



POLICE ASSOCIATION OF NEW SOUTH WALES

A.B.N. 86 047 021 267

P.O. BOX A1097, SYDNEY SOUTH, N.S.W 1232

PHONE: (02) 9265 6777

FAX: (02) 9265 6789

EAGLENET 57070

NEW SOUTH WALES PARLIAMENT

SELECT COMMITTEE INQUIRY INTO THE CONDUCT AND PROGRESS OF THE OMBUDSMAN'S INQUIRY "OPERATION PROSPECT"

Mr Scott Weber, President Police Association of New South Wales

Questions taken on Notice on 29 January 2015 – Response

Question from Mr David Shoebridge in relation to the English System of Police Oversight?

1. Clearly the evidence given before the Legislative Council Select Committee on the conduct and progress of the Ombudsman's inquiry "Operation Prospect" ("the Select Committee") demonstrates that the police oversight system in NSW must be reformed.
2. With this in mind, the Police Association of New South Wales ("the Association") acknowledges that there is potential to learn lessons from overseas jurisdictions regarding how they manage police oversight.
3. However, the Association **does not support** the adoption of the English system of police oversight for a number of reasons which are detailed below.

The UK model is not a solution

The System in England is Broken

4. The oversight system in England is far from an ideal model of oversight. In fact, the English system of police oversight has been subject to scathing criticism by its own Parliament and Government as recently as in 2013.

5. In 2013, the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee (“the Committee”) published a report into the Independent Police Complaints Commission (“the IPCC”) which was deeply critical of the effectiveness of the police complaints and oversight system¹. For example, in the ‘Conclusions and Recommendations’ section of the Report, the Committee stated that:

*“The public do not fully trust the IPCC and without faith in the Commission, the damaged public opinion of the police cannot be restored. Unfortunately, too often the work of the Commission seems to exacerbate public mistrust, rather than mend it”.*²

6. In April 2013, the Government published a response to the Committee’s report which expressed almost complete agreement with the Committee’s criticisms³. Since then, the Government has actively sought to rectify the deficiencies.
7. Consequently, adopting the UK model of police oversight in NSW is not a simple and effective solution. In fact, it would mean that NSW would be replacing its broken oversight system with a system in an equal or greater state of disarray.

Policing in the UK and NSW are inherently different

8. There are inherent difficulties in attempting to airlift an overseas oversight system into the NSW context when this overseas model comes from an overseas jurisdiction with a very different:
- a) method of organising and deploying police resources; and
 - b) complaints system.
9. Furthermore, the public perception of policing in the UK and the way complaints are handled is entirely different to the NSW experience. For example, the IPCC reported in *Public Confidence in the Police Complaints System* that:
- a) only 66% of people were happy with the way police treated them during contact with police⁴;
 - b) 35% said they were not confident that police would deal with complaints fairly⁵; and

¹ House of Commons, Home Affairs Committee, Independent Police Complaints Commission, Eleventh Report of Session 2012–13, Published on 1 February 2013 by authority of the House of Commons London: The Stationery Office Limited.

² Ibid, point 3, page 35.

³ The Government Response to the Eleventh Report from the Home Affairs Committee, Session 2012-13, April 2013.

⁴ Harvey, Shepherd, and Magil, Ipsos MORI – Social Research Institute, commissioned by the Independent Police Complaints Commission, *Public Confidence in the Police Complaints System*, July 2014, table 3.3, page 12.

- c) 21% identified police harassment or other consequences as a deterrent to making a complaint (rising to 32% for those from ethnic minorities)⁶.
10. In comparison, the *National Survey of Community Satisfaction in Policing 2013-14*, found that:
- a) 80-89% of persons surveyed were satisfied with their most recent contact with a New South Wales Police Officer (compared to the 66% reported in England); and
 - b) 84-90% reported confidence in the Police⁷.
11. Furthermore, the Ombudsman's 2013-14 Annual Report reported that in NSW:
- a) 82% of police investigations into serious misconduct had no deficiencies; and
 - b) 9% had no deficiency other than timeliness.
12. While the Select Committee has heard serious allegations against senior officers of the NSWPF, these serious allegations are not reflective of the vast majority of police officers in New South Wales. Since the 1990s, the New South Wales Police Force ("the NSWPF") has undergone major change - both culturally and in managerial approach. The NSWPF is now a force with high professionalism and integrity. Year after year, the majority of police complaints are handled by the NSWPF satisfactorily.

