Debate resumed from 16 June 20009.

The Hon. AMANDA FAZIO [2.34 p.m.]: I commend the report of General Purpose Standing Committee No. 3 on its inquiry into the privatisation of prisons and prison-related services. There was a great deal of interest in this inquiry, which was evidenced by the fact that the committee received 453 submissions, including 11 supplementary submissions. Of those submissions, 180 were from staff who work in prisons, including prison officers, nurses, counsellors and other support staff; 44 were from organisations; 21 were from family members of prison officers and inmates; 3 were from academics; 1 was from a current inmate; and 204 were from members of the general public or from authors who did not fall within any of the above categories. Of the 453 submissions, 235 were fully public, 211 were partially confidential, and 7 were fully confidential. The committee held four public hearings at Parliament House, on 23 February, 20 March, 27 March and 1 April 2009. The committee conducted three days of site visits, during which it visited Parklea, Dillwynia, Cessnock and Junee prisons.

The committee received evidence from a range of witnesses, including representatives of the New South Wales Department of Corrective Services, the Western Australian Department of Corrective Services, the South Australian Department of Corrective Services, New South Wales Police, the Public Service Association, academics, community and justice groups, non-government organisations, operators of private prisons, and the Serco Institute in the United Kingdom. On 1 May 2009, after submissions to the inquiry had closed and midway through the drafting of the report, the Government overturned its decision to privatise Cessnock prison. The committee supported that decision. The Government also put a six-month hold on its plans to privatise the Court Escort Security Unit, allowing the Department of Corrective Services a chance to achieve $5 million in cost savings before finalising any decision to privatise the unit. This is referred to throughout the report as the 2009 decision. The committee recommended that the Government extend this offer to give the department one year to identify $5 million in savings per annum in the Court Escort Security Unit, and that the department provide the Government with an update after six months to advise of the actions and progress it has made toward achieving this target.

The committee made 18 recommendations, many of which were designed to increase transparency and improve accountability in both public and private New South Wales prisons. Some of these I do not support and I will go into more details about this later. The committee supported the implementation of The Way Forward at New South Wales prisons. Most importantly, the committee emphasised that prisons are not run for the benefit of prison officers. The invitation for submissions to the inquiry closed on 27 February 2009. Given the significant volume of evidence received, the committee was successful in producing a thorough and considered report in a relatively short time frame, tabling the report on 5 June 2009. I thank the members of the committee secretariat, Rachel Simpson, Teresa McMichael, Lynn Race, and Rhia Victorino, who, as usual, were very thorough, professional and helpful during the inquiry.

On 11 November 2008 the New South Wales Government announced plans to privatise Parklea and Cessnock prisons—referred to in the report as the 2008 decision. It also announced plans to privatise the Court Escort Security Unit and conduct a feasibility study into replacing Grafton jail with a privately financed, constructed and operated centre. Although the Government had overturned its decision to privatise Cessnock prison, it confirmed that the privatisation of Parklea would still proceed.

Throughout the report, the committee examined the arguments for and against the privatisation of prisons and prison-related services, and considered the experience of prison privatisation in other Australian and overseas jurisdictions. The report examines the Government's initial decision to privatise Parklea and Cessnock prisons. We considered the Government's approach and the public response to the 2008 decision, as well as the broad arguments both for and against privatisation. The committee came to the conclusion that there was inadequate information provided to and consultation with stakeholders prior to the 2008 decision, and is of the view that the decision to privatise may have been more positively received if the Government had better informed and consulted with stakeholders regarding the 2008 decision.

Given that Parklea Correctional Centre was not provided with an opportunity to implement The Way Forward before the decision was made to privatise the centre, the committee recommended that any move to privatise Parklea be delayed for three months to allow the Department of Corrective Services and the Prison Officers Vocational Branch of the Public Service Association to negotiate the comprehensive implementation of The Way Forward in all Corrective Services institutions. I did not support this recommendation as I felt that the privatisation should proceed without further delay, which would only cause more uncertainty for the staff of the centre.

The Committee was concerned about the officers at Cessnock Correctional Centre who had already taken up the department's offer to transfer to another location. The committee acknowledged that the Government offered to consider any requests to transfer back to the prison on a case-by-case basis. It was the committee's view that there is considerable weight in the argument that the Government, whether in respect to publicly or privately managed prisons, must adopt a service delivery model that emphasises fulfilling the principles of sentencing, improves inmate welfare, and achieves lower rates of recidivism in a cost-effective manner. A range of evidence was also submitted regarding the experiences of prison privatisation in other jurisdictions. It is clear that in some instances prison privatisation has failed. However, it is also clear that in other instances it has succeeded.

