contingencies were in place for emergency access to it and not only through OSG personnel.
2. The current capacity to deploy sufficient OSG personnel to an unplanned incident needs to be enhanced by all Regions to ensure it can be achieved in a timely manner.	2. Systems are required by Regions to ensure sufficient OSG personnel are contactable and deployed urgently to an unplanned incident in support of on duty OSG and General Duties officers.

POLICY

FINDINGS	RECOMMENDATIONS
1. The current public order management policy is inadequate in providing direction for Commanders in determining Police Responses to unplanned violent public disorder.	1. There needs to be a change in the corporate philosophy, reflected in a re-written Public Order Management Policy encompassing more forceful Police action to unlawful behaviour rather than just containment as a goal.
2. The Policy should be reviewed urgently to reflect the recommended necessary change to NSW Police corporate philosophy on Public Order Management.	2. Alternative tactical options are developed by a working party to be utilised in Public Order Management by NSW Police, reflecting the corporate philosophy shift and public expectations.
4. Modules in the proposed Counter Terrorist Commanders Course (before CET) could provide Command level Public Order Management training.	3. Recommended Public Order Management training include instruction in the execution of new tactics.

LUPTON REPORT REVIEW

FINDINGS	RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Redfern has been shown to have highlighted the need for adequate and ongoing training in incident command and control.	1. There is a need for the development of specific tactics relative to the varied environments in which NSW Police operates.
2. The tactics recommended by the Lupton report were developed for use in London and throughout the United Kingdom.	2. Training is extended relevant to the roles of Commander, Duty Officer and Supervisors, as well as basic training for recruit and General Duties personnel, in relation to incident management and resolution tactics.



FINDINGS	RECOMMENDATIONS
3. There is a need for the development of specific tactics relative to the varied environments in which NSW Police operates.	
4. It is not considered necessary or viable for all Duty Officers to undertake the entire OSG Basic Operators Course, given the appropriate role specific education this Strike Force suggests.	



METHODOLOGY

The Project was sponsored by Deputy Commissioner (Operations) Dave Madden and managed by Assistant Commissioner John Laycock.

A small Project Team working under the command of Assistant Commissioner John Laycock reviewed operational documentation and sought submissions from operational police, specialists and stakeholders.

The Project Team called for written submissions from interested stakeholders and held a number of debriefing sessions with officers involved in the initial incident on 15-16 February 2004. By way of summary information considered in this report consisted of:

- Briefings from key commanders;
- Consultation Review Committee Meeting held on 23 February 2004;
- Debriefing session facilitated by the Project Management Unit with key stakeholders on 5 April 2004;
- Submissions from interested parties including operational commanders, Executive and Police across New South Wales;
- Historical data including information sources from COPS, CIDS or submissions & reports dealing with public order management within the NSW Police; and
- Open Source Information (OSI), research from other Australian Jurisdictions, United Kingdom, Canada and United States of America.
- Submissions from the NSW Police Association.

A number of conflicting times were provided by key participants involved in the incidents on 15–16 February 2004. Strike Force Coburn experienced difficulties in reconstructing event timings and the extent of resource requests during the incident. The timings contained are based on officer recollections and VKG logs.

Four separate timelines have been prepared in addition to the master timeline held with Strike Force Coburn. These timelines are for the following areas:

1. Summary of significant events
2. General timeline of events
3. OSG personnel and equipment
4. Executive involvement/communications.

Data under the various subheadings has been duplicated to ensure information is kept in context, albeit, at the expense of some duplication.



GENERAL TIMELINE OF EVENTS

Thursday 12 February 2004

- 14:20 Redfern LAC police officers FUCHS & BAILEY took [REDACTED] (i) into custody in Eveleigh Lane, Redfern; these police were surrounded by numerous people who eventually attacked police and attempted to remove [REDACTED] (ii) from their custody as well as remove the glocks from police; they successfully removed the glock of D/S/Cst BAILEY for a short time; BAILEY called a **SIGNAL ONE** but radio transmissions were confused; police lost a pair of sunglasses and the police hat being worn by BAILEY which belonged to D/S/Cst PACE [distorted radio communication by police under stress at the scene].

Saturday 14 February 2004

- 11:15 Thomas HICKEY impaled on a fence in Phillip Street, Redfern, after an incident on his pushbike; he was conveyed to Prince of Wales Hospital.

During the afternoon of 14th February a number of phone calls were received at Redfern Police Station blaming Detective PACE [(part aboriginal NSW Police Officer) for the Thomas HICKEY incident]

Sunday 15 February 2004

- 01:10 Thomas HICKEY died at Prince of Wales Hospital.
- 08:30 Thomas HICKEY's mother attended Redfern Police Station with another female (possibly [REDACTED] (iii) Insp EMERY showed Thomas HICKEY's mother the bike with no damage to the wheel but faulty brakes.
- 15:00 Media briefing held outside Redfern LAC Police Station with Insp EMERY.
- 16:30 Group of youths commenced throwing bricks etc at Redfern Railway Station; City Rail commenced calling for police assistance.
- 16:49 Police attended Redfern Railway Station.
- 16:59 Lawson Street entrance to Redfern Railway Station closed.
- 17:00 From 5pm stories commenced on the news concerning the death of Thomas HICKEY and there was media presence in Redfern.
- 17:30 Side window of a police vehicle was broken in Eveleigh Street, Redfern; Insp EMERY arrived at Redfern Railway Station; police remained and patrolled the vicinity of the railway station from this time; posters titled "Wanted – Child Murderers" with photos of D/COPs SCIPIONE & MADDEN & COP MORONEY were being taped to telegraph poles out the front of Redfern Railway Station.
- 17:42 Insp EMERY told DOI a large group was congregating near Redfern Railway Station who had ammunition and were intoxicated; Insp EMERY had been trying to get hold of Supt SMITH (some time between this call and 6:00pm, someone, presumably Insp EMERY, made contact with Supt SMITH and appraised him of the situation).
- 18:00 Police "supervisor" [probably Insp EMERY] left Redfern Railway Station; City Rail closed platform 1; a white car parked in Eveleigh Street was hit by rocks; A/C WAITES contacted at approximately this hour by Supt SMITH to inform him that aboriginals around the 'block' had been drinking, becoming aggressive and trying to bait police.



