

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE

COMMITTEE ON THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN  
AND THE POLICE INTEGRITY COMMISSION

TEN YEAR REVIEW OF THE POLICE  
OVERSIGHT SYSTEM IN NEW SOUTH WALES

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At Sydney on Wednesday, 20 September 2006

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The Committee met at 6.30 p.m.

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PRESENT

Mr P. G. Lynch (Chair)

The Legislative Assembly

The Legislative Council

Mr S. Chaytor

The Hon. J. Burnswoods

Mr G. Corrigan

The Hon. D. Clarke

Mr M. Kerr

The Hon. L. Rhiannon

**CHAIR:** This is a meeting of the Committee on the Office of the Ombudsman and the Police Integrity Commission. This part of the meeting is part of our inquiry into the New South Wales police counter-terrorism and other powers, and into our inquiry into the ten year review for the system of police complaints. We have with us to give evidence today Mr Phillip Bradley.

Before I swear Mr Bradley and take his evidence I might deal with a matter that we should deal with. The Committee has recently considered a request from Mr Bradley that there should be no photography or reproduction of his image taken during his appearance before the Committee. This follows a similar request made by Mr Bradley prior to his appearance to give evidence before the Committee on 2 November 2005, on which occasion the Committee resolved that it would restrict photography of Mr Bradley.

In accordance with the New South Wales Legislative Assembly's Media Policy, the Committee has again considered Mr Bradley's objection to photography by balancing the need for proper protection of a witness and the public interest in the proceedings. It has treated Mr Bradley's requests on a case-by-case basis and has not issued any "blanket" non-publication order restricting photography. The Committee has acknowledged the views of the Press Gallery on this issue and it usually limits media coverage of its proceedings only in exceptional circumstances, for example, in the case of a witness who gave evidence in camera.

The Committee has concluded that it does not support the making of an order to limit publication of any image taken of Mr Bradley during his appearance at the public hearing. Nor does the Committee find Mr Bradley's request to limit media coverage to be justified, particularly as his photograph was published in the Sydney Morning Herald on 1 April 2006.

The Committee expects to be able to take evidence from the head of an agency in public session without limiting media coverage unless there are exceptional reasons to do so. The Committee is not aware of any similar orders for non-publication of photographs having been made in respect of the heads of other law enforcement agencies, including the head of national agencies such as Australian Security Intelligence Organisation and Australian Secret Intelligence Service, when they appear before parliamentary committees at public hearings.

Nevertheless, the Committee does not consider that it is in a position to determine the weight that should be afforded Mr Bradley's reasons for requesting the restriction on reproducing his image. Mr Bradley has sought confidentiality for these reasons, which will not be disclosed.

Consequently, having carefully weighed up the situation, the Committee will proceed to take Mr Bradley's evidence in public on the same basis as previously applied in November 2005. That is, there will be no publication of Mr Bradley's image taken during his appearance before the Committee on this occasion. This decision has been made because, on balance, the Committee considers there is a public interest in taking Mr Bradley's evidence on the inquiries at a public hearing without a photograph rather than not having his evidence in the public arena. The issues raised by the Committee's inquiries warrant examination of the witness on the public record. However, the Committee has not taken this decision lightly and will draw the circumstances of the matter to Parliament's attention. It is an issue that is likely to recur in respect to Mr Bradley's future appearances before committees, but we are not prepared to put in place an ongoing restriction on photography.

**PHILLIP ALEXANDER BRADLEY**, Commissioner, New South Wales Crime Commission, 453 Kent Street, Sydney, affirmed and examined:

**CHAIR:** Do you wish to make any opening statement?

**Mr BRADLEY:** No.

**CHAIR:** Has the Crime Commission had occasion to use any of the powers contained within the body of legislation governing anti-terror laws?

**Mr BRADLEY:** No, not specifically, the Crime Commission has not.

**CHAIR:** Are there any operational problems with that legislation that you would apprehend?

**Mr BRADLEY:** There is a sort of general apprehension, I suppose, about the detention powers. The powers in relation to covert search warrants, we have had some experience of that. We went through all of that at the time the legislation was drafted and I do not anticipate problems in relation to that. Experience, I suppose, will tell us more about that.

**CHAIR:** You mention preventative detention. Do you think that the safeguards that are built into that legislation are adequate?

**Mr BRADLEY:** I think so, without having experienced it in practice. I know that there is a debate about it and it is a very, very serious thing to detain someone to prevent them from doing something. I suppose in the fullness of time we will be in a better position to judge how good the safeguards are.