The English System would only exacerbate problems New South Wales currently face

13. One of the other major concerns that the Association has with adopting the English system of police oversight is that key aspects of the UK model do not differ substantially to the current system of police oversight in NSW.
14. For example, one option granted to the IPCC when handling a complaint is for the investigation to be carried out by the relevant police force but under the direction of the Commission⁸. In NSW, that sort of power is reserved for the specific cases that fall within the ambit of the Coroner. Outside of a coronial inquiry, the Ombudsman's powers under sections 146 and 145 of the *Police Act 1990* ("the Act") do closely resemble the IPCC directing power. For example:
- a) section 146 of the Act allows the Ombudsman to:

⁵ Ibid, para 5.2, page 22.

⁶ Ibid, table 4.2, page 17.

⁷ NSW Police Force, Annual Report 2013-14, page 19.

⁸ *Police Reform Act 2002*, Schedule 3, Part 3, section 15(4)(c).

“be present as an observer during interviews conducted by police officers for the purposes of an investigation, and may confer with those police officers about the conduct and progress of the investigation.”⁹

b) section s145(1)(b) requires police conducting the investigation to:

“have regard to any matters specified by the Commissioner or Ombudsman as needing to be examined or taken into consideration”

15. While the Association accepts that these powers are not as extensive as the directing power of the IPCC, the power for oversight to *direct* is already creating conflict in the investigation and oversight process.

16. For example, the power to direct is creating a conflict in the *investigative process* as when conducting an investigation, the police investigators must perform a difficult balancing act:

a) their obligation to conduct the investigation, follow lines of inquiry and choose a best course of action; and

b) try and balance the requests of the Ombudsman.

In matters involving death, this is exacerbated further, as the investigators must balance:

a) the direction of the Coroner;

b) their obligation to conduct the investigation, follow lines of inquiry and choose a best course of action; and

c) try and balance the requests of the Ombudsman.

17. Furthermore, an oversight agency's power to direct is also creating a conflict in the *oversight process*. For instance, despite the fact that the Ombudsman under s145(1)(b) may become involved in conducting a police investigation, the Ombudsman can then turn around and publish a report criticising that investigation. The lines between investigator and monitor have become blurred which has resulted in diminishing the outcomes and recommendations of various inquiries.

18. Consequently, the Association questions the utility in introducing a new oversight system in NSW that will simply replicate the difficulties that police currently face.

19. An oversight agency should be able to monitor, review or audit a police investigation, but not *influence* it. If the agency is able to influence the investigation, what course of action can then be taken if that very same investigation becomes subject to another investigation or review? How can an oversight agency perform its role in relation to an investigation that it exerted influence over? Again, these are not hypothetical warnings, we are witnessing the outcomes of these risks play out in evidence given to the Select Committee. As a result, this

⁹ Police Act 1990, s146(2).

matter has been passed from agency to agency who have all completed inquiries yet have failed to yield satisfactory conclusions to date. We are now left in a situation where there is no oversight agency left in NSW, apart from the Independent Commission Against Corruption ("the ICAC"), in which the public can have confidence in their findings on this matter. What has been learnt is that oversight agencies and the Police Force must be kept separate.

20. The ideal oversight process should not involve the ability for the oversight agency to be involved in a police investigation as investigators or quasi investigators. Having made the decision that it is appropriate for the NSWPF to investigate, an oversight agency should not interfere in that police investigation.

How should the NSW system be reformed?

21. The Association maintains the position from its original submission: the fundamental reform needed for the police oversight system in New South Wales is for the creation of a single oversight agency. The current functions of the Police Integrity Commission ("the PIC") and the Ombudsman needs to be transferred to the ICAC. The ICAC should be given all the legislative powers and resources necessary to perform this function.
22. Consequently, we submit that ICAC should be provided with all the current powers of the police oversight agencies, including:
 - the ability to receive police complaints;
 - mandatory notification and referral processes;
 - the ability to review or audit police handling of complaints;
 - the power to monitor investigations (amended to rectify the problems identified above);
 - the powers and resources to conduct independent investigations; and
 - the ability to hold inquiries.
23. One well-resourced agency will:
 - a. reduce the risk that the agency will inappropriately utilise the media to raise the profile of their particular organisation in an effort to be seen as relevant and effective;
 - b. ensure that the single agency is free to target high level corruption as opposed to matters that merely have the potential for high media interest;
 - c. prevent oversight agencies from competing for resources and kudos in the oversight space;

