



**FINAL REPORT INTO
MACQUARIE FIELDS PUBLIC ORDER
MANAGEMENT INCIDENTS**

Office of the Deputy Commissioner
of Police (Operations)



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Report into Macquarie Fields Public Order Management Incidents

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Executive Summary

The *Report into the Macquarie Fields Public Order Management Incidents* examines the police response to highly challenging and unusual circumstances.

Significant civil unrest occurred at Macquarie Fields after an incident in which two persons, suspected of stealing a car, were involved in a fatal motor vehicle accident after a police pursuit was terminated. Public order was compromised and at the height of the disorder both members of the public and police officers were endangered.

Although NSW Police received some just criticism for its handling of events, several factors obstructed the capacity of police to respond in an effective and comprehensive manner.

In some quarters emotions were charged and agitators were easily able to turn disquiet into hostility towards police. Fortunately during the riot itself, very few people were injured and little damage to property was sustained.

As a result of Strike Force Loudon, which was initiated to deal with the incidents at Macquarie Fields, NSW Police laid 186 charges and arrested 59 people, of whom



27 were refused bail. Charges included assaulting police, malicious damage, malicious wounding, possession of an offensive weapon, possessing illegal drugs and rioting.

This report outlines the events leading to the civil unrest and analyses in detail police directives, deployment, equipment and communications in response to this unrest.

Fifteen recommendations are proposed. These build on intelligence gained and lessons learnt from both Redfern and Macquarie Fields. Additional specialised training, new and improved equipment, the introduction of a Major Incident Response Team and the establishment of a new NSW Police Public Order Management Committee will help to ensure that the impact on local communities and police is minimised during any future episodes of major civil unrest.



Strike Force Delage was formed to investigate a number of persons who were suspected of being involved in Aggravated Break, Enter and Steal offences. At 11.00pm on 25th February 2005 police from Strike Force Delage engaged in a short pursuit in Eucalyptus Drive, [REDACTED] [REDACTED]¹. The pursuit ended when the vehicle being pursued collided with a tree killing two occupants of the vehicle while the driver escaped on foot. During the early morning of 26th February 2005, as specialist police attempted to investigate the accident, a group of onlookers became increasingly violent and began to throw concrete blocks and bottles at police and a violent confrontation ensued. Over the next two nights crowds continued the unrest with violent confrontations occurring throughout the evenings. Police employed a variety of tactics during the course of the unrest.

The Report

The report outlines the results of the review by the Deputy Commissioner (Operations) concerning the police response during the Macquarie Fields public order management incidents, which commenced on 25th February 2005. The objectives of the process were:

- To systematically and objectively identify key strategic decisions made by police Commanders throughout the incident;
- To assess how these decisions impacted upon the management of the public order management incidents;
- To examine the systems in place for the deployment of specialist public order management police;
- To identify any issues concerning the logistical support provided to police;
- To identify opportunities to improve the training of police involved in the incidents; and
- To examine the resources available to responding police and identify opportunities to build on these resources.



Matters expressly excluded from review:

The alleged assault of [REDACTED]² on 27th February 2005 and the subsequent police response has expressly been excluded from this report. This matter is subject to a separate internal police investigation.

It should also be noted that opportunities to improve the current Guidelines for the Investigation of Critical Incidents have been forwarded to the Professional Standards Command for consideration.

Methodology

The report obtained information from police concerning the handling of the Macquarie Fields public order management incidents. Such information was obtained through a review of data from radio broadcasts, police radio logs, command logs, video footage from the media, air-wing and police video unit. Also a formal seven phase debrief process was employed involving:

1. The Deputy Commissioner (Operations) and commissioned police officers who attended the incidents in a management capacity;
2. The Deputy Commissioner (Operations) and non-commissioned police officers who attended the incidents;
3. The Deputy Commissioner (Operations) and investigators involved in Strike Forces Delage and Loudon and the Critical Incident Investigation Team;
4. The Deputy Commissioner (Operations) and police from Macquarie Fields Local Area Command who were not actually in attendance at the incidents but who wished to contribute to the debriefing process;
5. Written submissions from any New South Wales Police officer who wished to contribute to the debriefing process;
6. A comprehensive personal debrief of the Macquarie Fields Local Area Commander by the Deputy Commissioner (Operations); and
7. A multi-agency debrief with the New South Wales Fire and Ambulance Services chaired by the Commander, Greater Metropolitan Region.



The Review Process

Phase One
Commissioned
Officers Debrief
17 March 2005

Phase Two
Non-Commissioned
Officers Debrief
17 March 2005

Phase Three
Investigators Debrief
22 March 2005

Phase Four
Macquarie Fields & Other
Non-Commissioned
Officers Debrief
22 March 2005

Phase Five
Written Submissions
30 March 2005

Phase Six
Personal Debrief of
Macquarie Fields
Commander
21 April 2005

Phase Seven
Multi Agency Debrief
Including Ambulance and
Fire Services

**Final
Report & Review
by Deputy
Commissioner
Operations**





Introduction

Macquarie Fields Local Area Command

The Macquarie Fields Local Area Command is located in the southwest suburbs of Sydney between Liverpool and Campbelltown. The Command covers an area of 84 square kilometres and a population of 77,634¹. It encompasses 13 complete suburbs and parts of 7 other suburbs.





The Command contains three large Department of Housing estates and a number of smaller ones. The residents of these premises constitute 24% of the population of the Command and are accommodated in approximately 3,946 Departmental dwellings².

Macquarie Fields is an area with a low socio-economic community and has a high rate of unemployment. According to the 2001 census, 7.4% of Sydney residents are unemployed whereas in Macquarie Fields the rate is 11.1%. This unemployment problem is magnified as Macquarie Fields has a high proportion of young people with 16.3% of the population in the 15-24 age bracket, compared with 13.3% across Sydney. Unemployment rates are further compounded as 18.4% of all young people in the area left school prior to completing Year 10.

² Source: Department of Housing. Macquarie Fields area 1921, Claymore 1,100, Minto 925. Correct as at 19 April 2005.



Topography of Macquarie Fields Housing Estate


The Macquarie Fields Housing Estate is bordered by Victoria Road in the north, Harold Street to the west and the proposed Georges River Parkway to the south and east. The estate is comprised of 1,408 individual dwellings; however the exact number of residents is difficult to determine as tenants sometimes neglect to notify the Department of Housing of changes in occupancy numbers.



There are ten parks or reserves within the estate and three on its boundaries. The housing estate is centred on Eucalyptus Drive, which is an irregular circular road with 13 streets directly running off it and 31 cul-de-sacs.



These 1,408 dwellings and more than 75 cul-de-sacs are contained within an area less than 2.2 square kilometres. Several pedestrian access routes, which are not represented on maps of the area, link the cul-de-sacs and streets.



The area contains high-density housing with several properties comprising connected 'townhouse' type development. Street and common area lighting in the area is very poor.



Estate during darkness. Image obtained through thermal imaging equipment



Policing Macquarie Fields

The Macquarie Fields Local Area Command has an authorised strength of 156 officers and currently is over strength by 7 officers with a total of 163 police officers within the Command. 55% of all police within Macquarie Fields have more than five years of policing experience.

