

**Submission
No 4**

MEASURES TO PROHIBIT SLOGANS THAT INCITE HATRED

Organisation: Alliance Against Islamophobia

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ALLIANCE AGAINST ISLAMOPHOBIA (AUSTRALIA)

**SUBMISSION TO NSW PARLIAMENTARY
COMMITTEE ON LAW AND SAFETY**

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Committee on Law and Safety

Inquiry into Measures to Prohibit Slogans that Incite Hatred

Submitted by: Alliance Against Islamophobia

1. About the Alliance Against Islamophobia

The Alliance Against Islamophobia (Australia) is a research-led, evidence-based advocacy organisation working to address anti-Muslim hatred, intimidation, and discrimination, and to strengthen social cohesion and public safety in Australia.

The Alliance Against Islamophobia (Australia) is formally recognised by the Office of the Special Envoy to Combat Islamophobia as one of four key organisations combating Islamophobia in Australia.

This recognition reflects AAI's established role in research-based advocacy, policy engagement, and evidence-driven contributions to addressing anti-Muslim hatred and its impacts on community safety and social cohesion.

AAI undertakes policy advocacy, community-based research, and regulatory engagement across federal and state jurisdictions.

Our work is grounded in constitutional compatibility, proportionality, and a **conduct-focused, context-based approach** to harm prevention. AAI does not seek to regulate belief, theology, or political opinion.

Our concern is with conduct and contextual factors where expressions are foreseeably linked to intimidation, dehumanisation, or threats to community safety

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2. Executive Summary

This submission responds directly to the Committee’s Terms of Reference by examining **how slogans and expressions operate in context**, and how **media, political, and extremist framing can transform their social meaning**, producing intimidation, fear, and heightened risk of violence.

AAI does **not** argue for blanket bans on political or religious language. Rather, this submission proceeds on the basis that:

- harm does not arise solely from isolated words or symbols, but from **contextualised use, repetition, coordination, and timing**, particularly following high-profile incidents;
- **Australian and international monitoring evidence shows predictable surges of anti-Muslim and anti-Palestinian intimidation and violence following trigger events**, particularly where **certain segments of political and media discourse attribute those events to Islam, Muslim identity, or pro-Palestinian activism**, including in cases later found not to involve Muslims or Palestinians.
- **foreseeability of backlash driven by framing** is a key law-and-safety consideration; and
- the most effective and proportionate response lies in **contextual assessment, contextual training, early intervention, proportionality, and early de-escalation**, without resorting to permanent categorical bans on language.

This submission therefore addresses the role of **political and media framing** as a contextual risk factor.

Multiple studies and official reports demonstrate that when violent or criminal acts are framed by political actors and media outlets as “Islamic”, “religiously motivated”, or as connected to Muslim or pro-Palestinian activism—particularly before facts are established—there is a foreseeable and measurable increase in anti-Muslim and anti-Palestinian hatred, intimidation, and retaliatory conduct.

AAI also draws attention to the **documented role of far-right Hindu extremist mobilisation (Hindutva)** in the weaponisation of certain religious slogans—most notably “*Jai Shri Ram*” and, in some contexts, “*Har Har Mahadev*”—as instruments of intimidation, humiliation, and lynching-associated mob violence against Muslim communities and other minorities, including in diaspora settings.

Key recommendations at a glance

1. **Adopt a conduct- and context-based approach** to assessing slogans and symbols.
2. **Recognise foreseeability of harm** following trigger events — particularly where political and media framing is present — as a relevant public-order consideration.
3. **Maintain constitutional compatibility**, protecting freedom of expression while preventing coercive or intimidating conduct.
4. **Recommend the development of contextual training for frontline decision-makers** (including police, local councils, and event regulators) to support **proportionate, de-escalatory responses** to contested protest slogans used in pro-Palestinian solidarity, where meaning is highly politicised and subject to media or political framing.
5. **Improve frontline training on dehumanisation**, dangerous speech, lynching-associated intimidation, and extremist mobilisation.
6. **Issue NSW-wide operational guidance** on intimidation, cumulative harm, mob dynamics, and extremist signalling.
7. **Strengthen early-intervention mechanisms** using existing public-order and safety powers.
8. **Explicitly recognise far-right extremist misuse of religious language and protest slogans**, without criminalising religion or lawful dissent.