It is important to consider these experiences in context, as overseas private prison systems may differ from Australian systems. The committee believed that there is a sound argument for introducing competition to the public prison sector, and we agree that a combination of public and private operators can be beneficial for stimulating much-needed innovation and efficiencies. The 2008 decision to contract out the management and operation of Parklea and Cessnock prisons and the Court Escort Security Unit was expected to save approximately $15 million per annum. The greatest concern heard by the committee in relation to claims of cost savings is that no two prisons are identical. Every prison varies in size, age, design and inmate classifications. Therefore, rather than comparing apples with apples, attempted comparisons are being made between apples and oranges. I do not know why we do not use different fruit.

The committee found that the achievement of cost savings is of common concern. One of the other impacts the committee looked at was the impact of privatisation on recidivism rates. Measuring the effect of an individual public or private prison's rehabilitation programs on recidivism levels is difficult and may not be feasible, given that inmates rarely spend the entire length of their sentence at one prison. However, a closely related area that is possible to measure is re-entry, that is, ensuring that inmates are released into a stable job and accommodation. Re-entry services play a key role in reducing recidivism. Therefore, the committee recommends that the Government introduce re-entry performance indicators for both public and private prisons in New South Wales.

A general theme of submissions to the inquiry was the public's concerns regarding the lack of transparency and perceived lack of accountability of private prisons. The report considers the importance of transparency in the prison sector and the need for adequate and independent monitoring mechanisms. It examines factors required for a good contract, which can be vital in ensuring a private prison's success. It also considers the rights of third parties to enforce private prison contract provisions, and the risk and cost to government of contract failure.

The committee found that there is a general lack of information available regarding the private prison at Junee, which has been a barrier to independent assessment of the performance of the prison. While the committee acknowledges the concerns that private contractors may have regarding commercial-in-confidence provisions, it notes that other jurisdictions have made their private prison contracts available to the public, and recommends that New South Wales do so as well. A number of recommendations have been made to increase monitoring and accountability in private prisons and also in some public prisons. Further, the committee agrees that a well-written, prescriptive contract that clearly defines the Government's expectations and requirements of a private prison and private contractor is essential if a private prison is to operate successfully.

Chapter 7 of the report examines the causes of high levels of overtime in public prisons, including consideration of staffing levels and budget allocation. It also discusses the Way Forward package of workplace reforms, which were introduced to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of public corrective services. The committee noted that the department's own figures show that actual overtime expenditure exceeded $20 million in every year since 1999-2000, and exceeded $40 million in each of the previous two years. The committee acknowledged the efficacy of using casual prison officers who have been provided with training equivalent or similar to that of permanent officers. The use of such officers may assist in reducing the department's overtime expenditure and, more importantly, may minimise such detrimental outcomes as prisoner lockdowns caused by the unavailability of staff from time to time.

However, despite the engagement of casual staff being a central component of the Way Forward reforms, evidence given to the committee by the Prison Officers Vocational Branch indicated that there was still not acceptance of the necessity for this reform to be introduced across all prisons in New South Wales. The Prison Officers Vocational Branch also raised concerns regarding the use of centralised rostering. The committee is concerned, based on the evidence as a whole, that the reluctance of the Prison Officers Vocational Branch to embrace workplace reform has unreasonably frustrated the achievement of the primary objectives of the operation of the prison system.

The committee is of the view that the Way Forward paves the way for positive and much-needed reforms, and supports the expeditious rollout of the reforms across the State. The committee also believes that apart from Junee and Parklea, all existing and future New South Wales prisons, including Grafton prison, should remain in the public sector under the Way Forward reforms. It further recommends that the New South Wales Government monitor the private sector management of Parklea and Junee correctional centres, and should they fail to meet their fundamental contractual obligations, those centres should revert back to public management.

The committee has recommended also that the Department of Corrective Services publishes details of the implementation of the Way Forward reforms and the cost savings achieved through the implementation of those reforms for each correctional centre in New South Wales, with details of the implementation to be published on the department's website biannually, with the first report of progress to occur by 1 November 2009. Finally, the report considers the potential privatisation of the Court Escort Security Unit, and the use and effectiveness of private perimeter security guards at New South Wales prisons.

