Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Warrants) Bill



About this Item
SubjectsPolice: New South Wales; Terrorism; Civil Liberties; Privacy
SpeakersKelly The Hon Tony; Clarke The Hon David; Rhiannon Ms Lee; Wong The Hon Dr Peter; Chesterfield-Evans The Hon Dr Arthur; Nile Reverend the Hon Fred; Gallacher The Hon Michael; Breen The Hon Peter; Roozendaal The Hon Eric; Deputy-President (Reverend the Hon Fred Nile); Hatzistergos The Hon John
BusinessBill, Division, Second Reading, Motion


TERRORISM LEGISLATION AMENDMENT (WARRANTS) BILL
Page: 17153


Second Reading

The Hon. TONY KELLY (Minister for Rural Affairs, Minister for Local Government, Minister for Emergency Services, Minister for Lands, and Minister Assisting the Minister for Natural Resources) [10.16 a.m.]: I move:

That this bill be now read a second time.

I seek leave to have the second reading speech incorporated in Hansard.

Leave granted.

The citizens of this State have a right to expect that their privacy will be protected from unjustified searches and interference from the State. Society recognises, however, that there are certain circumstances when an individual's right to privacy must be weighed against the greater public interest in order to allow law enforcement agencies to uphold the law and prevent criminal activity, especially when many lives are potentially at stake. The threat posed by terrorism clearly poses unique challenges. The Madrid bombings, which killed 191 people in March 2004, gave an indication of the type of threat and the devastation posed by terrorism in today's society. Closer to home, the Bali bombings in October 2002, which killed 88 Australians among the 202 lives lost, awakened our community to the possibility that Australians could be targeted by terrorist acts, both at home and abroad.

General criminal activity has never aimed to perpetrate the mass taking of life, the widespread destruction of property or the wholesale disruption of society in the way that terrorism does. The powers set out in this bill are not designed or intended to be used for general policing. Their use is restricted to the NSW Police Counter-Terrorism Co-ordination Command and to the units of the NSW Crime Commission assigned the task of investigating and responding to terrorism. Law enforcement agencies already have a wide array of investigation powers at their disposal and all these will continue to be employed in the fight against terrorism.

This scheme provides police with another tool that answers some of the more difficult characteristics of terrorist activity. For example, while both terrorists and organised crime gangs operate secretively and are aware of the possibility of official surveillance, terrorists operate over a much longer time frame. A terrorist operative may arrive in Australia years before any attack is planned, with no orders other than to lie low. So the first requirement of counter-terrorism covert investigative powers is that they be able to operate over a long period, enabling investigators to target terrorists from the early stages of their activities. Covertness is the second requirement. In the preparatory stages of a terrorist plot any hint to the terrorist operatives that their plans or activities have been discovered or that they are under surveillance could mean that they simply abort the entire terrorist operation, allowing the organisation the opportunity to regroup and change the object of its plans. What this scheme will allow police to do is enter private premises without the knowledge of the occupiers for the purpose of preventing or responding to these terrorist threats.

The Government sees this legislation not only as an investigative tool but also as a preventive tool. When preliminary or support activity is suspected there is a strong need to act to gather further information to prevent any possible future acts of terrorism that may cost innocent lives. This is recognised in the formulation of the applicable test to "prevent or respond to" the attack. Given the global nature of terrorism, information gathered here might be relevant to a planned or potential terrorist attack in another country. As such, the information derived from this scheme may be given to foreign law enforcement agencies, where its use may prevent a possible terrorist attack.

These powers are extraordinary and have been permitted only with the strictest of safeguards. These safeguards include the following. Warrants may be issued only when there is a reasonable suspicion or belief that a terrorist act has been, is being, or is likely to be committed. Annual reports must be made to the Attorney General and the Minister for Police regarding the exercise of these powers. Any complaint regarding the exercise of these powers can be investigated by the established bodies, the NSW Ombudsman, the Commissioner of Police and, where appropriate, the Police Integrity Commission. The scheme will be kept under constant legislative review through the existing review provisions in the Terrorism (Police Powers) Act, which requires yearly reports. The scheme is subject to independent monitoring by the Ombudsman for a period of two years.

Those safeguards are an attempt to balance the legitimate needs of law enforcement and the right of privacy that all citizens enjoy. The House will also note that schedule 4 to the bill creates an offence of membership of a terrorist organisation, which will be section 310J of the Crimes Act 1900. This offence is in the same terms as the Commonwealth membership offence. Of course, a terrorist organisation need not be a highly formalised structure, with a formal name or public profile. The Government considers that this is necessary as a temporary measure because membership of a terrorist organisation is not an offence known to New South Wales law, and New South Wales is constitutionally prevented from enacting a covert search warrant scheme for the investigation of Commonwealth terrorism offences.

Honourable members will note that this offence is subject to a sunset clause after a period of two years. It is hoped in that time that the development of a covert search warrant scheme can be dealt with at the national level by the Commonwealth and other Australian jurisdictions, and a Federal scheme enacted. I have written to the Federal Attorney-General to urge him to pursue this matter. My colleague the Minister for Police has also been successful in having the Australasian Police Ministers Council adopt a resolution requesting the National Counter-Terrorism Committee to draft such a proposal. This would be the more appropriate arrangement given the 2002 reference of power that New South Wales and the other States made to the Commonwealth in relation to terrorism; and if that should occur, New South Wales would consider repealing this scheme in order to avoid constitutional and operational inconsistencies.

I now turn to the details of the bill. I do not intend to canvass every section of the bill—many are self-explanatory. I will, however, highlight the more important details contained in the bill and elaborate on them where appropriate. Schedule 1 contains the principal amendments to the Terrorism (Police Powers) Act 2002. Proposed section 27A contains the definition of terrorist act. A terrorist act is defined to include the proposed State offence of membership of a terrorist organisation, created by schedule 4 to the bill. References to the commission of a terrorist act and to preventing or responding to a terrorist act are, in that case, to be construed as referring to the actual commission of the offence and as obtaining or providing evidence of the commission of that State offence.

The new offence of membership of a terrorist organisation will address situations where a person is a member of such an organisation but does nothing more in preparation for a terrorist act. The Commonwealth terrorism offences cover a broad range of terrorist activities and importantly criminalise preparatory or support activity, such as financing a terrorist organisation, or providing terrorist training, which may be conducted a long time before an actual terrorist attack, and may be committed in countries different to where any attack ultimately occurs, and by persons who do not ultimately play any other role. New South Wales has not sought to duplicate all of the existing Commonwealth terrorism offences because it considers that to do so would undermine the national approach to counter terrorism that is led by the Commonwealth, and because it considers that this bill provides sufficiently wide powers for preventing and responding to terrorist acts and potential terrorist acts.

The test that must be met when applying for a covert search warrant under section 27G is that the person giving the authorisation or making the application, as the case may be, suspects or believes on reasonable grounds that: a terrorist act has been, is being, or is likely to be, committed; that the entry to and search of premises will substantially assist in responding to or preventing the terrorist act; and that it is necessary for the entry and search of those premises to be conducted without the knowledge of any occupier of the premises. The important points to note in relation to that test are, firstly, there must be a reasonable suspicion or belief that a terrorist act has been, is being, or is likely to be committed. For instance, if police can demonstrate a reasonable suspicion that a person in Australia is financing terrorism or recruiting members for a terrorist organisation, with a view to planning or committing acts of terrorism, in Australia or elsewhere, this scheme will be available to prevent or respond to the potential terrorist threat.

Secondly, section 4A makes it clear that the ultimate act of terrorism may occur overseas. Clearly, the covert search of a terrorist financier's house in Australia may disrupt al-Qaeda funding and prevent acts of terror occurring, whether in Australia or elsewhere. Thirdly, the purpose of the covert search warrants is to 'prevent or respond to' a terrorist act. In practice, it would not necessarily be NSW Police or the NSW Crime Commission that would prevent the final act of terrorism. It may very well be that NSW Police locates information using a covert warrant which discloses preliminary or support activity occurring in London. NSW Police would obviously not act on that information itself, but would pass the information through liaison mechanisms to appropriate authorities in the United Kingdom. The warrants may be made in person and by telephone under sections 27H and 27I. Proposed section 27J sets out the matters that must be included in an application for a covert search warrant. An eligible judge may issue a covert search warrant under section 27K if satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for doing so.

When determining whether there are reasonable grounds to issue a covert search warrant, the judge is to consider, amongst other things: the reliability of the information on which the application is based; whether there is a connection between the terrorist act concerned and the kinds of things that are proposed to be searched for, seized, placed in substitution for a seized thing, copied, photographed, recorded, operated, printed or tested; the nature and gravity of the terrorist act; the extent to which the exercise of powers under the warrant would assist in the prevention of, or response to, the terrorist act; alternative means of obtaining the information sought; and the extent to which the privacy of a person who is not believed to be knowingly concerned in the commission of the terrorist act is likely to be affected if the warrant is issued.

Leaving aside the concept of membership of a terrorist organisation, terrorist act is defined to include an act or threatened act of force. As I have said, this act may come years after, and in a different country to, the various support or preparatory activities which this bill also is intended to cover. In some circumstances it may not be possible for a New South Wales agency to provide explicit detail of a final act of terrorism when applying for a warrant. The bill is drafted in a flexible way to allow a broad range of material to be placed before the court in order to support an application. Proposed section 27M provides that if an application for a covert search warrant has been refused, a further application may not be made for the same warrant unless the further application provides additional information that justifies the making of the further application. This is the same safeguard that applies to normal search warrants to discourage judge shopping.