**CHAIR:** One of the things that has come to the Committee's attention is the activities of the Public Interest Monitor in Queensland and how they have a role in preventative detention. Have you come across the work they do? Do you have a view about whether they might be a useful addition to the New South Wales scheme?

**Mr BRADLEY:** No. I think the answer to that is no, I have not had experience of it. I am generally aware of the public interest representatives in Queensland and I have had some experience of public interest lay people being on things like the Queensland Crime and Misconduct Commission, from when I was an ex officio member of their board. I suppose, as a general comment, there is a difficulty with people who have not had exposure to the practice of law enforcement, and especially the practice of law enforcement at the most serious end, making judgments about what is in the public interest and balancing the interest of the individual, which in those circumstances of course are very important. But I suppose it depends upon who the people are that are discharging the public interest monitoring function.

**CHAIR:** Thank you. Some other witnesses that have given evidence to the inquiry, in particular the inspector of the Police Integrity Commission, have raised the issue of oversight for the Crime Commission as a particular priority. What form of oversight would you see as beneficial to your organisation?

**Mr BRADLEY:** You mean current oversight or what would be beneficial in the future?

**CHAIR:** Well, maybe both. I guess both are probably interesting to us.

**Mr BRADLEY:** There are a number of things that need to be said. Firstly, I did not speak to Justice Wood about it and as far as I know he has not spoken to anyone from my organisation about it. That is one of the difficulties. There has been in the past a number of assertions about the need for a parliamentary committee and those assertions are often

premised on some fallacious assertion about the Crime Commission. That assertion then leads to a conclusion that the Crime Commission is off the chain, to use a vernacular expression. Then it is asserted that the Crime Commission needs a parliamentary committee. I think I referred to that last time I was here, when we covered a wide range of topics, and I do not really want to go over that for the reasons I stated then.

The next thing I think that needs to be said, and I suppose it is not strictly within what we are here to discuss tonight, is that the Crime Commission needs to be distinguished from those agencies that do have oversight committees, such as the Independent Commission Against Corruption and Police Integrity Commission, because we are often categorised as a watchdog, which we are not. We are an investigation agency. We do organised crime investigations and we confiscate the proceeds of crime. We are often not portrayed as that because it does not really suit the argument, it seems to me, and there is a lot of analogising going on. So I think it is very important, firstly, to make that distinction.

I think it is also important to understand that I am not coming at this from a position of opposing a parliamentary oversight committee, and I think I explained that to you on the last occasion. What I would like to see is some sensible debate about those sorts of things. In my view there has not been a sensible debate. There has been some assertions and some false logic, and we end up with people saying the Crime Commission needs an oversight committee.

In terms of existing oversight, of course everything we do - well, nearly everything we do hopefully goes to court. So that if we investigate something, someone gets charged, then that person finds himself or herself as an accused in court proceedings. In confiscation proceedings we commence proceedings in the Supreme Court against people. There are lots of opportunities, as you know, for people to challenge what we have done along the way in the Court process, and then also applications can be made to the Supreme Court about the use of our coercive powers. So that if we use powers under our section 17 to compel the production of documents, or section 16 to compel the appearance of witnesses, or ask questions that are considered to be objectionable, we can be challenged on that in the Supreme Court, and have been many times, though not successfully in the time that I have been there. Then, of course, in the criminal assets litigation, there are lots of opportunities for interlocutory applications and various orders that can be made under that Act.

We are also subject to oversight in specific functions. The Ombudsman has an oversight function in relation to us, and specifically in relation to telecommunications interception, controlled operations, and the terrorism police powers legislation. There is also a bit of oversight by the Commonwealth Ombudsman, I think, under the Commonwealth surveillance device legislation, which we are yet to use as a corporation ourselves. Then there is the Independent Commission Against Corruption, which has general oversight in relation to corruption. There is a management committee which sits over the Crime Commission and takes its responsibilities seriously. There is the audit office. We, of course, report directly to Parliament in our annual report without the intervention of the minister. We have liability in a limited way to freedom of information legislation. I think they are all the things that I have set out before. So there are a lot of bases upon which we can be looked at and our actions can be looked at. I do not think that any of those are inappropriate.