- 18:12 Insp EMERY asked DOI if any OSG, Vikings etc police were available.
- 19:00 Briefing held at Redfern LAC with day & night shift Duty Officers and police of both shifts.
- 19:22 Booking Office at Redfern Railway Station closed due to a barrage of bricks and bottles.
- 19:26 Briefing at Redfern LAC concluded; DOI advised Insp SMITH that a large group of youths was congregating in Lawson Street.
- 19:38 Redfern 17 called that a brick was thrown through the window of Redfern 16.
- 19:45 Police closed off Lawson Street, Redfern [vicinity of railway station].
- 19:46 Video camera to the area organised by Redfern LAC.
- 19:47 Platforms 1-7 at Redfern Railway Station closed down, platforms 8-12 near Gibbons Street continued to operate as did the underground.
- 20:05 Redfern 36 called that an aboriginal male approached and said the 'block' was about to start a riot.
- 20:26 All appeared quiet *[according to Insp SMITH]*.
- 20:55 Insp EMERY asked DOI the best way to get extra police to assist; Supt SMITH wanted to keep the situation low key.
- 21:02 Insp SMITH requested riot gear from Redfern 14.
- 21:03 large group of 60-70 ran out of Eveleigh Street, Redfern towards police throwing bricks and bottles; police ran onto the concourse of Redfern Railway Station.
- 21:04 Redfern 45 called **SIGNAL ONE** to Gibbons/Lawson Streets, Redfern.
- 21:05 Crowd retreated back to Eveleigh Street; police were given permission to wear riot gear.
- 21:06 Supt SMITH updated on the situation in Redfern; Insp EMERY spoke with DOI re arranging further police and equipment to assist.
- 21:15 Crowd attempted to break through Redfern Railway Station barriers which had been closed.
- 21:18 Police requested that no trains at all stop at Redfern Railway Station.
- 21:28 Crowd attempted to set fire to railway station; Fire Brigade called; Insp EMERY called DOI asking for Vikings or OSG; DOI gave Insp EMERY mobile contact number for Inner Metropolitan Region Operations Manager [Insp SNEL acting in this role at this time].
- 21:30 Insp SNEL contacted by Insp EMERY who requested OSG equipment personnel. (There is unresolved confusion over the content of this conversation as Insp SNEL understood the request was for OSG equipment only).
- 21:35 Insp SNEL called A/C WAITES re the riot and requested approval for OSG equipment.
- 21:40 Police in riot gear escorted Fire Brigade towards a fire at the railway station but soon retreated due to an attack by the crowd; fire at railway station deemed safe to allow to burn by the Fire Brigade; Insp SNEL called Sgt WADE and requested 20 sets of riot equipment for Redfern.
- 21:42 Insp SNEL called DOI for a sitrep.
- 21:45 Ambulance Service called for a number of police injured at the entrance to Redfern Railway Station.



- 22:05 Crowd advanced and police granted permission to advance their front line; crowd retreated to Eveleigh Street; a number of police were injured and removed.
- 22:11 First police dogs arrived (Lawson/Abercrombie Streets, Redfern).
- 22:14 Insp BENNETT called DOI and asked if there was a helicopter on; DOI responded that there wasn't one on.
- 22:19 Supt ADNEY contacted by DOI and provided with a sitrep.
- 22:30 Supt ADNEY sent an SMS to A/DCOP PARSONS to notify him of the incident at Redfern; approximate arrival time of Supt SMITH at the scene of the riot.
- 22:34 A/DCOP PARSONS called Supt ADNEY back *[from her SMS of 22:19]*.
- 22:41 IME60 called that they were on the way with OSG equipment.
- 22:48 IME60 called off at the command post with equipment.
- 23:00 All OSG personnel requested to attend the command post and requests were made for more OSG and any other police, by Supt SMITH and Insp Garth SMITH.
- 23:30 Supt SMITH called A/C WAITES and informed him that the situation was under control.
- 23:36 DOI contacted the SPG.
- 23:45 A/C WAITES received a call from A/DCOP PARSONS enquiring as to the situation at Redfern.