Proposed section 27N sets out the matters that must be specified in a covert search warrant. Proposed section 27O sets out the powers conferred by a covert search warrant, which includes the power to enter, without any occupier's knowledge, the premises the subject of the warrant, and to use such force as is reasonably necessary when entering; to impersonate another person for the purposes of executing the warrant; to enter the adjoining premises, for the purpose of entering the subject premises; to search the subject premises for any kind of thing described in the warrant; to seize a thing or replace a thing; to copy, photograph or record a thing; and to test a thing of that kind and any thing that the person finds in the course of executing the warrant if authorised in the warrant to do so.

An important issue that arose during drafting of the bill was the possible collection of DNA samples during covert searches. Given the desirability of regulating the covert collection of DNA samples for law enforcement generally—for example, in executing a search warrant, or by collecting discarded samples from used cups or cigarettes—it has been decided that the possible collection of DNA under a covert search warrant will be regulated as part of a general regulatory framework to be developed by my department. I have asked my department to consult with NSW Police in developing this policy. The warrant must be executed within 30 days of issue. Proposed section 27S requires a person to whom a covert search warrant has been issued to report back to the eligible judge who issued the warrant about the execution of the warrant.

Proposed section 27U requires an occupier's notice to be provided for the approval of an eligible judge, within six months of the execution of a covert search warrant. The proposed section enables an eligible judge to postpone, for a period of up to six months at a time, the giving of the occupier's notice if satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for doing so. This is in recognition of the fact that terrorist investigations may stretch over years rather than months. However, the giving of an occupier's notice must not be postponed for a total period of more than 18 months unless the eligible judge is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances justifying the postponement. This formulation makes it clear that a fundamental tenet of the scheme is that an occupier's notice will be served at some time and that there is no provision for a court to approve a notice never being served.

The Government takes these powers seriously. Along with power comes responsibility. A new offence for a person to give false or misleading information to an eligible judge in an application for a covert search warrant is created by proposed section 27Z. The proposed offence is punishable by a maximum penalty of $11,000 or two years imprisonment, or both. Proposed section 27ZA makes it an offence, with certain exceptions and in certain circumstances, for a person to intentionally or recklessly publish an application for a covert search warrant, a report prepared under section 27S, an occupier's notice or any information derived from such an application, report or notice. The proposed offence is punishable by a maximum penalty of $5,500 or 12 months imprisonment, or both.

Schedule 1, item [2] inserts proposed section 29A into the Terrorism (Police Powers) Act 2002, which enables the Minister to enter into arrangements with the Commonwealth in relation to the transmission of things lawfully seized under the scheme. This is similar to a provision in the Search Warrants Act and recognises that vital evidence relating to Federal matters—for example, Commonwealth terrorism offences prosecutions—might be discovered during the execution of a warrant. Schedule 1, item [3] amends section 36 of the Terrorism (Police Powers) Act 2002 to enable the Attorney General to require the Commissioner of Police or the Commissioner for the New South Wales Crime Commission to provide information, for the purposes of the annual review of that Act, about the exercise of functions by members of NSW Police, members of the Crime Commission or members of staff of the Crime Commission.

The other important aspect of this bill is the amendment to the Listening Devices Act 1984 contained in schedule 3. Item [1] amends section 16 of the Listening Devices Act 1984 to extend from 21 days to 90 days the maximum period during which a warrant authorising the use of a listening device is in force in relation to specified Commonwealth terrorism offences. This again recognises the fact that terrorist investigations may extend over longer periods than normal criminal investigations. These are extraordinary powers that the Government is enacting in response to the extreme threat that a terrorist attack poses to the peace and stability of our society. They are only enacted with the strictest safeguards and strong and effective oversight. The Premier, when introducing the Terrorism (Police Powers) Act 2002, said that he looked forward to the day when the threat of terrorism had been eliminated from our State and laws and powers like this can be removed from our statute books. I echo those sentiments. I commend the bill to the House.

I commend the Bill to the House.

The Hon. DAVID CLARKE [10.16 a.m.]: For some time Australia, like all countries that believe in democratic values and principles, has faced a growing and unique threat to its peace, prosperity and security. We in Australia, like the people of other democratic nations, are facing a threat to the lives and property of our citizens. This threat comes from international terrorism, which is in many ways a unique form of crime. For example, it seeks to inflict as much destruction to life and property as is possible. It makes no distinction between civilians and military personnel. It seeks to spread fear and intimidation as widely as is possible. Terrorists act without mercy: in fact, the aura of cruelty, barbarity and mercilessness is an image that they deliberately seek to promote.

In recent years there have been numerous episodes of terrorism. We witnessed the infamous attack on the New York World Trade Center in which thousands of innocent civilians lost their lives. Of closer connection to us was the Bali bombings in which Australian tourists were specifically targeted. In Russia, terrorists targeted children in schools and in Egypt tourists became a special target. In other countries, places of worship have been the subject of acts of terrorism. The aim of terrorist fanatics is to make every person feel unsafe and vulnerable. We need to be vigilant against terrorist fanatics. We need to prevent acts of terrorism from occurring and defeat them. We need to detect and apprehend terrorists and bring them to justice.

Since the beginning of the new terrorist phenomenon, the governments of the Commonwealth and the States have co-operated to focus on measures to prevent acts of terrorism from occurring in Australia. There have been a number of cases of individuals being arrested and charged with assisting in acts of terrorism or in preparation for acts of terrorism. The Terrorism Legislation Amendments (Warrants) Bill that is presently before the House for consideration enacts measures which should greatly assist in the fight against terrorism. The bill has the support of the Opposition. The bill amends, the Terrorism (Police Powers) Act 2002 to enable the covert entry and search of premises by specially authorised police officers or personnel of the New South Wales Crime Commission pursuant to a special covert search warrant that will be granted by an eligible judge of the Supreme Court for the purpose of responding to terrorist acts or preventing terrorist acts from occurring, and to obtain evidence of a new offence of membership of a terrorist organisation.

Before a warrant can issue there must be three pre-conditions. There must be reasonable suspicion that, first, a terrorist act whether in Australia or overseas has been, is being or is likely to be committed; second, the entry to and search of premises will substantially assist in responding to or preventing the terrorist act, and, third, it is necessary for the entry and search of those premises to be conducted without the knowledge of any occupier of the premises. In assessing whether there are reasonable grounds to issue a warrant, relevant considerations would include the reliability of the information on which the warrant application is based, the connection between the terrorist act and the things that are proposed to be searched for, the nature and gravity of the terrorist act, the extent to which the exercise of power under the warrant would assist in responding to the terrorist act, the alternative means of obtaining the information sought, and the extent to which the privacy of a person believed to be not knowingly concerned with the commission of the terrorist act is affected.

If an application for a warrant has been refused, no further application based on the same facts can be made. Only if there are additional facts can a further application be considered. In order to ensure that warrants are issue only in proper circumstances, it will be an offence to give false or misleading information in seeking a warrant. There is a requirement that a person to whom a covert search warrant has been issued report back to the judge who issued the warrant. Within six months of the execution of a covert search warrant an occupier's notice is to be provided for the approval of an eligible judge; and following that approval the notice is to be given to any person suspected of being knowingly involved in the commission of the terrorist act concerned. If no such person was an occupier when the warrant was executed, the notice is to be given to an occupier of the premises concerned.

An eligible judge can postpone for up to six months at a time the giving of such notice if there are reasonable grounds for doing so, but not for a period of more than 18 months unless there are exceptional circumstances. Matters relating to covert search warrants dealt with by an eligible judge are to be dealt with in the absence of the public. Each year the Commissioner of Police and the Commissioner for the New South Wales Crime Commission are required to report to the Attorney-General and the Minister for Police on the exercise of powers relating to covert search warrants. For two years from the commencement of the new Act the Ombudsman is required to monitor the exercise of powers pertaining to covert search warrants. Where relevant, the Attorney-General can enter into arrangements with the Commonwealth Minister for the transmission to or from the Commonwealth of things seized pursuant to a covert search warrant under the Act or seized pursuant to Commonwealth law.

Clearly this bill has put into place appropriate provisions to safeguard against any abuse or improper use of powers relating to covert search warrants. By amendment to the Listening Devices Act 1984 the maximum period of 21 days for a warrant authorising a listening device to remain in force in respect to certain specified Commonwealth terrorism offences and the proposed State offence of membership of a terrorist organisation, is extended to 90 days. The Crimes Act 1900 is amended to create a State offence that is equivalent to the Commonwealth offence of membership of a terrorist organisation. If, however, a person proves that he or she took all reasonable steps to cease to be a member of the organisation as soon as practicable after the person knew that the organisation was a terrorist organisation, the provision does not apply. This new offence will cover the position when a person belongs to such an organisation, even if there is no act in preparation or no support of an act of terrorism. By way of a sunset clause, provisions relating to this new offence will be repealed on the second anniversary of its commencement.

This is an important bill in the fight against terrorism. Through provisions authorising covert search warrants, the extension of the time for warrants authorising listening devices to remain in force and provisions prescribing membership of terrorist organisations, the bill will help safeguard our community from being a haven for terrorists and terrorist organisations. The bill will help prevent acts of terrorism here, or overseas for that matter. The bill establishes a sensible balance between effective counter-terrorism measures and the protection of the rights of citizens. The bill has multiple inbuilt safeguards to properly ensure that the new powers are not abused. This is necessary legislation in the fight against terrorism and, therefore, has the support of the Opposition.