- d. reduce the perceived need for quick results and prosecutions that actually do not lead to conviction due to the poor investigative practices employed and lack of evidence obtained.
 - e. allow for better targeting and a focus on significant corruption issues; and
 - f. provide agencies with a greater ability to conduct protracted investigations – something that is often required in complex corruption matters.
24. Addressing the obvious difficulties within the oversight space will:
- a. deliver better investigative results;
 - b. provide for an environment in which sensible discussions with stakeholders is possible; and
 - c. create an environment where good public policy can be developed.
25. In terms of transferring the police oversight function currently performed by the Ombudsman, the Association considers that the Police portfolio and staff within the Ombudsman’s office could be assumed within the ICAC. However, in relation to the PIC, we would be greatly concerned about a movement of personnel from the PIC into the ICAC due to the inherent bias in the practices of these investigators and for the other reasons we have outlined within our previous submissions.
26. The objective of the reform that we have outlined is to ensure that a single agency performs all the necessary functions which will avoid the problems created by duplication.

Lack of Oversight of Oversight

27. During the parliamentary inquiry, the Select Committee has further exposed the lack of accountability measures for the current oversight agencies in NSW. As was shown by the evidence of Mr David Levine, Inspector of the PIC, the Inspector does not have the resources necessary to form his important role. For example, a review of page 49 of the transcript from 30 January 2015 reveals that Mr Levine gave the following evidence:

Mr DAVID SHOEBRIDGE: Did you know at the time that you wrote your critical report on Strike Force Emblems that there were some 30 boxes of material relating to Strike Force Emblems and, indeed, there were about 20,000 pages of material contained on computer disks?

Mr LEVINE: I was inundated at some point with material of that volume.

Mr DAVID SHOEBRIDGE: Did you read it?

Mr LEVINE: No.

Furthermore, a review of page 55 of the transcript from 30 January 2015 shows Mr Levine further detail the lack of resources that he has to perform his function as the Inspector of the PIC:

Mr LEVINE: To satisfy both of you, at some point I asked—it is the chronology that I do not have clear in my mind. At some point I asked for material relating to Emblems from the Commissioner of Police, the NSW Crime Commission, Mr Tree, who I think was the chief executive officer of the police department, and I think the Police Integrity Commission itself. I received a telephone call from the Commissioner of Police indicating that he would be pleased to assist and the next thing that happened I was inundated with white boxes of white paper. My present recollection of the chronology is that the decision to refer it to the Ombudsman was made in light of that entity having the resources instead of what had been delivered to me. Notwithstanding that that decision had been made, I still decided that it was appropriate for me to report to the Minister. That is the best I can do.

28. Given the fact that the primary function of the Inspector of the PIC is to review investigations carried out by PIC and ICAC, the Association is greatly concerned with the lack of resources that have been given to the Inspector to perform his function. Also concerning is that fact that Mr Levine apparently never raised the issue of a lack of resources nor did he ask for assistance. The Inspector of the PIC and ICAC is meant to be able to hold the PIC and ICAC accountable and to expose any serious deficiencies in the investigative practices and biases. But the Inspector clearly does not have the resources to perform this important function.
29. It is also disturbing that Mr Levine does not appear to appreciate the obvious conflict which should have been raised by him with Government when he was asked to undertake a review relating to the release of the Emblems Report. After all, the Emblems Report related to allegations of the use of illegal or unlawful warrants by Mascot/Florida investigators which Mr Levine himself may have authorised.
30. It should be noted that the:
 - a) attitude that Mr Levine showed to the performance of the role of Inspector during the parliamentary inquiry; and
 - b) obvious inadequate resources provide to this role,has left the government exposed to the allegation that the role of the Inspector is merely a token gesture designed to give the perception of oversight and an ability to hold agencies to account where none really exists. This must be of serious concern to the Committee.
31. In addition to the issue of being inadequately resourced, we consider that the Inspector of the PIC and ICAC also lacks sufficient powers to hold these agencies accountable. As highlighted in our original submission dated 12 January 2015, the previous Inspector of the PIC found serious deficiencies in PIC investigations on numerous occasions and made

adverse findings, however made no steps to rectify those deficiencies. It is alarming that the PIC:

- a. has been subject to damning findings from the Inspector;
- b. has failed to undergo any process aimed at rectification of past deficiencies or improvements for future investigations; and
- c. continues to repeat the behaviours which the Inspector has criticised.