Macquarie Fields Local Area Command Human Resource Data 31 January 2005													
AUTH	ACT	DIFFERENCE (Actual vs Auth)	OFFICERS 15+ YEARS SERVICE	OFFICERS 5-15 YEARS SERVICE	CONSTABLES 1 - 5 YEARS SERVICE	PROBATIONARY CONSTABLES	TEMPORARY RESTRICTED DUTIES	PERMANENT RESTRICTED DUTIES	PART-TIME DUTY & MATERNITY LEAVE /LWOP	LONG TERM SICK	SECONDMENTS / EXTERNAL LOAN	EXTENDED LEAVE / FULL-TIME LWOP	CURRENT OPERATIONAL STRENGTH
156	163	7	44	46	57	15	5	1	5	8	10	2	132
N/A	100		27%	28%	35%	9%	3%	1%	3%	5%	6%	1%	81%

Public housing estates are located in Macquarie Fields, Minto and Claymore. These areas of economic hardship are hotspots for property offences, drug offences and crimes of violence. Macquarie Fields Local Area Command has advised that these residents are likely to be victims and sometimes offenders of crime. People from these areas place frequent demands on police resources, particularly in relation to domestic disputes and other disturbances.

The Macquarie Fields Local Area Command has been actively addressing issues pertaining to young people through the Crime Management Unit. The Unit includes a dedicated Youth Liaison Officer, two Domestic Violence Liaison Officers, an Ethnic Community Liaison Officer and a Crime Prevention Officer.




The Unit has overseen the implementation of the "Positive Choices" Program. The program was initially implemented in July 2003 and strives to provide an early intervention strategy for troubled young people by acting on referrals from schools and community groups. Community conferences are held between the young person, representatives from the community and police to assist that person in developing a responsible and positive attitude. A second phase has been developed, which incorporates a two-day program for young people who are referred by schools or community groups. Throughout the two days young people undertake exercises in self-esteem and learn about law, education, employment and community links.

The programs developed and implemented within the command may have contributed to a general downward trend in crime rates in the area. Over recent years crime has been generally falling. The crime trends across the major crime categories are below³.

Break and Enter

Break and Enter incidents have been on a downward trend. Incidents for January to April 2005 are 25% lower than those of January to April 2004.




³ NB. These are not Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research (BOCSAR) figures and are for internal police operational needs analysis only.




Robbery

Robbery incidents are on a downward trend. Incidents for January to April 2005 are 21% lower than those of January to April 2004.



Stealing

Stealing incidents were lower in the calendar year for 2004 than they were in 2003. However, the level of incidents for January to April 2005 is identical to those of January to April 2004.






Despite an increase in February 2005, stolen vehicle incidents have been on a downward trend since January 2004. Incidents for January to April 2005 are 18% lower than those of January to April 2004.




Assaults statistics are highly volatile but have been moving within a band of 80 to 120 incidents per month. Incidents for January to April 2005 are slightly higher than those of January to April 2004.






Drug Detection

Level of Drug Detections has been on a downward trend since December 2003. Detections for January to April 2005 are 58% lower than those of January to April 2004.



Person Searches


Whilst not as prevalent as in the past, Person Searches are still on a rising. Person Searches for January to April 2005 are more than four times those of January to April 2004.





'Move On' Directions

Despite now being much lower than their peak in December 2004, 'Move-ons' are still on a rising trend. 'Move-ons' for January to April 2005 are more than four times those of January to April 2004.





██████████ Ongoing Police Investigation ██████████

Macquarie Fields Local Area Command identified a number of people ██████████
██████████³ whom they believed were responsible for serious offences. Police believed these people were involved in stealing motor vehicles and breaking into homes across the Sydney metropolitan area. These offences were committed during the night while the occupants were at home.

Strike Force Delage was formed on 15th January 2005 to investigate these offences. ██████████
██████████


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██████████⁴, investigators obtained information that members of the criminal enterprise were preparing to commit an Aggravated Break Enter and Steal Offence on the evening of 24th February 2005. A decision was made to arrest those involved on the 24th February 2005 while they made their final preparations to commit the offence. When it became apparent on the evening of 24th February 2005 that the offence was not going to be committed that night, a decision was made to arrest the persons of interest for offences relating to a stolen motor vehicle prior to them returning to their Macquarie Fields' homes. That evening significant police resources were deployed in the field; ██████████
██████████⁵ and the arrest did not occur.



The Pursuit

On the evening of 25th February 2005, some information was [REDACTED] [REDACTED]⁶ that some of the persons of interest would be driving a stolen vehicle around Eucalyptus Drive, Macquarie Fields. Two officers from Strike Force Delage, who were stationed in a vehicle, were deployed to the area in an attempt to locate the vehicle and arrest the offenders. At 11.00pm, the two officers saw three males, [REDACTED] [REDACTED]⁷, in a stolen vehicle on Eucalyptus Drive. At 11:00.40pm Police Radio was advised that police were pursuing the motor vehicle. Shortly after (11:01.20pm) police reported that the stolen vehicle carrying the persons of interest had crashed into a tree.




Shortly after the accident at 11:08pm the Macquarie Fields Duty Officer, Chief Inspector WILSON, arrived on the scene and commenced the critical incident investigation procedures⁴. Superintendent SWEENEY, the Macquarie Fields Local Area Commander, was advised of the incident at 11:22pm and attended the scene at 12:07am on 26th February 2005.

⁴ The Critical Incident Investigation Team (CIIT) reports to the Region Commander and conduct their investigation independent of the Local Area Commander. The Region Commander is responsible to adequately resource a CIIT.



Public Order Management Incident





Public Order Management Incident

~~~~~ Evening of Friday 25<sup>th</sup> February 2005 ~~~~~  
~~~~~ Morning of Saturday 26<sup>th</sup> February 2005 ~~~~~


Following the pursuit on the evening of 25th February 2005, Superintendent SWEENEY attended the scene of the accident and assumed command of the scene at 12.07am. Superintendent SWEENEY determined that his focus and primary response was to protect the crime scene and the integrity of the critical incident investigation in order to facilitate a transparent and comprehensive investigation. Superintendent SWEENEY further determined that his response to the emerging public unrest would be 'low profile' in an attempt not to escalate the violence.

At 12.20am [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]⁸ were detained under the common law 'breach of the peace' provisions as they attempted to breach the police perimeter and enter the accident scene. Police on the scene advised Police Radio that the amassed crowd was beginning to become 'unrestful'. Consequently, a further two police were deployed to assist with crowd management. Due to the number of people gathering and poor light, Superintendent SWEENEY directed that police at the scene wear reflective vests allowing the command post to better monitor the position of police. Furthermore, Superintendent SWEENEY believed this would enable him to extend the perimeter.



Police wearing reflective vests on the perimeter



Street map of the relevant locations



Shortly after 1.00am a second arrest was made as a male attempted to cross through the police perimeter. In the ensuing hour the crowd continued to become unruly and aggressive and general duties police from Campbelltown Local Area Command arrived at the scene to assist with crowd management and support deployed police. Superintendent SWEENEY observed rocks being thrown at police by members of the crowd.

The crowd became more aggressive and began to throw bottles at police. Superintendent SWEENEY surmised that the crowd's intent was to damage the police vehicle involved in the pursuit. Furthermore, he believed that there were sufficient police on the scene and an increased response would have inflamed the situation. Police at the scene have since identified that the number of police at the location dictated that a defensive approach was required. If more police, including the dog squad, had been present, a more offensive approach would have been possible.

At this point, three interrelated outcomes were required. Firstly, the accident scene needed to be protected and preserved. Secondly, the motor vehicle collision needed to be investigated. Thirdly, the Critical Incident Investigation Team needed to gather information on behalf of the Coroner.

In order to ensure the success of the above, the amassed crowd had to be contained and managed to preserve the law and order.