Inquiry participants argued that the Court Escort Security Unit already runs as efficiently as possible, and that the overtime costs incurred by the unit are largely unavoidable. The committee was of the opinion that the Government's second chance offer to Department of Corrective Services to identify $5 million in savings within five months was unrealistic, and recommended that the Government extend the offer time frame to one year. As part of this, the committee has recommended that the department submit a review after six months to advise the Government of its actions and progress in attempting to achieve the target. It is interesting to note that three dissenting reports were made, which indicated the wide range of views surrounding this inquiry. I will refer only to the dissenting report of the Hon. Greg Donnelly, with which I agreed. It states:

The following Statement of dissent is made with respect to certain elements of the Inquiry's report. In terms of Recommendation 1, support is not given to delaying the process that is underway in regard to Parklea Correction Centre. It is noted that many of the components of the "Way Forward" reforms are already in place including the recruitment of casuals and centralising the rostering. The parties are already committed to a process of negotiating the "Way Forward" reforms with the assistance of the Industrial Relations Commission.

With respect to Recommendations 10, 11, and 12, I note that the Department's activities are already oversighted by a number of independent agencies including the Office of the New South Wales Ombudsman, the ICAC, the New South Wales Auditor-General, the Anti-Discrimination Board, the Privacy Commission, Official Visitors and the New South Wales Police Force. The existing privately operated prison is subject to external scrutiny and is also closely monitored for compliance through its contractual obligations. It is also noted that some of the Recommendations fall outside the Terms of Reference of the inquiry.

I will now turn to the recommendations with which I agree. Recommendation 2 states:

That the NSW Government provide adequate assistance and/or compensation to all former Cessnock Correctional Centre employees who have been disadvantaged by accepting a voluntary redundancy or transfer as a result of the November 2008 decision to privatise the centre.

Recommendation 3 states:

That the Department of Corrective Services publish details of its costing methodology, focusing on the allocation of departmental overheads to both public and private New South Wales prisons.

I support fully recommendations 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18. It was interesting to note during the inquiry that Opposition members attempted to cast themselves as the "friends of the workers" when we all know their true track record in this regard. I do not approve or condone the attempts by some to use the inquiry as a vehicle to attack and vilify the commissioner, who I believe is doing a very good job in implementing reforms, not just in relation to the operation of correctional facilities but also in respect of the programs and outcomes for inmates. I thank the commissioner and his staff, who were most helpful and cooperative during the course of the inquiry and facilitated our site visits to Parklea, Cessnock and Dillwynia. I might add that they also agreed to representatives of the Prison Officers Vocational Branch of the Public Services Association accompanying members during those inspections. I thank also the operators of Junee Correctional Centre, the GEO Group, for facilitating our visit to the Junee Correctional Centre. This inquiry involved key recommendations that received support from all, and I shall run through those briefly. Recommendation 6 states:

That the NSW Government consider the need to have an independent health service provider at all New South Wales prisons.

That is because committee members felt that Justice Health was doing a good job in the prison system. Recommendation 7 states:

That all private correctional centre contracts in New South Wales be made publicly available on the Department of Corrective Services website.

That will improve accountability and transparency. Recommendation 8 states:

That the Department of Corrective Services report the results of all New South Wales correctional centres against common Key Performance Indicators in the Department's Annual Report. Key Performance Indicator data should also be published on the Department's website.

Recommendation 9 states:

That the NSW Government ensure that private correctional centre contracts in New South Wales are made fully accessible under the Freedom of Information Act 1989.

Those recommendations deal with concerns expressed by people working both within and outside the prison system wanting to know whether the private correctional centres are being operated properly and what key performance indicators will be achieved within the prison system. The inquiry heard evidence from overseas and interstate jurisdictions that the information being publicly available has not impinged on the way in which their private prisons operate. Also, it is important to get the contract right. The inquiry heard evidence of interstate instances where the contracts were not drafted correctly in the first place and proper measures were not included in the contract. As a result, the contracts and the management of those private prisons turned out to be unsuccessful. I am sure that could be overcome in any privatisation of the Parklea Correctional Centre and I commend the report to the House.