Ms LEE RHIANNON [10.24 a.m.]: The Greens condemn this bill.

The Hon. John Hatzistergos: Of course.

Ms LEE RHIANNON: I acknowledge the Minister's interjection. The Greens condemn the bill because of the misguided ideological basis upon which it is founded.

The Hon. John Hatzistergos: Did your Bulgarian mates put out a template for this sort of stuff?

Ms LEE RHIANNON: Does the Minister want to explain his Bulgarian reference? He seems to have had many trips around the world lately.

The Hon. John Hatzistergos: I have not been to Bulgaria, but I know you have.

Ms LEE RHIANNON: I have not been to Bulgaria. How ridiculous!

The Hon. John Hatzistergos: Have you been to Cuba?

Ms LEE RHIANNON: No, I have not been to Cuba. The poor old Minister is hard up to say anything original. Michael Egan lives on while ever the Minister goes on like that. This bill is built on a basis of creating a mirage of security whilst eroding people's rights to privacy and protection from interference by the State.

The Hon. John Hatzistergos: I can see his ghost in here.

Ms LEE RHIANNON: I acknowledge the further interjection that the Minister can see Michael Egan's ghost. I do not know whether Michael Egan would be happy about that; I do not think he is dead yet. The bill will not achieve its policy objectives of intercepting and prosecuting terrorism. In fact, it will do the opposite by adding to the distrust that the community has of some security agencies. However, the bill will satisfy its broader objective of promoting the New South Wales Government as the law and order State government par excellence and of at least equal stature to its Federal counterpart as being keen to erode hard-won civil liberties. There is no need for this bill. While condemning the Government, let us remember that the Opposition would prefer to erode civil liberties than protect the community from interference by police.

I remind members that in voting for this bill they will support a regime that will allow homes in New South Wales to be secretly entered by police for no reason other than the proximity of their property to a suspect's property. It is quite extraordinary that anyone would sign off on that. We have just heard from the Opposition member Mr Clarke. That reminded me that we need to consider where the Opposition is these days. Where is the great Liberal Party tradition of protecting liberty and curtailing the power of a State that has at last, belatedly, started to resurface with the likes of Petro Georgiou and others in Canberra, but still appears long dead in this Parliament? I say "resurface" and I meant it, because the words of former Liberal Prime Minister Sir Robert Menzies are very relevant to this debate.

The Hon. Eric Roozendaal: He was a great libertarian.

Ms LEE RHIANNON: Yes, precisely. I acknowledge the interjection from Mr Roozendaal. That is the whole point, that is the standard against which one can make an interesting comparison today of where the Labor Party is at. In 1939 Mr Menzies said:

… there must be as little interference with individual rights as is consistent with concerted national effort … the greatest tragedy that could overcome a country would be for it to fight a successful war in defence of liberty and to lose its own liberty in the process.

The Hon. John Hatzistergos: It would if Stalin were in power now. Stalin was in power then.

Ms LEE RHIANNON: Oh, good heavens above! Here he goes again, but he should speak loudly.

The Hon. John Hatzistergos: Stalin was in power then.

Ms LEE RHIANNON: The Minister has to say it five times; he is trying to show that he knows his history. These laws sacrifice our liberty. Members could consider a more contemporary esteemed commentator. In condemning the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation bills of 2003, George Williams, Professor of Law at the University of New South Wales, said:

New laws must strike a balance between defence and national security on the one hand, and important public values and fundamental democratic rights on the other.

We must not pass laws that undermine the same democratic freedoms we are seeking to protect from terrorism.

It is a matter of balance and proportionality as well as a test of political leadership. If we fail this test we risk losing part of what makes this a great country to live in.

This bill fails that test because it promotes fear, suspicion and division in the community. This bill is the low liberty mark of civil rights in this State. The Government should withdraw this bill if it is to have any credibility as being aware of the need to balance the rights of individuals over the demands of investigative agencies. The bill will allow police to covertly enter, search and remove property from suspects' homes. It goes too far. I cannot accept the Attorney General's arguments supporting the introduction of this bill as it further eats away at the basic civil rights and freedoms enjoyed and so vigorously defended by the Australian people.

The Hon. John Hatzistergos: Civil liberties and terrorists.

Ms LEE RHIANNON: I again acknowledge the Minister's interjection. He is way off the mark. Time and again we have objected to terrorism. We have also objected to governments that misuse the word "terrorism" and attempt to take their law and order agendas from a State level to a national and international level to avoid dealing with the real crises, that is, hospitals, health, education and transport.

The Hon. John Hatzistergos: Transport?

Ms LEE RHIANNON: Yes. This legislation is a smokescreen. The Government is stating, "We are doing things. We are being tough."

The Hon. John Hatzistergos: Terrorism is a smokescreen?

Ms LEE RHIANNON: The Minister knows I did not say that terrorism was a smokescreen. This legislation is a smokescreen. At its core, suspects' homes can be covertly entered and searched, with police also being given the right to remove property without the suspect being aware of the search. On top of that this bill will permit police to enter the homes of people the police know are in no way associated with terrorism in order to conduct surveillance or search a suspect's property. Covert search warrants may be granted if the person giving the warrant believes on reasonable grounds that a terrorist act has been, is being, or is likely to be committed and that the entry to and search of premises will substantially assist in responding to or preventing the terrorist act, and that it is necessary for the entry.

The Hon. John Hatzistergos: Who is the person who gives the warrant?

Ms LEE RHIANNON: The Minister cannot deny that this is what can happen. He is trying to muddy the waters by interjecting but he is not achieving that. That is what is set out in this bill.

The Hon. John Hatzistergos: The Supreme Court judge gives the warrant.

Ms LEE RHIANNON: That has been said on many occasions. We know that to be the case. However, the Minister cannot deny that this is the regime this Government is setting up in New South Wales.

The Hon. John Hatzistergos: Is it a conspiracy?

Ms LEE RHIANNON: I did not say it was a conspiracy; I just said it is bad law. Covert search warrants may also be granted if the person giving the warrant believes on reasonable grounds that it is necessary for the entry and search of those premises to be conducted without the knowledge of any occupier of the premises. There are several problems with that approach. First, it will allow police to spy on citizens on the basis of preventing future acts. In itself that is a new proposal for law enforcement agencies.

As a rule, police are allowed to spy on citizens only after the act. However, this proposal turns that safeguard on its head and gives certain police the right to pre-emptively spy on the people of New South Wales. This new search power will enable police to become crystal ball gazers and enter the home of suspects. It also allows police to bust into the homes of new neighbours, euphemistically described as "using such force as is reasonably necessary" to search and spy on a suspect's property. When it comes to New South Wales police we know what that means—that they are not high on drugs or experiencing other problems.

[Interruption]

Does the Minister really want to go down that track? Is he really concerned about protests against the Iraq war?

The Hon. John Hatzistergos: Do you defend the protest?

Ms LEE RHIANNON: Of course I defend the protest. I think that most courageous and important action sent a message of opposition against war.

The Hon. John Hatzistergos: It is civil disobedience.

Ms LEE RHIANNON: The bill also allows the person who is granted a secret search warrant to use assistants to carry out the terms of the warrant. There is no obligation to accredit, train or vet that assistant who will then be tramping through innocent people's homes and bugging or searching others. That patently ridiculous proposition leaves a gaping hole in this bill. In addition to that, defects in the warrant do not necessarily invalidate the warrant's legality. In these circumstances, as we have seen, police can and do search the wrong house or do not get the warrant right, but the occupier may not have any form of redress.

Let us consider the recent work of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation [ASIO], to some extent New South Wales' Federal counterpart. Mr Stephen Hopper, the previous lawyer for Mamdouh Habib, recalled that in 2001 ASIO detained people without warrant or charge; pointed guns at the head of a woman who was breastfeeding her baby; raided a house without a warrant because it got the address wrong, in keystone cops style confusing the house with another one down the street; and, to add insult to injury, allowed $7,000 to disappear from one house in the process. The complaint that followed has still not been dealt with and the money remains missing. If that behaviour was the face of Australian security services under governments that lacked the enhanced powers contained in the bill, the difficulties will worsen if the Parliament provides such organisations with more tools to trample the civil rights of people in New South Wales.

The bill seems to prepare for that eventuality as it also gives the Commissioner of Police or the New South Wales Crime Commissioner the power to destroy documents relating to the search of premises. When an aggrieved person uses those documents to challenge the lawfulness of a secret search, the Government effectively promotes the shredding of that important evidence. NSW Police cannot be trusted with additional powers. We have seen time and again that when police powers have been increased the result has been greater abuse of police powers and increased corruption. The 833 matters that the Police Integrity Commission considered in 2004 clearly demonstrate that corruption is alive and well in parts of the police force.

In short, this bill is unnecessary overkill that deserves to be condemned by all those who cherish civil liberties in this State. This bill is another step on the gangplank towards oblivion that occurs when people live in a police State that would be sure to make Menzies turn in his grave. I acknowledge that the Hon. Eric Roozendaal and the Hon. David Clarke have a united front on this issue. I am sure those who read Hansard will be interested in that fact.

The Hon. Dr PETER WONG [10.36 p.m.]: I speak to the Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Warrants) Bill and indicate that the innocent loss of life in any terrorist attack is a hideous and despicable act of humanity. We all have an obligation to prevent such attacks. However, I believe that this bill only expresses the right-wing views of neo-conservative hawks in the United States of America and their supporters abroad. It is an ad hoc reaction to emotions invoked within us that we are yet to deal with objectively. Introducing a bill that is in conflict with the most basic principles in the freedom of expression and the right to privacy of an individual within a democratic State is wrong and ill-conceived.