██████████⁹ evidence confirmed ██████████¹⁰ was the driver of the vehicle when it crashed. The information also determined that ██████████¹¹, along with a number of other ██████████
██████████¹² were at a house at ██████████
██████████¹³.



It should be noted that the pursuit ended at approximately 11pm and resulted in the call out of a Critical Incident Investigation Team, which is responsible for the investigation of the accident. Unfortunately some delays occurred, which meant that the complete team was not onsite until 1.42am. Furthermore, the identity of the driver was not immediately apparent after the accident. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]¹⁴ the information was relayed to the Commander of the Critical Incident Investigation. While it is recognised that there was a delay, the investigation was complex and any decision to interview persons involved at that stage may have lead to a flawed investigation.

At 3.22am Superintendent SWEENEY requested, via the Duty Operations Inspector, that a crew from the Vikings Operations Support Group Street Crime Unit (hereinafter referred to as 'Vikings') be deployed to the area to assist with crowd management. The on duty Vikings police are not routinely equipped with Operations Support Group equipment as their vehicles do not support the permanent carriage of the equipment. However, such equipment is available at [REDACTED]¹⁵ and various other locations across the state. The on duty Vikings Supervisor was informed by the Duty Operations Inspector of public unrest. However, it was understood by the supervisor that the Vikings unit had been deployed to assist with stabilising the perimeter only. The supervisor was unaware that Operations Support Group equipment was readily available at [REDACTED]¹⁶ and accordingly did not equip the team with equipment.



At 3.25am police were pelted with bricks and rocks from Flinders' Field and forced to take shelter to avoid being hit. At 3.40am the Vikings crew advised that they were en route to Macquarie Fields. As the crowd became more aggressive and abusive Superintendent SWEENEY requested that Liverpool Local Area Command provide a police vehicle to assist.

About 3.50am Superintendent SWEENEY contacted Acting Assistant Commissioner CLIFFORD, who was the Acting Greater Metropolitan Region Commander, and requested that the on call Vikings Operations Support Group be activated. This unit, when on call, is routinely deployed with Operations Support Group equipment. The request was approved and a short time later Superintendent SWEENEY was informed that the estimated response time was 50 minutes. Chief Inspector NOAKES of Vikings was contacted by the Duty Operations Inspector at Police Radio to implement this request. However, on arrival at the scene by the Vikings Operations Support Group, there was no contact with senior officers and the urgency of the deployment was not conveyed to Vikings staff.

Superintendent SWEENEY believed the ten Vikings staff who were rostered on call combined with the four operatives already deployed would be sufficient to respond to the unrest.




At 4.10am a team of four officers from Vikings arrived at the command post. Operations Support Group 'teams' are [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]¹⁷.

Cabramatta and Green Valley Local Area Commands were requested to supply additional police. At 4.21am Chief Inspector WILSON directed attending police to not expedite as he believed that police responding with warning lights and sirens would inflame the situation. About 15 minutes later, two additional police from Cabramatta arrived to assist with crowd control.

Shortly before 5am police reported males collecting armloads of bricks and covering their faces and throwing bricks at police and their vehicles. During the next ten minutes police were pelted with rocks.



The command post had been positioned in close proximity to the increasingly violent crowd. At 5.07am Constable [REDACTED]¹⁸ from Operation Vikings was awaiting deployment at the command post when he was struck in the head with a rock that deflected off a police vehicle causing a minor laceration to the head. At this point no Operations Support Group equipment was at the scene as the first four on duty Vikings police had responded without equipment.



At 5.10am Superintendent SWEENEY directed three police caged vehicles to move into the park with police moving behind the trucks for shelter. The trucks moved toward the toilet block where young people had been breaking up bricks and throwing them at police. Police removed the ammunition used by the crowd from that area and the crowd dispersed as a result of the Police deployment into the area.



At 5.23am the on call Vikings Operations Support Group arrived with a Team Leader and established a static line. In accordance with the current policy, an Operations Support Group Commander was not deployed to the scene due to the small number of Operations Support Group officers in position. Superintendent ROLPH, the Commander of Vikings and who is not Operations Support Group trained, attended the scene in support of his officers.

Shortly after the arrival of the Operations Support Group, the bodies of [REDACTED]¹⁹ were removed from the vehicle and the crowd dispersed. At 6.50am the police withdrew from the area.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]²⁰ and he remained there throughout most of the day. Information was also obtained [REDACTED]²¹ that there was potential for further rioting. Superintendent SWEENEY was advised of this intelligence to assist future planning.



At 7.15 am Superintendent SWEENEY and Chief Inspector WILSON conducted a debriefing session. Police raised concerns that they were directed to wear reflective vests while people were throwing objects at them and that general duty police were not equipped with protective equipment. Officers also advised that there were insufficient police at the scene to contain the unrest.

It appears that following the debriefing session at Macquarie Fields there was no immediate appreciation process undertaken to determine if there would be a next phase of the operation and, if so, what resources would be required.

Following the cessation of the unrest on 26th February 2005 police were not tasked to undertake community based policing strategies and cultivate intelligence. It is considered that had this strategy been employed, the likelihood of continuing unrest may have been reduced. Macquarie Fields Police did however work in the area, as required, in their normal response capacity during that day without incident.

Superintendent Sweeney employed a low key approach to the activities of the evening for a variety of factors including that some of the community members present were affected by alcohol; young people were involved; and the fatal accident scene had a significant impact on people as the deceased were from the local community. Furthermore, Superintendent Sweeney wanted to limit the escalation of violence. Superintendent Sweeney described the actions as "low level street aggression".



~~~~~ Evening of Saturday 26<sup>th</sup> February 2005 ~~~~~  
~~~~~ Morning of Sunday 27<sup>th</sup> February 2005 ~~~~~

Based on an informal risk assessment conducted independently by Superintendent SWEENEY, it was determined that rioting on the evening of the 26th February 2005 was unlikely. However, as a proactive measure additional resources were deployed in the event of unrest.

Superintendent SWEENEY assessed that actions of the crowd on the previous night were unforeseen and that their actions on forthcoming nights were unforeseeable.

On the evening of 26th February 2005 a number of additional police resources were allocated to the Macquarie Fields area. Acting Assistant Commissioner CLIFFORD and Superintendent SWEENEY rostered 15 Operations Support Group police on duty at Macquarie Fields. A further 20 from the Inner Metropolitan Region were rostered on call for an unrelated operation in the Sydney Central Business District, which Superintendent SWEENEY understood may be utilised, if necessary.

Superintendent ROLPH, Vikings Commander, was requested to attend by Acting Assistant Commissioner CLIFFORD. As stated previously, Vikings officers are all Operations Support Group trained; however, Superintendent ROLPH is not an Operations Support Group Commander. This created confusion and Acting Assistant Commissioner CLIFFORD was mistakenly under the impression that Superintendent ROLPH was an Operations Support Group Commander. Due to this misunderstanding, no Operations Support Group Commander was deployed to the scene.

Greater Metropolitan Region Highway Patrol was also tasked with proactive patrols of the area. The State Protection Group supplied one vehicle to be part of the high profile proactive patrols.



Acting Assistant Commissioner CLIFFORD attended a briefing organised by Macquarie Fields Local Area Command on the evening of 26th February 2005 to ensure there were sufficient resources on hand. The briefing was run by Chief Inspector Wilson, Duty Officer, as the then Operation Commander. Operational orders, maps and other planning aids were not supplied at the briefing.