4. Response to the Terms of Reference

(a) Community Cohesion and Safety

This section responds to Term of Reference (a): The threat that the use of phrases like "globalise the intifada" poses to community cohesion and safety and the importance of maintaining social harmony and cohesion;

Community cohesion and safety are threatened not by slogans in isolation, but by **how slogans are framed, politicised, and amplified**, particularly following violent or high-profile events.

Australian experience demonstrates predictable surges in anti-Muslim and anti-Palestinian hostility following:

- violent incidents later misattributed to Muslims or Palestinians;
- rapid political commentary speculating on motive or ideology; and
- media narratives that frame identity, protest, or solidarity as extremist.

These surges do not arise from the events alone, but from **how events are framed in political discourse and media reporting**, especially where attribution occurs before facts are established.

Media and political framing as a risk multiplier

When political actors and media outlets frame violence as "Islamic", "religiously motivated", or linked to Muslim or pro-Palestinian activism, this framing functions as a **risk multiplier**.

It magnifies fear, legitimises collective blame, and increases the likelihood of retaliatory hostility, undermining social harmony.

Framing of "globalise the intifada"

Political and media framing that casts "globalise the intifada" as inherently violent, terrorist, or synonymous with antisemitism operates within a broader pattern in which **pro-Palestinian solidarity is equated with extremism**.

Research on media discourse shows that “intifada” and Palestinian resistance are routinely framed through a security or terrorism lens, with suspicion generalised from specific actors to **entire Muslim and Palestinian communities**.

Experimental framing research demonstrates that when protest or solidarity is labelled “terrorism” or “Islamic extremism”, publics are more likely to associate Muslims and Palestinians with violence and to support repression—even where conduct is lawful and non-violent.

Monitoring following October 2023 shows sharp increases in anti-Muslim and anti-Palestinian abuse online and offline linked to political rhetoric and media narratives invoking “intifada”, “jihad”, or domestic threat.

These dynamics erode trust, chill participation in public life, and undermine social cohesion.

For the purposes of this inquiry, the relevant issue is **not the intrinsic meaning of any slogan**, but how **political and media framing alters its social meaning and foreseeable impact**.

Clarifying the Evidentiary Position

It is important to note that **there is not yet empirical research demonstrating that the slogan itself directly causes or statistically explains increases in antisemitic violence**.

Current claims regarding harm are **largely inferential and normative**, grounded in **perceived meaning, community fear, and the broader spike in hate incidents following major geopolitical events**, rather than in slogan-specific causal data.

For law-and-safety purposes, however, **direct causal proof is not required**. Public-order risk arises where expressions, through **political and media framing**, reasonably contribute to fear, withdrawal from public space, and heightened inter-community tension, regardless of whether those effects can be isolated to a single slogan.

This evidentiary position underscores the urgent need for contextualised training for frontline decision-makers, to ensure **proportionate, informed, and de-escalatory responses** in situations where meaning, risk, and community impact are shaped by political and media framing, rather than by intrinsic properties of language.

Contrasting Pathways of Harm: Political Framing Vs Extremist Mobilisation

It is important to distinguish between **different pathways by which slogans come to pose threats to community cohesion and safety.**

In the case of slogans used in **pro-Palestinian solidarity**, such as “globalise the intifada”, the principal source of harm arises from **political and media framing.**

Where such slogans are characterised as inherently violent, terrorist, or antisemitic—particularly in advance of factual assessment—this framing generalises suspicion to Muslim and Palestinian communities and contributes to predictable surges in hostility and intimidation.

The risk to cohesion arises less from protest conduct itself than from how that conduct is narrated, amplified, and securitised in public discourse.

By contrast, slogans such as “*Jai Shri Ram*” and, in certain contexts, “*Har Har Mahadev*”, pose risks to community cohesion through a **different mechanism.**

Extensive investigative reporting, judicial findings, and academic research document their **weaponised use by far-right Hindu extremist (Hindutva) actors** as ritualised chants accompanying mob intimidation, forced chanting, and **lynching-associated violence**, particularly against Muslims and Christian minorities.