We cannot continue to introduce laws that restrict such freedoms. While such a law can act as a safeguard against perceived negligence on the part of government in the future, the costs of our freedom far outweigh any perceived risk. How do we deal with a perceived threat that may or may not eventuate? Are we expected to vote for a law that will unduly allow agents to trespass on the personal rights and liberties of New South Wales citizens with ill-defined administrative powers, or without sufficient powers of appeal by affected persons? The bill will significantly infringe on the rights to privacy of citizens in New South Wales by extending the period that a warrant must be served to two years.

I note that in introducing the Terrorism (Police Powers) Bill in 2002 the Government looked at corresponding legislation in the United States of America and in the United Kingdom. As the Premier stated at the time, in drafting such legislation we need to balance the two competing imperatives. On the one hand we need to be prepared to act quickly, at short notice, to the threat of a terrorist strike, or in the immediate aftermath of such an attack. On the other hand we need to remain calm in the face of terrorism and not surrender unnecessarily civil liberties that are part of our working democracy. Police were given increased powers to counter existing credible terrorist threats and to guard against an incident occurring.

We have a change of tone in this bill. No longer is there any imperative to balance these two competing concerns. The Minister stated that the bill is drafted in a flexible way to allow a broad range of material to be placed before the court in order to support an application for a covert search warrant. I suspect that just what that broad range of material could or should include will be left to the discretion of agents. One would assume that the far-reaching powers granted to the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation and the Australian Federal Police, who have intelligence-gathering capabilities, will be more than sufficient in combating the threat of terrorism without having to resort to a law enforcement agency being granted odious "sneak and peak" provisions that allow agents to search a person's home but to delay admitting to such an intrusion.

I am not surprised by this shift in policy from a Government that prides itself on being a law and order devotee, and that has introduced draconian powers at an alarming rate. This year's budget attests to this, given that the only significant funding increase was directed at bolstering policing in this State. In the past few days the Government has answered questions about the Bulldogs pack rape case in a dismissive and cavalier manner. This Government may be happy to treat the serious deficiencies of NSW Police as a joke and to grant them Stasi-like powers, but I will not be a party to such contempt for democratic and civil rights.

Using the United States as an example, we are all aware that the Patriot Act was introduced advantageously at a time of trauma, fear and hysteria. It was inconceivable that anyone would vote against this Act at such a difficult time, for fear of being branded unpatriotic. It appears that just as the Patriot missile failed to protect Israel, so the Patriot Act has missed its target and seriously harmed the very thing that it was designed to protect. Three years later, the Act has been shown to have severely compromised the basic freedoms of the American people by going far beyond what was needed to pursue a terrorist threat. Republicans and Democrats alike in the United States Congress are now calling for these far-reaching draconian laws to be curtailed, not expanded. The Act has gone so far as to allow Federal agencies blanket powers to seize medical records and to obtain documents from libraries and bookstores for the purpose of tracking people's reading habits.

The terrorism hysteria that followed the 9-11 attacks has failed to abate—in fact, it is fuelled further from time to time by the media and politicians alike. It is only natural that at a time of fear and uncertainty for many within the community a person would become more intrigued about the threat that he or she is supposedly facing. How does one face these fears if one is unable to access information—if, for nothing else, to learn what it is that drives people to commit such acts of terror? How does one form an objective opinion if his or her access to information is restricted, not by force but by fear that one will be tracked down and labelled a terrorist for reading such material or attending a seminar or conference where the conduct of our foreign policy comes under heavy criticism? Or is this the intended consequence of a law that seeks to silence any dissent?

Freedom of opinion and freedom of expression are the two most fundamental rights of a representative democracy, and two of the most powerful tools to use to keep the Government in check and prevent it from introducing draconian laws that do not reflect true wisdom. Under this bill, it will be a State offence to be seen to be a member of a terrorist organisation. But what exactly does membership of a terrorist organisation mean? Do terrorists carry membership cards with them, or should we simply look twice when we see a person who appears alien to our traditions? Is the Government aware of any database in existence that lists these so-called "terrorist members"? If a member of a terrorist group is someone who commits a terrorist act or who aids in the commission of a terrorist act in one way or another, I have no problems. But if it is a person who sympathises with the plight of the Afghan and Iraqi people, is willing to make a vocal stand against the innocent loss of life when coalition bombers drop their payloads and who is placed under covert surveillance as a result, I have a problem—and so should every member in this House.

I fear that the powers conferred by the bill will, like the Patriot Act, unleash similar ramifications and restrict the basic freedoms and privacy we currently enjoy. As in the United States of America, can we also expect New South Wales public librarians and bookstore owners to act as informers after a person has looked at or purchased a so-called "book of interest"? How can we expect to check seriously a Government that would pass a bill such as this but materially protects us against terrorism by placing on the Sydney Harbour Bridge two security guards on foot patrol to stop it being blown up? I would have thought a sizable truck would be required for that purpose, not someone with a backpack. I can say only that this bill appears to reward incompetence and ineptitude and that a properly functioning police service, operating on the basis of true intelligence, would not need the powers that this bill envisions. Powers based on intelligence and exercised by NSW Police would be less threatening than the current situation.

The Hon. Dr ARTHUR CHESTERFIELD-EVANS [10.45 a.m.]: The Australian Democrats do not support the Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Warrants) Bill. When speaking to the Motor Accidents Compensation Further Amendment (Terrorism) Bill on 3 December 2002, I said:

The Federal Government has said that we need education on how to recognise a terrorist. I say that we need education on how to recognise a decent foreign policy. If we strut about, slavishly following the United States of America and basically blockading, with the Australian Navy, a country half a world away that had been buying our wheat we will get a reaction. We will identify ourselves as a country that is totally committed to whatever the United States of America does with its foreign policy, and we will get a response of terrorism such as only the United States of America and Israel seem to illicit.

In essence, the problem is that we have a bad foreign policy. Fundamentally, terrorism is the method that people with less power employ to attack those who have more power. Terrorism is said to be indiscriminate, but that suggests that those who bomb cities are being discriminating. The idea that cities can be bombed without harming civilians because that was not the purpose of the raid—the target was a power plant or a bridge—is fundamentally absurd and arbitrary. It is about the methods used in what is, effectively, a war.

Yesterday crossbench members received a briefing about peak oil. This is the idea that the world's supply of oil will peak sometime between 2007 and 2013, and that is as much oil as we will ever have. Our reliance on oil is increasing. The policies of this Government do nothing to identify and provide alternative fuels, and we will continue to experience problems as we build motorways instead of rail infrastructure in our cities. So the peak oil concept is important. It may be that the neo-conservatives in the United States of America are shoring up the supply of Iraqi oil, no matter what happens. That is one explanation for the rise of the neo-conservative philosophy.

Matthew Simmons, who wrote a book about Saudi Arabian oil, apparently briefed Dick Cheney, a former chief executive of the Halliburton oil services company, that Saudi drilling techniques—water and carbon dioxide is pumped into a well to push out the oil when the well begins to dry up—could cause a fall in oil production. If Matthew Simmons is correct, the world's oil supply will soon decline more quickly than ever before. So the neo-conservatives were shoring up America's oil supply through the Iraq raid, and discussions about Islam, terrorism and the appalling reign of Saddam Hussein are merely a smokescreen for that imperative.

Be that as it may, Australia has followed America uncritically, antagonising those who once simply purchased our wheat. I believe we do not have a strategic interest in what happens in Iraq in the way that the Americans do—we are not geopolitical world players. Yet we have been following a foolish foreign policy that has put us at risk. Australia has adopted a policy based on revived American McCarthyism, and this bill is just another step down that path—as defined by the Howard Government and its pro-war policy. Last week I attended a performance of the play Two Brothers at the Sydney Opera House, which told the story of two brothers and their reactions to the political situation in Australia. It is an excellent play, which I commend to honourable members. It reminded me a little of The Crucible, the famous Arthur Miller play that dealt with the Salem witch trials in America and led to much criticism of Miller during the McCarthyist era.

The playwright of Two Brothers has not been criticised yet, but if Australia continues with its foolish foreign policy one never knows what will happen. Australia has the ignominious reputation of ignoring the people whom the Americans arbitrarily locked up in Guantanamo Bay without any evidence to charge them. The United States Supreme Court struck down the process that removed these people from United States jurisdiction and allowed a United States military court to have a bash at them. Mamdouh Habib has been released without being charged. David Hicks may well be kept at Guantanamo Bay indefinitely; the Americans cannot charge him and do not seem willing to release him. It is an international disgrace that the Federal Government has ignored the voices of Australians who are supporting this unfortunate man's civil liberties. Will the Government ignore the interests of Australian who gets into trouble overseas? Surely the idea that these horrors can happen only to others and therefore should be ignored is abhorrent to all honourable members.

The Hon. Charlie Lynn: It is not to me.

The Hon. Dr ARTHUR CHESTERFIELD-EVANS: The honourable member's interjection shows how ridiculous he is and what little respect he has for human rights. A medical student was arrested and held for six weeks because of a theory that he might be involved with a terrorist organisation, even though that term has never been clearly defined. This week the newspapers revealed that in an attempt to release Douglas Wood in Iraq the Australians used poor intelligence and conducted a raid on the wrong man—on the very contact who was trying to liaise between the hijackers and the Australian negotiators. His house was invaded by a group of people, including Australians.