Throughout New South Wales there are ■²² accredited Operations Support Group Tactical Advisors responsible for developing strategies and tactics at the scene of a public order incident. Tactical Advisors were selected and appointed on the basis of training and experience. Advisors have all successfully completed the Operations Support Group Basic Operators Course and Team Leaders or Instructors course. They must hold the rank of Senior Constable or above and have broad operational experience in public order management. (Refer to Chapter: *Education, Training and Commander Development*).

In consultation with Sergeant BROADHURST who is an accredited Tactical Advisor, Superintendent SWEENEY had decided to undertake a 'low profile' operation and not to engage in 'running battles' due to the geographical lay out of the area including concealed laneways and poor lighting (Refer to Chapter: *Introduction – Topography of Macquarie Fields Estate*). Consequently, resources such as the Police Mounted Unit were not requested. Superintendent SWEENEY planned a 'slow escalation' and was conscious of the fact that many of the offenders appeared to be in their early teenage years.

Outline of Events

About 9.15pm the State Protection Group vehicle pelted with rocks, resulting in the windscreen being smashed while patrolling the area. From this point the violence escalated.

At 9.30pm a command post was established at the southern end of Glenquarie Shopping Centre car park at the direction of Chief Inspector WILSON. The location of the command post and the available facilities have since been criticised by attending police.



Officers advised that the command post was exposed, had poor security and few planning aids. NSW Police has a fully equipped mobile command post vehicle, which can be deployed to major incidents, but was not in this instance.

Despite some evidence of planning and preparation, operational orders were not prepared until the 1st March 2005. At the time, a dedicated operations communication channel was activated, but the only available channel [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]²³. There was no request to use one of these channels on a priority basis and it appears this option was not offered by the Duty Operations Inspector. This was problematic as the analogue channels have a number of 'black spots' or poor communication areas, which resulted in officers experiencing difficulties in communicating on this frequency.

Whilst there was a quantity of water supplied at the command post it appears that as the night unfolded water was not regularly supplied to officers deployed forward of the command post. Further, the police in the field did not receive meals during the course of their shift. Police were not expecting a lengthy deployment on that evening therefore there was no prior planning for the supply of meals. Basic logistical requirements were not addressed, which indicates a failure in the planning process.




Chief Inspector WILSON was the rostered Duty Officer for the Macquarie Fields Local Area Command and was coordinating the police response. Shortly after 9.30pm, in response to the escalating violence, Chief Inspector WILSON requested Superintendent SWEENEY attend the scene. At 10.11pm Superintendent SWEENEY arrived at the command post and assumed control of the incident.

A short time later a briefing was held between Superintendents SWEENEY and ROLPH, Chief Inspectors NOAKES and WILSON, and the State Protection Group and Operations Support Group. The officers discussed the current deployment of specialist police and other resources.

As a consequence of the briefing at 10.28pm permission was sought from Acting Assistant Commissioner CLIFFORD to activate the Regional Operations Support Group. Authority was granted and the Regional Operations Support Group was activated. In addition, Campbelltown, Camden and Liverpool Local Area Commands were asked to provide police. Two general purpose police dogs were also requested and POLAIR was asked to report on crowd movements.

The arrival of the on call Operations Support Group from Inner Metropolitan Region was delayed as 19 members of the team were waiting at [REDACTED] [REDACTED]²⁴ for an operative who was responding from [REDACTED]²⁵, prior to deploying to Macquarie Fields. This delayed the Regional Operations Support Group arrival by approximately 45 minutes. The on call team was activated at 10.28pm, even though they did not arrive until 12.50am.



Shortly before 11.00pm
POLAIR, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]²⁶ reported to the
command post that there
were 80-90 people in
Flinders Field. A short time
later Campbelltown Local
Area Command advised that
they were unable to provide
any

police to assist due to workload within the Local Area Command. The Radio Electronics Unit was requested to attend and supply additional portable radios and batteries.

About 11.10pm police became aware that 60 persons in Laurel Place were discussing making Molotov cocktails. Shortly thereafter Superintendents SWEENEY and ROLPH and Chief Inspectors APPLETON and WILSON held a meeting where they discussed deployed police numbers.

About 11.30pm POLAIR advised there was a fire in Eucalyptus Drive [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]²⁷ POLAIR were unable to
determine whether a house or a vehicle was on fire. At the same time, a
member of the public reported that she had driven down Eucalyptus Drive and
rocks had been thrown at her vehicle.


Shortly before 12.00am the radio technician arrived on site and officers were
directed to switch from the dedicated analogue operations channel to the
regional 'working channel' to enable the technician to address the 'black spot'
problems that were occurring with the analogue channel. It appears that most
officers received the message to transfer to the 'working channel'.



On several occasions, police experienced difficulty in arresting offenders, as those throwing rocks were often standing behind, or were in close proximity, to members of the public. This made it difficult to move forward and arrest offenders who shielded themselves behind others.




At 12.10am police reported 40-50 people in Flinders Field and the surrounding area. A tree was set alight around that time. [REDACTED]²⁸ reported that some of the people were in possession of firearms. Numerous reports were received from members of the public stating that youths in the area were damaging vehicles and were armed with baseball bats. Whilst a number of these calls were genuine, police experienced difficulty in establishing the authenticity of some reports due to a large number of hoax calls. Police instigated a protocol [REDACTED]²⁹ to confirm the authenticity of the call.



At 12.50am the ten Operations Support Group officers from the Vikings 'on call' team arrived equipped with ten sets of equipment. A short time later the crowds began throwing bricks and bottles at police.




The crowd retreated from Harold Street back into Rosewood Drive and the Vikings police advanced down Harold Street and into Rosewood Drive to contain the crowd within the Macquarie Fields Estate.



A short time later, 20 on call Operations Support Group police from Inner Metropolitan Region arrived, and brought 40 sets of equipment with them. As additional Operations Support Group police arrived throughout the night, the issue of equipment was not recorded. Furthermore, no system was in place to record equipment movement; however, all officers were issued with equipment.

A number of people were arrested by Operations Support Group police, which had the effect of dispersing the crowd. The exact number of people arrested cannot be determined as some people were detained under breach of the peace provisions; these arrests were not adequately recorded. As Investigators were not incorporated into the management of the incident until 28th February, there was little coordination of the charging process or consistency in the charges preferred. It appears that people were detained under common law breach of the peace provisions rather than being charged with the substantive offences they had committed.



Officers were seemingly deployed with little or no knowledge of the area and without orientation aids such as maps. Consequently the officers became disorientated and lost. Once within the housing estate, officers had rocks and bottles thrown at them predominately from abandoned houses and the area around Hickory Place. The Operations Support Group were tasked to undertake a sweep of the area and then to withdraw to the command post. However, the officers became disorientated and were attacked from multiple locations. At 1.25am, additional Operations Support Group police were deployed to assist, and as a result, the officers were able to move forward and disperse the crowd.

At 1.37am, POLAIR advised that ten people were returning from the park and dispersing. The command post directed all staff to withdraw to the command post and not to engage. Again, the officers were disoriented and on a number of occasions were confronted by crowds on multiple fronts. By 2.20am all Operations Support Group police had withdrawn from the area to the command post.

The police operation ceased at 4.10am. It appears a debrief was not held with Police prior to them completing their shifts therefore making it difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of the police response or inform future planning.

Injuries



At 2.25am Constable [REDACTED]³⁰ from the Operations Support Group sought treatment from ambulance staff for an injury that occurred about 1.00am. A large piece of concrete had been thrown at him, breaking his shield. The concrete struck his wrist, forearm and lower leg.