In these contexts, the slogans function as signals of **dominance and imminent harm**, understood by targeted communities as precursors to violence rather than as political expression.

Although the pathways differ—**discursive criminalisation in one case, extremist mobilisation in the other**—the outcome is similar: **foreseeable fear, withdrawal from public space, erosion of trust, and damage to social cohesion.**

For law-and-safety purposes, both scenarios demonstrate why slogans must be assessed through **context, conduct, and impact**, rather than literal wording alone.

(b) Preventing the Use of Slogans That Incite Hatred

This section responds to Term of Reference (b). How best to prevent the use of phrases that are so inherently hateful by their nature that they lead to incitement of hatred and threaten community safety;

AAI does not contend that all contested slogans are inherently hateful by nature.

Harm arises where **phrases are deployed as conduct**, including through coordination, targeting, repetition, and intimidation.

Effective prevention is best achieved through **contextual assessment, contextual training, early intervention, proportionality, and early de-escalation, without resorting to permanent categorical bans on language.**

This approach enables authorities to distinguish lawful expression from intimidatory conduct, to intervene proportionately where risk is foreseeable, and to avoid both under-enforcement and over-reach.

Contextual training on contested protest slogans

AAI recommends contextual training for police, councils, and event regulators on slogans used in pro-Palestinian solidarity (including “globalise the intifada”), where meaning is highly politicised and evidentiary certainty about causal harm is limited.

While this recommendation is framed in relation to slogans used in pro-Palestinian solidarity, the need for contextual training extends more broadly to the assessment of all slogans whose meaning is highly contested or whose threatening impact arises through **different pathways.**

This includes slogans that become intimidating primarily through **political and media framing**, as well as slogans that acquire threatening force through **extremist mobilisation and historical association** with mob violence, such as “*Jai Shri Ram*” and, in certain contexts, “*Har Har Mahadev*”.

Such training would enable frontline decision-makers to:

- assess **conduct rather than language in isolation**;
- recognise when escalation risk arises from framing rather than protest behaviour;
- intervene **early and proportionately** where intimidation is foreseeable; and
- apply **de-escalatory responses** that protect community safety while preserving lawful political and religious expression

By equipping institutions to manage ambiguity responsibly, contextual training improves safety and cohesion **without restricting lawful protest**.

(c) Safeguarding Communities from Hatred, Intimidation and Violence

This section responds to Term of Reference (c). The need to protect communities from hatred, intimidation and violence;

Intimidation frequently occurs **without explicit threats**. Communities report ritualised chanting, coordinated presence, collective blame, and fear-based withdrawal from public spaces.

In this context, it is important to recognise that **anti-Muslim and anti-Palestinian hatred is frequently intensified by political and media framing**, particularly where public discourse portrays Muslim identity, Palestinian identity, or solidarity with Palestine as inherently violent, extremist, or disloyal.

Australian and international monitoring demonstrates that periods of heightened political rhetoric and media coverage linking violence or protest to “Islamic extremism” or to pro-Palestinian activism are associated with **spikes in harassment, threats, verbal abuse, and physical intimidation directed at Muslim and Palestinian communities**.

These impacts are experienced not only by activists, but by **ordinary community members**, including women, children, and those visibly identifiable in public space.

For communities on the receiving end, the harm is not abstract. It manifests as **fear of retaliation, withdrawal from public life, reluctance to attend protests or community events, and erosion of trust in institutions** perceived to be uncritically adopting politicised narratives.

Protecting communities from hatred and intimidation therefore requires attention not only to direct threats, but to the discursive environments that normalise suspicion and hostility.

Lynching as a foreseeable reference point for intimidation

Certain slogans—most notably “*Jai Shri Ram*” in extremist contexts—have become internationally associated with **lynching as a form of mob violence**. Victims have been forced to chant these slogans during assaults culminating in fatal harm.

For law-and-safety purposes, the issue is not whether lynching occurs in Australia, but whether conduct **evokes a known pattern of lethal mob violence**, making fear reasonable and foreseeable and chilling participation in public life.