Monday 16 February 2004

- 00:57 Insp EMERY called DOI and described the situation as not far off a signal one.
- 01:15 Supt SMITH called A/C WAITES requesting additional police at the scene; it was after this call that A/C WAITES prepared to leave home and attend the riot.
- 01:32 Crowd increased; Supt SMITH requested 20 more police to the location.
- 01:34 Crowd consisted of over 100; petrol bombs/molotov cocktails were being thrown.
- 01:39 DOG54 suffered a foot injury and DOG11 was hit by a brick.
- 01:47 Arrival time of A/C WAITES; A/C WAITES called DOI and asked about the availability of tactical gear (because molotov cocktails were being thrown) and asked who has responsibility for the SPG.
- 01:50 OSG operative Sgt O'RIORDAN loaded a further 50 sets of riot equipment into vehicles.
- 02:05 DOI told A/C WAITES he was calling the helicopter and Video Unit [this was the approximate call out time for Polair].
- 02:14 Supt SMITH had command of the Fire Brigade hose and was using it in an attempt to control the crowd.
- 02:30 OSG operatives Sgts O'RIORDAN & STOKES arrived at the scene of the riot with additional riot equipment.
- 03:00 OSG Team Leaders held a briefing at the scene.



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- 03:02** Fire hose used to break up crowd *[according to Insp SMITH]*
- 03:03** Polair airborne and overhead.
- 03:26** All lines advanced *[according to Insp SMITH]*
- 03:30** OSG made a tactical approach and moved in 3 sections of 12 each.
- 03:35** Supt SMITH called DOI and asked if Polair could light up Eveleigh Lane just in front of the police line.
- 03:40** [between 3:40am & 4:20am] 5 POI's were arrested (at Lawson Street and the intersection of Lawson & Eveleigh Streets) and conveyed to the Sydney Police Centre where they were entered into custody; 2 of the POIs were charged on 160204 with outstanding warrants and 3 released without charge; 4 of these 5 were charged with matters relating to the riot at later dates and the remaining one was not charged at all.
- 03:51** Redfern 10 called that no further police were required and the area was under control.

SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS TIMELINE



Thursday 12 February 2004

14:20 Offenders attempted to remove glocks from 2 Redfern LAC police officers at the 'block' Redfern.

Saturday 14 February 2004

11:15 Thomas HICKEY impaled on fence in Phillip Street, Redfern after an incident involving his pushbike; conveyed to Prince of Wales Hospital.

Sunday 15 February 2004

01:10 Thomas HICKEY died at Prince of Wales Hospital.

16:30 Group of youths commenced throwing bricks etc at Redfern Railway Station; City Rail commenced calling for police assistance.

16:59 Lawson Street entrance to Redfern Railway Station closed.

17:30 Side window of police vehicle broken in Eveleigh Street, Redfern; Insp EMERY arrived at Redfern Railway Station; posters titled "Wanted – Child Murderers" with photos of DCOPs SCIPIONE & MADDEN & COP MORONEY were being taped to telegraph poles out the front of Redfern Railway Station.

17:42 Insp EMERY told DOI a large group was congregating near Redfern Railway Station with ammunition and alcohol.

18:00 City Rail closed platform 1; A/C WAITES contacted by Supt SMITH to inform him that the aboriginals around the 'block' had been drinking, becoming aggressive and trying to bait police.

18:12 Insp EMERY asked DOI if any OSG, Vikings etc police were available.

19:00 Briefing held at Redfern LAC with day & night shift Duty Officers and police of both shifts.

21:02 Insp SMITH requested riot gear from Redfern 14.

21:04 Redfern 45 called **SIGNAL ONE** to Gibbons/Lawson Streets, Redfern.

21:06 Supt SMITH updated on the situation in Redfern; Insp EMERY spoke with DOI re arranging further police and equipment to assist.

21:28 Crowd attempted to set fire to railway station; Fire Brigade called; Insp EMERY called DOI asking for Vikings or OSG; DOI gave Insp EMERY contact number for Inner Metropolitan Region Operations Manager.

21:30 Insp SNEL contacted by Insp EMERY who requested OSG equipment personnel. (there is unresolved confusion over the content of this conversation as Insp SNEL understood the request was for OSG equipment only).

22:05 Crowd advanced and police granted permission to advance their front line; crowd retreated to Eveleigh Street; a number of police injured and removed.

22:14 Insp BENNETT called DOI and asked if there is a helicopter on; DOI responded that there wasn't one on.

22:41 IME60 called to say they were on the way to get OSG equipment.



- 22:48 IME60 called off at the command post with equipment.
- 23:00 All OSG personnel requested to attend the command post and requests made for more OSG and any other police by Supt SMITH and Insp Garth SMITH.
- 23:30 Supt SMITH called A/C WAITES and informed him that the situation was under control.
- 23:45 A/C WAITES received a call from A/DCOP PARSONS enquiring as to the situation at Redfern.

Monday 16 February 2004

- 01:15 Supt SMITH called A/C WAITES requesting additional police at the scene; it was after this call that A/C WAITES prepared to leave home and attend the riot.
- 01:34 Crowd consisted of over 100; petrol bombs/molotov cocktails being thrown.
- 01:47 Arrival time of A/C WAITES; A/C WAITES called DOI and asked about availability of tactical gear (because molotov cocktails were being thrown) and asked who has responsibility for the SPG.
- 02:14 Supt SMITH had command of Fire Brigade hose and was using it in an attempt to control the crowd.
- 02:30 OSG operatives Sgts O'RIORDAN & STOKES arrived at the scene with additional riot equipment.
- 03:02 Fire hose used to break up crowd [*according to Insp SMITH*]
- 03:30 OSG made a tactical approach and moved in 3 sections of 12 each.
- 03:35 Supt SMITH called DOI and asked if Polair could light up Eveleigh Lane just in front of the police line.
- 03:51 Redfern 10 called that no further police were required and the area was under control.