Equipment and Deployment Issues

Some officers advised that appropriate equipment such as fire retardant overalls had not been issued by their respective LACs. This, however, was rectified prior to their deployment. Furthermore, officers advised that deployment in cross regional teams was problematic. Regional based training develops familiarity with other operatives and an understanding of the methods of police colleagues. As a result, police advised that it was easier to work with officers from within their respective regions.

It appears omissions in the planning and appreciation process were repeated following the second night of unrest. In respect to the planning for potential future incidents the omissions referred to previously were repeated. In summary, there was minimal property damage and injuries to police and the unrest was contained within a relatively small geographical area.

If the resolution of a public order incident crosses geographical boundaries of local area commands, the Region Commander should take control, ensure that adequate resources and logistical support are made available and administer the ongoing management of the incident.



~~~~~ Evening of Sunday 27<sup>th</sup> February 2005 ~~~~~  
~~~~~ Morning of Monday 28<sup>th</sup> February 2005 ~~~~~

Superintendent SWEENEY undertook an informal risk assessment and concluded that rioting was unlikely. However, Superintendent SWEENEY deployed additional resources in order to be able to respond in the event that further unrest occurred.

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~~~~~<sup>31</sup>. This information was relayed to Superintendent SWEENEY. As a result Superintendent Sweeney had discussions with the Region Commander, Region Operations Manager and local Duty Office to plan an appropriate Police response.

On Sunday 27th February 2005 Sergeant BOGG, the Crash Investigator who was part of the Critical Incident Investigation Team investigating the cause of the collision, concluded that he had sufficient evidence to arrest ~~~~~³⁰.

~~~~~<sup>32</sup> but the search warrant was delayed and not obtained until 5.40pm that afternoon. Detectives were required to apply for the warrant in person at Parramatta in accordance with Section 11 (1) of *Search Warrants Act 1985*, which provides that "*An application for a search warrant must be in writing in the form prescribed by the regulations and must be made by the applicant in person*". The Act authorises that an application can be made by telephone or facsimile only in 'urgent' circumstances. The Authorised Justice in this instance determined that this application did not meet the 'urgent' criteria.

Superintendent SWEENEY and Chief Inspector APPLETON decided not to execute the search warrant until the following day as they held concerns for the welfare of their staff. If the warrant was executed at night, it was thought that





the incident may develop into a siege. Furthermore they were not confident that they could secure the necessary specialist resources to execute the warrant.

████████████████████<sup>33</sup> and a number of those involved in the rioting were inside the premises, and the decision not to execute the warrant was maintained by Superintendent SWEENEY.

On the evening of 27<sup>th</sup> February 2005, approximately 40 Operations Support Group police along with local police were deployed to manage emerging public order incidents. A further 20 Operations Support Group police were activated later that evening. A briefing was held for the Operations Support Group police present at that time however, a significant number of Operations Support Group police who attended after the main briefing and subsequently they were not appropriately briefed.


Superintendent SWEENEY had decided to maintain the 'low profile' approach that had been adopted over the previous two nights. Superintendent SWEENEY maintained that this course of action was less likely to inflame the situation and he was conscious of deploying large numbers of police into a community that was grieving for the two youths.

A command post was established in the Glenquarie Shopping Centre car park in the same location as the previous evening with Superintendent SWEENEY in command. The location was again later criticised by a number of police due to its proximity to the unrest, perceived poor security and poor facilities.

Superintendent ROLPH and Chief Inspector NOAKES were at the scene in support of the Vikings staff. Superintendent SWEENEY was in command and Detective Chief Inspector APPLETON was also present. Chief Inspector SUANEZ was on scene as the Operations Support Group Commander.



At 11.00pm police became aware of a crowd of 40 people gathering in Cottonwood Place and an additional 30 others in Eucalyptus Drive. At about 11.20pm Molotov cocktails were thrown at police.



At some point prior to 11.30pm Chief Inspector SUANEZ requested and received permission from Superintendent Sweeney to move forward from the Command Post and conduct a personal inspection of the trouble zones. Chief Inspector SUANEZ believed that it was necessary for her to be in Eucalyptus Drive so that she could observe what was occurring. This action unfortunately left no Operations Support Group Commander at the command post. Previous training and policy did not specifically address where an Operations Support Group Commander should be positioned. At some later point Acting Inspector BARLOW, an accredited Operations Support Group Team Leader, arrived at the command post and with the approval of Superintendent SWEENEY, Acting Inspector BARLOW took on the role of Operations Support Group Commander and began to relay directions via police radio to Chief Inspector SUANEZ and other Operations Support Group police in the field.





There was significant break down in communications, with police at the scene operating on both the local operating channel and a specially allocated operations channel. This was a result of a failure or inconsistency in the briefings supplied to police who arrived later in the evening. Officers at the scene reported they were unable to receive radio transmissions and the command post experienced difficulty communicating with Chief Inspector SUANEZ in the field. Communications were made more difficult due to the noise from the public order incidents, the protective equipment worn by police and the prevailing difficulties with the operating channels.

At 11.35pm Chief Inspector SUANEZ was in Eucalyptus Drive in command of an Operations Support Group team. The crowd set a mattress on fire and placed it near the police line. At the same time, a police officer was injured (on the police line) and an ambulance was requested. It appears the crowd had broken into two groups, attacking the police line from the front and from a park at the side.

*Front View**Side View*

During tactical deployment of the Operations Support Group Officers Senior Constable [REDACTED]<sup>34</sup>, was struck by a rock thrown from the side of the police line. Around the same time, a block of concrete struck and broke the officer's shield and a brick struck the officer in the groin.





Chief Inspector SUANEZ requested authority from the command post to move the line forward. It is at this point that there was a communication breakdown. Authority was given and other Operations Support Group teams were deployed to the area. Consequently, as the police advanced, the crowd ran from the approaching line of police.

#### ***Aerial View***



Some isolated rock and projectile throwing occurred over the ensuing hours, however, the violent confrontation that occurred shortly before midnight was not repeated.

#### **Deployment Issues**

Operations Support Group operatives believed they were deployed throughout the evening without a clear objective or purpose.

#### **Dog Squad**

As an additional public order management tool, the Police Dog Squad was also deployed. Officers advised that they would benefit from incorporating training with the dog squad into the Operations Support Group course. Chief Inspector





CRUMBLIN, the Commander of the Dog Squad, confirmed that officers are no longer trained in the deployment with dogs, and is unaware why this component of the basic Operations Support Group course was removed some years ago. Whilst this training may be beneficial there is no evidence to suggest that it hindered the police deployment. One injury was sustained by an officer as a result of a dog bite; however, this officer was a Team Leader and had been trained in joint deployments with dogs.