As to a parliamentary oversight committee, I think there are strong arguments for and against. I do not agree with most of the ones that have been put forward to date because of the way they have been premised upon. I think the strongest argument is that there are so many respectable people saying it would be a good idea that it probably is. I just hope that everyone gets an opportunity to reflect on the bases for forming those ideas. It is not a good thing to have an organisation which is about protecting public interest, as we think we do every day, being the subject of criticism on the basis that it is acting beyond its power and therefore needs oversight by a parliamentary committee.

As to the benefits, I think that remains to be seen. I have spoken to the Commissioner

for the Police Integrity Commission and he thinks that there are significant benefits, especially in terms of perceptions about that organisation having proper oversight. It is distinguishable from the Crime Commission very significantly, because it is a watchdog body. I think he has had the benefit of sensible discussion before the Committee.

My own experience of committees is very limited. I have been before estimates committee obviously every year. In the main I do not get questions. Those questions which I do get do not seem to advance the situation much. I think Mr Clarke asked for an early edition of an annual report on the last occasion and a number of people have been working on that and some documents have been prepared. Parts of the annual report, not the whole annual report, but there are things that he wants to know six weeks before the usual cycle and we are doing our best to do that. There have been other bits and pieces that I have been able to clarify, and that is an advantage to some extent.

Sometimes you get a question, as I did here on a previous occasion, about the media and things like that, and it has been an opportunity for me to, firstly, correct false assertions about the Crime Commission, and then to say things that might flow from that.

**CHAIR:** Thank you. If I can turn to something else. Police now have access to a large body of powers to deal with terrorist incidents.

**Mr BRADLEY:** Yes.

**CHAIR:** One of the views that has been put to us is that the lack of uniformity of authorisation regimes to access those powers and the various reporting requirements once they have been used could lead to confusion or a greater likelihood of misuse or abuse of those powers. Is that a view you share?

**Mr BRADLEY:** No. I think that there is scope for confusion. If there is a high degree of technicality associated with reporting, or even an onerous regime, if I could put it that way, then there are more opportunities for people to make mistakes in relation to the reporting side of things. So that, for example, occasionally someone will run up to my office and say we have got this report due at the Ombudsman by five o'clock this afternoon. We forgot about it and we need it to be read, signed and hand delivered today. If that did not get done it would not be a catastrophe in the sense that no one would suffer as a consequence, but it is one of the formal requirements we need to meet. If we do not, the Ombudsman in his annual report may say the Crime Commission defaulted on three occasions by failing to deliver its reports on the exercise of this or that power on time.

So it does not look good. It looks like we are being casual or lackadaisical about our reporting obligations, and therefore an inference is available that we are probably not all that serious about the other obligations under the legislation. I do not think that is true. I just think that you tend to do the operational part of it and then the reporting bit tends to follow, and some of the reporting bits are onerous and it is possible to forget, get it wrong, or be distracted by other operational priorities.

I have been a strong advocate of simplification of the controlled operation arrangements and they have, over time, with a succession of reports, been simplified so that people can understand them better and they are a bit more logical and less onerous in terms of documentation. I do not think documentation advances it particularly, provided you have the right sort of reporting and the right sort of auditing going on, in this case by the Ombudsman.

**CHAIR:** You mention controlled operations. I think there has been some legislation amending that that allows for retrospective approval of controlled operations. I do not think it has come into effect yet. Do you see that as having any particular significance for police counter-terrorist activities? Do you think there is a particular issue about oversight that might arise in relation to retrospective controlled operations, or retrospectively approved control

operations?

**Mr BRADLEY:** I think that is just a recognition of the fact that the exigencies of operational activity present people with emergencies that cannot be made the subject of the formal process. In all of the regimes, even with surveillance devices in the Commonwealth scheme, telephone interception, there is always some sort of emergency provision. In the case of telephone interception, you can ring a judge and get an approval over the phone, and then within 24 hours you have to formalise the process. Retrospectivity obviously is a concern, but in controlled operations the environment is less controlled, if I can put it that way, so that undercover operatives can be presented with situations where it is just not possible to proceed down the pre-execution approval process. It is something that needs to be carefully monitored I think.

**CHAIR:** One of the other issues that has been raised with the Committee is the exercise of covert search warrants. Do you see that as an area that has any particular problematic aspects? Do you think there is a way of more effectively overseeing the use of covert search warrants?

**Mr BRADLEY:** I think that the oversight arrangements are appropriate. Obviously the difficulty with covert search warrants is that police and others are authorised to go into private premises of people and go through their belongings without telling them that they have done it. That is one of the things that has been fairly fundamental to search warrants for a very long time, that people need to be served with an occupier's notice and know that people have been in there and know the reason that they have been in there. There are provisions in the Search Warrants Act for deferral of occupier's notices in some cases and there has been a regime of covert searching going on for several years.