(d) Comparative Australian and International Approaches (Including the United Kingdom)

This section responds to Term of Reference (d). Australian and international examples of best practice to combat the use of such slogans, including measures and approaches taken in the United Kingdom;

United Kingdom practice continues to illustrate why conduct-focused regulation is preferred over statutory word-based bans, while also demonstrating the risks of perception-driven, phrase-focused enforcement during periods of heightened tension.

UK public-order and hate-crime law is structured around **conduct, context, and impact**, rather than lists of prohibited phrases.

Core offences criminalise *threatening, abusive or insulting words* or behaviour where, in context, they are intended or likely to stir up racial or religious hatred, or to create fear of violence.

Prosecutorial and policing guidance directs authorities to assess **targeting, timing, location, group dynamics, and the effect on victims**, while emphasising proportionality, early engagement, and protection of lawful religious and political expression.

Recent statements by some UK police forces indicating that chanting or displaying particular protest phrases (*including “globalise the intifada”*) may lead to arrest **reflect a practice-level response to heightened community fear** following major attacks, rather than the introduction of statutory phrase bans.

Even in these instances, police have explicitly relied on existing **Public Order Act powers**, asserting that, in current circumstances, the use of particular phrases may amount to **threatening conduct** because of their perceived impact on targeted communities.

This recent practice underscores—rather than undermines—the central feature of the UK model: **intervention is justified by conduct and context, not by the intrinsic existence of words themselves.**

AAI cites UK practice descriptively to demonstrate that community safety can be protected through **contextual assessment, contextual training, early intervention, proportionality, and early de-escalation as the primary regulatory tools, without resorting to permanent categorical bans on language.**

Why bans are not recommended

AAI does not recommend prohibiting specific phrases, including religious slogans.

Bans are neither necessary nor proportionate to address the risks identified in this submission.

- **Risk arises from conduct and context**, not words alone.
- **Constitutional compatibility:** Categorical bans are more vulnerable under the implied freedom of political communication and freedom of religion.
- **Operational effectiveness:** Behavioural thresholds supported by guidance and training are more effective than word lists.
- **Best-practice alignment:** Comparative jurisdictions rely on contextual assessment and early de-escalation, not bans.

Accordingly, AAI recommends **robust early intervention against intimidatory deployment** of language—**without prohibiting religious or political expression per se.**

(e) **Constitutional Considerations and Freedom of Political Communication**

This section responds to Term of Reference (e). The Australian Constitution and the implied freedom of political communication;

AAI acknowledges the **implied freedom of political communication under the Australian Constitution**. However, this freedom is **not absolute**.

Proportionate regulation that targets **intimidating conduct**, rather than viewpoint, belief, or political opinion, is **compatible with constitutional principles** where it pursues legitimate objectives such as **public safety, prevention of violence, and the protection of social cohesion**.

The approach advanced in this submission is deliberately framed to meet those constitutional requirements. It does **not** propose content-based prohibitions or categorical bans on language. Instead, it emphasises:

- **contextual assessment** of conduct, including timing, location, coordination, and impact;
- **contextualised training** to equip frontline decision-makers to interpret contested expressions responsibly;
- **early intervention and de-escalation** where escalation is foreseeable; and
- **proportionality**, ensuring that any restriction on expression is limited to what is reasonably necessary to address public-order risk.

By focusing on **how expressions are deployed and experienced**, rather than on their political or religious content, this framework respects the implied freedom of political communication while allowing the State to discharge its responsibility to protect communities from intimidation, fear, and violence.

This conduct-focused approach is therefore constitutionally safer and more defensible than content-based bans, and aligns with both Australian constitutional doctrine and comparative public-order practice.

(f) **Application of Existing Legislative and Regulatory Powers**

This section responds to Term of Reference (f). Existing offences and other measures in New South Wales and Commonwealth legislation, including offences and measures that have been announced;

New South Wales and Commonwealth law already provide a range of **offences and regulatory measures capable of addressing intimidation, harassment, and public disorder**, including where such conduct is associated with the deployment of slogans or chants.

These include, but are not limited to:

- public-order offences addressing **threatening, abusive, or intimidating conduct**;
- offences relating to **harassment, stalking, and intimidation**;
- provisions dealing with **racial and religious vilification**;
- police powers to intervene where there is a **risk to public safety or breach of the peace**; and
- Commonwealth frameworks addressing online abuse, incitement, and coordinated harmful conduct.