32. An oversight agency must have a well-resourced body overseeing their conduct. Currently in NSW, the Ombudsman's office does not even have an Inspector and the Inspector afforded to the PIC and the ICAC, for the reasons outlined above, is grossly inadequate.

33. Evidence before the Select Committee has raised concerns about the accountability of the Ombudsman, specifically in relation to the Committee on the Ombudsman, the PIC and the NSWCC's ability to ensure the accountability of the Ombudsman in relation to specific investigations it is conducting. Again this should not be interpreted as necessarily a criticism of the Ombudsman or his office but it must be acknowledged that complaints and concerns regardless of where they come from and whom they are about should be able to be investigated and resolved in a meaningful way. The Ombudsman who intimately understands a risk management framework must accept this proposition. Public confidence in our system of government and public agencies demand this.

34. Provisions such as the recently introduced 35A of the *Ombudsman Act 1974* coupled with the constraints upon Parliamentary Committees¹⁰ or Courts to require these bodies to account for their actions or omissions basically place these agencies beyond review and unaccountable, should they choose to hide behind the veil of their various mirrored legislative provisions.

35. Oversight accountability measures must be reviewed and significantly strengthened to ensure the integrity agencies of NSW operate to the same standards they demand of those they oversight.

Question from Hon. Adam Searle in relation to an open judicial enquiry.

The manner in which the issues and concerns have been left to languish unresolved over the years by successive Governments and the NSWPF has now created a perception that there is no appetite to get to the truth of the matter and is fuelling conspiracy theories.

Inability or unwillingness to deal with the issues

¹⁰ Section 31A of the Ombudsman Act 1974

36. Whilst not seeking to diminish the very serious nature of the complaints made relating to the substantive issues, the inability or unwillingness to deal with those issues has of itself become a more serious problem in our view for the overall health of the NSWPF, the Government and oversight in NSW. There is a loss of trust in individuals and the systems and agencies which the community needs to trust to feel safe.
37. There is a sense of unfairness and injustice in that it is becoming more and more widely felt that:
- a) some individuals and agencies are protected and above the law;
 - b) noble cause corruption will be tolerated;
 - c) personal relationships and growing of personal or organisational power matter more than truth;
 - d) if it is too politically difficult that serious failures in individuals or systems and structures will be ignored.

The inability or unwillingness deal with the issue must be addressed.

38. The evidence given to the Parliamentary Inquiry has clearly shown that concerns were raised from multiple fronts about possible breaches of the law and inappropriate behaviour many years ago. We have now heard that:
- a) the NSW Crime Commissioner himself was concerned;
 - b) the actual Mascot Florida investigators themselves were trying to raise concerns as best they could from within the strict confines of the NSWCC secrecy provisions imposed on them; and
 - c) the complainants obviously raised multiple concerns over many years that have essentially been ignored or have gone unaddressed in any meaningful way.

The conduct of the Commissioner of Police

39. Commissioner Scipione essentially states in his evidence that:
- a) he thought these issues had been resolved;
 - b) he had a conflict dealing with anything to do with the matter due to the fact that he was the Commander of SCIA at a point in time;
 - c) he relied upon assertions of Commissioner Moroney in 2005 that no further action could be taken;
 - d) he never read the Emblems report until 2012 even though it appears the Emblems Report had been through his office at an earlier point in time. This explanation

seems at odds with the obvious agitation on this issue which has continued unabated both internally and publicly.

40. The assertion by the Commissioner that these matters had been “fully investigated” does not accord with the facts – this matter has never been fully investigated and questions remain to this day. His continued attempts to distance himself from inaction, inquiry and responsibility on this matter undermines his credibility and reinforces perception of favouritism. It is clear that the Commissioner has chosen to ignore the serious concerns raised by Deputy Commissioner Kaldas and others.
41. At best Commissioner Scipione did not make a proper inquiry or inform himself or take any positive steps to resolve the conflict between Deputy Commissioner Burn and Deputy Commissioner Kaldas until the situation became of such public concern that it could not be ignored. Sadly it was Government who was forced to act and seek legislative amendments and allow the Ombudsman to conduct an inquiry into the substantive issues not the Commissioner of Police or his predecessor.
42. It is also very concerning that we have still have not heard of any action that the Commissioner has taken to resolve the issues and deal with the obvious dysfunction within his Senior Management Team or to get to the truth of the allegations. He has allowed his Senior Executive Team to deteriorate into a toxic state which we are now seeing being played out very publicly. He has failed as a leader and not managed the situation and has permitted this issue to deteriorate to a point where the reputation of individuals and the NSWPF, Oversight and the Government are being adversely impacted.