EXECUTIVE INVOLVEMENT/COMMUNICATIONS TIMELINE

Saturday 14 February 2004



- 12:30 Supt SMITH and Insp EMERY held a full briefing at Redfern Police Station including Insp BENNETT concerning the incident with Thomas HICKEY that morning; Supt SMITH spoke with A/C WAITES and they determined it was not a critical incident.

Sunday 15 February 2004

- 01:15 Supt SMITH received a call to notify him that Thomas HICKEY had died.
- 13:30 Joanne ELLIOTT (Police Media) spoke with Supt SMITH as she had been receiving calls from 1:00pm from television stations wanting to interview police re the Thomas HICKEY matter; a decision was made not to conduct an interview at this stage.
- 15:00 Media briefing held outside Redfern Police Station with Insp EMERY and television and radio media.
- 16:30 Several calls were made from Redfern Railway Station (security etc) for help re stone throwing and aggression by youths at and in the vicinity of the Railway Station before police arrived at 4:50pm.
- 17:30 Insp EMERY first arrived at Redfern Railway Station.
- 17:42 Supt SMITH was appraised of the situation at Redfern *[probably by Insp EMERY who told DOI at 5:42pm that he had been trying to contact Supt SMITH]*; in his 5:42pm conversation with DOI, Insp EMERY also said that the aborigines were full of hate without knowing the facts of what happened with Thomas HICKEY and they were congregating, equipped and intoxicated – this was the first call to DOI concerning the situation at Redfern which developed into the riot.
- 18:00 Supt SMITH contacted A/C WAITES to inform him that the aboriginal community around the 'block' had been drinking and were becoming aggressive and trying to bait police [as discussed between Insp EMERY and DOI at 5:42pm]; this was simply a notification by Supt SMITH as no further assistance required *[according to A/C WAITES]*; Insp EMERY left Redfern Railway Station at approximately 6:00pm.
- 19:00 Briefing held at Redfern Police Station with day and night shift police including Duty Officers EMERY & SMITH.
- 20:51 Insp EMERY told DOI that Supt SMITH wanted to keep a low key presence.
- 21:28 DOI provided Insp EMERY with a contact number for Inner Metropolitan Region Operations Manager [Insp SNEL] to arrange an OSG response.
- 21:30 Insp EMERY called Insp SNEL; Insp EMERY stated that he requested OSG equipment and personnel [in his submission]; Insp SNEL stated that Insp EMERY requested 20 sets of OSG equipment; Insp SNEL contacted by Insp EMERY who requested OSG equipment personnel. (there is unresolved confusion over the content of this conversation as Insp SNEL understood the request was for OSG equipment only).
- 21:35 Insp SNEL called A/C WAITES following her call from Insp EMERY re OSG equipment and A/C WAITES agreed re the provision of OSG equipment and stated that on arrival Supt SMITH could assess the need for OSG personnel. *[according to Insp SNEL]*
- 21:42 Insp SNEL told DOI that A/C WAITES was not aware that the railway station had been closed; just prior to or after this call, Insp SNEL called Supt SMITH who was getting ready to leave home to attend the scene and they discussed OSG equipment being provided and Insp SNEL stated that she told him to contact her if OSG is required. *[according to Insp SNEL]*



- 22:14 DOI told Insp SMITH he needed to call the Commissioner's Staff Officer to provide an update on the situation.
- 22:19 DOI first contacted Supt ADNEY; immediately after this Supt ADNEY sent an SMS to A/DCOP PARSONS and DCOP MADDEN [*Supt ADNEY estimates the time she sent the SMS as 10:30pm but it may have been earlier*].
- 22:20 Supt SMITH picked up Joanne ELLIOTT (Police Media) at Redfern Police Station to head to the scene of the riot, therefore his approximate arrival time is 10:30pm.
- 22:34 A/DCOP PARSONS contacted Supt ADNEY to check with DOI that the Region Commander had been notified.
- 22:36 Supt ADNEY sent an SMS to DCOP MADDEN.
- 23:30 A/C WAITES received a call from Supt SMITH who was at the scene and stated that there were approximately only 30 people involved in some rowdy behaviour in Lawson Street and the situation was in hand. [*according to A/C WAITES*]
- 23:45 A/C WAITES received a call from A/DCOP PARSONS enquiring what was happening at Redfern; A/C WAITES apprised A/DCOP PARSONS with the information provided to him by Supt SMITH; A/DCOP PARSONS asked A/C WAITES if he was going to attend; A/C WAITES said he had considered attending but Supt SMITH insisted the situation was under control.

Monday 16 February 2004

- 01:15 Supt SMITH called A/C WAITES indicating that he needed more police and there were approximately 100 more rioters and police were being attacked with rocks, bricks and bottles; it was after this call that A/C WAITES prepared to leave home and attend the riot.
- 01:37 A/C WAITES called DOI on his way to the riot stating that Supt SMITH was in urgent need of more assistance, another 30-50 police; A/C WAITES advised he was on his way and would arrive in approximately 10-15 minutes.
- 01:47 Arrival time of A/C WAITES; A/C WAITES called DOI and said something was required by means of a circuit breaker because molotov cocktails were being thrown at police; A/C WAITES asked DOI about the prospect of using/contacting the SPG and protocols for doing so; after this call A/C WAITES spoke with Ch/Insp Craig JENNINGS (Tactical, SPG).
- 01:51 Redfern Duty Officer called DOI asking for all available police across Sydney as a matter of urgency.
- 02:00 A/C WAITES called Sgt WADE re the availability of chemical munitions; Sgt WADE informed A/C WAITES that nothing was available at that time which could be used.
- 02:05 DOI called A/C WAITES and advised him that he had called the helicopter and asked if he also wanted the Video Unit and A/C WAITES confirmed he did.
- 02:14 DOI called Supt SMITH stating that the helicopter and Video Unit were on the way; Supt SMITH said that he had shields on the way and he had taken hoses from the Fire Brigade and was hosing the crowd.
- 02:17 DOI called Supt ADNEY to appraise her of the latest developments and they discussed staffing levels at the riot, closure of police stations, helicopter and Video Unit attendance arranged, A/C WAITES' attendance, use of the fire hose, media, molotov cocktails, SPG and Supt ADNEY suggested the use of negotiators.