~~~~~ Evening of Monday 28<sup>th</sup> February 2005 ~~~~~  
~~~~~ Morning of Tuesday 1<sup>st</sup> March 2005 ~~~~~

Strike Force Loudon was formed on the evening of 27<sup>th</sup> February 2005 and commenced operations on the morning of 28<sup>th</sup> February 2005 to investigate those involved in the civil unrest. Detective Sergeant SALIBA was appointed as the Officer in Charge.

Superintendent WALES assumed command of the incident on the evening of 28<sup>th</sup> February 2005. Superintendent WALES explained his approach to the incident as a 'high profile' proactive police presence.

A comprehensive command log was maintained by Superintendent WALES outlining decisions taken and the rationale for these decisions.

A large number of Operations Support Group police were deployed during the afternoon to conduct high visibility foot patrols and make arrests where appropriate. Large teams of fully equipped Operations Support Group police made arrests throughout the evening. These arrests were met with some resistance and a large crowd of onlookers; however, they did not result in large-scale confrontation.

The violence on this night was significantly less than the previous three nights and there were no major confrontations between police and the crowd.









***A number of submissions received in the course of the review called for the establishment of a 'full time' Operations Support Group. The review confirms that the Vikings Operations Support Group Street Crime Unit is a 'full time' unit with staff available twenty-four hours a day.***



Operation Vikings commenced operation in May 2002 essentially providing a high visibility policing response. The Vikings Operations Support Group Street Crime Unit commenced operation in October 2004 and has 47 police officers, of which 45 are Operations Support Group trained. The unit is commanded by a Chief Inspector with six Sergeants and 40 Constables.

The Charter of the Vikings Operations Support Group Street Crime Unit determines that the unit shall *"Respond to incidents of civil disorder, public order management and major incidents as required"*<sup>5</sup>.

Vikings officers are rostered on the basis of intelligence driven assessments to facilitate an appropriate and timely response when incidents occur. In addition, <sup>36</sup> officers, <sup>37</sup>, are rostered on call and are provided with Operations Support Group equipment to respond to any incident where they are required.

Vikings Operations Support Group Street Crime Unit complement the existing Regional Operations Support Group and since October 2004, Vikings have completed 1,066 individual Operations Support Group shifts<sup>6</sup>. These shifts do not incorporate the routine high visibility work undertaken by the unit, only those individual shifts where officers were deployed to specifically undertake

<sup>5</sup> Vikings Street Crime Unit Call Out Procedures. Page 1.

<sup>6</sup> Source: A/Commander, Vikings. Correct as at 29 April 2005.





Operations Support Group duties. Such duties encompass many facets of policing including public order management.

The unit has been provided with a complete set of Operations Support Group equipment. Previously the unit drew on equipment sourced from the respective locations strategically placed across the state.

Vikings Operations Support Group Street Crime Unit draws its operating expenses from dedicated funding, which will meet the full costs of deploying police for *"Operations addressing issues that are over and above the normal operational activity or response of the LAC"*<sup>7</sup>.

The Vikings Operations Support Group Street Crime Unit was formed instead of a unit solely dedicated to Operations Support Group functions due to the infrequency of large-scale public order incidents. New South Wales Police recognised there was a need to ensure Operations Support Group police were available at short notice to complement Regional Operations Support Group teams. Whilst there have been two recent public order incidents, they do not occur frequently and as such the substantial investment of public funds for a dedicated Operations Support Group cannot be justified. Rather, the Vikings Operations Support Group Street Crime Unit was formed so that it could respond to such incidents when they do occur. The unit is also able to undertake duties as part of larger Vikings Operations, including high impact policing incorporating the deployment of large numbers of trained police into an area to maximise results.

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<sup>7</sup> Operation Vikings, Standard Operating Procedures. Page 13.







*The Review found that the equipment issued to both Operations Support Group and General Duty Police was sufficient to respond to the incidents. Indeed, in many cases the amount of equipment exceeded the number of officers at the scene.*

| Day <sup>38</sup> | Date   | OSG Deployed <sup>36</sup> | OSG Kit Available at Scene <sup>36</sup> |
|-------------------|--------|----------------------------|------------------------------------------|
| Saturday          | 26-Feb |                            |                                          |
| Sunday            | 27-Feb |                            |                                          |
| Monday            | 28-Feb |                            |                                          |
| Tuesday           | 1-Mar  |                            |                                          |
| Wednesday         | 2-Mar  |                            |                                          |
| Thursday          | 3-Mar  |                            |                                          |
| Friday            | 4-Mar  |                            |                                          |
| Saturday          | 5-Mar  |                            |                                          |
| Sunday            | 6-Mar  |                            |                                          |
| Monday            | 7-Mar  |                            |                                          |
| Tuesday           | 8-Mar  |                            |                                          |
| Wednesday         | 9-Mar  |                            |                                          |
| Thursday          | 10-Mar |                            |                                          |
| Friday            | 11-Mar |                            |                                          |
| Saturday          | 12-Mar |                            |                                          |

Source: Acting Operations Manager, Greater Metropolitan Region

However, there were isolated incidents, which were addressed in the previous chapters, where problems were experienced with equipment.

#### ARGUS 017T



New South Wales Police is currently in the process of replacing the *Scott Aspen* style helmet with the more modern *Argus 017T*. Whilst both helmets meet the operational needs of officers, police report that the neck protection and adjustable size of the *Argus* helmet makes it preferable.

On the first night of the unrest, General Duty police were not equipped with helmets to protect themselves from bricks and other projectiles. This equipment



was available and could have been supplied if requested by the Incident Commander. Public Order Management Protective Equipment Training (POMPET) is a relatively new course being implemented across the State. The course incorporates training in the use of specialist equipment and has currently been undertaken by approximately 500 officers. However, officers should not be precluded from wearing protective equipment simply because they have not undertaken Public Order Management Protective Equipment Training.

Operations Support Group officers at the incident also reported difficulties in readily accessing water and requested the issue of 'Camelbak' type hydration systems.

Some officers submitted that more protective equipment should be available for the upper body such as arm and torso protection. Front line officers, who were consulted, are divided over the merits of this equipment as the increased protection is offset by decreased mobility and increased weight and heat. This type of equipment may further restrict the ability of officers to arrest offenders. Following consultation with Uniform Services, 70 sets of reinforced hand protection (gauntlets) have been ordered for distribution throughout the state and 50 complete light weight riot suits have been ordered for a trial. All of the aforementioned equipment will be delivered by 1 July 2005.







There were also a small number of incidents whereby riot shields broke as a result of being hit by concrete blocks and bricks. This is despite the shields meeting the relevant standard and being considered one of the best shields commercially available.

Whilst there was sufficient and appropriate equipment at the scene, in the early stages of the unrest, a logistics or equipment officer was not appointed. Consequently, both Commanders and operatives did not know the exact location and quantity of equipment available at the scene.









## Education, Training and Commander Development

*In response to the Coburn Report and as part of an ongoing review into the training of specialist public order police, a number of public order management courses have been developed and implemented. 556 of the State's eligible 763 senior police have successfully completed the Commissioned Officers Public Order Management Awareness Program. In addition, three new courses designed specifically to provide further training for senior officers in public order management have been developed and are in the final stages of implementation.*

### **Synopsis of Public Order Courses**

*The following information has been extracted from the Registration Documents for the respective courses issued on 25/5/05, Version 04-1.*

#### **Major Incident (Public Order) Commanders Course**

The Operational Safety and Traffic Training Unit have developed a Public Order Management Commanders course designed for Local Area Commanders and Duty Officers. The course is currently running its fourth pilot program with 27 Local Area Commanders and 31 Duty Officers having been trained.