A typical example is going into a drug laboratory when it is unattended and examining the status of the process. With amphetamines laboratories, obviously they take the precursors and they cook them and turn them into speed or MDMA or Ice or something. It is a significant advantage to the police to know what stage the process is at and when people are likely to be there and things like that. There have been instances of searches being conducted in those circumstances and the occupier's notice being deferred until the people are arrested, usually. So it has a place.

In the case of terrorist matters, terrorism in the limited experience we have had over the last couple of years and from what we have read of other people's experience, conspiracies to commit very serious crimes can go on for years. There is a great advantage in the law enforcement agencies being able to monitor the conspiracy without obviously the conspirators knowing that you are doing so. The other problem with terrorist offences is that, unlike for example drug offences, it is not possible to allow the conduct to go on until an appropriate volume of evidence has been accumulated and then arrest all the players. If you act too late with a terrorist matter the consequences are so dire that they are just unthinkable. In fact, that was another significant factor in the operations that were conducted last November, because everyone was very concerned about how long it should be allowed to go on for in terms of collecting sufficient evidence to prove the conspiracy and minimising the risks that the conspiracy would be executed.

So covert search warrants obviously have a place in those very long term conspiracies, so that you can have some idea of the stage to which it has advanced; whether for example the explosives are in a dangerous state or not yet present, what is in the safe house, and a range of other things that you might want to know before the conspirators are aware of your interest in them.

**CHAIR:** I take it from your reference then to events in November last year, that the Crime Commission was operationally involved in those arrests, without going into any of the details of that?

**Mr BRADLEY:** Yes, yes.

**CHAIR:** But the Crime Commission did not use any of the anti-terrorist legislation in relation to that?

**Mr BRADLEY:** No. We used a number of other powers that we have but not the specific anti-terrorist legislation, no.

**CHAIR:** What is the relationship of the Crime Commission and the Australian Federal Police?

**Mr BRADLEY:** The relationship? The Australian Federal Police is a law enforcement agency with whom we deal with on a daily basis, because there is a lot of overlap between the work that we do. Terror is one, drugs is another. So we have a continuing need for dialogue. My staff were at the Australian Federal Police all afternoon dealing with a specific matter, dealing with specific logistical issues with counter-terrorism. I have staff working permanently in the Australian Federal Police building and they have had, from time to time, staff working permanently in mine.

**CHAIR:** It is a matter of some interest to us because of the oversight aspects of cross-jurisdictional things.

I think that is probably the only questions I have got on the counter-terrorism parts of what we are doing. I might open it up for committee members, perhaps starting on my left.

**Ms RHIANNON:** Mr Bradley, you said at one point that you looked to see there is sensible debate about those things. That is what I wrote down that you said. I gather what you meant by that - and I am not trying to verbal you, I am just trying to understand what you said - that you do not believe there has been sensible debate about the various matters that you have just dealt with.

**Mr BRADLEY:** No, only about the issue of whether or not a parliamentary committee is required. I do not think there has been sensible debate about that.

**Ms RHIANNON:** About whether a parliamentary committee is required to --

**Mr BRADLEY:** To oversight the Crime Commission.

**Ms RHIANNON:** Don't you think that partly the problem of having sensible debate, because it is such an unknown factor, that people are - like, what can we debate? That is partly the problem, that there is not much on the table there to deal with. So that restricts - I mean, wouldn't you agree that that is part of the problem?

**Mr BRADLEY:** No. If you are asking me what is on the table, there is a piece of legislation, there has been discussion here and I have been, I think, very open about the things that I do and the way that we do it within the limits of the restrictions imposed by legislation and the public interest. I have not taken points of order, you may have noted, in relation to - if it were open to me to do so - in relation to issues that do not relate to the subject of this Committee or the estimates committee, with one or two exceptions. Things that are sub judice, obviously I have taken points about that, and things that are otherwise secret I have taken points about that. I think I have been candid in private hearings of this Committee in particular. We could start with the legislation, we could start with the willingness of me to discuss it. I have discussed the Crime Commission with a number of people, including the current Leader of the Opposition in my office at length.

**Ms RHIANNON:** But that is not actually public debate, is it?

**Mr BRADLEY:** No, but if people want to find things out they could ask questions, instead of just making assertions that the Crime Commission is --

**Ms RHIANNON:** How can they ask questions when there is a rarely an interface with you, there is rarely that opportunity.