The central issue identified by AAI is **not the absence of legislative tools**, but rather:

- **inconsistent application** of existing powers across contexts;
- limited **operational guidance** on how to assess slogans and chants that are politically or religiously charged;
- insufficient **training for frontline decision-makers** on contextual interpretation, escalation pathways, and community impact; and
- reactive rather than **early, preventative use** of public-order and safety powers.

These challenges are particularly acute in New South Wales due to the decentralised role of councils and event regulators in managing protests and public assemblies.

Where slogans are deployed in ways that reasonably create fear, signal intimidation, or contribute to escalation, existing law already permits intervention.

Without clear guidance and contextualised training, there is a risk of both **under-enforcement** (failing to act where communities are intimidated) and **over-enforcement** (intervening on the basis of assumption or politicised framing rather than conduct).

AAI therefore submits that **strengthening guidance, training, and consistency of application** is a more effective and proportionate response than introducing new offences or prohibitions on language.

(g) Other Related Matters : Extremist Mobilisation and Weaponised Religious Language

This section responds to Term of Reference (g). Any other related matters.

Far-right Hindu extremism and weaponised religious slogans

AAI draws the Committee's attention to the **documented role of far-right Hindu extremist ideology (often described as Hindutva)** in the weaponisation of certain religious slogans, including *"Jai Shri Ram"* and, in some contexts, *"Har Har Mahadev"*.

While these phrases are **not inherently unlawful or hateful** and form part of legitimate religious expression in many contexts, extensive investigative reporting, judicial findings, and academic research demonstrate that **far-right Hindu extremist actors have deployed these slogans as tools of intimidation**, including:

- ritualised chanting in confrontational group settings;
- forced chanting directed at members of targeted communities; and
- association with **lynching-related mob violence** and other forms of vigilante intimidation, particularly against Muslims and Christian minorities.

In such contexts, the threatening impact of these slogans does not arise from theology, but from **conduct, coordination, and historical association** with violence.

When reproduced in diaspora settings—especially through rallies, convoys, or social-media-amplified mobilisation—these slogans can reasonably be understood by targeted communities as **signals of dominance or imminent harm**, contributing to fear and withdrawal from public space.

Media, extremism, and transnational amplification

AAI also notes the role of **transnational extremist narratives and digital amplification** in shaping how slogans are interpreted and experienced in Australia.

Content originating overseas is frequently circulated through social media and messaging platforms, **importing communal tensions and violent symbolism** into Australian public life.

This reinforces the importance of:

- **contextual assessment** rather than literal interpretation of words;
- awareness of **diaspora-specific risk factors**; and
- coordination between community safety, online safety, and public-order responses.

Relevance to the Committee's inquiry

These matters are directly relevant to the Committee's inquiry because they illustrate:

- why one-size-fits-all approaches to slogans are inadequate;
- how different pathways of harm (political framing, extremist mobilisation, historical violence) require differentiated responses; and
- why contextual training, early intervention, proportionality, and de-escalation are essential to protecting community cohesion and public safety without infringing lawful religious or political expression.

5. Conclusion

This submission demonstrates that risks to community cohesion and public safety associated with slogans and chants do not arise from words in isolation, but from **how language is deployed, framed, and received in context**.

The evidence before the Committee shows two principal pathways of harm.

First, political and media framing can rapidly transform contested expressions into perceived threats, contributing to predictable surges in anti-Muslim and anti-Palestinian hatred, intimidation, and withdrawal from public life.

Second, extremist mobilisation, including the weaponised use of religious slogans by far-right actors, can imbue language with threatening force through coordination, historical association with violence, and signalling of dominance or imminent harm.

Although these pathways differ, their effects converge in reasonable fear, erosion of trust, damage to social cohesion, and heightened risk to community safety.

The Committee is not required to recommend prohibitions on language to address these risks.

Rather, the most effective and constitutionally sound response lies in contextual assessment, contextual training, early intervention, proportionality, and early de-escalation, without resorting to permanent categorical bans on language.