The course is designed to provide training to Commanders in responding to a public order management incident. A training simulation utilising the 'Minerva' system is under development and will be incorporated into the training. Minerva will provide a realistic simulation of a public order management incident allowing members of the command team to develop both individual and team skills. Based around a computer network, the simulator consists of a number of separate rooms or 'pods' each equipped with a standard personal computer, police radio system, pager, mobile and landline telephone. Each pod is controlled from a central exercise control room. Exercise participants work in teams on the simulator from within their respective 'pods' which - through the





use of video, audio and text based messages - recreate the various aspects of an incident complete with their associated demands and problems. It is envisaged that the course will be rolled out state wide early in the 2005-2006 financial year.

This course will be delivered over four days (32 hours) of residential tuition. The course is theory and exercise based and involves participants undergoing instruction and assessments. There will be a written examination at the commencement and completion of the course, including a practical examination during the course.

#### **Subjects Covered:**

- Command Post Management/ Activation of the Police Operation Centre (POC);
- Location, staffing, perimeters, recording, security media, communication, and Critical Incident management;
- Legal Obligations;
- Crowd Psychology;
- OSG Charter/ Call out;
- Tactical Advisors;
- Operational Management – Command and Control;
- Planned and reactionary events, appreciation process, risk assessment and management, planning, resources, Operational Orders, briefing, debriefings;
- CTCC Protest Groups; and
- Tactical and strategic use of resources.

#### **■ ■ ■ Operations Support Group Commanders Course ■ ■ ■**

The Operations Support Group Commanders Course is currently under development by the Operational Safety and Traffic Training Unit. The course builds upon the practical experience and formal training of Operations Support Group Team Leaders to equip them to respond to a large-scale deployment of





Operations Support Group personnel. This course is expected to be rolled out state wide early in the 2005-2006 financial year.

This course will be delivered over four days (32 hours) of residential tuition. The course is theory and exercise based and involves participants undergoing instruction and assessments. There will be a written examination at the commencement and completion of the course, including a practical examination during the course.

**Subjects Covered:**

- OSG Policy / Charter;
- OSG Tactics & Deployment ;
- Legal Obligations;
- Crowd Psychology;
- Tactical use of resources;
- CBRN and the OSG;
- Bomb Management and the role of OSG;
- Public Order and the role of OSG;
- OSG Callout / Viking;
- Tactical Advisors;
- Operational Management – Command and Control; and
- Planned and reactionary events, Appreciation process, risk assessment and management. Planning, resources, Operational Orders, Briefing, debriefings.

The two days of scenarios are designed to give maximum exposure of OSG Commanders to decision making and deployment strategies in a “real time” riot, with OSG police and “rioters” engaged in a confrontational planned or reactionary event.




















### **Tactical Advisors Course**

There are 20 accredited Operations Support Group Tactical Advisors across New South Wales. The Operational Safety and Traffic Training Unit is also in the process of developing a Tactical Advisors course. The course will build on the extensive operational experience of these officers enabling Tactical Advisors to provide timely, tactical options at the scene in consideration of prevailing conditions, resources and the overall aim of the operation. This course is also expected to be rolled out state wide early in the 2005-2006 financial year.

This course will be delivered over four days (32 hours) of residential tuition. The course is theory and table-top exercise based and involves participants undergoing instruction and assessments. There will be a written examination at the commencement and completion of the course, including a practical examination during the course.

#### **Subjects Covered:**

-  Crowd Management (Planned and Reactionary);
-  OSG Charter;
-  Deployment of OSG/ Minimum Numbers;
-  Tactical Formations;
-  Appreciations;
-  Search Procedures;
-  Command Structure / Chain of Command;
-  Logistics Resources;
-  NSW Police Public Order Policy;
-  Legal Obligations;
-  Duties at Correctional Facilities;
-  Command Post and Perimeters;
-  Operational Uniform;
-  Preparation of Sitreps;
-  Welfare of Staff;





- Cooperation with other Agencies;
- Building Clearance;
- Communication; and
- Map Reading.

An additional focus will be record/log keeping of public order incidents including their appreciation process and advice given to Commanders.









# Major Incident Management System

*The review identified that the management of large scale public order incidents requires specialist skills and experience. Accordingly, the Review proposes to incorporate the trained Incident Management Teams into a broader Major Incident Management System. The System will draw upon these trained Command Teams and utilise their experience and training to resolve major incidents.*

## Overview

There is an existing group of senior officers specifically trained and experienced in the management of large scale prescribed major incidents. These skilled officers form an integrated command team drawing on their established expertise in the management of major incidents and well-practiced response. The team is currently available to be deployed to assume command of prescribed incidents. The new *Major Incident Management System* will expand the existing integrated command and control system to respond to further major incidents where the placement of the team would be appropriate, such as large scale public order incidents. This will ensure that where such a major incident occurs highly trained incident management specialists will be deployed to resolve the situation

## Composition

A *Major Incident Response Team* shall comprise of specialist senior officers trained in the management of major incidents. The team shall consist of a Police Commander and where applicable Investigation Coordinator, Operations Support Group Commander, Logistics Coordinator, Planning Coordinator, Traffic Coordinator, Public Information Coordinator and Intelligence Coordinator.





### **Major Incidents**

The *Major Incident Response Team* will respond to a major incident that would be most appropriately managed by the team. In making such a determination consideration will be given to the following factors:

- If the incident transcends command boundaries;
- If serious injury or significant damage to property involving multiple victims may occur;
- Whether resources beyond the Local Area Command or Region are required;
- Whether the incident is likely to be protracted in nature;
- Whether the geographical location makes the incident more difficult to manage;
- Whether the incident would significantly effect the normal operation of the Local Area Command or Region; and
- If the event is of significant public interest or concern.


### **Activation**

The Deputy Commissioner Operations will activate the Major Incident Response Team. Such an activation may be of the Deputy Commissioner's own volition or on the request of a Region Commander or a Local Area Commander with concurrence of the Region Commander. Each of these senior officers will be expected to activate or seek to activate the team when, with reference to the above factors, it is appropriate to do so.

### **Practical Application**

The illustration on the following page demonstrates how the Major Incident Management Team may have been formed to respond to the public order incidents at Macquarie Fields.













The reporting of the public order management incidents at Macquarie Fields has the benefit of hindsight. Whilst police were confronted with a challenging situation, the unrest was contained within a relatively small geographical area and ultimately resolved with few injuries and minimal damage to property.

Incidents of large scale public disorder are rare in New South Wales and require specialist skills and experience to resolve. Accordingly, whilst senior officers across the state build their skills through simulations and increased training, specialist incident management professionals should respond to large scale public order incidents. New South Wales Police currently maintain a specifically trained group of senior officers who are experienced in the management of major incidents. Through the implementation of the *Major Incident Management System* these senior officers will now be deployed to large scale public order incidents such as those that occurred at Macquarie Fields.

In responding to the Macquarie Fields public order management incidents police displayed discipline, courage and professionalism in an increasingly hostile and difficult environment. With the adoption of the recommendations of this Review, New South Wales Police will be better equipped and prepared to respond to any future public order management incidents.

This review has been restricted to considering the management of the Macquarie Fields public order incidents. As a result of information supplied at the various debriefing sessions several suggestions are being forwarded to the Professional Standards Command in relation to the oversight, formation, composition and deployment of Critical Incident Investigation Teams.





## ❑❑❑❑❑ ❑❑❑❑❑ ❑❑❑❑❑ Recommendations ❑❑❑❑❑ ❑❑❑❑❑ ❑❑❑❑❑

1. Where a ***significant public order incident*** occurs a specialist Major Incident Response Team, as detailed within this *Report*, be deployed to assume command of the incident allowing the Local Area Commander to coordinate routine local issues.
2. A Major Incident Response Team be comprised of an accredited Forward Commander, Investigation Coordinator, Operations Support Group Commander, Logistics Coordinator, Planning Coordinator, Traffic Coordinator, Public Information Coordinator, Intelligence Coordinator and any other person deemed appropriate by the Forward Commander.