An investigation into the issues was possible by the NSWCC or the NSWPF

43. The NSWPF has a positive and collaborative ongoing working relationship with the NSWCC. In the 15 or so years which have passed since these matters initially arose, there would have been other instances where complaints have been raised in relation to NSWPF officers working with the NSWCC on joint references. Are we to be expected to believe that those complaints also have been unable to be inquired into and left unaddressed? Of course that would not be the case. It would never be tolerated. So, what made this matter so unusual? Why this matter which, on its face, seems simple to resolve by access to information held within the NSWCC holdings has been so impossible to resolve, which has been buried and essentially ignored, is of serious concern.
44. The NSWCC could have conducted an investigation of its own or allowed NSWPF to do in accordance with s80(4) of the *Crime Commission Act 2012*. Had such an investigation

occurred, the investigators would also have been subject to the secrecy provisions the *Crime Commission Act 2012*, therefore, limiting or eliminating broader risks of breaches of the secrecy provisions. However, for some unexplained reason, an investigation by the NSWPF or the NSWCC has never occurred.

45. A consideration of why a proper inquiry was not conducted at the time and the subsequent mismanagement of this issue should be the focus of any future independent inquiry. Recommendations should also be made to ensure that this situation never occurs again. Mistakes must be learnt from.

Unwillingness to accept responsibility

46. This Parliamentary Inquiry runs the risk of being remembered for all the wrong reasons with a succession of high ranking serving and retired police attempting to shift blame and responsibility because they did not know, or did not inquire, or state it was not their responsibility. The Select Committee has repeatedly heard current and former high ranking officers assert that they could do no more or just did not recall specific details – their memories failing with the passage of time when the hard questions are asked.
47. We are of the view that the abrogation of responsibility that has been publically evidenced before this parliamentary inquiry is at best troubling and at worst, staggering.

The division within the police hierarchy

48. We should not allow, permit or tolerate a situation to be created where people are essentially above the law and unaccountable. We well appreciate that calling people to account will create damage to the NSWPF and possibly damage the reputation of individuals including both the current and former Commissioner of Police and this is rightly a significant concern.
49. However, the risks of not dealing with these issues are much more concerning for the health of the NSWPF moving forward. The significant dysfunction and mismanagement of these issues and the oversight space has been made very public by the witnesses before this inquiry. These issues must be addressed so that we can begin to attempt to restore faith in our oversight system and the involved agencies including NSWPF.
50. The division and lack of trust within the hierarchy is, in our view, damaging the ability of the NSWPF to move forward. It is widely known within NSWPF that deep divisions run through NSWPF hierarchy and there are distinct and powerful camps which sit in behind those divisions and a lack of trust between those camps. The only way to address this situation is

for there to be a completely transparent review and for that to be conducted by a completely independent entity.

51. Former Commissioner Moroney informed the committee of the unsuccessful attempts that he made to try and resolve the issues including the obtaining of legal advice and relies upon that as sufficient to justify a failure to resolve the issues. Why successive Commissioners, powerful influential men in their own right who have a positive collaborative ongoing positive relationship with the NSWCC, could not secure access to important information in this matter is deeply concerning.

The conduct of the Ombudsman

52. The reputation of the Ombudsman has also now had to suffer through the course of this Parliamentary Inquiry.

53. However, we are concerned about:

- a) the evidence given by some witnesses as to the focus of the Ombudsman's inquiry; and
- b) the manner in which our officers' welfare has been managed. As stated in our previous submissions, we believe that the welfare issues that we have raised can easily be addressed and we have made recommendations that we hope the Parliamentary Committee will endorse to resolve those issues.
- c) the time it is taken the Ombudsman to undertake his inquiry. The Government is also now in the difficult position whereby evidence which has been given before the parliamentary inquiry which may impact on the acceptance of the findings and recommendations of any future Ombudsman's report.