This approach aligns with existing NSW and Commonwealth powers, is compatible with the implied freedom of political communication, reflects contemporary international practice, and reduces the risks of both over-enforcement and under-protection.

Where empirical causation between particular phrases and specific acts of violence remains uncertain, contextualised training and conduct-based decision-making become more, not less, essential.

Equipping frontline decision-makers to understand framing effects, extremist signalling, and community impact is critical to preventing escalation while preserving democratic freedoms.

Submitted respectfully,

Alliance Against Islamophobia (Australia)

Annexure A – Evidentiary Sources and Comparative Jurisdictional Analysis

(Supporting the Submission by the Alliance Against Islamophobia (Australia))

Purpose of this Annexure

This Annexure sets out the evidentiary, institutional, and comparative material relied upon by the Alliance Against Islamophobia (Australia) (AAI) in support of its submission to the NSW Parliamentary Committee on Law and Safety.

It supports AAI's central proposition that threats to community cohesion and public safety associated with slogans and chants do not arise from words in isolation, but from contextualised use, political and media framing, coordination, timing, and foreseeable impact.

The Annexure does not assert that any slogan is inherently unlawful, violent, or hateful.

1. Political and Media Framing as a Risk Multiplier

A substantial body of empirical research and institutional analysis demonstrates that political and media framing can operate as a **risk multiplier**, transforming contested expressions into perceived threats irrespective of protest conduct.

Key findings include:

- Violent incidents framed as “Islamic”, “religiously motivated”, or linked to Muslim or pro-Palestinian identity are associated with predictable spikes in anti-Muslim hostility and retaliatory conduct [1].
- Institutional analysis recognises Islamophobia as an intersectional form of racism that affects participation, safety, and social cohesion [2][3].
- Framing effects contribute to public support for repression and generalised suspicion of Muslims and Palestinians even where conduct is lawful [1][3].

This evidence is relied upon to establish **foreseeability of backlash and escalation**, not intrinsic meaning of language.

2. Post-Trigger-Event Spikes in Anti-Muslim and Anti-Palestinian Harm

Australian and international monitoring shows sharp increases in anti-Muslim and anti-Palestinian harassment following major geopolitical or violent events.

Evidence indicates that:

- Spikes in abuse correlate strongly with political rhetoric and media narratives invoking “Islamic extremism”, “jihad”, or “intifada” [1][2].
- These surges occur even where Muslim or Palestinian actors are later found not to be responsible for the triggering event [1].
- Resulting harms include fear-based withdrawal from public space and erosion of trust in institutions [3].

This supports a **law-and-safety risk assessment** even where slogan-specific causation is not established.

3. Weaponisation of Religious Slogans by Far-Right Hindu Extremist Actors

Investigative journalism and peer-reviewed research document the weaponised use of slogans such as “*Jai Shri Ram*”(and in some contexts “*Har Har Mahadev*”) by far-right Hindu extremist actors.

Documented patterns include:

- ritualised chanting accompanying mob intimidation;
- forced chanting directed at targeted individuals; and
- association with lynching-related violence against Muslim and Christian minorities [6][7][9][10].

In these contexts, slogans operate as **signals of dominance and imminent harm**, not devotional expression. When reproduced in diaspora settings, including Australia, such associations may reasonably generate fear [6][7].

4. Digital Amplification and Transnational Spill-Over

Peer-reviewed research and Australian institutional studies demonstrate that extremist and polarising narratives are transmitted transnationally through digital platforms.

Findings show that:

- mis- and disinformation disproportionately affect culturally and linguistically diverse communities, including in Western Sydney [4][11];
- online mobilisation can translate into offline intimidation and social fragmentation [9][11]; and
- diaspora communities may experience imported conflicts disconnected from Australian social context [11][12].

These dynamics heighten the importance of **contextual interpretation and early intervention** by frontline decision-makers.

5. Political and Media Framing of Pro-Palestinian Slogans (Including “Globalise the Intifada”)

Research and reporting demonstrate that Palestinian resistance language, including the term “**intifada**”, is frequently framed through a terrorism or security lens.