A study of organisations such as the Irish Republican Army shows that membership of those groups is very indefinite to ensure security. The Central Intelligence Agency [CIA] used indefinite private contracts to engage the people who worked for it, so it was never clear whether a CIA operative took part in any action. The idea that these organisations can be proscribed and their membership can be defined, including people who are not members who might later become members, is effectively a smear. That point is made in the play Two Brothers currently being staged by the Sydney Theatre Company at the Opera House.

A book entitled "The Secret State", a study of Australia's policy during the cold war, contrasts the ASIO analysis of the danger of communism to this country and the views expressed in the editorials in the Sydney Morning Herald and the Australian. Twenty years later, the ASIO analysis is clearly seen as a crazy, paranoid rant and the Sydney Morning Herald and the Australian editorials are obviously sensible analyses of what would most likely happen in foreign policy. That is what happened. Basically, sensible journalists got it right. The paranoid ranting of spies who live in their own little world and play games with spies on the other side is a much greater danger than the views of those they purport to protect us from. The Legislation Review Committee was asked to look at the legislation. Commencing at paragraph 35 the committee states:

35. The Bill … authorises the use of very significant powers against those who may not be involved in terrorist acts. In particular, it should be noted that:

• the threshold for invoking the powers is suspicion on reasonable grounds (which will inevitably lead to the covert entry and search of premises of innocent people);

• it is not necessary that all or any occupiers of the premises be suspected of any criminal acts, although the Judge is to consider the extent to which the privacy of a person who is not believed to be knowingly concerned in the commission of a terrorist act is likely to be affected; …

• there is no requirement of imminent threat before a warrant may be issued;

• once a warrant had been issued, the Bill allows the covert search powers to be used to seize "any other thing … that is connected with a serious indictable offence", without the need for any evidence of connection between that thing and a terrorist act; …

36. … the Bill opens the possibility for certain highly undesirable consequences which should not be allowed unless truly necessary and should be defended as far as is practicable. In particular, the Bill appears to enable:

• persons not connected with a terrorist act who occupied the same premises as a person suspected of committing a terrorist act, or are visited by such a person, to be subject to the full force of a covert search warrant;

• a covert search warrant to be used to gather evidence for a serious indictable offence unconnected with a terrorist act using powers that could not otherwise be used for an investigation of that offence; and

• applications for a covert search warrant to be made without sufficient care being taken, given the gravity of the powers sought, to test the grounds of suspicion of the terrorist act …

39. There are clearly risks in this situation that an innocent occupier will react violently to an ineffective impersonation in purported exercise of a power of self-defence. While it would appear that in these circumstances the occupier would have available to them a complete defence of self defence under s 418 of the Crimes Act, the exposure to the risk of prosecution in these circumstances can be viewed as trespassing on personal liberties, particularly where the possible provocation and resultant risk is created by law enforcement agencies.

40. The Committee notes that the broad covert search powers significantly trespass on the personal right to privacy …

42. The Committee notes that the Bill provides for very significant trespassers on the rights and liberties of persons who are not suspected of being involved in the commission of a terrorist act …

43. The Committee also notes that the Bill provides no protection in relation to reasonable responses by occupiers discovering covert intruders who are executing a warrant …

49. The Committee refers to a parliament the question as to whether the extension from 21 days to 90 days of the maximum period for a warrant authorising the use of a listening device trespassers unduly on the right to privacy …

53. Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides:

1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of his interests.

2. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those which are prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public order … the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others …

54. To help ensure the prescription of terrorist organisations is done on an objective basis, the Criminal Code provides that:

• before the making of the regulation, the Minister must be satisfied on reasonable grounds that the organisation is directly or indirectly engaged in, preparing, planning, assisting in or fostering the doing of a terrorist act; …

55. The definition "member of an organisation" in Section 102 .1(1) of the Code, which the Bill adopts, includes:

a) a person who is an informal member of the organisation;

b) a person who has taken steps to become a member of the organisation; and

c) in the case of an organisation that is a body corporate—a director or an officer of the body corporate.

56. This is extremely broad definition extends considerably beyond the usual criminal law limits of inchoate offences …

58. The Committee notes that while many specific statutory offences erode this distinction, this is a particularly extreme example. Membership of an association is itself relatively remote from any offence of violence, but, in addition, any steps taken to become a member are sufficient under the Bill. The scope of "informal member" is also not defined and may be very remote from active participation in or support of any violent objectives of the organisation.

59. When this broad offence definition is coupled with the very extensive entry, search and seizure powers proposed in the Bill, it is evident that the Bill represents a very significant trespass on personal rights and liberties, both in terms of the right to privacy, and the traditional criminal law principle that offences should prohibit acts rather than mere status.

60. The Committee also notes that the Bill infringes on the presumption of innocence by placing the burden of proof on the accused to prove that he or she:
          took all reasonable steps to cease to be a member of the organisation as soon as practicable after the person knew that the organisation was a terrorist organisation [proposed s 310J(2)] …

62. The Committee notes that Schedule 4 of the Bill criminalises membership of organisations specified as terrorist organisations in regulations made by the Governor-General under s 102.1 of the Commonwealth Criminal Code.

63. The Committee further notes that the definition of "membership" of a terrorist organisation is extremely broad and includes acts extremely remote from any acts of violence …

64. The Committee also notes that proposed section 310J(2) reverses the onus of proof.

It might be noted that there was immense fuss about the reversal of the onus of proof in the amendments to the Occupational Health and Safety Act regarding workplace deaths. I received a plethora of letters about that reversal provision from people concerned that if there were a death in their workplace, the general obligation of that Act to provide a workplace free of hazards would render them liable to prosecution. In the instant case of the reversal of proof, I have heard nothing. The reason for the lack of concern is that it is assumed that somebody else will wear the brunt of this reversal provision.

The looseness of the definition of "membership of an organisation" is extremely significant. Honourable members would remember that Tim Anderson was put in gaol for about 16 years supposedly because he was a member of the Ananda Marga organisation, which supposedly was responsible for the Hilton bombing. There was some doubt about whether Ananda Marga, a religious sect, had anything to do with that bombing. Tim Anderson, in a quite well-intentioned way, met some of its members quite tangentially as he looked for some peaceful philosophy in his university days—and he spent some 16 years in gaol for his trouble.

His conviction was based on totally unsatisfactory evidence. That conviction resulted from simply branding an organisation a terrorist organisation, concluding that it had therefore carried out a bombing, and therefore that someone who was really only peripherally associated with the group warranted 16 years in gaol—on the evidence of a false witness who rather enjoyed being the centre of attention because of a personality disorder.

I was involved in the group BUGA-UP [Billboard-Utilising Graffitists Against Unhealthy Products], which was a small protest group that raised issues about the power of advertisers to tell lies with total impunity. We wrote on the odd billboard and engaged in some street theatre that kept people amused but demonstrated the absurdity of the activities of the people we were attacking. Eventually the Special Branch—whom we regarded as our own personal police—was disbanded and the Keystone Cops nature of their activities in trying to get our membership list was revealed. Most of us were university students or of university student age.

One fellow, a heavy smoker in his late 40s who did not seem to be dedicated to any of our particular causes, turned up at our meetings and was very keen to help with the membership list. Of course, he stuck out like a sore thumb. Interestingly, he toddled off to take a photograph of one of our members—so called; we had no formal membership—who was particularly good at throwing paint bombs at high billboards, had a worthy aim, and did good work along Oxford Street. Be that as it may, one Sunday afternoon this person's house was being photographed. His next door neighbour, who was mowing his lawn, wondered why a chap would get out of his car and take a photograph of his neighbour's house. The neighbour noted the registration number of the photographer's vehicle.

When the group next met at a coffee shop in Glebe the fellow whose house had been photographed asked this man why he had taken a photograph of the house, and the man said, "Okay, fair cop; you're really not a bad mob of blokes; I'm out of here." He toddled off and was never seen again. Of course, this was not recorded in the absurd rantings and speculations about the membership of BUGA-UP that eventually became part of the Special Branch's files. Eventually, we obtained our Special Branch files. Mine was only six pages long, and I must confess that I was a little jealous that the President of this House had a 16-page file; I felt somewhat outshone by that!

The point is the absurdity of the secret State, and the vagueness of the definition. It is interesting that the Australian definitions of "terrorist organisation" varies from those in the United States of America. We have 18, four of which are not listed by the State Department of the United States. The United States has 23 definitions, and 20 of those do not appear on the Australian list. These organisations may or may not have formal structures. They probably do not. Most cells of the IRA did not. This concept of guilt by association appears to be a problem for Habib and David Hicks. It certainly was a problem in the BUGA-UP days. It led to absurd paranoia associated with what amounts to a bad foreign policy, and that is leading to this bad legislation. The Democrats will not support this further ratcheting up of McCarthyism philosophy.

Reverend the Hon. FRED NILE [11.04 a.m.]: The Christian Democratic Party is pleased to support the Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Warrants) Bill, which has a number of purposes. The first is to amend the Terrorism (Police Powers) Act 2002 to enable the covert entry and search of premises by certain officers of the New South Wales Crime Commission or the police force under the authority of a special covert search warrant allowed by an "eligible" judge. Covert entry and search of premises will be allowed for the purpose of responding to or preventing terrorist acts, including getting evidence of the proposed State offence of "membership of a terrorist organisation".