54. We note that the Ombudsman has indicated that:

- a) he has undertaken a thorough investigation. However, there is a perception, rightly or wrongly, that this is not the case. Complainants have raised concerns about a lack of questioning in relation to original complaints and the substance of those complaints.
- b) agencies have been cooperatively providing documentary evidence. However, Mr Giorgiutti has indicated that he is concerned that the Ombudsman has not been provided with all of the relevant documents which is concerning given the seriousness of the subject matter and the time that it has already taken for the Ombudsman to look into the complaints; and
- c) he has undertaken an objective investigation. However, there are serious concerns about the Ombudsman's capacity to deliver a report that will be accepted as truly

independent. The neutrality of the Ombudsman's office must be questioned when considering:

- i. the perceived closeness of the relationship between the current Commissioner of Police and the Ombudsman's office; exacerbated by the Commissioner's very public statement of support for Ombudsman and his office in respect to the Prospect Inquiry and his perceived favouritism towards Deputy Commissioner Burn.
- ii. statements made by the Ombudsman in correspondence to this committee - in particular statements made under the heading "Misconceptions in the Public Domain"¹¹. These statements are being interpreted as an attempt by the Ombudsman to dismiss the allegations of complainants prior to the completion of his inquiry;
- iii. the discontent with the outcome of the inquiry conducted by the Ombudsman into the management of asbestos in Police Buildings¹². What must be highlighted is that within his special report, the Ombudsman stated that *"While I am satisfied there has been no cover up, the NSWPF clearly failed to ensure hazardous materials were properly managed in its properties. Deficiencies in the management of the NSWPF property portfolio resulted in NSWPF failing to put into place appropriate systems to comply with its obligations concerning hazardous material including asbestos and lead paint."*¹³
- iv. the inability to resolve issues between stakeholders relating to the management and oversight of critical incidents¹⁴; and
- v. the stalling of the review in to the *Police Act 1990* again rumoured to be caused by an inability of stakeholders to come to an agreement on significant issues again relating to the management of complaints and the role of the Ombudsman.

55. What must be noted is that the manner in which the Ombudsman's report will be received will be impacted by:

- a) perceptions around the growing of power and broadening of functions;
- b) personal and professional relationships;
- c) political and organisational agendas; and

¹¹ Ombudsman letter to the Chair dated 28.1.15 points 48 – 56.

¹² Safe as houses? Management of asbestos in Police buildings. A special report to Parliament under s31 of the Ombudsman Act 1974, July 2012.

¹³ Safe as houses? Management of asbestos in Police buildings. A special report to Parliament under s31 of the Ombudsman Act 1974, July 2012, p1.

¹⁴ (Oversight of Police Critical Incidents Report to the Hon Barry O'Farrell premier of New South Wales Hon Robert McClelland 29 November 2013

d) self-interest.

These perceptions may be grossly unfair on the Ombudsman's office and false but unfortunately the perception remains.

Where to from here?

56. The only true way of getting to the truth in this matter is for a truly independent public inquiry to be conducted by an entity that does not have a current or recent role in police oversight in NSW. We consider that the ICAC could perform this duty since they have had no:

- a) role in police oversight for many years. Therefore, personal and professional relationships between agencies are limited and sufficiently distanced to address any concern of bias or influence; and
- b) involvement in this matter either from the perspective of involvement in any of the investigations nor from an oversight or monitoring roll.

The state of the Senior Executive Team

57. The Commissioner, Police Minister and Premier have all publicly stated since the commencement of the hearings that the NSWPF is functioning to the high level the public should expect of it and continues to deliver the best crime results in decades.

58. What is true is that the NSWPF continues to operate under effective operational leadership within Regions and Commands delivering phenomenal results in all key crime categories and major crime, as this is what the majority of ethical, hardworking police strive to achieve. This is remarkable because it is despite the fact that the strategic arm of the NSWPF – its Senior Executive – is quite obviously and very publicly dysfunctional.

59. The hardworking police that make up the rank and file of the NSWPF should be commended for the results that they continue to deliver to their Senior Executive and government and the community. It has always been the Constables, Senior Constables and Sergeants that do the bulk of the work that deliver the results. Whilst we are all asleep these police protect the community of NSW.

60. The Commissioner is the leader of the Senior Executive – they are his team. Surely he must take some responsibility for the state of the relationship between Deputy Commissioner Kaldas and Deputy Commissioner Burn. To deny the hostility between them as he has done publicly has to surely affect his credibility. The divide that exists between these two Senior

Executive members is widely known and can no longer be denied. Something must be done to deal with this ongoing dysfunctionality.

SCOTT WEBER

President

Police Association of NSW

12 February 2015