**Mr BRADLEY:** Well, I'm in the phone book.

**Ms RHIANNON:** Isn't that what we are dealing? So you are saying that you are happy for - that is, again, pretty unstructured. How real is that that it is going to happen and be beneficial?

**Mr BRADLEY:** I do not mean to sound like I am treating your question lightly, but what concerns me is that people make assertions about the Crime Commission without checking whether it is true or not. Now, if the Crime Commission is doing a good job and doing it in the public interest, as I say it is, then it is a very bad thing for the Crime Commission to be impugned by members of the Parliament and persons in the media and not to have any constructive discussion, not to have any recognition of the positive things the Crime Commission has done, including solving a lot of serious crimes and the seizure of \$150 million worth of the proceeds of crime. These things, I think, are positive things and they need to be recognised, instead of having false assertions. That is one side of the discussion.

**Ms RHIANNON:** Can I just come in there. I imagine you are not saying - certainly I am getting the impression that is what you are saying, but that is why I want to check - that just because the Crime Commission does good work, that does not mean that, therefore, we do not talk about or we do not analyse where there could be problems, where there could have been mistakes made?

**Mr BRADLEY:** I would welcome that. I would welcome that. But there is no analysis done. All it is is assertions without bothering to check. In fact, if I made some of the assertions that have been made about the Crime Commission in respect of the people whom I investigate, people would be saying this person needs a parliamentary committee.

**CHAIR:** Can I just interrupt there, because there is a point that you raised that I would like to touch on. You mentioned legislation. I am not clear from what you said whether that is the legislation that currently exists about the Crime Commission or whether there is some proposed new legislation that is circulating?

**Mr BRADLEY:** There is an Act. In fact, there are two acts. There is the Crime Commission Act and the Criminal Assets Recovery Act. There has been ongoing debate for several years about amending the Crime Commission Act, and one of the issues obviously is the parliamentary committee issue.

**CHAIR:** I just thought from what you said you were being more precise than that.

**Ms RHIANNON:** You spoke about the issue of assets confiscation and that you seem to be fairly satisfied. It was in the context when you were running through where you say there is already various ways that there is oversight of the work you are doing and that people can challenge if they are not satisfied with the way the assets confiscation is played out. Wouldn't you agree all they can do is do it through the Court, it is very costly, and there has been some of those well publicised cases where it did seem as though it was out of balance, how you managed it. I thought the fact that you used that as an oversight example, when the only opportunity people have is to go through the courts, when they are going to be up for more money when they have already lost their assets, it just seemed to be a bit unreasonable.

**Mr BRADLEY:** Well, there is a number of questions in there. The first, I suppose, is to

deal with the assertion that I think you said that the Crime Commission's action seem to be inappropriate or something like that. The only ones that I am aware of are groundless. I have looked at those assertions and I am satisfied that they are groundless.

The fact is that we commence the proceedings on behalf of the Crown as a plaintiff, the Crime Commission, and that the persons who have the assets which we assert are ill-gotten are liable to lose them if we succeed. Now those people, it is true, need to incur expense in representing their position. But I do not see how you can have some in-between supervision of the litigation process which would be consistent with what we understand our justice system to be.

I am particularly concerned that some litigants who think they can run their case in the newspaper and enlist other people to take a position because they are unsatisfied about the Crime Commission seeking to take their assets away from them. We do not commence these things lightly. There is a whole process that goes on in our office, which involves me personally in every single case, and I think that we won 99.99 per cent of those cases, and we commence more than a hundred pieces of litigation a year. That is two a week in the Supreme Court. That is a very high caseload. We complete more than a hundred a year, which is more than two a week. A very, very high caseload. To have such a very low rate of cases where we have not succeeded I think speaks for itself.

**Ms RHIANNON:** You spoke about overlap with the Australian Federal Police, and considering --

**Mr BRADLEY:** I - yes, go on.

**Ms RHIANNON:** I think I was correct.

**Mr BRADLEY:** No, I think that is right.

**Ms RHIANNON:** I was just curious, considering you gave details about that overlap, considering there is oversight of that body, that is what I am trying to get my head around. There is oversight of these other bodies, but the Crime Commission is off on its own. Considering you have acknowledged this similarity with some of the activities of the Australian Federal Police, couldn't you see that it would be justified to have oversight as well?