Evidence shows that:

- political and media actors often equate Palestinian solidarity with extremism, generalising suspicion to Palestinians and Muslims as groups [1][13][14];
- experimental framing research shows that labelling protest as “terrorism” increases public support for repression [1]; and
- human-rights reporting documents the rhetorical transformation of solidarity into extremism (“narrative delegitimation”) [13].

This evidence does **not** establish intrinsic meaning or direct causation, but demonstrates **foreseeable public-order risk** arising from framing effects.

6. Perception, Contestation, and Public-Order Risk: “Globalise the Intifada”

There is clear evidence that the slogan “**globalise the intifada**” is widely perceived by many Jewish organisations, public officials, and some regulators as antisemitic or rhetorically linked to violence against Jews [13][14][15].

At the same time, scholars, journalists, and legal-advocacy organisations explicitly contest this interpretation, emphasising that “intifada” literally denotes uprising and warning against collapsing Palestinian political expression into antisemitism [13][14].

For law-and-safety purposes, the relevance lies not in resolving the slogan’s “true meaning”, but in recognising that **deeply polarised interpretations themselves generate foreseeable risk**, including fear-based withdrawal from public space and heightened inter-community tension.

7. Post–October 2023 Antisemitism Surge: Evidence, Attribution, and Limits

There is strong evidence of a very large increase in antisemitic incidents following 7 October 2023.

Monitoring bodies report:

- record-high levels of antisemitic harassment, threats, vandalism, and assaults in the United States and United Kingdom [17][18][19];
- a substantial proportion of incidents occurring in the context of the Israel–Gaza conflict and public demonstrations [17][18].
- At the same time, there is **no empirical study demonstrating that the slogan “globalise the intifada”, in isolation, causes or statistically drives violent antisemitic attacks**. Existing monitoring does not disaggregate slogan-specific effects [17][18][19].

Authorities and some Jewish organisations nonetheless frame the slogan as contributing to a hostile environment, grounding this position in perceived meaning and heightened communal fear rather than slogan-specific causal data [15][20][17] [18].

This distinction reinforces the need for **context- and conduct-based regulation**, rather than assumptions of intrinsic harm.

8. Comparative Public-Order Practice – United Kingdom

Conduct-Based Law and Emerging Phrase-Specific Practice

United Kingdom public-order and hate-crime law is traditionally structured around conduct, context, and impact, not statutory lists of banned words.

Core offences under the Public Order Act 1986 criminalise threatening, abusive, or insulting words or behaviour where, in context, they are intended or likely to stir up racial hatred, or where threatening conduct is used with intent to stir up religious hatred [22][23][24].

Crown Prosecution Service and College of Policing guidance directs police and prosecutors to assess context, targeting, timing, group dynamics, and impact on victims, while emphasising proportionality, early engagement, de-escalation, and protection of lawful political and religious expression [24][25][26].

Recent announcements by the Metropolitan Police and Greater Manchester Police that chanting “**globalise the intifada**” may result in arrest represent a shift toward **de facto phrase-specific enforcement in practice**, justified by reference to heightened community fear following antisemitic attacks [15][16][21][27].

Even in these cases, enforcement is formally grounded in existing conduct-based powers rather than statutory word bans, underscoring both the flexibility and the risks of precautionary enforcement in periods of heightened tension.

9. Evidentiary Significance and Conclusion

Taken together, the evidence in this Annexure establishes the following conclusions for law-and-safety purposes:

- threats to community cohesion and public safety arise primarily from **context, framing, conduct, and impact**, not from words in isolation [1][2][3][13];
- different slogans and expressions may pose risk through **distinct pathways**, including political and media framing on the one hand, and extremist mobilisation and historical violence signalling on the other [6][7][9][10];
- Recent enforcement practices, including in the United Kingdom – for example, announcements that chanting “globalise the intifada” may lead to arrest – demonstrate how **perception-driven, precautionary responses** can emerge in periods of heightened tension, even within conduct-based legal frameworks.[15][16][21]; and
- the most effective and constitutionally compatible responses lie in **contextual assessment, early intervention, proportionality, and de-escalation**, rather than categorical bans on language [22]–[27].

Accordingly, the evidentiary record supports the submission’s recommendation that NSW law-and-safety responses focus on **training, guidance, and consistent application of existing powers**, while safeguarding lawful political and religious expression.

References

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