- 02:22** DCOP SCIPIONE called DOI; DOI explained how the riot had progressed (as per the above call with Supt ADNEY); DCOP SCIPIONE said he had had a call from the Fire Brigade (Greg MULLINS); DOI explained the staffing levels, Supt SMITH & A/C WAITES' presence and the closure of police stations etc, they discussed the police dogs and injuries to police, dogs and damage to the cars, SPG; DCOP SCIPIONE asked DOI if there had been any arrests but DOI was unaware.
- 02:37** A/C WAITES called DOI and explained there were enough police but not enough protective equipment; they discussed trailers on the way with further equipment.
- 02:43** "Alan" from the Minister of Transport's Office called DOI to enquire what was occurring at Redfern; "Alan" had received a call from State Rail wanting to know when they could run trains again; DOI told "Alan" he would arrange a senior officer at the scene to contact him.
- 02:46** DOI called Supt SMITH as a result of the call from the Minister of Transport's Office; Supt SMITH told DOI that the trains had been recommenced; DOI and Supt SMITH also discussed equipment coming from [REDACTED] ⁽ⁱ⁾ [one of the trailers discussed in the call between DOI and A/C WAITES at 2:37am].
- 02:58** DOI called A/C WAITES and told him the van was on its way and the helicopter crew should have made contact by that time with a location; A/C WAITES said the helicopter hadn't contacted him but perhaps they had contacted Supt SMITH.
- 03:02** Fire hose used to break up crowd [*according to Insp Garth SMITH*]
- 03:35** Supt SMITH called DOI and asked if Polair could light up Eveleigh Lane just in front of the police line.
- 03:51** Redfern 10 called that no further police were required and the area was under control.
- 04:45** A/C WAITES gave a media interview at the scene of the riot.
- 05:00** COP called DOI to enquire on the situation at Redfern; DOI explained the progression of events, numbers, arrivals, injuries, damage and presence of A/C WAITES.
- 05:30** Ross NEILSON [Public Affairs] was contacted by the Police Minister's Office displeased that they had not been notified earlier of the scale of the problem; they heard early morning media reports only.
- 06:46** Supt ADNEY called DOI [FITZGERALD] for an update but he had not at that stage been briefed.
- 06:54** DOI [FITZGERALD] called Supt ADNEY and advised her that Supt SMITH would call her with an update.

OSG, PERSONNEL & EQUIPMENT TIMELINE

Sunday 15 February 2004



- 18:12** Insp EMERY asked DOI if there was any OSG, Vikings etc working; DOI responded that there was no Vikings that he was aware of and the only OSG he was aware of was their own [ie Redfern's OSG].
- 18:14** Redfern Duty Officer [probably Insp EMERY] told VKG he had kept back the day shift troops at the police station, and that they would keep a small contingent at the railway station until they got more staff.
- 19:45** Insp EMERY VKG that he was trying to arrange enough staff to contain the situation.
- 21:00** Supt SMITH was of the understanding that equipment and OSG personnel were on the way. *[according to Supt SMITH]*
- 21:00-21:59** **1 OSG operative arrived at the scene of the riot.**
- 21:05** Personnel given permission to wear riot equipment. *[according to Insp SMITH]*
- 21:06** Enquiries continued by Insp EMERY for further staff and equipment. *[according to Insp SMITH]*
- 21:28** Insp EMERY called DOI and said they didn't have any emergency response or OSG; DOI explained that the Operations Manager is responsible for organising them; DOI provided Insp EMERY with the Operations Manager's [Insp SNEL relieving] contact number.
- 21:29** Additional equipment arrived from Redfern with personnel. *[according to Insp SMITH]*
- 21:29** Insp EMERY called Insp SNEL and requested personnel and equipment. *[according to Insp EMERY]*
- 21:30** Insp EMERY called Insp SNEL and said they had little OSG equipment, DOI was co-ordinating OSG personnel on duty to attend and asked Insp SNEL if additional OSG equipment could be made available. *[according to Insp SNEL]*
- 21:35** Insp SNEL called A/C WAITES following her call from Insp EMERY; A/C WAITES agreed re the provision of OSG equipment and they discussed personnel to which A/C WAITES added that once Supt SMITH arrived at the scene he could assess the need for OSG personnel. *[according to Insp SNEL]*
- 21:42** Insp SNEL called DOI as a result of Insp EMERY having called her for OSG equipment; DOI said he wasn't sure how many OSG personnel she would be able to get in the area on a Sunday night.
- 21:45** Insp SNEL called Sgt WADE requesting that he arrange OSG equipment for the situation at Redfern; Sgt WADE told Insp SNEL he would arrange an OSG operative to go in and arrange equipment; Insp SNEL told Sgt WADE that A/C WAITES said Supt SMITH will assess the need for OSG staff when he arrives at the scene.
- 22:00-22:59** **4 OSG operatives arrived at the scene of the riot.**
- 22:03** A/Insp SHEARER [on duty as Duty Officer at Waverley on the night] called VKG after Sgt WADE had called him re-arranging equipment for Redfern; A/Insp SHEARER was provided with a sitrep and provided his contact details to be passed on to Redfern Duty Officer to call him.
- 22:19** DOI called Supt ADNEY and told her that he thought the Inner Metropolitan Region Operations Manager had been called to arrange OSG.
- 22:23** IME60 [first called on police radio] asked about the situation at Redfern [this is the call sign used by the first OSG operatives who arrived at the scene with equipment].