**Mr BRADLEY:** Which oversight of the Australian Federal Police are you speaking of?

**Ms RHIANNON:** I must admit I do not have the details in front of me at the moment.

**Mr BRADLEY:** There is a proposal, I do not know if it is current legislation, The Australian Criminal Law Enforcement Integrity Agency, which I think will look at the Australian Crime Commission and the Australian Federal Police in a similar way to Police Integrity Commission. I think that there are distinctions to be made, not just between us and the so-called watchdog bodies, but between us and police bodies. We do not have field office --

**Ms RHIANNON:** So you do not see yourself as a police body?

**Mr BRADLEY:** No, I do not employ any police. My biggest discipline is intelligence analysis. My next biggest discipline is forensic accounting. There are a small number of lawyers and there are four people, I think I told you on the last occasion, who are former senior police, who have a good understanding of what a brief looks like, I suppose would be the best way of putting it, because most of the other disciplines do not have that sort of background and experience, and that is what they are there for.

**Ms RHIANNON:** Okay.

**Mr BRADLEY:** I should, to be fair to you, say they are designated special constables as well.

**Ms RHIANNON:** Yes, that is why I get confused.

**Mr BRADLEY:** Yes.

**Ms RHIANNON:** Going back to the question.

**Mr BRADLEY:** So I think that there is a very strong distinction to be made between the Crime Commission and the 16,000 field police essentially that we have in New South Wales, and the I do not know how many hundreds of police the Australian Federal Police has, who are basically field operatives and exercise a different type of power altogether.

**Ms RHIANNON:** Okay, so that is another argument that you are putting why it is not necessary. I still find --

**Mr BRADLEY:** No, I am not saying it is not necessary. I am saying I would like to see some balance in the discussion, so I have tried today, as I have on many other occasions, to tease out some of the issues.

**Ms RHIANNON:** Right, okay. I will come back to it. Thank you.

**CHAIR:** Thank you. I have got a couple of questions about the police oversight system. How many police are currently attached to the Crime Commission by way of secondment, or are involved in Crime Commission operations?

**Mr BRADLEY:** I cannot give you a number. I can take it on notice. There are no secondees, as I mentioned on the last occasion. There are people who work for Commissioner Moroney and report within that discipline who are also formally members of staff of the Crime Commission. That is really so that when they are working in task force arrangements they have access to the same information that my staff have access to, and that is a practice adopted in other places, including the Australian Crime Commission. There are large numbers of detectives working in relation to references that the Crime Commission has, but I cannot give you the precise number. Some of those work in the building intermittently, some work in the building permanently, but most of them work in their own squads outside the building.

**CHAIR:** You talked about two categories of police then. The second category are largely detectives, from what you said. The first category, where were they drawn from within the police service?

**Mr BRADLEY:** Sorry if I gave you that impression. There are not two categories. Nearly all the police who work for Commissioner Moroney are detectives and they work on task forces with which we have relationships under section 27A of our Act.

**CHAIR:** What part of the police service would they have come from?

**Mr BRADLEY:** Mostly the State Crime Command. I should elaborate a bit. The ones that are working in the building permanently are from the Professional Responsibility Command, formerly known as SCU, that is the Special Crime Unit. It is an organised crime function but it comes under that command.

**CHAIR:** Misconduct allegations against those police officers are dealt with in the same way as misconduct allegations against other police officers?

**Mr BRADLEY:** Yes.

**CHAIR:** What about misconduct allegations against civilian employees of the Crime Commission, how are they dealt with?

**Mr BRADLEY:** Well they are dealt with as they are in public sector departments. If it amounts to corruption, for example, it would be reported to the Independent Commission Against Corruption. Lesser disciplinary type offences are dealt with in accordance with the disciplinary procedures that apply in the public sector. So the range of options are dismissal down to counselling.

**CHAIR:** The only other thing that I wanted to raise, and I am sure you have come across this before, but the Committee has previously dealt with the issue of the Police Integrity Commission inspector's jurisdictions, and the proposal that his jurisdiction be extended to permit the inspector to investigate the conduct of Police Integrity Commission investigative partners where the conduct of such partners is connected to allegations concerning the Police Integrity Commission. The one thing I do not think we have raised with you before, do you see any practical problems associated with extending the Police Integrity Commission inspector's jurisdiction?

**Mr BRADLEY:** Not really.

**(The witness withdrew)**

**(The Committee continued in camera)**

**(The Committee adjourned at 7.30 p.m.)**