The bill will also amend the Listening Devices Act 1984 to extend, from 21 days to 90 days, the maximum period during which a warrant issued under that Act for the use of a listening device remains in force. This extension of time will occur only if the warrant is issued in connection with certain Commonwealth terrorism offences and the proposed State offence. Last, the bill will amend the Crimes Act 1900 to create a State offence that is equivalent to the Commonwealth offence of "membership of a terrorist organisation".

We support the bill because it is part of a movement by the United States of America, Australia, the United Kingdom, and other democratic nations to pursue the war against terrorism. That is why Australia supported the United States of America and the United Kingdom to bring democracy to Afghanistan and Iraq. We fully support working in co-operation with those nations, who are our main allies in the fight against terrorism and dictatorships. Having heard the contributions of a number of honourable members, particularly the Hon. Dr Arthur Chesterfield-Evans, one wonders whether they are aware of the realities of the threat of terrorism in the world, but particularly in Australia.

Why do we need this legislation? Is it just an imagined fear, or is it a reality? What are the facts? There is no doubt that there has been a dramatic change in the world as a result of the terrorist attack on the twin towers of the World Trade Centre in America and terrorist attacks in other countries, including Indonesia. Sadly, from 1990 onwards we have been facing a completely new type of threat: terrorism and threats against security that are without precedent. World War I and World War II were fought as what could be termed traditional wars. Obviously we all oppose wars, but those wars were forced on democratic nations that were compelled to defend their freedom. Australia, as always, rose to the challenge and volunteered to fight to meet those threats.

Now that we have the more sinister threat of terrorism we need to be able to mount various types of responses by our security forces and police forces. This requires legislation to enable various Australian organisations to carry out their roles. It is no good telling those organisations that we want them to maintain security in Australia without providing the resources and legislative power necessary to enable them to discharge their roles. Is it a real threat that we are responding to? Yes, it is, without any shadow of doubt. Last November the head of ASIO, Mr Dennis Richardson, made a speech in which he summarised the terrorist threat facing Australia. He made a number of statements, including that:

… the number of Australians confirmed or assessed to have undertaken terrorist training continues to grow.

So we have not only a threat of terrorism but people actually engaging in terrorist training, with the purpose of carrying out terrorist acts. Mr Richardson went on to say:

… Australia has been a potential target for Al-Qaeda for at least four years and would continue to be so.

In the past three years, an attack on the Australian High Commission in Singapore had been thwarted but the bombings of Bali nightclubs in 2002 and an attack on the Australian embassy in Jakarta in September had succeeded.

Had more adequate security measures been in place, those attacks and the loss of life, particularly in Bali, may not have occurred. Mr Richardson went on to say that attacks in Australia have been identified. One example is the plans by Frenchman Willy Brigitte, a convert to Islam deported to France last year and held since then under France's tough antiterrorism laws. Apparently he had planned an attack but security forces were able to prevent it. In late 2002 a raid in Pakistan uncovered details of a number of airports being cased by terrorists before September 11, 2001, including an Australian airport. He did not indicate which airport but the obvious one would be Sydney airport, which is the largest and most strategic in Australia. Since the 2001 attacks in the United States the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation [ASIO] has prevented 10 people suspected of tourism activities from entering Australia. We do not know how many attacks that intervention prevented.

We are all aware of the Muslim convert Jack Roche from Perth, who was convicted of and sentenced for terrorism offences for a planned attack on the Israeli Embassy in Canberra. These are realities, not myths. Mr Richardson said that four other people were awaiting trial for alleged offences in Sydney. He said that investigations are continuing, and that they could lead to the arrest of others. He added that the spy agency had been working to identify Australians worldwide connected to terrorism. Mr Richardson said, "That work has taken us from Indonesia to inside the Arctic Circle and to all continents but Antarctica." That work continues. He said that four Australians were in custody overseas, either awaiting trial for alleged terrorist offences or serving a sentence for such offences.

David Hicks is currently in American detention in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and Mamdouh Habib, who was being held in the same facility, has been released. Hicks was charged with a series of terrorism and related activities, and is awaiting trial by military commission. The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation 2003-04 report provides further factual details. For example, ASIO has uncovered six more Australians suspected of training in terrorist camps overseas, bringing the total to 20. All six have had their passports cancelled or denied, and remain under surveillance. ASIO successfully sought three warrants to interrogate suspected terrorists in Australia, from whom they gleaned valuable information. The aim of the covert warrants provided for in the bill is to glean information that can be used in further investigations, which may lead to charges being laid.

Four people are awaiting trial on terrorism charges in Australia: Zeky Mallah, Izhar ul-Haque, Faheem Khalid Lodhi and Bilal Khazal. Lodhi, a Sydney architect who picked up Brigitte from the airport when he arrived from France, faces seven terrorism-related charges. His arrest came one week after a Pakistani-born university student, Izhar ul-Haque, was charged with training with terrorists in Pakistan in January last year and making false statements to ASIO.

We have heard a lot about the Corby case involving drugs and baggage handlers. In June last year 34-year-old Bilal Khazal, a former Qantas baggage handler, was charged with collecting or making documents likely to facilitate terrorist acts. Zeky Mallah will stand trial for allegedly planning a suicide attack on the Sydney office of the Department of Foreign Affairs. ASIO continues to be active—perhaps it should be more active—in carrying out its role. This State legislation complements what is happening at the Federal level.

In November 2004 Jack Thomas, a Melbourne taxi driver, was charged with providing support to al-Qaeda. In early 2001 he spent up to three months in a terrorist training camp in southern Afghanistan. It is believed that Mr Thomas may have trained at the same camp and at the same time as Australian David Dicks, who is being held by American forces in Cuba. Mr Thomas arrived at the terrorist training camp in Kandahar for basic military training in April 2001, a month after leaving Australia with an Indonesian-born wife and baby daughter. For thousands of foreign supporters of al-Qaeda, Camp Farouq was the principal location for both basic and advanced terrorist training. I have seen on television, as other members probably have, videos found by Americans and Afghanis showing the well-organised and disciplined training. The videos show raids carried out by people on motorcycles with one person on the pillion seat carrying a machine gun, probably for assassination purposes.

The video showed terrorists-in-training entering ancient buildings in Afghanistan used for training purposes. On the wall were cut-out figures of human beings, which are probably used for target practice. But I was shocked to see on the figures a prominent Christian cross, which seemed to be a clear incentive for the terrorists to execute Christian civilians—there may have been other targets, such as people from the Jewish faith. That should be condemned. For those reasons the Christian Democratic Party supports the legislation. We wish it were not necessary, but as I have outlined we are dealing with reality and real terrorist threats. We must balance that with maintaining our civil liberties. We hope that the terrorist threats will pass and that when they do the legislation can be repealed, but at the moment we need this type of legislation to ensure Australia's security.

The Hon. MICHAEL GALLACHER (Leader of the Opposition) [11.18 a.m.]: Given the contribution of my colleague the Hon. David Clarke, I will make only a brief contribution. It is important that members of all parties continue to put on the record their concern about the approach to counter-terrorism. There is no doubt that pressure must be applied to governments of all persuasions to achieve greater interagency co-operation. I hate to say it, but from time to time I feel that even though we pass this type of legislation and carry out mock terrorism exercises it is all about building a false sense of security. I am not convinced that we are necessarily taking the overseas experience seriously enough. We may be; it may be happening quietly. I hope the Government can assure us that everything is under control. Ultimately it falls to members of Parliament to continue to ask questions to ensure that the Government is doing everything it can to guarantee our safety.

I make that point because I simply do not have confidence in the Government's security measures, especially when I consider the recent exposure of lapses in security. Without a doubt, concerns related to Port Botany resonate in me through my experience in the ports portfolio. There is increasing pressure from the shipping industry for the greater involvement of police in port security. As I told the House on a previous occasion, one night I had the experience of driving out to Port Botany port with someone from the shipping industry. We were testing the veracity of the assertion that port security was working well. We were greeted with a wave from the security officer at the gate as we drove onto Port Botany port, and that was the only check on us during the entire visit. The security officer did not even bother getting out of his seat; he simply waved us through as we drove in.

The port was in operation and a number of ships were being loaded or unloaded. We drove up to a large ship that was being loaded with containers and walked up the gangplank. We were welcomed on board by someone from a Third World country who obviously had difficulty with the English language. We moved around the ship completely unchecked for approximately 30 minutes while it was being loaded. We spoke to other crew members as we moved around. One of them asked us what we were doing, but because we had a clipboard and we looked official, the crew seemed to imply that we were there for official purposes. I asked where the captain was and I was told he was on the bridge. I was asked whether we would like to be accompanied to meet the captain, but I said no, we knew we were going, and off we went. We continued to walk around the ship completely unchecked.

I would like to think that security has improved, but when I see evidence of the "office hours" approach the Government has taken to Water Police in Port Botany, my concerns intensify. There is a launch at Sans Souci, but the Water Police work office hours. Without being sarcastic, I point out that criminals and terrorists are aware of the hours of operation of police stations, and the criminals and terrorists do not work office hours. They know when premises are vulnerable to illegal entry, because they look for weaknesses in the chain of security. In the light of recent events, is it any wonder that there is concern about the Government not taking security matters seriously in relation to ports and airports?

Over the past couple of weeks the Government has made a big song and dance about the Federal Government's responsibility for airport security. Airport baggage handling has received a great deal of media attention. However, the airport's footprint in Sydney includes the airport police station at Mascot. The building is still there and many of the logos are still on the walls. It is still possible to see some of the imprints of words from the stains on the walls where the words used to be, but what is missing, apart from the words, is the police. At a time when the authorities are moving forward to increase security, the New South Wales Government is pulling the police out of a police station that was designed and situated primarily to look after international and domestic airports.