The Hon. JOHN AJAKA [2.49 p.m.]: I join my colleagues from General Purpose Standing Committee No. 3 in the debate on the committee's twenty-first report on the privatisation of prison-related services. I thank the committee chair and other committee members, and commend the committee staff for the efficient and professional manner in which the hearings were conducted. My contribution to the debate focuses principally on three matters: first, the manner in which the Government approached the question of privatisation; second, the oversight and monitoring mechanisms needed to maintain Government accountability in contracting out the day-to-day management of correctional facilities; and third, the policy considerations underpinning the joint dissenting statements made by the Hon. Trevor Khan and me.

The initial rationale for the Government's move to privatise Parklea and Cessnock prisons, as well as the court escort security unit was, in broad terms, as follows: to introduce competition into the public prison sector, with the intention of generating greater innovation and efficiencies through having a combination of public and private operators in the market; to benefit from significant cost savings of an estimated $15 million per annum, leaving aside the obvious difficulties of comparing the financials of prison administration and noting that the committee has called on the Department of Corrective Services to publish the details of its costing methodology; and to establish benchmarks against which to gauge performance standards in the State's publicly run prisons.

More specifically, it appears that Parklea and Cessnock prisons were selected on the basis that they were sufficiently large to be marketed as a commercially viable investment; they were sufficiently close to a metropolitan centre to allow existing staff to seek alternative employment; neither facility provided highly specialised functions; and the centres had failed to meet key performance indicators. Yet a number of inquiry participants criticised Commissioner Woodham's rationale for selecting Parklea and Cessnock prisons for privatisation, on the basis that irrelevant considerations and isolated incidents that occurred over a decade ago were given undue weight in the decision-making process.

In addition to the criticisms levelled at the selection criteria, the manner in which the Government announced and commenced the implementation of the privatisation was decried by inquiry participants as clandestine, haphazard and ill conceived. At no stage was Cessnock City Council consulted or informed of the decision to privatise. The Public Service Association of New South Wales indicated that the plans for privatisation and market testing were first brought to its attention through the media on 18 August 2008. A number of prison officers indicated that they were first made aware of the plans for privatisation not through management but through the media. The commissioner confirmed in November last year that the privatisation would go ahead, notwithstanding that the mini-budget, released on the same day as this announcement, was silent on the matter of specific privatisation plans.

More than 100 inmates were transferred, under the cover of darkness, out of Cessnock prison on the evening of 15 March 2009, supposedly as part of a downsizing process in preparation for privatisation. Finally, on 1 May this year, while the inquiry was still on foot, and after a number of Cessnock employees had accepted voluntary redundancies in anticipation of the privatisation, the Government announced an abrupt reversal of its plan to privatise Cessnock prison, attributing the change in its position to economic uncertainty in the region. This was another hallmark eleventh-hour policy reversal of a Government with no real convictions when it comes to addressing the problems facing New South Wales corrective services. Whilst the committee supports the decision not to proceed with the privatisation of Cessnock prison, it finds the circumstances under which the policy decision was made regrettable, particularly in light of the adverse impact on many corrective services personnel.

In relation to the oversight and monitoring mechanisms needed to maintain government accountability in contracting out the day-to-day management of correctional facilities, two main concerns were raised throughout the hearings: first, in relation to the limits on oversight mechanisms in the corrective services sector, and second, in relation to the paucity of meaningful data published on corrective services outcomes and key performance indicators. The monitoring framework within which the privately run Junee correctional facility operates is illustrative of the oversight model likely to apply to the newly privatised Parklea prison.

Currently, Junee correctional facility's private operators are required to abide by Department of Corrective Services operational policy and protocols and are subject to the safeguards—including minimum standards and performance indicators—laid down by the Crimes (Administration of Sentences) Amendment Act 2008, the Crimes (Administration of Sentences) Regulation 2008, the New South Wales Ombudsman, the Independent Commission Against Corruption, the Official Visitors Scheme, and the New South Wales Anti-Discrimination Board. In addition, the Department of Corrective Services employs a full-time monitor to oversee the Junee prison, bearing the responsibility for auditing monthly performance reviews and submitting reports to the department on a monthly basis and to the Parliament on an annual basis. I note that the Department of Corrective Services' submission to the inquiry indicated that the privately run Junee facility is subjected to a markedly more rigorous performance review than public correctional centres. Commissioner Woodham indicated throughout the hearings that "the expectations of the public sector prisons are less clear and less robustly monitored", vis-a-vis the private facilities.