- 22:41** Insp SMITH called again for more OSG personnel and equipment; IME60 called over the air that they were on the way with OSG equipment.
- 22:46** IME60 called to ask for the location of the Command Post and stated an estimated arrival time of one minute.
- 22:48** IME60 called off at the command post with equipment.
- 22:49** Insp SMITH recorded that the OSG van arrived with additional equipment at 9:49pm and he attempted to identify OSG personnel and those identified were kitted out. (this time is presumed to be mixed up with 10:49pm).
- 23:00** Insp SMITH asked for all OSG to attend the Command Post and also requested that some attend Abercrombie/Lawson Streets; "OSG50" [S/Cst SNOWDEN (& CROWE) *according to S/Cst SNOWDEN*] called for all OSG police to attend the Command Post, 20 on duty required from Inner Metro Region [channel A, C, D, etc]; Supt SMITH called DOI and stated that 20 OSG were on the way/on call and asked for 20 more police [GDs]; DOI told Supt SMITH he had as many police as possible; Supt SMITH asked for police to be called from anywhere [not just IMR]; Supt SMITH said that once the OSG police arrived the other police could be relieved.
- 23:00-23:59** **4 OSG operatives arrived at the scene of the riot.**
- 23:04** RF10 called that there were no OSG personnel at Abercrombie/Lawson Streets.
- 23:06** RF10 called that 1 OSG person was on the way.
- 23:09** Supt ADNEY called DOI and said she had spoken with Supt SMITH at the scene who said he wanted 20 OSG and 20 more police [he had 20 OSG on the way but wanted 20 additional police; Supt ADNEY said that ES10 (A/Insp SHEARER) said only 20 OSG trained were wanted; DOI said Supt SMITH has as many police as he can get there now [ie. all police available in the city area]; DOI said he will try and get 20 police for Supt SMITH.
- 23:20** Insp EMERY called DOI and DOI said ES10 said they didn't want untrained men, only OSG; DOI asked Insp EMERY what they wanted; Insp EMERY said they needed 20 more, preferably OSG and Insp SMITH had confirmed 20 OSG were on the way; DOI confirmed that Supt SMITH told him that too and they wouldn't get any more OSG but VKG would go to channels D & E.
- 23:25** Insp SNEL called Supt SMITH to see if OSG personnel were required but he was unable to talk at the time and she spoke with Insp EMERY instead [according to SNEL no request for OSG personnel was made at this time].
- 23:34** DOI called Supt SMITH regarding extra personnel; DOI said that all he could get from going to channels C, E, F & D was 5 people; DOI asked Supt SMITH if he had 20 OSG on the way; Supt SMITH spoke with someone else [*possibly "Darren" (BENNETT?)*] and said that he couldn't confirm numbers but that he was expecting more; DOI asked Supt SMITH if anyone had thought to contact the SPG and Supt SMITH said yes but he didn't think they'd "come to this"; DOI said he would call the SPG and give them a contact number at the scene.
- 23:36** DOI called S/Cst COMPTON [SPG, Tactical] re using SPG; S/Cst COMPTON and DOI discussed equipment and personnel; DOI asked COMPTON to call Supt SMITH; S/Cst COMPTON said some OSG guys had been there and SPG started the truck for them and Surry Hills had asked SPG for some gear which he gave them; S/Cst COMPTON said the OSG



truck took off over an hour ago kitted up for Redfern; S/Cst COMPTON said Surry Hills Duty Officer said they had 20-30 OSG trained at Redfern and they just wanted equipment; S/Cst COMPTON agreed to call Supt SMITH and "put his mind at ease".

- 23:40** Insp SNEL and DOI discussed prison trucks/vans, DOI mentioned that having gone to channels C, E, F & D he could only get an additional 5 staff.
- 23:46** Channel A called channel E and asked if any OSG were amongst those coming over [it appeared they were only GDs].
- 23:52** Channel G called channel A and said that Flemington 10 probably had 4 OSG and asked if they were wanted; channel A says only if they are Inner Metropolitan Region [said he is only going on what he's been told].
- 23:58** Ch/Insp ASHTON of Flemington LAC called DOI and said he was OSG and he had 2 other OSG trained but they were called off by the radio operator [if they were from Greater Metropolitan Region]; DOI checked and then said that they only wanted Inner Met Region [but they'd keep them in mind]; Ch/Insp ASHTON said they would be on all night; another channel called channel A and said that he had Campsie on the phone, they didn't have any OSG on and asked if they should be called out; channel A said OSG60 would make that decision, but to keep them on standby.