3. As a priority, Local Area Commanders undertake the Major Incident (Public Order) Management Course which incorporated an assessment of the Commanders ability to manage a public order incident.
4. At all ***significant public order incidents*** an appropriate command post must be established using either the Emergency Operations Centre for the Region, Mobile Command Post or other suitable premises.
5. At all ***significant public order incidents*** formal briefings and debriefings must occur and be appropriately documented, to ensure the free exchange of information. Such material shall be treated confidentially.
6. At planned or recurring ***significant public order incidents*** operational orders must be prepared.
7. At all public order incidents where Operations Support Group police are deployed an Operations Support Group Commander and Tactical Advisor be deployed.





8. Successful completion of the formal training programs and subsequent accreditation be a prerequisite to deployment as an Operations Support Group Commander or Tactical Advisor
9. At all public order incidents a comprehensive and contemporaneous command log be maintained and filed at the command where the incident occurred.
10. The Operations Support Group trial arm bands or tabards to facilitate the identification of personnel during deployments.
11. The 700 'Camelbak' Hydration Systems recently ordered by New South Wales Police be issued to all Operations Support Group police.
12. Continued development of mass arrest procedures for every Local Area Command incorporating appropriately resourced arrest kits.
13. The training of police in Public Order Management Protective Equipment be continued with a priority on frontline officers.
14. A new **Public Order Management Committee** be formed and chaired by the Deputy Commissioner (Operations). The committee shall absorb the *Operations Support Group and Public Order Management Steering Committee* and the *Operations Support Group Coordination Committee*.
15. The **Public Order Management Committee** shall include the Inner Metropolitan Region Commander as the Corporate Spokesperson on Public Order and also as a representative of Region Commanders.





# Appendices

**Table of Injuries**

**Table of Submissions**

**Street Map**

**Aerial Photograph**





## TABLE OF INJURIES

| Name <sup>39</sup> | Reg'd No.  | Where incident occurred      | Approx time of Injury | Injury Details                                                                                                                                                                       |
|--------------------|------------|------------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| [REDACTED]         | [REDACTED] | Freeman Park, Mac Fields     | 26.2.05<br>2.00am     | Hit in the face by an object causing severe laceration to lip.                                                                                                                       |
| [REDACTED]         | [REDACTED] | Eucalyptus Drive, Mac Fields | 25.2.05<br>11pm       | Involved in police pursuit. Fatal motor vehicle accident. Suffered trauma.                                                                                                           |
| [REDACTED]         | [REDACTED] | Eucalyptus Drive, Mac Fields | 25.2.05<br>11pm       | Involved in police pursuit. Fatal motor vehicle accident. Suffered trauma.                                                                                                           |
| [REDACTED]         | [REDACTED] | Eucalyptus Drive, Mac Fields | 26.2.05<br>4.30am     | Hit in head with brick causing bruising and swelling, laceration to head                                                                                                             |
| [REDACTED]         | [REDACTED] | Rosewood Drive, Mac Fields   | 26.2.05<br>1.00 am    | Object has passed shield and colliding with chest causing bruising and swelling to chest                                                                                             |
| [REDACTED]         | [REDACTED] | Rosewood Mac Fields          | 27.2.05<br>23.50      | Pelted by objects during riots causing fractured Wrist                                                                                                                               |
| [REDACTED]         | [REDACTED] | Not stated                   | 27.2.05<br>1.00am     | Hit by a block of concrete by rioters causing bruising and swelling to upper arm                                                                                                     |
| [REDACTED]         | [REDACTED] | Rosewood Drive, Mac Fields   | 27.2.05<br>1.30am     | Tripped over traffic island whilst walking backwards straining muscle in upper back and bruised hand.. Shield hit with brick causing bruising to ankle, right forearm hit with rock. |
| [REDACTED]         | [REDACTED] | Not stated                   | 27.2.05<br>2.50am     | Numerous rocks, bricks and other paraphernalia thrown at police. A piece of rock hit officer causing bruising and swelling to knee                                                   |
| [REDACTED]         | [REDACTED] | Rosewood Drive, Mac Fields   | 27.2.05<br>2am        | Missiles thrown at police causing strains to head, neck and arm                                                                                                                      |
| [REDACTED]         | [REDACTED] | Rosewood Drive, Mac Fields   | 27.2.05<br>11.30 pm   | Concrete thrown at riot shield, shield broke and hit officer in right groin causing swelling and bruising. Injured left shoulder and aggravated previous back injury.                |





|  |  | Where Incident occurred                         | Approx time of Injury | Injury Details                                                                                                                                       |
|--|--|-------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|  |  | Rosewood & Eucalyptus Drives Mac Fields         | 27.2.05<br>12.00 am   | Large pieces of concrete thrown causing bruising and swelling to upper back and neck                                                                 |
|  |  | Rosewood Drive and Eucalyptus Drive, Mac Fields | 28.2.05<br>12.00am    | Large boulder thrown and hit right shoulder followed by another boulder hitting left knee causing bruising and swelling to shoulder and knee         |
|  |  | Rosewood Drive, Mac Fields                      | 27.2.05<br>1.00am     | Large pieces of concrete thrown and broke shield causing injury to wrist and forearm. Large piece of concrete hit left foot and knee.                |
|  |  | Rosewood Drive Mac Fields                       | 28.2.05<br>1am        | Pelted by objects causing concussion                                                                                                                 |
|  |  | Eucalyptus Drive and Bangalay Cres, Mac Fields  | 28.2.05<br>5.15 pm    | Punched in face by offender during arrest causing bruising and swelling to face                                                                      |
|  |  | Rosewood Drive Mac Fields                       | 28.2.05<br>00.01      | Objects thrown and struck by brick causing bruising and swelling to elbow                                                                            |
|  |  | Not stated                                      | 28.2.05<br>2 am       | Wrestled with offender and hand got caught under accused causing bruising to hand                                                                    |
|  |  | Rosewood Drive, Mac Fields                      | 1.3.05<br>1.00 am     | Punched in face by offender during arrest causing bruising and swelling to eye and nose                                                              |
|  |  | Rosewood Drive Mac Fields                       | 27.2.05<br>1am        | Brick/cement object impacted with thigh during crowd control causing bruising and swelling to upper leg                                              |
|  |  | Rosewood Drive, Mac Fields                      | 1.3.05<br>1am         | Walking in formation at riot over undulating ground at night, twisted ankle when placed foot in ditch on side of path causing bruising and swelling. |





## TABLE OF SUBMISSIONS

| Organisational Submissions                         |                                                                                                                                        |
|----------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Organisation                                       | Notes                                                                                                                                  |
| New South Wales Police Association                 | Despite an invitation, the Police Association did not submit a full submission to the review, rather a brief 'overview' was submitted. |
| Inner Metropolitan Region Operations Support Group |                                                                                                                                        |
| Macquarie Fields LAC Criminal Investigations       |                                                                                                                                        |


| Individual Submissions |                              |
|------------------------|------------------------------|
| Officer <sup>40</sup>  | LAC/Unit                     |
|                        | Coffs Harbour LAC            |
|                        | Campbelltown LAC             |
|                        | Botany Bay LAC               |
|                        | Monaro LAC                   |
|                        | Southern Region - Operations |
|                        | Southern Region - Operations |
|                        | Mounted Unit                 |
|                        | Dog Unit                     |
|                        | Campbelltown Crime Scene     |
|                        | OSTU - Goulburn              |
|                        | Communications Group         |
|                        | Vikings Unit                 |





NSW POLICE MAPPING UNIT  
JOB NUMBER: 4047  
PRINTED IN 2005

## Eucalyptus Drive, Macquarie Fields



NORTH