The committee considered the models of independent oversight employed in several overseas jurisdictions, in the process of evaluating the most effective way to ensure the accountability of private service providers of corrective services. The United Kingdom model, which employs an independent inspectorate to conduct announced and unannounced inspections of both public and private prisons, has been generally effective in maintaining public confidence in the integrity of private prison management. The primary function of the United Kingdom inspectorate is to conduct a qualitative evaluation of prison management and operation, complementing the chief inspector's monitoring of quantitative targets.

The reputational cost associated with the circulation of a negative inspectorate report, through broad media coverage, has served an important deterrent and public accountability function in the United Kingdom. The strength of this accountability mechanism has been diluted in its translation into the New South Wales context, in the sense that the Corrections Inspectorate of New South Wales remains part of the Department of Corrective Services and therefore lacks the feature of independence, which is central to the United Kingdom model's success in securing public confidence.

The Government has been subject to significant criticism for abolishing the key accountability safeguards that were originally put in place to temper perceptions of partiality surrounding the Corrections Inspectorate of New South Wales. Indeed, as the Hon. Justice Dowd, President of the International Commission of Jurists Australia, observed throughout the course of the inquiry, "'We do not have appropriate prison visitors who are outside the control of Corrective Services."

Accordingly, I support the array of recommendations made by the committee to bolster accountability safeguards and to increase transparency. I refer to recommendation 7, which provides that all private correctional centre contracts in New South Wales be made publicly available on the Department of Corrective Services website; recommendation 8, which provides that the Department of Corrective Services should report the results of all New South Wales correctional centres against common key performance indicators in the department's annual report and that key performance indicators data should also be published on the department's website; recommendation 9, which provides that the New South Wales Government should ensure that private correctional centre contracts in New South Wales are made fully accessible under the Freedom of Information Act; recommendation 10, which provides that the position of New South Wales Inspector General of Prisons be reinstated to report on both public and private prisons; and recommendation 11, which refers to the transfer of the Inspectorate Office to another department, such as the Attorney General's Department or the Department of Premier and Cabinet. As the committee has noted in its report, this may "ensure a degree of independent review and reporting".

Turning finally to my joint dissenting statement with the Hon. Trevor Khan, I make two brief points. First, I wholeheartedly agree with the thrust of the New South Wales Police Force's submission to the committee, which argued that the force has suffered as a result of a shifting of responsibility for prisoner transfers from the Department of Corrective Services to the New South Wales Police Force, due in part to the Department of Corrective Services' pursuit of cost savings. Privatisation or reform of the Court Escort Security Unit should not be aimed at simply cost cutting. Instead, it should focus on expanding the existing service to relieve the Police Force of responsibility, wherever possible, with regard to the guarding or transport of prisoners particularly in rural and regional local area commands. This will enable the police to more effectively achieve their core policing responsibilities.

Second and lastly, I make the point that this corrective services debate was not so much about the relative efficacy of public versus private prison operation but, rather, about ensuring that the Department of Corrective Services, through whatever contractual means necessary, fulfils its responsibilities for prisoner transfers and thereby enables the police to fulfil their core functions with optimal efficiency. I commend the committee's report to the House.

Ms SYLVIA HALE [2.58 p.m.]: I join previous speakers in thanking the officers of General Purpose Standing Committee No. 3 and my fellow committee members for ensuring that this was a most interesting and stimulating inquiry. That is not to say that I in any respect agree—and, I have to say, nothing has persuaded me that I should change my mind—that the privatisation of prisons is to be supported. As I have said in my dissenting report—I suppose it is of interest that a majority of the committee members submitted dissenting reports; I am not sure that that is a totally usual outcome—the functions of prisons and related services are significantly different from those of other types of government services that have been privatised. Unlike finance, health, transport or similar government services, prisons operate for the purpose of exercising coercive power. The purpose of prisons is to deprive those sentenced by the courts or those denied bail of their liberty. In addition, prisons operate their own disciplinary procedures, and that can include physical restraint and solitary confinement. That is the essence of my objection, and the objection of the Greens, to the privatisation of prisons.

The Government had a series of objectives in its attempt to privatise Parklea and Cessnock prisons and the prisoner escort service: to save money and, more importantly, break the Prison Officers Vocational Branch. The fact that the Government was unable to achieve those objectives at Cessnock prison and was forced to back down, is a tribute to the members of that union; it is also a recognition by the Government of how marginal the electorate of Cessnock would be had the privatisation proceeded. The Government also held the further objective—that by outsourcing the prisons it somehow would remove itself from accountability for their operation.