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- 00:16** VKG told City Rail that the OSG was assembling and if they had enough troops they would move in soon if they were going to do it.
- 00:56** DOG37 called that they had been split from the OSG.
- 01:00-01:59** **8 OSG operatives arrived at the scene of the riot.**
- 01:02** Supt SMITH called DOI saying that they needed OSG kits and asked if they could do a call out, the SPG was sending 5 or 6; the Duty Officer said there were about 40 kits; DOI said that he didn't have the list for the OSG call out, then Supt SMITH discovered that Sgt WADE would do a call around; after this call Sgt WADE received a call from Insp SMITH requesting 20 OSG personnel to be called out to Redfern; Insp SNEL received a call from Sgt WADE stating that OSG had been requested and he was requesting approval to deploy OSG personnel; Insp SNEL approved; Sgt WADE commenced calling out IMR OSG staff from home.
- 01:04** DOI called S/Cst COMPTON who reiterated it wasn't a job for Tactical; S/Cst COMPTON said OSG should have been there by then.
- 01:05** Sgt O'RIORDAN received a call from Sgt WADE directing him to attend Regent/Lawson Streets, Redfern.
- 01:14** RF45 called for RF46 to go to the Command Post with the keys to the OSG truck.
- 01:17** OSG60 called for all vehicles coming to Redfern to be wearing bullet resistant vests.
- 01:19** Supt SMITH called DOI to check how the numbers of police were going, Supt SMITH explained the situation at the scene and that they will have to replace police on the line because some had been there for 18 hours and asked that they go outside the Inner Metro Region area; Supt SMITH said he had OSG on the way and asked DOI how many police were



coming and DOI said he didn't know exact numbers, but that they would identify themselves on arrival; Supt SMITH said he would get on to A/C WAITES to arrange a call out.

- 01:47** A/C WAITES called DOI re the throwing of Molotov cocktails and the possibility of some kind of "circuit breaker"; A/C WAITES asked who called the SPG and what equipment they have; DOI agreed to call the SPG and get them to call A/C WAITES [which DOI did at 1:48].
- 01:50** Sgt O'RIORDAN commenced loading a further 50 sets of riot equipment into vehicles.
- 01:51** Liverpool Duty Officer (Insp GAMOSH) called DOI saying he believed DOI said OSG would be paid overtime from the OSG budget, and he said he had OSG trained and a car crew but their budget was restricted.
- 02:14** Supt SMITH told DOI they were getting shields etc and he had taken the fire hose from the Fire Brigade and was hosing people and he had enough staff.
- 02:37** A/C WAITES told DOI that they had plenty of police but no protective equipment, A/C WAITES said that there was a trailer on the way from [REDACTED] (which only had 15 sets of riot equipment) and he believed there was a store at [REDACTED]; A/C WAITES asked DOI to contact [REDACTED] (i)
- 02:00-02:59** 15 OSG operatives arrived at the scene of the riot.
- 02:30** Sgts O'RIORDAN & STOKES arrived at the scene of the riot with OSG equipment which they commenced handing out.
- 02:55** Fairfield LAC Supervisor asked that DOI be informed that the [REDACTED] (ii) would be on the way in 10 minutes.
- 03:00** Sgt O'RIORDAN conducted a briefing with OSG Team Leaders [CIBULKA, CROWE, SHEARER, VLACHOS, DUNLOP & STOKES].
- 03:02** Fire hose used to break up crowd [according to Insp SMITH]
- 03:14** Sgt Dean SMITH of Fairfield LAC called DOI re a request to supply equipment for the Redfern incident; Sgt SMITH called to confirm what was required [riot gear or vests]; DOI said full gear; Sgt SMITH said there wasn't anything in the truck as it wasn't kitted up; DOI thought the truck was ready to go; SMITH said he would arrange 10 sets of riot gear and 10 additional vests to send in.
- 03:15** Truck with trailer arrived [according to Insp SMITH]; City Central 15 called for the truck with trailer to meet at the intersection of Regent and Lawson Streets.
- 03:00-03:59** 2 OSG operatives arrived at the scene of the riot.
- 03:30** Tactical advance commenced [according to Sgt O'RIORDAN] with 3 sections of OSG personnel, each of which consisted of 12.
- 03:35** Supt SMITH called DOI and asked if Polair could light up Eveleigh Lane just in front of the police line.
- 03:51** Redfern 10 called that no further police were required and the area was under control.



EQUIPMENT


PHYSICAL ASSETS ON HAND AT REDFERN

Inquiries by Strike Force Coburn confirm the following physical assets were authorised to be on hand at the Redfern Local Area Command on the evening of 15 February 2004:

- 10 riot shields (Arnold A/C4 model - Standard)
- 10 helmets (Scott Aspen brand)
- 10 sets of leg protectors (Reliance brand)

Since 15–16 February 2004 the number of physical assets on hand at Redfern has not changed.

At a Region level, physical assets on hand on 15-16 February 2004 are summarised below:



(i)

ASSET STORAGE AND ACCESS ARRANGEMENTS

Inquiries by Strike Force Coburn indicate difficulties arose when attempts were made to access protective riot equipment on 15 February 2004. These difficulties are summarised in chronological order below.

21:05 Initial difficulties in access to sufficient riot equipment at the scene:

A decision was made to issue Redfern's riot equipment following the "Signal One Call at 2103hrs. Of the 10 sets of equipment available, 8 sets are supposed to be carried in the Redfern Supervisors Vehicle (Redfern 14). This is to allow the quick deployment of 8 sets of equipment at the scene of incidents. Inspector Smith the Duty Officer on the evening of 15 February 2004 reports that Redfern 14 attended Lawson Street, Redfern, yet only four complete sets of equipment and seven other shields are reported to have been immediately available. Other reports vary from only 2–4 sets of equipment being available.