The Government has removed police resources, and I cannot but wonder why it is not taking notice of the telltale signs that are obvious to everyone. A couple of years ago there was a gas leak in the centre of Sydney. I am still not confident that contingency plans have been put in place to deal with simple matters of that type. It transpired that the fumes were caused not by the gas leak but, rather, by incorrect maintenance of a train. Nevertheless, the chaos affected the entire Sydney rail system and the metropolitan road system, which became absolute bedlam within a couple of hours. The city was in an absolute meltdown mode.

Again I make the point that total reliance upon closed-circuit television surveillance in our public transport system as an adequate security device may be unwise. Six thousand closed-circuit televisions are being monitored by 100 surveillance officers who rotate on a 24 hours a day, seven days a week roster, which means that, at best, 20 people are monitoring 6,000 closed-circuit television sets at any one time. The numbers simply do not stack up. Twenty people monitoring 6,000 closed-circuit televisions in our rail system cannot perform surveillance in a proactive manner.

I point out again that the approach adopted by the Government means that the closed-circuit television network is a valuable tool only for the Coroner's Court. It is not a preventive measure; it is a valuable tool in a retroactive sense only. The Government should learn the lessons from the incident in Madrid approximately 12 months ago. There, the closed-circuit television network showed offenders moving in and around the rail system and among trains. According to a public transport security conference that was held in Sydney last year, they had backpacks and were wearing balaclavas. The perpetrators were watched on the closed-circuit television network, and people were scratching their heads and wondering what the perpetrators were doing, but it was too late for anything to be done to save the poor souls who lost their lives or those who were maimed in the incident after the bombs were set off.

The question I keep asking the Government is whether security measures have changed since the Madrid incident. I cannot get an answer, and that is why I do not have confidence in the Government's approach. Security measures in Sydney seem to suggest the likelihood of an incident similar to what happened in Madrid—same story, different actors. I do not believe that the appropriate security measures are in place in this State, particularly in Sydney, that people are entitled to expect. I think this Government has much to learn.

The Hon. PETER BREEN [11.25 a.m.]: I am opposed to the Terrorism (Police Powers) Act 2002 and to this amending bill. The legislation provides for a covert search warrants scheme to amend the Listening Devices Act with respect to the duration of warrants for terrorism offences, and to amend the Crimes Act to create a State offence of "membership of a terrorist organisation". I will deal first with the last of the bill's objects. The new offence of "membership of a terrorist organisation" reminds me of the laws proscribing membership of the Communist Party. The Communist Party was seen as a great threat to the people of Australia, and the Government passed a law that made it illegal to be a member of that political party.

Ms Lee Rhiannon: And the Labor Party stood up against the bill.

The Hon. PETER BREEN: Not only the Labor Party, but the High Court as well. However, these days neither the Labor Party nor the High Court would be willing to oppose that type of far-reaching legislation that impinges on fundamental rights that have been in existence for longer than any of us have been alive.

The Hon. John Hatzistergos: To be a member of a terrorist organisation is a fundamental right, is it?

The Hon. PETER BREEN: It seems to me to be a retrograde step that a terrorist organisation can be labelled by the Commonwealth Attorney-General, Mr Ruddock, and that we in New South Wales will adopt his definition of what a terrorist organisation is.

The Hon. John Hatzistergos: Do you think we should have our own?

The Hon. PETER BREEN: I think we should at least rely on some other objective definition of what constitutes a terrorist organisation. I would prefer our Minister's definition than Mr Ruddock's.

The Hon. John Hatzistergos: I can understand that.

The Hon. PETER BREEN: But the reality is that we are tying to Mr Ruddock our civil laws, freedoms, and human rights that we have worked so long to achieve. I cannot understand why we would want to do that.

The Hon. John Hatzistergos: It is for two years.

The Hon. PETER BREEN: The Minister says it is for two years, but the reality is that this type of legislation has a benefit for governments that not only win elections by frightening people and creating fear but by maintaining fear as their policy and as a way of serving their electorate and the people who voted for them. It seems to me that this legislation offers some salutary lessons for all of us. Recently I was the subject of an investigation by the Independent Commission Against Corruption [ICAC]. As part of that investigation, a search warrant was executed on my parliamentary offices. After the inquiry was completed I was entitled, under the search warrants legislation, to a copy of the search warrant to see exactly what it was that the applicant for the warrant thought I was doing that was illegal. There were a number of anomalies in the application—in fact, not only anomalies, but also inaccuracies. One of the inaccuracies was that it claimed I was the owner of a certain property, and I was not. That piece of misinformation, together with other misinformation, was used to obtain the search warrant. People who apply for search warrants are fallible, irrespective of whether they are from the New South Wales Crime Commission, the police service, ICAC or any other investigative body. They are fallible; they make mistakes.

Under this bill we will not know what mistakes were made in an application for a warrant until two years after the warrant is executed. To my mind that is one of the most serious problems with this bill. If one has to wait two years before one knows what was looked for, what information was used to apply for the warrant, and on what basis the judge was asked to issue the warrant, it seems to me that one is automatically behind the eight ball. Two years after the event no-one will be too interested in what was wrong with the search warrant application. In fact, the Law Reform Commission looked at that issue recently. In a report published in 2001 on surveillance, the Law Reform Commission stated:

The lengthening of time lags for the application for a warrant weakens the high degree of accountability which covert surveillance requires and which shorter time frames secure.

The importance of shorter time frames is that after 21 days the legality of the application for the warrant and for the warrant itself can be questioned. However, if people do not know that a warrant has been obtained—if it is a covert warrant, as will be created in this bill—they will not know that they are being investigated. Under this bill a person will not be entitled to know about that until a maximum of two years after the event. An investigation may be carried out for two years, and the currency of the warrant is 90 days, and then there is a further two years before the warrant can be questioned. Those time lags undermine very important legal rights that people otherwise have to question the origin of a warrant.

The last object of the bill to which I will refer involves the Listening Devices Act and extending its provisions to warrants involving terrorism. The Crime Commission already has extensive powers under the Listening Devices Act, and the Independent Commission Against Corruption has powers to obtain listening devices and telephone intercepts. The bill extends those powers to police officers involved in investigating terrorism. There is absolutely no need to do that. Currently police officers investigate criminal offences and the Crime Commission has a role to play, along with Federal authorities, in investigating terrorism. Why we would want to blur the line between the activities of the Crime Commission and the New South Wales police force escapes me. It is simply unnecessary and creates a burden on not only the people of New South Wales, and infringes their civil liberties, but also on the police, and that is unnecessary.

Police officers are subject to the scrutiny of the Police Integrity Commission, but under this bill the commission will not know about the warrants until two years after they have been obtained. On that basis alone this bill should be opposed. In my opinion the bill is unnecessary, it is a gross invasion of human rights principles and civil liberties. It is a retrograde step in the enforcement of law. The bill should be opposed.

The Hon. ERIC ROOZENDAAL (Parliamentary Secretary) [11.32 a.m.]: I will make a few comments in response to some members who have contributed to this debate. It is always a very difficult task to balance civil liberties with protecting democracy, and democracy does need to be protected. I will recount some of my experiences in this regard, because I believe that some members of this place live in a bubble. They think that this bill involves an esoteric discussion, and that it is all about civil liberties. Each day when I drop off my six-year-old son at school—he attends a Jewish day school—my car is checked and identified and an armed guard ushers my son into school. When I drop off my four-year-old at kindergarten—which has children from 3 to 5 years—an armed guard observes me arriving and ushers my son inside.

When I go to pray at my synagogue, police and armed guards usher me into the synagogue, and everyone entering the synagogue is subjected to a search by a metal detector. That is a daily occurrence for the Jewish community in New South Wales. It is not done out of paranoia, or because we are frightened by government, it is done out of reality. The assessment of the Jewish community's own security consultants—and it has to have its own security consultants—the assessment of New South Wales and Federal police, and the assessment of various other security organisations is that my son's kindergarten, my son's school and my synagogue are potential terrorist targets. We are not having an esoteric discussion about what happens in Spain, Iraq or Bali; we are discussing a daily occurrence in this country.

A pertinent point was made earlier by the Leader of the Opposition about closed-circuit television. I understand the point he made, because even with the most sophisticated metal detectors, cameras and other devices, ultimately the prevention of terrorism relies mostly on intelligence gathering. If the last line of defence is an armed security guard outside premises, that is a pretty thin line of defence. That is why we need very strong legislation to deal with such situations. An earlier speaker said that terrorism is about those without power attempting to take power from those with power. I reject that. That is a nice, romantic assertion of the underprivileged rising up against the privileged, and I reject it. Many acts of terrorism throughout the world are carried out as religious acts. Suicide bombers are not political activists; they are making a religious statement. People are seeking religious enlightenment when they blow up a bus or take over a cinema or hijack a train in Spain. These terrorist acts are not political acts, although they may have political connotations. At the end of the day people commit a religious act because they believe it brings them religious enlightenment.

Some members of this House choose to treat terrorists as romantic heroes, and that is not what this bill is about. Terrorists are fanatics and they go to extremes to commit extreme, outrageous crimes. They have no respect for democracy or any laws. The problem with democracy and many of our laws is that they are based on dealing with normal criminal activity. Generally speaking, criminal activity is taking something from someone else, or doing something one should not do according to law. Terrorists ignore all of that, because they are not interested in a criminal outcome as such. Terrorists are interested in committing a terrorist act.

The Hon. Peter Breen: We didn't have these laws for the Baader-Meinhof.