It is convenient to lay the blame on third parties for the shortcomings in the way in which our prisons are conducted. We have seen how the privatisation of prisons and escort services can rebound on governments and how anxious governments are to be shielded from that. I will give two examples of what happened when such services were privatised. First, the privatised prison escort service in Western Australia resulted in the death of a Mr Ward a year or two ago, when he was transported in absolutely inhumane circumstances of massive heat, and died of dehydration. Second, where the previous operators of the Acacia Prison in Western Australia performed so badly that that State government was forced to intervene and the operators did not see out their contract.

I found particularly interesting the evidence given to the committee by Mr Brian Lawrence, Manager, Acacia Prison Contract, Court Security and Custodial Services, Department of Corrective Services, Western Australia. Mr Lawrence was enthusiastic about the way in which the Acacia Prison was run. He was enthusiastic because the prison was being run in contrast to the way it had previously been run by the AIMS Corporation, and because he believed Western Australia had inserted into its contracts for the running of the prison clauses that guaranteed that if there was a failure to live up to the key performance indicators, to meet the objectives and do everything that the private service contracted to do, there were mechanisms in place to allow the government to immediately intervene.

If one were to concede for a moment that prison privatisation is a desirable thing—and that is extraordinarily questionable—then at the very least before going down that path safeguards should be in place. I find it particularly disturbing that the New South Wales Government has put in place at Parklea prison none of the safeguards recommended by the committee. Not one of the safeguards that Mr Lawrence emphasised in his evidence to the committee is in place. Mr Lawrence said:

What I would say, though, in terms of lessons learnt, from the first contract we had to the second one that we wrote at the end of the first five years was vastly different. I would say that irrespective of whose decision is to privatise, there are key things you need to do. Those are: make sure that you determine what the services are that you want. You need to specify and include in the contract exactly what you want that prison to deliver. Further to that, in terms of the procurement process, you need to make sure you select the right contractor and make sure that what they say they are going to deliver is actually written into the contract.

He then went on to list a series of requirements. Interestingly, he referred to pay parity and said:

What I can tell you is that we have pay parity for our private prison. If our officers in the public system get a pay rise, so do the officers in the private prison; otherwise the minute the officers in the public prison get a pay rise staff would want to leave to go and join the public system so we introduced a system where we [have] pay parity.

There is no such system in New South Wales. The statistics provided in evidence to the committee about Junee prison indicated, firstly, that GEO was seeking to casualise its workforce; secondly, that its workers worked longer hours; and thirdly, that its workers have fewer holidays and less access to sick pay—generally speaking, their working conditions are worse than those of prison officers within the public system. Rather than the State Government encouraging and granting a contract to a private operator whose conditions of employment for its workforce are worse than those in the public system, there should be a requirement for the conditions under which people work to be at least comparable.

I am far from persuaded that Serco, the operator of the Acacia Prison in Western Australia, is all that it could be. For example, in late 2006 Australian Labor Senator Kate Lundy drew attention to attempts by Serco Sodexho, which had won the defence services contract in Canberra, to use duress to force employees to sign Australian work agreements. The unions also attacked Serco for sacking cleaners in the defence services for refusing to sign Australian work agreements. Rather than employing workers under a collective agreement, Serco brought in workers from Wollongong to perform the contract work. I do not think Serco is an ideal employer but I do feel that the Western Australian Government, by going down the path of privatisation, has attempted to ensure that those safeguards are in place and that safeguards essential to the privatising of prisons should also be in place. They were some of the recommendations of the committee.

The Hon. TREVOR KHAN [3.08 p.m.]: I note that to get an idea of the position and views taken by individual members of the committee, rather than referring to the summary of their positions expressed, as they were, by the chair of the committee, Hon. Amanda Fazio, one is best assisted by referring to the minutes of the deliberations on the draft report. I will refer to the resolution I moved in that committee—a resolution that was moved in similar form on a number of occasions. I read from page 187 of the committee report:

Resolved, on the motion of Mr Khan: That two additional paragraphs be inserted after paragraph 4.19 to read:

The Committee emphasises that based upon the evidence received that the achievement of cost savings are, in and of themselves, not sufficient to justify the privatisation of prisons.