1

(ii)



21:30 Confusion over access to resources (equipment vs OSG resources): 20 Operations Support Group (OSG) personnel and riot equipment were requested. This request was made by mobile telephone by Redfern Duty Officer Inspector Emery to Inspector Snel, who was relieving as the Region Operations Manager. Inspector Snel later states she understood it was equipment only which was requested.

It has been reported difficulties were experienced in accessing the OSG equipment at the [REDACTED]⁽ⁱ⁾ as the relevant keys could not be obtained. As a result Rescue Squad personnel were dispatched to the [REDACTED]⁽ⁱⁱ⁾ and were required to force access to the equipment.

22:50 At 2250hrs 20 additional sets of OSG equipment + 2 OSG officers arrived at the scene.

01:05 Further equipment requested: Additional equipment was requested with Inspector Smith calling Sgt Wade at 0105hrs. By 0150hrs Sgt O'Riordon loaded further sets of equipment from the [REDACTED]⁽ⁱⁱⁱ⁾ arriving at Redfern at 0230hrs. Prior to its arrival requests were made for additional equipment resulting in a trailer from Fairfield also being deployed to the scene.

There appears to have been no effective auditing process at Redfern LAC for checking specific items or quantities, despite the existence of a signed Supervisors Checklist on a weekly basis including the date of the riot. Since the incident the processes adopted for checking equipment by Supervisors at Redfern has been revised to include the protective riot equipment.

Once the appropriate personnel were contacted, sufficient protective equipment was subsequently provided to Police at the scene, however the time delay is an issue. Presently the majority of the OSG protective equipment is stored at the [REDACTED]^(iv) as 90% of public order incidents take place within the Sydney Metropolitan Area.

All Regions need to re-assess their current equipment storage processes, the locations and quantities held to ensure the capability for the urgent access to this equipment. Additionally, given the present terrorism risk storing the bulk of these assets in one location such as the [REDACTED]^(v) may no longer be prudent.

ADEQUACY OF EQUIPMENT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES

The Redfern incident has highlighted procedural issues relating to deployment, training, familiarisation with and maintenance of equipment. It has also provided a catalyst to review the appropriateness of evaluating alternative equipment.

Processes were in place to deploy required equipment, and once followed were found to be effective in ensuring its delivery albeit not a timely response. The quality of certain equipment deployed was found to be of a poor standard. Scott Aspen brand helmets, which are generally only used for training purposes were deployed during the incident. These helmets were found to have scratched visors, reducing visibility for officers.



The evening heat during the incident reportedly resulted in some helmet visors fogging up. It cannot be identified which helmets did so, however the helmets on issue to Redfern are Scott Aspen Brand, whereas the ones held at the [REDACTED]⁽ⁱ⁾ are Argus Brand. Argus helmet visors are treated with Anti Fogging chemicals and tend to resist fogging more than the Scott Aspen Helmets. This issue highlights the possible need for alternative helmets more suited to Australian climatic conditions.

Strike Force Coburn believes the physical state of the equipment on hand at Redfern during the incident was poor. Inquiries suggest deficiencies in storage arrangements resulted in some damaged equipment being used by Police on the ground.

In addition to the protective equipment held at the [REDACTED]⁽ⁱⁱ⁾ the OSG possess equipment that allows communication between the OSG line and others. It was not deployed to Redfern, though it generally would accompany all other OSG equipment to an incident.

Similarly the non-issue of water bottles to police on the front line, from those held with the OSG equipment at the [REDACTED]⁽ⁱⁱⁱ⁾ could have greatly assisted police during the incident. It was found that the provision of refreshments to officers was poor.

Police in attendance at the Redfern riot were wearing their General Duties issue Ballistic resistant vests, which contain ceramic plates within the vests. They were worn for protection from the impact of missiles being thrown at officers, yet they are not designed for this purpose. The ceramic plates in the vest make them considerably heavier than riot-specific vests. They were worn because it was all that was made available.

Any of these vests which were struck by a brick or similar object can be considered to have had the ceramic plate compromised which has adversely affected the bullet resistant integrity of the vest. Inner Metropolitan Region were advised of this fact in order to communicate it to all Local Area Commands which had officers respond to the Redfern riot to evaluate the integrity of their vests on hand.

This highlights the need for more riot specific protective vests to be obtained rather than utilising the bullet resistant vests for a function for which they are not designed.

ONE SIZE FITS ALL

The Strike Force received information that a female officer who attended Redfern had extreme difficulties with the equipment available to her at the scene. The difficulties stemmed from the officer's stature, with a total body weight being 55kgs, and the issuing of a large bullet resistant vest and helmet to her.

The officer reported that due to her size, anytime she wears the current issue bullet resistant vests they are too long for her, preventing her from reaching her appointments if so required. Additionally the vests slip forward every time the officer bends over, providing her with ineffective protection. The current bullet resistant vests utilised by General Duties are the ADA brand, model D98 containing ceramic plates, and of a total weight of 8 kilogram's.

Redfern was the first time the officer had utilised a helmet and found it was too large, with a damaged chinstrap. Each time the officer looked down, the helmet would either cover her face or completely fall off.