The Hon. ERIC ROOZENDAAL: No, and we did not have planes flying into the World Trade Center either, comrade. I guess it is reflective—

[Interruption]

The DEPUTY-PRESIDENT (Reverend the Hon. Fred Nile): Order! The member should be permitted to continue his contribution without interruption.

Ms Lee Rhiannon: He is being hypocritical.

The DEPUTY-PRESIDENT (Reverend the Hon. Fred Nile): Order! He should be heard in silence just as other members were heard in silence.

The Hon. ERIC ROOZENDAAL: My point is that it is never ideal to tighten up some aspects of people's civil liberties. I understand that. But we are dealing with people who have no regard for Western democracy or Western social values. The Bali bombing was an horrendous act against many Australians, but it was not carried out because of Australia's foreign policy. It was carried out because the terrorist believed Westerners in Bali were living immoral lives and doing all sorts of things that the terrorists did not approve of. It was an act against all Western values. Most terrorist acts are attacks against our values. That is why the bill should be supported. It is important that we are able to gather intelligence, so that people in this country and this State can go about their daily lives with some level of safety. That is why I support the bill.

The Hon. JOHN HATZISTERGOS (Minister for Justice, Minister for Fair Trading, Minister Assisting the Minister for Commerce, and Minister Assisting the Premier on Citizenship) [11.38 a.m.], in reply: I thank all honourable members for their contribution to this debate, a number of whom have spoken from their own perspectives. It is important, as the Hon. Eric Roozendaal pointed out, that we should remember that potentially there is a terrible cost to pay for complacency or for lack of vigilance. One only has to look at the thousands of innocent lives lost in terrorist attacks across the world, including, regrettably, a number of Australians. This Government remains vigilant in looking for further ways to ensure the safety and security of our citizens, and also to play its part in the national and global effort to stop terrorism.

In meeting this challenge the Government is happy to stand by its record of ensuring that extraordinary powers are accompanied by strong and effective safeguards. I invite honourable members to compare the existing covert search warrant schemes in Victoria and Queensland with the New South Wales scheme to confirm that our proposed scheme has the strongest safeguard and oversight provisions. When this issue is raised at a national level, as it should be, New South Wales will hold up its scheme as one that successfully balances the needs of strong law enforcement with the rights of law-abiding citizens to privacy and freedom from unjustified intrusion.

It is regrettable that in the course of debate Ms Lee Rhiannon attempted to downplay those safeguards. She referred to the issuing of the warrant by "a person". I interjected at that point and said that she should identify that person. It is, in fact, a Supreme Court judge. She tried to obfuscate that fact because it did not suit her particular brand of argument. If honourable members read proposed section 27K—regrettably speakers who spoke against this bill failed to do so—they will see an extensive provision about the eligible judge who will determine these issues. Incidentally, it will be a judge with Supreme Court status. It will not be some lay magistrate who makes these decisions; it will be a judge of the Supreme Court.

[Interruption]

If the Hon. Peter Breen read the bill, he would understand it. Proposed section 27K (2) states:

(2) An eligible Judge, when determining whether there are reasonable grants to issue a covert search warrant, is to consider (but is not limited to considering) the following matters:

(a) the reliability of the information on which the application is based, including the nature of the source of information,

(b) whether there is a connection between the terrorist act in respect of which the application has been made and the kinds of things that far proposed be searched for, seized, placed in substitution for a seized thing, copied, photographed, recorded, operated, printed or tested,

(c) the nature and gravity of the terrorist act,

(d) the extent to which the exercise of powers under the warrant would assist in the prevention of, or response to, the terrorist act,

(e) alternative means of obtaining the information sought to be obtained,

(f) the extent to which the privacy of a person who is not believed to be knowingly concerned in the commission of the terrorist act is likely to be affected if the warrant is issued,

(g) if it is proposed that premises adjoining, or providing access to the subject premises be entered for the purposes of entering the subject premises:

(i) whether this is reasonably necessary in order to enable access to the subject premises, or

(ii) whether this is reasonably necessary in order to avoid compromising the investigation of the terrorist act,

(h) whether any conditions should be imposed by the Judge in relation to the execution of the warrant.

Proposed section 27L provides that there has to be a record of that. Proposed section 27S provides that there has to be a report to the eligible judge on the execution of the warrant.

The Hon. Peter Breen: What about proposed section 27T?

The Hon. JOHN HATZISTERGOS: Honourable members should read proposed section 27T. It has been suggested that this is some sort of cover up; that the judge can disregard his judicial duty and somehow the warrant will not be affected. The provisions in proposed section 27T are not invalidated by a defect other than a defect that affects the substance of the warrant in a material particular. What is wrong with that? Are honourable members suggesting that if someone slips up and it does not affect the substance of the warrant that somehow it should be invalidated?

The Hon. David Clarke: That is ludicrous!

The Hon. JOHN HATZISTERGOS: It is a ludicrous proposal. The only people who would advocate that sort of approach are those who fail to recognise the delicate balance that this bill strikes between civil liberties and the need for community protection. If honourable members are serious about protecting civil liberties—I think most people in this House ought to be—they should be concerned about the civil liberties of innocent people who do not engage in these sorts of practices. Those are the civil liberties that people should be seeking to protect as much as possible.

I will deal with a number of issues that were raised about membership, which was also raised in the context of the report of the Legislation Review Committee. With regard to the creation of an offence of membership of a terrorist organisation the Legislation Review Committee noted that freedom of association is a fundamental right. The Government supports that view, but that right does not extend to protect a person's right to be a member of a group engaged in criminal activity, whether it is terrorism or commercial drug manufacturing. In criminal law that type of association is called a criminal conspiracy. Although the Legislation Review Committee made some comments about the form of the offence, honourable members will note that this is simply a mirror offence of an existing Commonwealth law; it is in exactly the same terms in order to avoid inconsistency. Honourable members will recall that we have passed legislation referring to Commonwealth laws relating to terrorism offences.

It would be absolutely abhorrent and unworkable if we were to add our own definition of a terrorism organisation separate from that to be found in Commonwealth legislation. We said we will adopt that definition and that there will be a two-year sunset clause in relation to it. It is hoped that in time a consistent national approach to these issues will be enacted at a Federal level, thus negating the need for this offence and for this scheme. Members would be aware that a number of organisations are covered by the existing regime. It is appropriate that this legislation is activated in circumstances in which people are involved in associations such as al-Qaeda and Jemiah Islamiah. My comments have adequately and appropriately addressed the concerns raised. I am always intrigued by whatever Ms Lee Rhiannon has to say in relation to these sorts of subjects. I was interested to learn that she crossed out, and did not read, slabs of her speech.

Ms Lee Rhiannon: You are so hung up about that. You have an obsession about it. How many times have you gone on about it?

The DEPUTY-PRESIDENT (Reverend the Hon. Fred Nile): Order! It is not question time. The Minister will continue.

The Hon. JOHN HATZISTERGOS: It indicates that she read her speech before she gave it in this Chamber—and that is unusual! One of the points she made was that the bill even allows for the destruction of documents. She made that statement as if to say that the world was going to collapse because the bill will allow the destruction of documents. Had she read the bill, she would know that the destruction of papers and documents will be authorised by the commissioner as a safeguard designed to protect private information that might come into the hands of police. That is the purpose of that provision; there is nothing sinister in it. Ms Lee Rhiannon did not refer to the Supreme Court judge, she went on up a bit about the destruction of papers and then she created an aura that somehow the world was going to cave in because this bill was being enacted, and all to support her—

The Hon. Michael Costa: Paranoid psychosis.

The Hon. JOHN HATZISTERGOS: She did that to support her paranoid psychosis. I will adopt that term.

The Hon. Eric Roozendaal: Just because you are paranoid does not mean that no-one can hurt you.

The Hon. JOHN HATZISTERGOS: As my colleague the Hon. Eric Roozendaal pointed out, these days we live in a different world. These powers are extraordinary; we tried to balance them with civil liberties.

[Interruption]

The DEPUTY-SPEAKER (Reverend the Hon. Fred Nile) Order! It is not question time. I ask the Minister to conclude his speech.

The Hon. JOHN HATZISTERGOS: Why would one ban something that is defunct? Such an ideology has collapsed. The only people who still subscribe to it are those who do not support this bill. The ideology has been discredited. That Ms Lee Rhiannon now parades herself as a Green indicates just how discredited the term "communist" is. I do not think we need to worry about banning the Communist Party. If she believes that is an appropriate label, she should go out and campaign for it, and she will suffer the appropriate consequences.

Question—That this bill be now read a second time—put.

The House divided.
Ayes, 30
Ms Burnswoods
Mr Catanzariti
Mr Clarke
Mr Colless
Mr Costa
Ms Cusack
Mr Donnelly
Ms Fazio
Mrs Forsythe
Mr Gallacher
Miss Gardiner
Mr Gay
Ms Griffin
Mr Hatzistergos
Mr Jenkins
Mr Lynn
Mr Macdonald
Reverend Nile
Mr Oldfield
Ms Parker
Mrs Pavey
Mr Pearce
Ms Robertson
Mr Roozendaal
Mr Ryan
Mr Tingle
Mr Tsang
Mr West

Tellers,
Mr Harwin
Mr Primrose

Noes, 5
Mr Breen
Dr Chesterfield-Evans
Ms Rhiannon
Tellers,
Mr Cohen
Ms Hale
Question resolved in the affirmative.

Motion agreed to.

Bill read a second time and passed through remaining stages.