Moreover the committee notes that the evidence received suggests that the privatisation of correctional facilities can assist in achieving the primary objectives of the operation of the prison system, which are:

1. fulfilling the principles of sentencing
2. improving inmate welfare and
3. lowering rates of recidivism in a cost effective manner.

This resolution encapsulates the position I took in committee deliberations and throughout the committee's consideration of the evidence—that is, to look at the objective of the operation of a correctional facility. For example, the purpose of a correctional facility is not to provide employment. That may be a secondary objective, but it is not the primary objective. The community expects from the operation of our prison system that, firstly, people who are sentenced to jail are to be held safely in a facility—safely for themselves and safely for the community—and, secondly, there is a positive outcome when prisoners are released from incarceration. Not only is that a reasonable expectation of the community, it is also fundamental commonsense.

Some members of the committee, particularly the Greens representative, seemed to consistently misunderstand the objective of our prison system. In fact, we heard Ms Sylvia Hale in her contribution today make constant reference to award conditions. In New South Wales in the order of 10,000 people are locked up, and that number is increasing by 4.1 per cent a year. It is the obligation of this Parliament, of all of us who serve here and of any government of New South Wales, to focus on those 10,000 people and the impact on the community of those 10,000 people while they are incarcerated and when they are released. During the gathering of evidence, the committee was confronted with horrific statistics. For example, in the order of 40 per cent of people who serve terms of imprisonment go back to jail. The recidivism rate is 40 per cent. Yet Ms Sylvia Hale, the Greens representative, in her contribution today did not make one reference to that horrifying statistic. She referred to overtime rates and sick leave, but she said nothing about the serious impact of a 40 per cent recidivism rate upon our community and individual prisoners.

That is the type of helpful evidence that was given before the committee and that is the evidence upon which we should concentrate our minds. We should not concentrate on evidence about overtime rates and comparative wage rates—albeit they are issues of some importance. If a society is to be just and considerate in the operation of its correctional facilities, the significant issue we must look towards is the outcome of prisoners—not, with the greatest of respect, wage rates. The committee was told that in New South Wales there have been significant increases in the size of our prison population. Since 1998-99 there has been a consistent rise in the number of prisoners. In 1998-99, 6,835 prisoners were in custody. By 2007-08 the number had risen to 9,634. That is a very significant rise in the number of prisoners in our institutions. The committee was told that the number of correctional officers and overseers in our facilities has increased from 2,961 in 1998-99 to 4,187 currently. In 10 years there has been an increase of more than 1,000 additional people employed in our prison system.

Members should reflect on the failure of our prison system to deal with rates of recidivism, and that will result in an ever-increasing incline in the number of prisoners in our institutions and the number of people who are employed to house those prisoners. Within a period of 10 years, 1,000 additional people are being paid every week to house our prisoners. We are not employing those 1,000 people to work in our schools to improve literacy rates or to work in our hospitals or police force. We are employing those 1,000 additional people to house prisoners. That is a frightening statistic. The committee heard that the Corrective Services budget is more than $1 billion a year. Obviously that $1 billion must be spent, but it is not being spent on our hospitals or on education; it is being spent in a negative way to lock people up. It would seem that the Greens representative does not see the horror of that statistic. Instead, she talks about wage rates and sick leave. Money is being spent at the wrong end. It is a skewing of the responsibilities and objectives of our society.

It is not a question of philosophy about whether prisoners should be incarcerated in private or public institutions. That is a misunderstanding. Our objective must be to ensure that those who are locked up are held securely in custody and that our recidivism rates decrease. When prisoners are released we must ensure that they have been punished for the wrong they have done, that they are better educated and that they are deterred from committing more crime. We must provide them with the skills to ensure that they do not go back to jail. It does not matter whether that takes place in a private or public institution. That was essentially the committee's findings. The majority of the committee concluded that we must ensure that our prisons are more effective in achieving these outcomes. We must achieve a reduction in recidivism rates by encouraging people not to go back to jail.

I thank all the committee members for the way in which they approached their deliberations to productively move the matter forward. I hope when the Government considers this committee report it looks towards our primary responsibility. We have to strip away the arcane politics of private versus public and concentrate on achieving the outcomes required by a just and humane society.

Debate adjourned on motion by the Hon. Michael Veitch and set down as an order of the day for a future day.